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Several books concerning the Chinese overseas and their commercial ven-
tures are now available, some with special reference to the business acumen 
of sojourners turned settlers. New basic research examines the history of 
their wide-ranging activities and the methods and organizations they em-
ployed wherever they went. Some studies of their regional and global net-
works confirm that the Chinese did well in some countries and less so in 
others, and suggest the reasons why. While it is clear that these trading com-
munities were remarkably adaptable in what they achieved in many parts of 
Southeast Asia, the studies covering the commodities in which they traded 
have been uneven, desultory, and even fragmentary. It has therefore been dif-
ficult to develop a clear picture of why the Chinese concentrated on certain 
trade items, and how they came to dominate certain regional and colonial 
markets. This collection, edited by Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang, 
is a welcome addition to the body of literature on that subject, providing a 
comprehensive assessment of the range of trade items that made the Chi-
nese so formidable and so necessary for the development of local econo-
mies.
 The four essays in the first section offer valuable theoretical insights, 
some preliminary, that put the long history of Chinese trade in Southeast 
Asia in historical perspective. Each makes a distinctive contribution, and 
together they capture slices of the rich experience with commodities that 
different generations of Chinese were able to trade in. Building on earlier 
work, Anthony Reid and Carl Trocki both illuminate the broader dimensions 
of the mining and opium industries that engaged so many Chinese workers 
and merchants. Of particular interest is Adam McKeown’s picture of human 
labor as a commodity; although this constituted a rather special trade, the 
so-called coolie trade, it is enlightening to have it set beside goods that are 
no less valuable, but usually inanimate. The fourth of the essays, by C. Patter-
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son Giersch, examines less-well-known trading conditions in southwest-
ern China, highlighting the fact that less research has been done on over-
land merchandise across the porous Chinese borders of mainland Southeast 
Asia. Indeed, at least five essays in this volume deal with this relatively ne-
glected area of study, and all make useful suggestions about possible future 
research.
 The remaining four parts are arranged more or less chronologically, from 
precolonial to early colonial, from high colonial to postcolonial. Scholars 
of commodity trade through the centuries, especially those working on the 
trade between China and Southeast Asia and on the economic role of the 
Chinese overseas, will benefit greatly from this volume. Social and economic 
historians of Asia in general will also find much to learn. For myself, I am 
gratified to see how far the field has come since I started writing, in 1953, 
about the early centuries of the ancient Nanhai trade in the South China Sea. 
At the time, I was disappointed to find that efforts to develop trade with the 
southern seas seemed always to come from Chinese officials who were re-
sponsible for foreign relations. The vast majority of the records dealt with 
tribute envoys coming by sea to bring merchandise as gifts and the Chinese 
emperors giving gifts in return. In between, the officials in charge profited 
greatly from the monopolistic conditions at the Chinese ports. Where pri-
vate enterprise was concerned, it was foreign merchants from the south and 
the west who opened up trade routes. I was particularly surprised at the 
lack of early documentation about Chinese seagoing vessels competing with 
those coming from South and Southeast Asia. The Chinese seemed to have 
been content to travel on foreign bottoms when they sailed to and from the 
Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, I speculated that the proto-Chinese Yue peoples 
of what became the southern coastal provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and 
Guangxi were engaged in the maritime trade, and that their Chinese descen-
dants eventually led the way as late Tang (ninth century), Wudai (907–959), 
and Song (960–1279) China increasingly launched their own ships to com-
pete against well-established Muslim fleets.
 By the time of Zheng He’s Indian Ocean naval expeditions in the 15th cen-
tury, the Chinese were poised to dominate the southern seas. But continen-
tal power prevailed and that initiative did not go any further. For much of 
the next six centuries, Chinese private merchants operated in the interstices 
of European trading empires. Without state support, they had little choice 
but to adapt the best they could by utilizing the power of others while they 
wove their own networks wherever they were given operational space. The 
strategies for survival and prosperity depended a great deal on resilience, 
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transactional skills, and good fortune. It was astonishing how the many dis-
parate groups of Chinese, compatriots as well as competitors, managed to 
devise ways to serve foreign rulers, powerful mercantile companies as well 
as themselves, even while European powers consolidated control over new 
colonial states. No port was too small, no corner of the region too remote, 
as they sought new commodities for the markets of China and the West.
 When Chinese governments after the late 1890s finally came to appreci-
ate their achievements, the overseas Chinese classes discovered that official 
attention was not always helpful for their manifold businesses. For the past 
century, these classes have been both sought after by a rejuvenated Chinese 
state and, after the colonial powers withdrew, constrained by new loyalties to 
their adopted countries. A new set of dynamics has been set in motion, and 
the Chinese merchants trading abroad must again reassess the parameters 
within which they hope to thrive—this is still very much work in progress. 
How they will emerge from the new mix of responsibilities depends on many 
factors, not least the fact of globalization, which has exposed them to con-
ditions beyond their control. But, not least, they will be experimenting with 
new kinds of commodities, whether natural or manufactured, that they 
must learn to handle. Under these circumstances, Chinese merchants could 
benefit from reading this volume and learn about how their predecessors 
managed the trade goods of earlier times. Some might even draw lessons 
about how to meet changing conditions of trade, something that they face 
every day. But the studies in this volume have a larger purpose. The authors 
have used their great professional skills to paint a picture of extensive and 
precarious trading activity that illuminates the underpinnings of Southeast 
Asian economic development for the last millennium. It is their success in 
doing so that recommends this collection to all who wish to understand why 
the region is what it is today.
Wang Gungwu
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Introduction
the arC of historiCal CommerCial  
relations between China and southeast asia
Wen-Chin Chang and Eric Tagliacozzo
Theoretical review
Chinese merchants have been trading down to Southeast Asia for centuries, 
sojourning—and sometimes settling—during the course of their voyages. 
These ventures have taken place by land and by sea, linking the wider orbit of 
the Chinese homeland with vast stretches of Southeast Asia in a broad, mer-
cantile embrace. The present volume aims to examine these contacts, trans-
actions, and transmissions over what the great French historian Fernand 
Braudel called the longue durée. Despite the presence of several foundational 
volumes by Wang Gungwu and others, which have charted the directions of 
this field of study over the past several decades, the field of Chinese trade 
in Southeast Asia has become so large and so complex that a syncretic book 
on its parameters seems long overdue.1 We hope to build on past achieve-
ments and outline the scope, diversity, and complexity of Chinese trade 
interactions over a vast geography and an equally broad temporal spectrum. 
Because the languages, archives, and sources needed to master a task such 
as this are beyond the grasp of any one person, we hope that this book will 
make a signal contribution to the field, in summarizing where our knowl-
edge now stands and where future directions of research may wish to go.
 The idea of networks as being crucial to the linking of human societies 
has received much attention in the past several decades. Philip Curtin was 
among the first to point this out in his broad and wide-ranging study Cross-
Cultural Trade in World History.2 In that book, he linked the Phoenicians of 
Mediterranean antiquity, the Hanseatic merchants of the early-modern Bal-
tic, and Bugis traders of modern Indonesia in a single, coherent narrative, 
showing how merchant diasporas could be analyzed with theoretical rigor 
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over the centuries. Scholars brought this global vantage down to a regional 
scope, such as Christine Dobbin in her fascinating Asian Entrepreneurial Mi-
norities: Conjoint Communities in the Indian Ocean.3 Where Curtin saw “types” of 
ethnicized commercial ventures, Dobbin stressed communities, borrowing 
a page out of Tönnies and the Frankfurt school of sociology. To bring this 
line of thinking even closer to the subject of this volume, Aihwa Ong’s re-
cent work has also shown how ideas of traveling subjects—often involved 
in trade—can be seen as crucial transnational actors in the making of politi-
cal economies.4 Ong’s focus on the Chinese in this respect brought a new 
theoretical sophistication to the idea of including Asians in Western social-
science paradigms involving diaspora, a much-needed corrective that has 
subsequently received huge attention in the literature.
 Merchants transport products, not just themselves, over vast distances of 
mountains, deserts, or seas, so an analysis of commodities—and not just the 
networks that carry them—is also a vital part of this volume. Here again, re-
cent social-science research, particularly by scholars such as Arjun Appadu-
rai and Igor Kopytoff, is crucial to our aims.5 Appadurai and Kopytoff have 
spoken of the social histories and cultural biographies of “things.” Accord-
ing to Appadurai, commodities are like persons; they have social lives and 
move in and out of different regimes of value in discrete space and time. The 
“total trajectory” of commodities—that is, from the course of their produc-
tion, through their exchange and distribution, to their eventual consump-
tion—involves different stages, and is enmeshed in complex intersections of 
economic, political, and cultural factors. We have endeavored in this book to 
foreground the commodities themselves that have linked China and South-
east Asia over the centuries, at least as much as the actors who have trans-
ported them. For the present study, these commodities include a bewilder-
ing array of objects, and many of them—including books and other forms of 
traveling print, human labor, fish (dried and fresh), and jade stones—have 
not been thoroughly explored in existing studies on this part of the world.
 Chinese merchants have been involved in the transit of most “things,” 
historically, between Southeast Asia and the Chinese mainland, and it is 
difficult to find any single line of trade where they have not played a part, 
in some form or another.6 Yet linking a great variety of trades over a long 
period of time and even wider geographies is a very tall order. Nevertheless 
this is one of the primary aims of this volume. How similar were the dynam-
ics of these ventures, and how different? Are there mechanics or dynamics 
of the trades that we can point to as being analogous? Does our vantage of 
analysis shift if we make the commodities themselves as important as the 
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people carrying them, or is this altering of locus irrelevant? We have asked 
each scholar in the volume to highlight one particular commodity or class of 
commodities, in addition to a period of time or a proscribed geography, so 
that we might see what comparative insights might be achieved by bringing 
these essays together in one coherent study.
 This volume, by its very scope, also fits into a wider general debate over 
the nature of Chinese trade and capital over the past several centuries. Max 
Weber and Karl Marx were foundational in these debates more than a cen-
tury ago, but since that time ideas on how to study Chinese economic struc-
tures and particularities—especially as part of regional or transregional 
units—have changed.7 G. William Skinner made an impressive contribution 
in this respect in the 1960s and 1970s, and he was later joined by a coterie of 
scholars—including Mark Elvin, Philip Huang, Peter Purdue, R. Bin Wong, 
and Ken Pomeranz—in trying to decipher how Chinese market mechanisms 
have worked over time.8 Much of this discussion has focused on rural macro-
regions, but with the more recent work of Sherman Cochran on Shanghai 
and William Rowe on Hankow, among others, an urban component has 
emerged in these discussions as well.9
 One of the issues at stake, in fact, is whether there has been any such 
thing as “capitalism” or “Chinese capitalism” in the passage of Chinese 
history, and if so, when these processes started, and what forms they may 
have taken. Terence Gomez and Michael Hsiao, again among other scholars, 
have critiqued essentializations of the cultural aspects of Chinese business-
networking, showing how these patterns have been both similar to and 
different from Western variants.10 Other scholars, such as Timothy Brook 
and Gregory Blue in a particularly useful volume on the historical period, 
and Gary Hamilton in a more contemporary era, have questioned capital-
ism’s place in a Chinese context, both as a historical reality in a proscribed 
time and place and as a useful concept altogether.11 David Faure has even at-
tempted to connect freewheeling notions of Chinese-style “capitalism” and 
family/business enterprise into a single, concerted whole in his treatment 
of the topic.12 These analyses tend to be sociological or economic in nature, 
but scholars such as Philip Kuhn have shown that they can be human stories 
as well, with an emphasis on the lived experience of actual human beings.13 
All of these studies have brought an impressive edifice of data, interpreta-
tion, and methodology to bear in helping us think about how these Chinese 
merchant connections have stretched from China itself to a variety of land-
scapes (Southeast Asian and otherwise) into the wider world.
4 wen-ch i n chang an d e ric Tagliacozzo
The Shape of the Volume
TheoreTical and Precolonial VanTages
In bringing together twenty scholars, we have hoped, among other things, 
to achieve a blending of generations: scholars whose shoulders we all stand 
on now; mid-level professors who are now beginning to shape this field; 
and younger scholars who will follow new avenues of inquiry in the years to 
come. Anthony Reid opens the volume with an essay entitled “Chinese on 
the Mining Frontier in Southeast Asia,” which is inclusive of the region as 
a whole. Reid argues that Chinese technologies of mining and metalwork-
ing have been influential in Southeast Asia at least since Dong-Son times, 
stretching far back into the region’s antiquity. Since Sung times, and prob-
ably long before, iron and bronze artifacts were imported to Southeast Asia 
from China because larger-scale Chinese methods of extraction and manu-
facture could produce them more cheaply. Reid points out that Chinese 
miners and metalworkers no doubt interacted with Vietnam over a longer 
period, but began to travel southward by sea from the Mongol period. His 
essay examines what little we know about these early interactions, but nec-
essarily focuses on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Chinese 
miners revolutionized the Southeast Asian tin industry.14
 In a similarly encompassing essay, titled “Cotton, Copper, and Caravans: 
Trade and the Transformation of Southwest China,” C. Patterson Giersch 
picks up the longue durée thread laid down by Reid. Giersch examines the 
overland trade of two commodities, copper and cotton, which dominated 
Yunnan Province’s early modern trade with both Southeast Asia and eastern 
China. Giersch asserts that previous work on the caravan trade and mining 
has challenged accepted economic-geography paradigms that divide South-
east Asia from China, and has demonstrated how Southwest China’s com-
mercialization produced profound economic and political transformations 
in Southeast Asia as well. His essay builds on past scholarly accomplish-
ments by explaining how Chinese merchants organized long-distance trade 
across rugged terrain, and how this contributed to profound, long-term 
transformations in Yunnan’s society and economy. More specifically, Giersch 
argues that the changing nature of long-distance trade over the longue durée 
was linked to broad patterns of migration, urbanization, and economic de-
velopment across much of what now constitutes Yunnan Province proper.15
 Adam McKeown likewise takes a wide-angled approach with his essay, 
“The Social Life of Chinese Labor.” McKeown suggests that labor can easily 
be understood as a commodity; a person may sell or lease his own labor, and 
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merchants may also profit from the organization and sale of other people 
and their labor. The conceptualization and historiography of labor as a com-
modity, however, presents several difficulties, especially with regard to Chi-
nese migrant labor. The radical polarization between freedom and slavery 
that has shaped the understanding of labor and migration since the aboli-
tion of African slavery has made it difficult to understand the many forms of 
obligation, control, and private organization that fall between these poles. 
McKeown argues that much understanding of Chinese migration can still 
be traced to categories established in the extensive debates surrounding the 
“coolie trade” from the 1840s to 1880s. He therefore problematizes the de-
bate in his own essay, arguing for a new and more syncretic understanding 
of the position of Chinese human beings in forging the links between places 
like China and Southeast Asia.16
 Carl A. Trocki follows this approach in his essay, “Opium as a Commodity 
in the Chinese Nanyang Trade,” offering a periodization of the rise and de-
cline of opium as a key element in the Chinese economy of the Nanyang. 
He focuses primarily on the role of opium revenue farming, and looks at 
the changing importance of these institutions in the region. Trocki argues 
that opium as a commodity in the Chinese trade of Southeast Asia can be 
traced through three relatively distinct phases. The first lasted from about 
1760 to 1820; during these years opium was traded much like any other com-
modity, throughout the region and to China itself. Between 1820 and 1880, 
the revenue farms grew in value and influence. An interdependence devel-
oped between opium, labor, commodity production, and Chinese capital, 
which agglomerated around the farming system. After 1880, the farms grew 
beyond their local economic bases and became large international syndi-
cates. Groups of investors from the various capitals of the region sought to 
build syndicates controlling the flow of opium to many major settlements. 
By 1915, even though Chinese workers continued to be among the most im-
portant opium consumers, opium processing and retail distribution were 
both taken over by colonial states.17
 The second section of the volume focuses on the precolonial interactions 
between China and Southeast Asia. Takeshi Hamashita opens this part by 
focusing attention on the Lidai Baoan (the precious documents of succes-
sive generations of the Ryukyu Kingdom). This is a compilation of several 
large volumes of documents, written in Chinese with some inflection of local 
Fujian dialect, relating to Ryukyuan contacts with China and eight South-
east Asian countries (or, more exactly, port towns), covering the period from 
1424 to 1867. The eight Southeast Asian locations include Siam, Melaka, 
table 1 commodities, geographies, and Time Periods
Author/Time Period Commodity Geography
I. THEORETICAL/LONGUE DURÉE
Anthony Reid precious metals Pan–Southeast Asia
C. Patterson Giersch cotton and copper China and mainland
 Southeast Asia
Adam McKeown labor China and Southeast Asia
Carl A. Trocki opium Pan–Southeast Asia
II. PRECOLONIAL
Takeshi Hamashita pepper and sappanwood South China Sea
Li Tana coins Vietnam
Masuda Erika luxury goods Thailand
Heather Sutherland tortoiseshell Indonesia
III. EARLY COLONIAL
Sun Laichen gems Burma
Leonard Blussé junk cargoes Java
Lucille Chia books Philippines
Kwee Hui Kian textiles Indonesia
IV. HIGH COLONIAL
Man-houng Lin capital Taiwan, South China,
 and Southeast Asia
Wu Xiao An rice Malaysia
Nola Cooke fish Cambodia
Jean DeBernardi Bibles China and Southeast Asia
V. POSTCOLONIAL
Bien Chiang birds’ nests Sarawak
Eric Tagliacozzo marine products Coastal Southeast Asia
Wen-Chin Chang jade stones Burma and Thailand
Kevin Woods timber Burma
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Palembang, “Jawa,” “Samudera,” Sunda, Patani, and Annam. Hamashita’s 
essay examines the role of the Ryukyu tributary trade network with Fujian 
merchants’ networks in East and Southeast Asia, concentrating particularly 
on the pepper and sappanwood trades.18 In many ways, it is a specific com-
modity history of the South China Sea in miniature.
 Li Tana then picks up the precolonial thread in her essay, “Cochinchinese 
Coin Casting and Circulating in Eighteenth-Century Southeast Asia.” Li ar-
gues that while much has been said about Chinese business networks in 
modern Southeast Asia, little is known about the coins they used in these 
ports and about the origins of the coins. Locating the coin business in a re-
gional trade system, Li’s essay explores the links of the coin business be-
tween eighteenth-century China and Southeast Asia, and particularly be-
tween the different ports of Southeast Asia. The evidence she introduces 
suggests that there were much closer connections than previously supposed 
in this important branch of Chinese business, namely between mining in 
Tongkin, copper and zinc importing from Japan and China, and coin-casting 
in Cochinchina. These coins eventually circulated on to neighboring polities 
as well, such as Siam and even inland to landlocked Laos.19
 Masuda Erika extends the vision of precolonial interactions between 
Southeast Asia and China in her essay, “Import of Prosperity: Luxuri-
ous Items Imported from China to Siam during the Thonburi and Early Rat-
tanakosin Periods (1767–1854).” Masuda argues that previous studies on the 
rise and fall of the Sino-Siamese junk trade demonstrated that after the trade 
reached its peak in the early 1830s, it gradually declined, with Siam being 
keenly aware of this decay. These studies, Masuda asserts, give the mislead-
ing impression that Siam abruptly stopped paying attention to China, and 
that the latter disappeared entirely from the former’s external perspective. 
However, she continues, Siamese documents indicate that the degradation 
of China’s political prestige due to the opium war and the loss of trading 
privileges in Guangzhou under the tributary system did not change the pros-
perous image China held in Siam, nor did it affect the image of Guangzhou 
as a desirable outlet for commerce. Masuda emphasizes the Siamese ruling 
class’s continuing appetite for luxurious or ornamental items imported from 
China to Siam during the early Rattanakosin period. She also emphasizes 
how these items were enjoyed by the Siamese ruling class, and often embel-
lished and justified Siamese monarchs’ claims to royal power.20
 Adopting a commodity-chain approach, Heather Sutherland also makes a 
case for continuity in her stimulating essay, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity 
Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
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Centuries.” Sutherland argues that during the seventeenth-century Chinese 
consumption of trepang (bêche-de-mer, or edible sea cucumbers) increased, so 
much so that early-eighteenth-century Makassar emerged as a transit port 
for this new commodity, enabling it to become again a center of regional 
commercial networks after a hiatus of many decades. At first trepang was 
sent through intermediate ports (especially Batavia), but during the second 
half of the eighteenth century Makassar was allowed a direct junk link to Xia-
men in South China. In fact, in the 1770s Xiamen passed even the colonial 
Dutch capital of Batavia as Makassar’s main trading partner. If in the 1720s 
Makassar’s most valuable imports and exports were Indian textiles and rice, 
by the 1780s they were both trepang. China was always the principal market 
for this highly profitable cargo, Sutherland argues, and eagerly sought out a 
continuing, stable supply of the shells.21
colonial and PosTcolonial VanTages
In the early colonial period, some of these patterns of interaction began to 
change. One of the best places to examine these echoes is in the upland fron-
tier areas separating mainland Southeast Asia and Southwest China. Sun 
Laichen focuses on the gem trade between Ming and Qing China and Burma 
to the south. He explores the changes in and continuities of gem trade from 
the Ming into the Qing, looking in particular into the development of Chi-
nese terminologies related to specific precious stones. He points out that 
rubies and sapphires (called baoshi 寶石 in Chinese) dominated the flow of 
gems into Ming China, whereas during the Qing, especially from the eigh-
teenth century onward, Burmese jadeite ( feicui 翡翠) overtook baoshi as the 
most popular gemstone. This shift of fashion resulted in the booming of jade 
mine excavation in the Kachin state of Burma. The history of jade commerce 
thus effectively demonstrates how China’s demand helped drive economic 
and political changes in Southeast Asian history, particularly along this one 
landlocked frontier.22
 Complementing Sun’s work in the maritime corridors of Asia is Leonard 
Blussé’s essay, “Junks to Java: Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang in the Sec-
ond Half of the Eighteenth Century.” Blussé points out that there is almost 
no quantitative research on the import and export cargoes of the junks that 
plied between the “primate city” of Batavia and Southeastern China, apart 
from the more qualitative studies on sea products such as bêche-de-mer, shark 
fins, and delicacies like edible birds’ nests. Blussé has made a long-term 
project of collecting from archival sources any available quantitative ma-
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terial about the cargoes of individual junks or series of junks. He argues for 
the vast importance of this subject given that the junk trade formed a meta-
phorical umbilical cord between Southeast China and overseas Chinese port 
towns. Taken together, Sun’s and Blussé’s essays provide a fascinating over-
view of early modern relationships as they were acted out between China and 
Southeast Asia over the course of the eighteenth century and beyond, both 
by land and by sea.23
 Lucille Chia draws attention to the striking fact that very little Chinese 
culture was introduced through print to local societies before the nineteenth 
century, while many other cultural elements diffused into Southeast Asia fol-
lowing the arrival of both humans and goods from China. In spite of this 
centuries-long paucity in print was the anomalous appearance of Chinese 
books in the early Spanish Philippines. These books were largely religious in 
nature, reflecting the efforts of Spanish missionaries to proselytize the Chi-
nese in the Philippines. The success of these campaigns, Chia argues, often 
turned both the Chinese and local Filipinos away from their native cultures. 
Later, when the printing of books in Chinese and Chinese works in trans-
lation gained a foothold in Southeast Asia, following large-scale arrivals of 
Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century, the Philippines was the coun-
try in the region the least receptive to establishing a long-term Chinese pub-
lishing tradition.24
 Following these paradigms even further south, to the nascent Dutch 
East Indies, Kwee Hui Kian examines the place of Chinese merchants in the 
trade of South Asian textiles. She argues that the consumption of Indian tex-
tiles in the Indonesian archipelago was dependent on the competitiveness 
of the price and quality of the commodity relative to those produced locally 
in the region. When the prices of Indian textiles were driven up by increas-
ing European demand during the late seventeenth century, island Southeast 
Asians turned to regional sourcing to procure higher quality, cheaper tex-
tiles. The decrease in the demand for the Indian product within the Indo-
nesian archipelago was therefore primarily a factor of the region’s resource-
fulness, rather than a sign of its economic decline. Kwee shows the vital 
place of Chinese merchants in these processes, especially in the warp and 
weft of the early colonial period, when it was by no means clear who would 
be controlling the future of this profitable line of commerce.25
 As we move into the high-colonial period of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the essays in this volume increasingly emphasize the 
role of capital in binding Chinese trade networks between China and South-
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east Asia. Man-houng Lin examines these processes by exploring the role 
of cultural ties in the shaping of economic networks. Lin focuses specifi-
cally on Taiwanese merchants’ overseas business relations with South China, 
Southeast Asia, and Manchuria during the period of Japanese colonial rule. 
She first explores the power of cultural ties that contributed to Taiwanese 
traders’ high investment in South Fujian and north Guangdong provinces, 
where most Taiwanese immigrants’ families had originally come from, sev-
eral generations back. Southeast Asia was also very important to the inter-
ests of Taiwanese traders because they knew overseas Chinese there shared 
common cultural backgrounds and ties to the southeastern coasts of China 
proper. Manchuria, which did not share these cultural links, ranked last in 
Taiwanese traders’ estimations. However, following Japan’s growing politi-
cal and economic influence in Manchuria after Manchukuo was established, 
in 1932, Taiwanese traders’ investments there grew substantially. This shift 
was further stimulated by other factors, such as the benefit Taiwan derived 
from a regional division of labor with Manchuria. As this case study sug-
gests, economic comparative advantage can trump cultural ties in economic 
engagement, which, Lin argues, disproves culture-based concepts, such as 
the “Greater China Economic Zone” and the idea of a “global Chinese net-
work.”26
 Wu Xiao An agrees with Carl Trocki that, as was the case with the opium 
business, commercialization of the rice industry in Southeast Asia was tied 
through Chinese traders to the global capitalist economy. This was true 
both in terms of production and consumption, as all of these products were 
closely related to the larger colonial tin, rubber, and other cash-cropping 
economies. Wu shows that prior to the Second World War, British Malaya 
depended primarily on imports of rice, comprising over 60 percent of the 
colony’s total consumption. The rice trade in British Malaya was largely 
monopolized by Chinese merchants (mostly Hokkien and Teochieu), who 
formed close-knit trading networks through credit, kinship, and guild asso-
ciations. Another pattern of rice trading that concerns Wu is the local rice-
milling economy in northern Malaya, a case study of Chinese trade in the 
region that Wu is able to explore in some detail.27
 Nola Cooke focuses on a different industry: the Chinese contribution to 
fish farming in Cambodia in the high-colonial period. In certain respects, 
Chinese (and Sino-Khmer) commodity production in nineteenth-century 
Cambodia remained remarkably unchanged by the advent of French colo-
nial protection, in 1863. Along the major rivers, Cooke argues, Chinese agri-
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culturalists continued to rent the most fertile river banks and islands from 
the Cambodian king, and to plant them with a variety of cash crops which 
included indigo, tobacco, and cotton. Chinese (and Vietnamese) junk traders 
continued to transport these products downriver to the markets of Cochin-
china. The most important change to occur in commodity production, how-
ever, involved the fishing industry, especially on Tonle Sap, the Great Lake. 
Where this activity had involved all resident ethnic groups in the first half of 
the century and produced relatively small catches, by the 1890s a major in-
dustry had emerged. This industry was overwhelmingly run by Chinese and 
Vietnamese, and its produce was exported to markets in coastal China and 
much of Southeast Asia. Cooke’s paper examines how this fishing industry 
developed and, by the 1890s, assumed the form that would persist through-
out the colonial era.28
 The last essay in the high-colonial rubric focuses on Singapore and its 
connections with China. Jean DeBernardi uncovers a rather unexpected link 
between these two places: the commodity of a single book, the Bible. DeBer-
nardi argues that evangelical Protestant Christians, excited and perhaps even 
compelled by the challenge posed by China’s enormous population, aspired 
to distribute the Bible to every living person in the Middle Kingdom. With 
this in mind, in 1815 the London Missionary Society launched an impor-
tant program of Chinese translation and printing in Southeast Asia under 
the umbrella of colonial rule. DeBernardi traces the history of Chinese and 
Southeast Asian Bible production and transmission since that time, with 
an emphasis on the high-colonial years, when records for this practice be-
came particularly important. She also makes use of ethnographic research to 
bring this study into the present, linking history and anthropology in novel 
and interesting ways along the way.29
 The last section of the volume deals with postcolonial developments and 
connections in the binding of China and Southeast Asia through the trade 
in various “commodities.” Bien Chiang explores the trade of edible birds’ 
nests in Sarawak to Chinese consumer markets back in China. He reviews 
the Chinese medicinal tradition, which contains a hierarchy of birds’ nest 
categories and has triggered a huge demand for this commodity among 
Chinese consumers, resulting in the formation of a lucrative circum-South 
China Sea birds’ nest market. Chiang discusses the interactions between 
Chinese traders and indigenous communities in Sarawak, pointing out that 
local people are not just passive workers exploited by these same Chinese 
merchants, but instead carve out a share, as well as a career, for themselves, 
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by working as collectors and guardsmen in the caves where birds’ nests are 
found.30
 Continuing the emphasis on natural, environmental produce, Eric Taglia-
cozzo investigates the marine-products trade between East and Southeast 
Asia. His essay draws on oral-history work completed among wholesalers, 
retailers, and fishing communities throughout coastal Southeast Asia, and 
is backed up with interviews conducted in the “Chinese core” areas of Hong 
Kong, China, and Taiwan as well. He argues that this trade, one of the oldest 
of the commercial linkages between China and Southeast Asia, is still vital 
and important, despite having gone through a number of changes over time. 
It has acquired regional variations in hierarchy and function that are readily 
apparent.31
 Wen-Chin Chang then orients our vantage to the mountains of main-
land Southeast Asia, where she has been tracing legal and illegal jade net-
works among migrant Yunnanese Chinese through ethnographic research. 
Her essay looks into Yunnanese migration and resettlement in Thailand and 
Burma, these peoples’ interaction with state agents and other ethnic com-
munities, and mining and trading regulations, as well as the operation of 
capital flows in the region. She argues that a state-centered slant must be 
avoided in order to obtain real insights into the traders’ economic dyna-
mism, beyond the restrictions imposed by area regimes. Employing a non-
state perspective, she analyzes contemporary field data as well as relevant 
historical sources to illustrate the intertwining of historical contingency and 
continuity in this particular underground transnational business.32
 Finally Kevin Woods, an ngo worker embedded in Chiang Mai, takes a 
global commodity chain approach by looking at another “liminal” product: 
the timber trade in Burma (Myanmar), much of it carried through ethnically 
Chinese hands. Northern Burma, Kevin Woods argues, has played an impor-
tant role in Southeast Asian regional trading for the past millennium, which 
has relied on natural-resource wealth and the control of strategic border 
checkpoints passing from landlocked Yunnan into mainland Southeast Asia, 
even on to India. Using the case of the timber economy along the China-
Burma border today, Woods traces the connections of the three successive 
nodes of this commodity trade. The first node is timber production in the 
Kachin state of Upper Burma; the second node is that of procession, con-
trolled by Chinese merchants along the China-Burma border, to Shanghai, 
Guangdong, and Hong Kong; and the third node is consumption of this ille-
gal timber in different parts of the world. This case study reveals the violence 
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of the insurgent economy in Burma, the role of Chinese merchants in this 
trade, and the erasure of the violence at the consumption end of this many-
miles-long process.
charting directions
The field of Sino-Southeast Asian Studies is now so large and complex that 
a synthesis of information, ideas, and approaches seems highly desirable. 
Sources have become available that were previously inaccessible, and dis-
ciplinary boundaries have begun to be crossed, as interpreters of this aca-
demic field strive to stretch the bounds of what is knowable about Chinese 
movements in Southeast Asia, both historically and today. The languages in 
this volume alone include Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, Burmese, 
Malay, and Indonesian—and that covers only the Asian languages, leaving 
out Western scholarship (read here in Eng lish, French, Spanish, and Dutch). 
Because no single scholar can hope to know all of these languages, let alone 
the geographies, time periods, and most important, the varied contexts of 
Chinese trade in the Nanyang, bringing these essays together to see what 
they can tell us as a collective seems like a very good idea. As a group, they 
elucidate the hardship, toil, failure, and success of Chinese merchant ven-
tures into Southeast Asia, both in the now darkening glow of past centuries 
and in our own ethnographic present, as several of the later contributions 
clearly show.
 Chinese merchants have not been alone in the Nanyang; they were joined 
by Indians, Arabs, Parsees, Armenians, and Jews, all conducting their own 
commerce and often along their own commercial lines. Equally often these 
diasporas have found cause to work together. It is conceivable that compan-
ion volumes to this one might usefully appear on any one (or all) of these 
other merchant diasporas, and the products they transited between South-
east Asia and other lands. A start has been made toward that goal already. 
Ravi Shankar, for example, has written on the Tamil Muslim connections 
between South India and Southeast Asia (particularly Malaysia and Singa-
pore), and David Rudner has concentrated on the merchant caste known as 
“Chettiars” specifically in this context.33 Gene Ammarell has looked at Bu-
gis networks in a similar vein, using an anthropological lens, while Chris-
tian Pelras has done the same from a historical vantage.34 The connections, 
both actual and conceptual, between Jewish trading networks (mostly in 
Europe) and Chinese merchant diasporas (mostly in Southeast Asia) have 
been problematized by Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid to very good effect, 
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for thinking about how these processes work both in cross-cultural and in 
comparative terms across large swaths of the earth.35
 We hope that this volume will provide a broad and wide-ranging perspec-
tive on these mercantile processes, elucidating not only the dynamics and 
mechanics of the Chinese as a merchant diaspora far from home, but also 
the workings of one group among many engaged in the pursuit of commerce 
in lands not originally their own. Taking seriously the conjuncture of geogra-
phy, temporality, and the commodities themselves, this book asks how mer-
chant diasporas operate, both actually and conceptually over long periods of 
time. As such, we hope it contributes to the ever-deepening field of Chinese 
studies overseas, but also to the critique and analysis of globalization as this 
has happened in past centuries, and in our own lifetime. That lofty goal is 
one of the signal aims of this book.
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Chinese on the mining frontier in southeast asia
Anthony Reid
The influx of Chinese into Malaysia in particular and “Central Southeast 
Asia” more generally is often popularly attributed to colonial rule, as if the 
pluralism they exemplified were not “natural” to the region. In reality, the 
Peninsula has always been highly plural, and the advance of the Chinese 
mining frontier within it preceded the British.1 This essay documents some 
of the means by which Chinese mining advanced the economic frontiers in 
Southeast Asia ahead of European capital. Tin, being the most obvious ex-
ample, takes center stage in this story.
early controversies
How metals technology spread in Southeast Asia in the earliest periods is 
a matter of considerable and long-standing debate, particularly since the 
Ban Chiang excavations in Thailand in the 1970s raised the possibility that 
bronze-working there may have been as old as that in China. The earliest 
Ban Chiang periodizations have now been largely discredited, however, and 
a consensus is emerging that the Southeast Asian bronze age began in the 
middle of the second century B.c.e., that it was distinct from any of the 
older “Chinese” traditions, yet somehow related to them, and that it long 
predated the rise of states in Southeast Asia. Gold, iron, copper, and tin 
were undoubtedly mined, smelted, and worked into ornaments, utensils, 
and weapons in Southeast Asia before the Common Era (c.e.), and Chinese 
records of contact with Lao peoples at the end of the sixth century c.e. de-
clare that they made their own bronze drums in a manner different from the 
Chinese. We know little, however, about how the relevant technologies were 
disseminated or developed.2
 Until the era of bulk imports in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
iron and copper remained relatively scarce in island Southeast Asia, and trav-
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elers from Europe and China found that their everyday nails, knives, and 
needles were in great demand from the locals. The reasons appear to have 
been not so much the lack of minerals in the ground (although Java and Bali 
were particularly disadvantaged in that regard) as the sparse population (by 
Chinese standards) in the vicinity of most of these minerals, and conse-
quently smaller scale, less efficient methods of both mining and smelting.
 As trade developed in the second millennium of the Common Era, every-
day metal items became cheaper to import from afar than to produce locally. 
In Sung times, iron and ironware were “among the commonest commodi-
ties” exported to Southeast Asia from China.3 By 1500, the needs of South-
east Asian maritime centers like Melaka were provided principally from 
China, including “copper, iron . . . cast iron kettles, bowls, basins . . . plenty 
of needles of a hundred different kinds, some of them very fine and well 
made . . . and things of very poor quality like those that come to Portugal 
from Flanders.”4 These items could be produced far more cheaply in China 
than in any of the Southeast Asian cities because of more advanced min-
ing and smelting methods, so that Southeast Asian mining and metalwork 
tended to retreat with time to less accessible areas in the interior.
was There a chinese role in Borneo ironworking?
Iron is found in the northerly areas of the mainland states, and in the hills 
between Siam and Burma, as well as in the islands in central Sumatra, Beli-
tung, western Borneo, and central Sulawesi. Weapons, tools, and plough-
tips manufactured in these places had to circulate to many other populous 
centers, such as Java and Bali, where iron was not found.
 The ready availability of brown iron ores near the surface in many parts 
of western Borneo, and the islands of Belitung and Karimata off its shores, 
make this region particularly interesting. The ironworking site at the mouth 
of the Sarawak River was somewhat controversially investigated by Tom Har-
rison in the 1960s. He and Stanley O’Connor claimed as many as 40,000 tons 
of slag were left behind in three adjacent sites where iron was extracted from 
ores between around 900 and 1350. The technology for smelting the iron was 
not of Chinese type, with a fixed furnace, but rather by using open charcoal 
fires in bowl-like recessions in the ground. This relatively simple technology 
was still in use in the nineteenth century among peoples of interior Borneo 
such as the Kayan and Kenyah, whom imported iron was the last to reach.5 
Karl Hutterer also found large amounts of slag in Cebu that he dated to iron-
smelting processes of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.6
 Both sites were relatively accessible to the China trade. In particular, West 
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Borneo was on the standard sailing routes between south China and the 
Majapahit heartland of Java. While discounting Chinese technological influ-
ences on ironworking in Borneo, Harrison and O’Connor argue that Sarawak 
iron may have been carried to China by Arab and other ships, since too much 
was being produced for local consumption. Wheatley had already argued 
that wi-mung-i, which was listed in the Sung chronicle as being brought to 
China by Arab merchants, was probably “the hydrated iron oxide known as 
limonite.”7
 Around 1600, a time for which evidence of the internal Southeast Asia 
trade is more abundant, the most important archipelago center for exporting 
parangs and other iron tools was Karimata, about 60 kilometers off the coast 
of Southwest Borneo. Java and Makasar imported their axes and parangs 
from Karimata, while Malays of the Peninsula were said to carry krisses of 
Karimata steel. When the Dutch found a way to access this supply, in 1630, 
they purchased almost 10,000 axes and parangs in one lot.8 Although Beli-
tung was also a source for this kind of trade, with “more parangs but fewer 
axes,” the reputation of tiny Karimata for superior workmanship was such 
that the label “Karimata” was applied more widely.9
 So centrally were the Karimata islands located on the sailing routes be-
tween China and Java that the major strait on that route was named the Kari-
mata Strait, between those islands and Belitung. Whatever the case in the 
Sarawak River area, there is firm evidence in Karimata of Chinese craftsmen 
settling as early as the thirteenth century. Wang Dayuan, describing the Nan-
yang a half-century after the Mongol fleet set off to conquer Java in 1293, had 
this to say of an island he called Goulan Shan.
When the [Yuan] dynasty was founded, the forces to attack Java were 
driven by the wind to this island, and the ships wrecked. One ship fortu-
nately escaped with stores of nails and mortar. Seeing that there was a 
great deal of timber on this island, they built some tens of ships, every-
thing from ribs to sails and bamboo poles were supplied [from the 
island]. Over a hundred men who were ill from the long beating about in 
the storm and were unable to leave were left on the island, and today the 
Chinese live mixed up with the native families.10
 Rockhill sought to identify this mysterious island with the tiny island 
of Gelam off the coast of Southwest Borneo, though the Karimata group 
seem more likely in view of their location on the sailing routes. Whether or 
not this group of Chinese transferred smelting technology to Karimata and 
Belitung, there were many other Chinese craftsmen who passed this way in 
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Ming times, some of whom may also have been shipwrecked or defected vol-
untarily. As Zhou Daguan put it of Angkor in the 1290s, since “women are 
easily had . . . a great many sailors desert to take up permanent residence.”11
 Whatever technology transfer there may have been to iron-production in 
this Karimata-Belitung area cannot have been continuous. The gap between 
economies of scale in production in China and in the archipelago grew wider 
with more frequent shipping in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth 
century, cheaper imported Chinese iron- and metalwork drove out most of 
the production in accessible coastal areas of the archipelago. The dwindling 
community of ironworkers of Karimata left for the mainland in 1808.12
chinese expansion of the mining frontier in the eighteenth century
In the eighteenth century, China’s population grew markedly, stimulating 
an increase in the demand for silver, gold, copper, and lead as currency to 
fuel the expanding economy. The quest for minerals was one factor propel-
ling Chinese explorers, miners, traders, and officials south and west, even-
tually bringing the empire’s extent to its historic maximum. Yunnan was the 
largest mining frontier for Chinese, with 300,000 Han miners reportedly 
working there in 1750 and 500,000 in 1800.13 Sources of silver, lead, and 
zinc were particularly abundant around what is today the boundary between 
southern Yunnan and Burma’s Shan state. The massive Munai and Maolong 
mines peaked in production in the mid-eighteenth century, and eventually 
came under permanent Qing control.14 Chinese miners went beyond im-
perial control, into the hills in the north of Dai Viet and what is today Bur-
mese and Lao territory.
 The huge Bawdwin opencast mine in Shan territory was the most impor-
tant Chinese-worked mine of the border area that never fell under Qing con-
trol. It may have been “protected” from this fate by malaria, which Herbert 
Hoover contracted when inspecting the mine for its modern rebirth in the 
British period. Ming records suggest that it was Chinese miners who first 
brought the mine into production in 1412, and they continued to extract sil-
ver from it in increasing amounts throughout the eighteenth century.
 Copper, lead, and silver also occur in the border area of northern Viet-
nam, where geographical barriers to an influx of Chinese miners were less 
intimidating, but political ones were better established along one of Asia’s 
oldest frontiers. Here, too, the eighteenth century was the peak period for 
the expansion of Chinese mining. The Trinh regime that governed northern 
Vietnam (Tonkin) profited greatly from the booming output of the mines 
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and in the 1760s was reportedly drawing half its revenue from levies on these 
northern mines. By midcentury, there were upward of 20,000 Cantonese at 
the Tong-tinh copper mines alone, despite a series of royal decrees seeking 
to limit their numbers. In the second half of the century, the copper-mining 
operation in the border areas was thought to have averaged over 500 tons 
output per annum, making it one of the largest in Asia. The tenuous control 
the court exercised over the Chinese mining kongsis caused increasing diffi-
culties, however, and in 1767 the Trinh attempted to expel them from Viet-
nam. The economic stakes were too high, however, and the attempt failed.15
gold-working
Precious metals were the most ancient and valued of Southeast Asia’s pre-
cious minerals, particularly the silver of the northern mainland close to Yun-
nan, and the gold of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Peninsula. Chinese miners 
were also attracted to these commodities, although they never became as 
dominant as they were on the nineteenth-century tin fields. Sumatran gold, 
which gave rise to the Sanskrit soubriquet Suvarna-bhumi (gold-land), was 
for the most part off limits to Chinese miners. It was considered so precious 
an item of royal monopoly that outsiders were discouraged. William Dam-
pier related that in Aceh in the 1680s, when gold had become the principal 
export of the state, only Muslims were permitted to go to the rich mining 
areas of Kawaj XIII in the hills behind Pidië. Huge profits were reportedly 
made in these goldfields, discovered only about thirty years earlier, and the 
wealth they produced brought Chinese traders and craftsmen to the Aceh 
capital every year. However, to prevent them reaching the goldfields, armed 
guards were posted along the route.16
 Central Southeast Asia—western Borneo, eastern Sumatra and its 
islands, and the Peninsula—with its sparse populations and states largely 
dependent on the economic activities of outsiders, was the major Southeast 
Asian theater of Chinese mining. Gold had been extracted from Borneo and 
the Peninsula for more than a millennium, by simple methods of panning. 
However, as with tin, the larger-scale labor organization of Cantonese and 
Hakka miners was introduced to archipelago gold-mining in the middle of 
the eighteenth century. In most cases, river-mouth chiefs and rajas engaged 
them to work more efficiently interior mineral resources hitherto dependent 
on the part-time attention of agriculturalists.
 One such early settlement on the Peninsula was Pulai, in upper Kelantan, 
which Hakka gold-miners had opened by the second half of the eighteenth 
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century.17 Graham, however, suggests it was considerably older, and that in 
earlier times “the mineral products of Kelantan considerably exceeded in 
value those of any other State” in the Peninsula.18 During the reign of Sultan 
Mahmat in Kelantan (1807–1837), the ruler’s son was killed by the previously 
self-governing Chinese miners when he tried to enforce his newly granted 
monopoly of rice distribution by cutting off the mining settlement from all 
supplies coming up the river to them. The dead prince’s son then organized 
a massacre of the whole Chinese settlement, “and the gold mining industry 
of Kelantan came to a sudden end.”19
 But it was the goldfields north of the Kapuas River in West Borneo that 
drew the largest number of Chinese pioneers. As early as 1740, the ruler of 
Mempawah, or in some accounts the Sultan of Sambas, decided to bring 
Chinese miners in to work the gold-bearing rivers he sought to control. 
Production had previously depended on the part-time labor of Dayaks. The 
Malay rulers used terms that had been effective on a small scale with the 
Dayaks, providing salt, rice, opium, and cloth at inflated monopoly prices in 
return for a monopoly of the gold extracted. In addition, the Chinese as out-
siders were forbidden to engage in agriculture (to increase their dependence 
on the ruler’s supplies) and were charged a head tax on entering or leaving 
Borneo through the ruler’s port.20
 The Chinese miners set to work initially on mines abandoned by the 
Dayaks, but used more intense and mechanized methods to sluice away the 
topsoil above the gold-bearing lode. They were also much more centrally 
organized through their kongsi, a ritual brotherhood in which capital and 
labor were shared in acknowledged portions.21 Gradually the kongsis be-
came autonomous by forming their own relations with interior Dayaks (in-
cluding marriage), farming the surrounding land, and smuggling their gold 
out through channels not controlled by the rulers. The capitalists who estab-
lished the mine and funded the importation of workers of course had the 
largest share, and laborers still indebted for their passage had none, but 
older workers did share decision-making and often rotated the leadership 
among themselves.
 There is no way to know the amount of gold shipped out, chiefly to China, 
but the fact that about 60,000 Chinese miners were at work there over about 
a century indicates that it must have been extremely large. As Dutch power 
advanced in the nineteenth century, most of the kongsis made their peace 
with it through a system of indirect rule, but the strongest Montrado kongsi 
remained defiant until conquered in the 1850s.
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The chinese Tin-mining frontier
A large proportion of the world’s tin is concentrated in the chain of hills 
from eastern Burma in the north down through the Malayan Peninsula to 
the islands of Bangka and Belitung in the south. By the tenth century, the 
Peninsula was supplying most of Asia’s tin needs. The trade boom of 1580–
1640 witnessed a great increase in mining of this tin to supply the busy mar-
kets of India, China, Siam, and Java. Up until the seventeenth century, it 
was the ports of the western coast of the Peninsula—Junk Ceylon (Phuket), 
Perak, and Selangor—that supplied India, while Ligor (Nakhonsithamma-
rat), Pahang, and other ports on the eastern coast supplied most of China’s 
needs.
 The miners appear to have been long-term Peninsula residents of various 
ethnicities, who attended to mining when the demands of rice growing or 
serving their rulers’ requirements permitted. Mining sites were located and 
supervised by a pawang (shaman) who could mediate with the spirit of the 
tin. Men dug the ore and earth out of flooded pits, while women separated 
the tin ore with their fingers.22 The method was first described in Perak by 
Eredia: “The earth is dug out of the mountains and placed on certain tables 
where the earth is dispersed by water in such a way that only the tin in the 
form of grains remains on the tables. It is then melted in certain clay moulds 
and by a process of casting is converted into . . . slabs.”23 The “casting” was 
a primitive form of smelting in which burning charcoal was mixed with the 
tin ore until the metal ran out into the mold. These slabs, of about twenty 
kilograms, were then floated down the rivers to port, where the port-ruler 
usually took the largest share of the profits of selling it.
 Around 1500, the port-sultanate of Melaka controlled most of the tin 
of what is today Kedah, Perak, and Selangor, and sold most of it to pass-
ing Indian merchants to take back to their own South Asian markets. The 
amounts, however, appear to have been small. Pires gives figures for the tin 
rendered to Melaka as tribute by all the west-coast ports, which amounts to 
only 34 tons (36,000 calain), worth 1,000 cruzados.24 Estimates of total ex-
ports around 1600 vary between 100–300 tons, mostly from Perak and Phu-
ket. The largest estimate at the peak of the trade boom is a Dutch one of 
1638, to be taken with caution, that Perak and Kedah could each produce up 
to 1,000 tons (6,000 bahar) a year.25
 The Portuguese occupants of Melaka (1511–1641) had to contest the 
supply of tin with Muslim traders, and they lost out completely after their 
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great Muslim enemy Aceh conquered the Perak and Kedah fields in 1575. The 
Dutch, who in turn conquered Melaka in 1641, hoped to use the port to mo-
nopolize the supply of tin, and they were in a much stronger position to do 
so. The largest amount they ever succeeded in acquiring, however, was 380 
tons, in 1650, and the effect of their heavy-handed “system of fixed prices, 
annual quotas and exclusive privileges” appears only to have been to drive 
the tin industry of the Peninsula into decline in the second half of the cen-
tury.26
 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Voc) attempts to force the purchase 
of tin at unrealistically low prices from the Malay states it could control from 
Melaka drove the chief centers of production northward into Siamese and 
Burmese territory, so that Phuket (Junk Ceylon), Takuapa, and Tavoy were 
supplying much of the market in the early eighteenth century. Chulia (south 
Indian), Bugis, Chinese, and Eng lish traders paid higher prices and took the 
bulk of the supply.27 The quantities remained modest (probably below 1,000 
tons in total), however, until the systematic exploitation of tin discoveries 
on Bangka by Chinese miners in the middle of the century. China’s demand 
for Southeast Asian tin expanded greatly during its prosperous eighteenth 
century, partly to make the tinfoil burnt as joss paper in offerings to the an-
cestors, but also for packaging the booming tea trade.28
 The tin of Bangka was discovered around 1710 by Muslim Sino-Malays 
familiar with mines on the Peninsula. It came to the notice of Batavia in 
1717, when a pretender to the Palembang throne in exile in Bangka offered 
some to the Dutch in an attempt to gain their support. In 1722, the Voc 
signed a contract with the sultan of Palembang for the delivery of all Bangka 
tin, and in the years 1723–1730 deliveries averaged 175 tons a year. Produc-
tion continued at this modest level by traditional Southeast Asian methods 
until about 1750, when a Chinese known in Bangka tradition as Un Asing 
began systematically importing Chinese contract workers from Guangdong 
with their sophisticated sluicing techniques. Production increased rapidly, 
so that deliveries to the Voc averaged 1,037 tons a year in the 1750s and 
1,562 tons in the 1760s.29 Although the level of reported deliveries to the 
Voc dropped a little thereafter, the reason appears to have been that larger 
proportions of Bangka tin were evading Dutch control and being bought by 
Eng lish, Chinese, and other traders at independent ports such as Riau. Euro-
pean ships alone sold 1,611 tons of Southeast Asian (chiefly Bangka) tin in 
Canton in 1768 and an average of 2,162 tons a year in 1771–1774.30 Presum-
ing that an equal amount was being imported to China by Chinese vessels 
or being taken by Indian and Southeast Asian consumers, Southeast Asia’s 
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tin production must have rivaled Cornwall’s by the 1770s. Europe, however, 
was slow to realize the remarkable growth of this threat from the East.
 Although some of the Chinese miners of Bangka were reported in a Malay 
history to have been brought from Siam and Vietnam, and links with the 
gold-miners of Borneo cannot be ruled out, most were certainly brought in 
directly from Canton through an exclusively Chinese network.
Annually . . . a confidential and competent Chinese agent [went] by the 
junk returning from Palembang to China, to invite efficient and select 
men. . . . The expenses of their voyage and establishment was to be de-
frayed by the [local capitalist] who was to be reimbursed from their first 
profits at the mines. . . . Until they had liquidated the obligations they 
thus incurred . . . they were not permitted to relinquish the labours of 
the mines.31
 There were probably over 6,000 Chinese miners there by the 1770s, chiefly 
Hakkas from the Meixian area of Guangdong. They were organized in teams 
(kongsi, pinyin gongsi) of about thirty men responsible to a headman repre-
senting the authority of the tikos (pinyin dage, elder brother), usually a Sino-
Malay trader living in Palembang and providing the capital needed to open 
the mine and import the labor. The kongsis were relatively egalitarian: “The 
whole of the labourers work on terms of equality . . . while all share equally 
in the profits.”32
 The larger units of labor and capital, as well as techniques brought from 
China, made possible a much higher level of technology in both mining and 
smelting the tin. The Chinese used a chain-pallet pump common in Chinese 
irrigation to clear pits of 6–10 meters depth, and to wash the soil from the 
ore. In smelting, they introduced a superior furnace and bellows, with spe-
cialist teams of six or more men producing a high standard of purity that 
gave “Bangka tin” an unrivaled reputation worldwide.33
 Bangka production declined in the 1790s because of the usual problem of 
insecurity. On the one hand, the essential function of the tikos in mediating 
between the Palembang court and Chinese miners broke down as Palembang 
aristocrats attempted to dominate the industry. On the other, Illanun and 
Malay marauders began raiding the island for tin and slaves, reducing min-
ing communities to ruin and driving the surviving Chinese away. Production 
began to rise again when the British occupied Bangka, in 1812, and the re-
stored Dutch in 1816 decided to rule the island directly. Although the miners 
and smelters remained Chinese, the autonomy of the kongsis was gradually 
replaced by a greater degree of Dutch control, even in the recruitment of 
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labor from Canton. Tin production recovered rapidly, from 1,250 tons a year 
around 1820 to 3,000 tons in the 1830s.34 In addition, the production of the 
various centers on the Peninsula totaled 2,000 tons in 1835, according to a 
careful survey by P. J. Begbie.35 Most of these centers, too, were worked by 
Chinese, with Sungei Ujong (around modern Seremban), Perak, and Treng-
ganu the most productive.36
 In the nineteenth century, industrial Europe and America surged ahead 
of Asia as importers of tin. Straits Settlements tin exports in the 1840s had 
been distributed between India (39 percent), China (10 percent), Europe (34 
percent) and the United States (9 percent). By 1869–1873, the proportions 
had shifted to India 9 percent; China 18 percent, Europe 43 percent, and the 
United States 28 percent.37 The reason for the shift was the manufacture of 
tin plate, in which rapid technical advances had been made throughout the 
century. Tin consumption in Britain grew from a thousand tons a year in the 
first decade of the century to 2,600 in the 1820s and 5,800 in the 1840s. From 
being the world’s major exporter of tin, Britain became a net importer in the 
1850s. Europe as a whole became a major importer of the tin first of Bangka 
and then of the Malayan Peninsula (see table 1).
 Chinese mining gradually wrought the same transformation on the 
rich Peninsula tin fields as it had in Bangka, though with many initial set-
backs due to the lack of security. Chinese had been involved in leasing the 
tin fields of Phuket from the Siamese king early in the eighteenth century, 
and were smelting there while Malays and Thais dug for the tin. Ambitious 
Malay rulers must periodically have introduced Chinese to boost the existing 
Malay production elsewhere in the Peninsula. The Sultan of Perak adopted 
a Dutch suggestion in the 1770s that he emulate the favorable Bangka ex-
perience by employing Chinese miners, finding some for the task in Dutch 
Melaka. The ruler of Selangor brought Chinese miners into Lukut around 
1815, and there were more than 300 there by 1834, when fighting broke out 
and caused a collapse. The Penghulu of Sungei Ujong (now in Negri Sembi-
lan) established 600 Chinese miners on the Linggi River in 1828, making use 
of a large advance from Melaka merchants to whom the tin was consigned. 
But after a conflict over a local woman in 1830, “great numbers” of the Chi-
nese were slaughtered and the remainder fled, their property seized by the 
local chiefs.38 In Perak, Chinese miners had begun work by 1818. Each time 
violence broke out, new miners were induced to return a few years later.39
 The uneasy cooperation between Malay rulers, Chinese financiers from 
the Straits Settlements, Chinese smelters, and a mixture of Malay and Chi-
nese miners opened up the forested peninsula and attracted a variety of mi-
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grants to it. Wong Lin Ken instances the system operated by the Dato Klana 
of Sungei Ujong in the 1820s. He received an advance of $2,500 every month 
from Chinese financiers in Melaka, in return for directing the tin output to 
them. The Dato provided supplies and opium to the Chinese kongsis that 
worked each mine, and also levied a monthly rent from them. He required 
each bangsal (shed) to provide him three bahar (540 kg) of tin at a favorable 
fixed price, which he then sold to the Melaka merchants.40
 In the 1840s, production expanded rapidly in response to the increasing 
demand for and price of tin in Europe. New ore deposits were discovered in 
Lukut (in today’s Negri Sembilan), along the Klang River in Selangor (in-
cluding the area of modern Kuala Lumpur), at Kanching on the Selangor 
River, and above all at Larut in the Taiping area of Perak, where there were 
5,000 Chinese miners working in 1861. Older workings in Melaka itself, in 
nearby Sungei Ujong, and in Phuket (southern Siam) were worked much 
more rigorously by Chinese miners than had been the case with the mixed 
and part-time labor of earlier periods. Phuket, where the ancient mines had 
been left to languish during the wars of the late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth, revived spectacularly, to the point where Bradley claimed it had 
a population of 25,000 Chinese (and fewer than a thousand others) in 1870, 
table 1 european imports of Southeast asian Tin, in Tons p.a.












1831–35  6,185 1,804 (29) 787 (12.7) 1,017 (16.4)
1836–40  7,704 2,403 (31) 1,575 (20.4) 829 (10.8)
1841–45  9,992 3,294 (33) 2,452 (24.5) 842 (8.4)
1846–50 11,793 4,875 (41) 4,066 (34.5) 809 (6.9)
1851–55 11,789 5,507 (47) 4,207 (35.7) 1,300 (11.0)
1856–60 14,647 7,773 (53) 5,978 (40.8) 1,786 (12.2)
1861–65 17,537 7,856 (45) 4,579 (26.1) 3,277 (18.7)
1866–70 18,277 8,515 (47) 4,956 (27.1) 3,559 (19.5)
1871–75 23,134 10,606 (46) 4,755 (20.6) 5,851 (25.3)
Source: Calculated from Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1964), 14.
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producing 3,600 tons of tin per year.41 As before, it was Chinese merchants 
in the Straits Settlements who provided the capital and initiative for this 
expansion, and who persevered in finding laborers for the booming mines 
even when political instability and periodic massacres drove the original 
miners out.42
 Straits Settlements exports of Peninsula tin reached 2,446 tons per 
annum in 1844–1848, 3,750 tons per annum a decade later, and 7,919 tons 
per annum in 1864–1869, more than tripling in twenty years.43 Bangka pro-
duction grew much more slowly, and was overtaken by the Peninsula in the 
1870s. For Penang, trade grew in the decade after 1851 “at a greater rate than 
at any other period of her history,” largely because it was a base for the tin of 
Perak and of Phuket.44 The value of Penang’s trade with Siam and the Penin-
sula, fueled overwhelmingly by tin, rose more than tenfold in each case (see 
table 2).
 In the years after 1873, Britain was drawn to intervene in the crucial tin-
producing states—Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang—largely 
by pressure from Straits merchants, Chinese and European, to end the cha-
otic instability that hindered commerce there. In the years after British con-
trol, Malayan tin production continued to increase rapidly, until 1895, as 
did Bangka more slowly, though stabilizing or even stagnating thereafter.45 
In 1879, Malaya surpassed Cornwall and Australia to become the world’s 
largest tin producer, and soon thereafter produced more than the rest of the 
world combined, a position that Southeast Asian producers retain today. 
Throughout that period of expansion, Chinese dominated the Malayan tin 
trade, whether in terms of capital, labor, or technology. Peaceful conditions 
table 2 Value of Penang Trade with Siam and 






Source: Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: 
Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858–1898 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), 294.
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and the beginnings of transport infrastructure helped after British inter-
vention, but the pace of expansion on the Chinese mining frontier had been 
as great or greater during the thirty years before British intervention created 
those conditions.
 The frontier levied a terrible toll on these Chinese miners. Tens of thou-
sands arrived every year to work in the mines, and a substantial proportion of 
them died every year there. Many succumbed to the internal conflicts of the 
1830s through the 1860s, initially at Malay hands but later overwhelmingly 
through secret-society conflicts, whereby the Cantonese of the so-called five 
districts were mobilized by the Hai San society, and those of the “four dis-
tricts” by the Ghee Hin or Triad. Many more died of diseases, including ma-
laria, cholera, and dysentery. Figures are not available until the late 1870s, 
by which time the ravages of beriberi made the Perak tin fields among the 
most lethal frontiers anywhere.46 In the years 1879–1882, about 3,000 Chi-
nese died every year in the Perak tin mines alone. From the 150,000 beriberi 
cases treated in the hospitals and clinics of the Federated Malay States in the 
1880s and 1890s, and the assumption that only a third of total cases actually 
reached these clinics, a recent analyst has calculated that 100,000 miners 
may have died of beriberi in this period alone.47
analysis
What was the effect of the Chinese mining frontier on the longer-term his-
tory of the region? Unquestionably, these Chinese miners brought capital-
ism, the global economy, and industrial-scale production techniques to 
areas that had previously been largely jungle. They provided some infrastruc-
ture, and survived the most dangerous disease regime before settled condi-
tions were established. Their success made Malaya, Bangka, and West Bor-
neo so productive and important that colonial power followed.
 Reports are more mixed on the political effects. George Windsor Earl, 
like many other advocates of British intervention in the 1860s, regarded as 
a great evil the “unlimited extortion” that the Chinese capitalists, who typi-
cally also controlled the secret societies and hence the labor trade, could 
exercise over the miners. Mary Turnbull, while citing these views, argues 
that “the rapid expansion of the tin trade hastened the disintegration of tra-
ditional authority in the Malay states.”48 On the other hand, Wong Lin Ken 
sees the authority of the fifteenth-century Melaka sultanate as having well 
and truly disintegrated by the nineteenth century, to the point where any eco-
nomic surplus local chiefs could extract was devoted to pursuing internecine 
conflicts rather than developing the land.49
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 In comparative terms, what was exceptional about the Chinese mining 
kongsis was their readiness to accept the fragile authority of established 
river chiefs, even including paying them substantial rents, provided their 
essential livelihood was not threatened. Had a male workforce of this scale 
entered the Peninsula under Bugis, Malay, Acehnese, Thai, or European aus-
pices, it would immediately have changed the power balance and threatened 
the position of rulers. What attracted the local river chiefs, indeed, was the 
Chinese reputation for political docility, and for governing their own inter-
nal affairs through kongsi, secret-society, and religious means. When rival 
Chinese secret societies were drawn into Peninsula conflicts, they certainly 
exacerbated them by increasing substantially the scale of operations. How-
ever, the conflicts between the chiefs were already there, and inviting Chi-
nese in was another weapon in the ongoing Malay struggles. In more uni-
fied political environments, as in Siam, Vietnam, or the Dutch sphere, such 
polarization seldom occurred.
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Cotton, Copper, and CaraVans
Trade and the Transformation of Southwest china
C. Patterson Giersch
From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, Southwest China 
experienced remarkable political, economic, demographic, and cultural 
changes. To fully understand these transformations requires coming to 
terms with a number of crucial variables, including geographical space. To 
date, however, our understanding of geography continues to be limited by 
long-standing conceptual and methodological approaches. Most notably, 
there are still too few studies that challenge the concept of “macroregions.”1 
In a series of extraordinary articles in The City in Late Imperial China, William 
Skinner argued that by the late nineteenth century, China comprised nine 
separate urban systems, each occupying a major physiographic region of 
the country (see map 1). Each “macroregion” contained core and peripheral 
areas. Within a macroregion, each settlement—from marketing towns in 
the periphery to the great cities at the core—was linked in an interlocking 
marketing hierarchy. These urban systems developed along largely autono-
mous paths primarily because of high interregional transport costs.2
 Over the years, the macroregion model has attracted both critics and de-
fenders, but recently there have been well-articulated arguments that ques-
tion the model’s weakness in regard to long-distance trade and historicity.3 
In a particularly trenchant critique, Carolyn Cartier notes how the macro-
region model emphasizes geography and distance over human agency, an ap-
proach now deemed problematic and potentially ahistorical by many geog-
raphers.4 These findings are important for understanding Southwest China 
since the concept of macroregion has been used to shape our knowledge 
of early modern (Ming-Qing) developments there. In his brilliant work on 
southwest demography and economic transformation, James Lee drew from 
Skinner’s conception to argue that migration helped transform the south-
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west (Yun-Gui) macroregion from “congeries of small, fairly autonomous 
enclaves into an integrated regional hierarchy of central places and their 
hinterlands.”5 Lee includes long-distance trade analysis, but trade is envi-
sioned primarily as a process of transferring resources from peripheries to 
cores, the implication being that historical transformations are best under-
stood through the core-periphery model that is at the heart of the macro-
region concept. As in Skinner’s work, core and periphery were determined 
according to population density. In Lee’s analysis of Yunnan Province, he 
created four categories—“inner core,” “outer core,” “near periphery,” and 
“outer periphery”—to simplify the conception of space and emphasize the 
orientation of the province toward the macroregional core in Yunnan and 
Chengjiang prefectures (the Kunming metropolis).6
 My own work has revealed a far messier landscape of human activity, par-
ticularly long-distance trade, which leads me to challenge the limitations 
of the macroregional approach to Southwest China. I begin with the as-
sumption that the geographical patterns of human society and economy are 
shaped by human agency. Geography and climate do play a role, of course: 
a good harbor, a navigable river, plentiful rainfall, a strategic mineral de-









map 1 g. william Skinner’s macroregions of china. Sources: CHGIS data [CD-ROM], Version 2.0 
(cambridge: harvard yenching institute, 2003); ESRI data and maps [CD-ROM] 2004 (redlands, calif.: 
environmental Systems reasearch institute, 2004). available: wellesley college library.
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ever, as the literature on economic geography reveals, major events and the 
creation of human institutions to facilitate trade shape economic and social 
change.7 In nonindustrial societies, the human ability to radically alter eco-
nomic geography is perhaps weaker than in industrial ones, but it did have 
an impact. This is particularly clear in Southwest China, where human in-
stitutions, networks, and historical events shaped long-distance trade and 
radically altered economic geography.
 To demonstrate these changes, I focus on the “circulation” of cop-
per and cotton, two goods that were central to the Yunnan economy dur-
ing the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. The concept of “circula-
tion” comes from a recent study of South Asia in which Claude Markovits, 
Jacques Pouchepadass, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam defined it as the “move-
ment to and fro of men and goods between one part of the subcontinent 
and another.” Circulation is more than mobility or trade, for circulation im-
plies long-term relations of repeated flows that transform society. The goal 
of investigating circulation, then, is to gain new insights into forces that 
change a society.8 As initially envisioned by Markovits et al., this approach 
emphasized the placement of society (India) in a larger global perspective in 
order to examine the connections and interactions of the subcontinent with 
the wider world. I adopt this approach in order to evaluate the circulation 
of goods between Yunnan Province and three other regions: South China, 
Tonkin, and Burma. The idea is to remove the concept of a Yun-Gui macro-
region and to instead look at how miners, merchants, and others were linked 
through circulation to the You/Yu/West River basin, South China, and the 
Guangdong ports; to the Red River basin, Hanoi, and the port of Haiphong; 
and to the overland routes of Burma and Siam (see map 2).
 These circulation patterns were intimately related to the great transfor-
mations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Long-distance circula-
tion linked specific towns and mines to consumers and producers far away 
in China and Southeast Asia. Circulation was influenced by and changed ac-
cording to demographic, political, economic, and technological changes, 
and not all of these changes emanated from China itself. Circulation shaped 
historical change, including remarkable population growth and urbaniza-
tion in areas usually labeled “peripheral” in the macroregions model. Net-
works and institutions that facilitated circulation differed from place to 
place, but the overall tendency was for states and merchants to innovate 
and develop techniques for facilitating circulation across the long distances 
and rough topography of the regions discussed here. In the end, Southwest 
China’s remarkable transformations are best understood not in terms of 
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autonomous macroregional growth alone but in terms of patterns of inter-
regional circulation.
 The period under consideration spans the seventeenth through the 
nineteenth century, when millions of settlers made Chinese the majority 
throughout Southwest China. Among those many migrants were merchants 
and miners, the central actors in this story of change. Others have noted 
the importance of these developments, including Victor Lieberman and Sun 
Laichen, who have linked Southwest China’s population explosion and com-
mercialization to profound transformations in mainland Southeast Asia.9 I 
reverse their line of inquiry, asking not how Chinese developments affected 
Southeast Asia, but how commercialization throughout Eastern Eurasia 
(Southeast and East Asia) influenced Southwest China. While I build on the 
work of those who examined mining and copper transport, as well as those 
who examined the caravan trade between Yunnan and Southeast Asia, my ap-
proach nevertheless diverges from earlier work in several important ways.10 
First, I consider the trade from Yunnan to South China alongside Southeast 
Asia trade. Second, I provide an initial inquiry into the dynamics of mer-
chant institutions and state policies that facilitated circulation. The level of 
state intervention into the Southwest China economy increased dramatically 
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map 2 South china and Southeast asia. Sources: CHGIS data [CD-ROM], Version 2.0 (cambridge: 
harvard yenching institute, 2003); ESRI data and maps data [CD-ROM] 2004 (redlands, calif.: 
environmental Systems reasearch institute, 2004). available: wellesley college library.
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what (but not entirely) related development, Chinese merchant practices in 
Southwest China and upland Southeast Asia seemed to change dramatically 
over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the great-
est growth and elaboration being from the early to late nineteenth century, a 
trend paralleling the expansion of the export fishing industry in Cambodia, 
in which Chinese were deeply involved (see Cooke, in this volume). Thus far 
it has proven challenging to clarify and analyze these transformations with 
precision, although they seem to reflect the extension of family and native 
place-based business practices at the heart of Chinese business structure 
since the early nineteenth century. Third, I argue that the important demo-
graphic and economic changes in Southwest China were not purely south-
western or even Chinese phenomena, meaning that southwest history cannot 
be written without reference to other parts of the Qing empire and Southeast 
Asia. The strong version of this argument therefore claims a central role for 
long-distance circulation in the major transformations of Southwest China.
copper circulation: yunnan, Tonkin, and South china
From Tang and Song times, if not earlier, there were extensive exchanges 
between Yunnan, Tonkin, and South China.11 In Ming and Qing times, the 
scale of trade increased dramatically, and four main routes connected Yun-
nan to a larger world. The routes to Tonkin went from Yunnan via Yuanjiang 
or Mengzi, down the Red River valley to Hanoi and Haiphong. A second set 
of routes connected Yunnan via Baise (Bo’se) and Nanning to Beihai (Pakhoi) 
and Qinzhou, two bustling ports on the “Dragon Gate Sea” (Beibu Gulf ). 
By the Daoguang reign (1821–1850), Qinzhou had a dense population and 
was importing Vietnamese rice along with betel, pepper, sugar, and leather. 
It attracted merchants from Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou.12 A third set of 
routes to the maritime world also crossed overland from Yunnan’s Guang-
nan Prefecture through Baise and Nanning before following the You River 
(右江) as it flowed into the Yu River (郁江) through Guangxi into the West 
River and on to the Guangdong delta. A fourth route, used to transport cop-
per from Yunnan to China’s prosperous eastern provinces, followed the You 
and Yu Rivers to Wuzhou city. The boats then turned north, going upstream 
to Guilin; eventually the copper was transhipped to the Xiang River and on 
to Changsha, Hankou, and Jiangnan.13
 One of the key commodities that drove these circulation regimes was 
copper. It is well known that growth in marketing and commerce during 
the late Ming and Qing periods fueled Chinese demand for money, whether 
silver (imported from the Americas), copper (some imported, some mined 
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domestically), or, increasingly, paper money and credit. It is also known that 
the new Qing regime assumed that state control of copper coinage (bronze 
“cash,” 錢) was central to maintaining order. Thus, the Qing created two 
metropolitan mints, the Baoyuan ju under the Board of Works and the Bao-
quan ju under the Board of Revenue, to oversee the casting of coins.14
 The difficulties of managing the money supply were complicated by a 
number of factors. Before the 1680s, the Qing prevented coastal trade for 
strategic reasons, and the regime frequently experienced copper shortages 
because domestic supplies were weak. From 1684–1715, after coastal trade 
was permitted, the Qing relied on imported copper, mostly from Japan. 
However, China was not the only market for copper. By the late seventeenth 
century, demand for copper was high throughout Eastern Eurasia, much 
of this demand fueled by Chinese economic activity throughout the South 
China Sea (a phenomenon that has led Tony Reid to label the eighteenth 
century in Southeast Asia a “Chinese Century”).15 At this point, Southeast 
Yunnan mines increased output, and Tonkin merchants came to purchase 
copper at Lao Cai near Hekou.16 Both China and Vietnam relied on copper 
imports, and both states’ coinage was undermined when Japan began to 
limit copper exports in 1715. Copper became increasingly dear, and the eigh-
teenth century was thus a period in which there was a copper coinage short-
age in China and throughout the South China Sea trading world.17
 Demand for copper was thus an important issue from the seventeenth 
century onward. From early on, the Qing and its agents sought to exploit 
Yunnan copper deposits, and Wu Sangui’s Yunnan-Guizhou regime (1662–
1681), nominally under Qing suzerainty, promoted mining and traded cop-
per coins in a market just to the north of Hekou on the Red River. Cantonese 
merchants sailed up the Red River to purchase these coins, which went into 
circulation in the Southeast Asian trading networks and, presumably, can 
be counted among the coins exported from China to Cochinchina (Li, this 
volume). In 1682, immediately after the Qing destroyed Wu’s autonomous 
government, Governor-General Cai Yurong initiated a program to expand 
Yunnan copper mining and coin minting in order to help pay for the con-
quest and reconstruction.18 Cai encouraged merchants to open and adminis-
ter mines, rewarding them with government titles; the state taxed the mines 
at a 20 percent rate, leaving merchants free to sell the rest on the market.
 Cai’s efforts marked the beginning of an era in which the central gov-
ernment tinkered with copper mining policies. In 1705, the state revamped 
its policies to make sure it captured the 80 percent of copper production 
that was previously sold on the open market. Local officials gained con-
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trol over mines, which had to provide at fixed prices all copper to the state. 
Whereas the 1682 policies led to increases in copper production, the 1705 
policies curbed production. In 1723, as copper imports declined, the Yong-
zheng regime again permitted some private sales, and this helped ignite a 
major expansion of mining in Yunnan.19 Although China never stopped im-
porting Japanese copper, Yunnan copper came to supply all the needs of the 
central government mints by 1738. Provincial mints, meanwhile, still relied 
on some Japanese copper, but increasingly they too were turning to Yunnan. 
In general, as the circulation of copper from Japan declined, the state and 
consumers in China began to look elsewhere for copper and coin supplies, 
and Yunnan gradually became the biggest supplier.20
 Qing China was not the only state to intervene in mining. Like China, 
Vietnam relied on copper (and zinc) imports to mint the coins that fed com-
mercial growth (Li, this volume). When Japan curtailed copper exports, 
Tonkin’s Trinh rulers also turned to the Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands, 
where veins of copper are found from the hills of Northeast Yunnan to those 
of northern Vietnam. The Trinh promoted mining in their territories and at-
tracted tens of thousands of Chinese miners.21 Victor Lieberman has argued 
that Chinese mining settlements in Tonkin were crucial to helping Southeast 
Asia’s booming economy meet its needs for money. Chinese-run mines, in 
fact, may well have been the main non-agrarian industry in Vietnam.22
 It was becoming a central industry in Southwest China, too. From the 
1720s through the mid-nineteenth century, Yunnan provided almost all the 
copper for the empire’s metropolitan and, later, the provincial mints, and 
the output was truly immense. In the 1720s, Yunnan was producing approxi-
mately 650 short tons (1 million jin) of copper annually; by the 1740s, it was 
producing over 6,500 short tons (10 million jin). Those who have studied 
copper mining estimate that output peaked in the late 1760s, at nearly 9,500 
short tons (about 14.57 million jin), but high production levels continued 
into the early nineteenth century. Approximately 4,000 tons annually were 
earmarked for the metropolitan mints, and much of this was shipped from 
the great Northeast Yunnan mines via Sichuan and then down the Yangzi.23 
The rest was kept for Yunnan provincial mints or shipped to other provinces. 
Since previous studies have emphasized the copper sent to the metropolitan 
Baojuan and Baoyuan Mints, I focus on the copper transported to the pro-
vincial mints.
 By the 1730s, provinces around the empire were reporting severe coinage 
shortages. Sufficient foreign copper was no longer available in the coastal 
markets, and provincial officials petitioned for access to Yunnan copper. 
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By 1740, ten provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Guangdong, Jiangxi, 
Shaanxi, Fujian, Hunan, Hubei, and Guizhou) had received permission to 
periodically send representatives to Yunnan to purchase copper (cai mai 
採買 or cai tong 採銅), which would be used for minting coins in the pro-
vincial mints. These copper-buying missions were extremely important. 
Government-minted coins were used throughout the expanding commer-
cial economy; people of all backgrounds and statuses needed coins. Thus, 
the copper purchases were vital to two government missions: providing for 
the people and paying the military. If the government could secure enough 
copper for casting coins, moreover, it could prevent the illicit casting of 
coins by private individuals, which was widespread in the mid-eighteenth 
century.24 Illicit coin production was so lucrative at this time, in fact, that it 
fueled zinc exports to Vietnam, which were crucial for the counterfeit coins 
imported into Guangdong (Li, this volume).
 When provincial officials purchased Yunnan copper, they sent represen-
tatives to both northern and southeastern Yunnan mines. Quite often they 
were directed to the Jincha mine (金釵廠) in Lin’an Prefecture’s Mengzi 
County, a mine that was designated for cai mai. No matter where the cop-
per was purchased, however, each province (except Guizhou) was required 
to ship it via Guangnan in Southeast Yunnan and on to Baise and Nanning 
in Guangxi.25 These shipments were huge, the smallest being 10,000 jin (6.5 
short tons) while most were about 40,000 jin. From 1740–1811, Yunnan’s 
largest copper customer was Guizhou, but close on its heels were Guangxi 
and Guangdong, purchasing a minimum of 20 million jin (approximately 
13,000 tons) over this seventy-two-year period.26 All of this was transported 
via Southeast Yunnan and Nanning, Guangxi.
 Mining was thus central to the circulation regimes that both linked and 
divided China and Southeast Asia. The Trinh and Qing sought to intervene 
to control circulation in ways that benefited their respective regimes. With 
a significant exception of ca. 1705–1723, Eastern Eurasia’s growing com-
mercial economy and state policies helped increase the copper supply. The 
significance of these findings lies not only in the fact that Yunnan’s copper 
was exported first to Tonkin and then around the Qing empire, but also in 
the major transformations in demographics, urban landscapes, and indige-
nous (non-Chinese) livelihoods. To satisfy the demand for borderland cop-
per, thousands of Chinese migrated to Southeast Yunnan (and Tonkin). To 
measure these changes, we can examine the mining areas of Mengzi County 
and the trade town of Guangnan.
 Within Mengzi lay two important mine complexes: Jincha, a copper min-
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ing area, and Gejiu, which produced silver, tin, and copper. Neither mine 
was new (there was mining near Gejiu as early as the Han dynasty), but early 
modern commercialization in Eastern Eurasia, followed by state promotion 
of mining, encouraged the opening of mines throughout Yunnan, and both 
Jincha and Gejiu mines expanded rapidly.27 Expansion attracted an influx of 
miners, and by the late Qianlong period (1736–1795), an estimated 10,000 
migrant miners worked these deposits; by the 1750s, the Gejiu sky was thick 
with smoke from the many smelting furnaces that contained their hard-won 
copper ore. As was so often the case, most migrant miners hailed from Hu-
guang and Jiangxi, although some came from Shaanxi and Shanxi.28
 Following patterns that existed elsewhere, Mengzi expanded its role as a 
trade entrepôt as the miners arrived. Migrant merchants from Jiangxi, Fu-
jian, and Huguang established their associations (huiguan) in the county seat. 
Jiangxi was actually represented by three merchant associations, one estab-
lished by merchants hailing from Ji’an, another by merchants from Fuzhou 
and Ruizhou, and a third by merchants from Nanchang. In the Gejiu mining 
area, these merchants established branch associations. The earliest date for 
any of these institutions belongs to the Shoufo Temple of the Jiangxi natives, 
first built in 1704.29
 Merchant organizations and networks were directly linked to mining in 
four important ways. First, the state recruited investors and managers for 
copper mines, and often the recruits were merchants from outside the prov-
ince. Second, both before 1705 and after 1723, private sales of copper were 
permitted, and merchants handled this trade.30 Third, while the Qing gov-
ernment managed copper transportation, merchants handled the transport 
of tin, lead, and silver, often using the same Guangnan-Baise route.31 Finally, 
the influx of miners to any site led to numerous opportunities to meet in-
creasing local demand for clothing, food, and other goods.
 This influx of miners and merchants transformed the landscape of Mengzi 
County. A town emerged at the foot of the Gejiu hills; meanwhile, nearby 
Mengzi town expanded in size and importance. The physical environment 
began to change as miners built elaborate tunnels and shafts, and smelt-
ing specialists erected furnaces and sought charcoal to help extract copper 
from ore. This need to fire the furnaces led to widespread deforestation. By 
the nineteenth century, most of the hills around Gejiu were bare, their trees 
turned into charcoal and thus sacrificed to commercial development in far-
away places such as Hanoi, Hankou, Guangzhou, or Fuzhou.32
 The demand for charcoal provided new, though limited, opportunities 
for local peoples. In surrounding villages, indigenous families, probably Yi, 
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Sha, Nong, and Tuliao (the latter three groups now classified as “Zhuang”), 
erected huts for preparing charcoal. To the northwest and north, in the areas 
around Lin’an and Amizhou, indigenous peoples, probably Yi and “Woni” 
(Hani or Akha), worked coal deposits, another fuel for the smelting furnaces 
of Gejiu.33 By the 1870s, the Gejiu mines imported charcoal from indige-
nous producers who lived ten or more miles from the mines.34 In addition 
to providing fuel for the smelters, indigenes often carried the copper on the 
gruelling overland transport legs.35 This brief examination of Mengzi’s Gejiu 
area demonstrates how mining was linked to demographic and environmen-
tal change, urbanization, and the integration of indigenes into production 
for the market. The promotion of copper, silver, and tin transport, however, 
touched more than just the mining towns.
 The Jincha and Gejiu mines were linked to patterns of urbanization and 
change even further away. State interest in exporting Yunnan copper via 
Guangxi seems to have originated in 1728, and Kent Smith has reported that 
Governor-General E’ertai invested in roads and water transport in south-
eastern Yunnan.36 This impacted towns such as Guangnan, which lay along 
the transport route. In the decade between E’ertai’s initial investment and 
the time when copper began to be shipped, Guangnan underwent important 
changes. The Qing state increased the number of civil officials dedicated to 
Guangnan and also increased by four hundred (a significant number) the 
number of soldiers stationed in the region. With central government ap-
proval, moreover, the local government brought a local indigenous leader’s 
revenue under imperial management.37 Such a move was rare, and it pro-
vided the Qing state with tremendous control over the indigenous power 
structure in Guangnan. While the evidence is circumstantial, it seems that 
the Qing state was securing this region not only as part of E’ertai’s gen-
eral expansion of state power, but also because Guangnan would be the site 
where copper was stored during the shipping process.38
 This expansion of the state presence in Guangnan was paralleled by a 
growing merchant and settler population. As an important stop on the cara-
van route that exported copper and other metals to South China, Guang-
nan attracted a diverse population of merchants and peddlers, who were 
soon followed by land-hungry migrants. These sojourners and settlers ar-
rived during the same period in which the state promoted copper transport 
via Guangnan, and by the early nineteenth century, Guangnan boasted a 
local population that included people from Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and 
Guangdong.39 Many of these sojourners and settlers were involved in com-
merce with South China, but also with Tonkin.40 As the migrant popula-
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tion increased, they had profound and unintended (from the state’s point 
of view) impacts on indigenous societies. By the 1730s, Qing officials had 
become concerned that Chinese merchants were gaining ownership over in-
digenous lands.41 This meant that local Sha and Nong peoples were simul-
taneously experiencing greater state control and competition from Chinese 
migrants who, increasingly, held the leases to their lands.
 Places such as Mengzi and Guangnan were clearly experiencing tremen-
dous changes as mining, the state, and mine-related commerce transformed 
their communities, landscapes, and livelihoods, but how should we under-
stand the source of these changes? James Lee employed the macroregional 
core-periphery model to contextualize and analyze important changes in late 
imperial Yunnan (see map 3). For example, he argues that population growth 
in Lin’an (where Mengzi County was located) and Guangnan Prefectures led 
to a population density that placed them in the category of “near periphery,” 
meaning that their population density relegated them to the third of four 
ranks within Yunnan Province. The first rank, boasting the highest popula-
tion densities (129–52 people per square km), was the “inner core” and in-
cluded Yunnan and Chengjiang prefectures in north-central Yunnan. Next in 
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map 3 yunnan’s “cores” and “peripheries.” Sources: CHGIS data [CD-ROM], Version 2.0 
(cambridge: harvard yenching institute, 2003); ESRI data and maps [CD-ROM] 2004 (redlands, 
calif.: environmental Systems reasearch institute, 2004). available: wellesley college library.
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tures (37–57 people per square km). Third was the “near periphery”: Chu-
xiong, Guangnan, Kaihua, Lin’an, Qujing, and Wuding (15–28 people per 
square km). Kaihua’s 15 people per square kilometer is, for some reason, 
distinguished from Tengyue’s 13 people per square kilometer, which was 
the most densely populated of the next tier, the “outer periphery” (which in-
cluded nine other districts). I do not dispute Lee’s figures, and he is careful 
to emphasize that these categories are for “heuristic purposes only,” but the 
ranking system implies a potentially misleading relationship.
 A powerful implication of the core-periphery model is that the periph-
eries were oriented toward the “inner core.” One would expect, therefore, 
that Guangnan’s or Mengzi’s changing demographic density, economic ac-
tivity, and political infrastructures were due to their stronger economic rela-
tionship with the macroregional core in what is now metropolitan Kunming. 
However, it is clear that Mengzi’s and Guangnan’s population growth, eco-
nomic transformation, and political changes were closely related to circula-
tion patterns that connected these areas to South China and Tonkin.
 Instead of using a core-periphery model to understand important trans-
formations, one might do better to examine state policies, merchant net-
works, and the creation of circulation corridors linking Yunnan to South 
China and Southeast Asia (see map 2). Eastern Eurasian demands for cop-
per were first met by exporting Yunnan coins via the Tonkin corridor. This 
provided the initial boost to mining in the seventeenth century. The Qing 
state then created transport and administrative infrastructures to capture 
copper resources for the empire; in the process they took advantage of and 
encouraged merchant activity along the Guangxi-Guangdong corridor. As 
Peng-Sheng Chiu has argued, imperial policies designed to expedite copper 
extraction helped merchants expand their businesses in Yunnan and else-
where.42 The economic activities promoted by the state and carried out in 
part by merchants contributed to the transformation of Yunnan. To build 
their networks, merchants often relied on the imperial state’s power to pro-
tect communications routes. Merchants were not mere agents of empire. 
Neither were they limited by the territorial boundaries of the Qing realm, 
and their growing networks helped expand other circulation corridors, too.
cotton circulation: yunnan and Burma
The circulation of goods, ideas, technologies, and religion between Yunnan 
and Burma can be found at least as early as the third century B.c.e. It was 
not until the eighteenth century, however, that bulk goods such as raw cot-
ton began to be carried in large volumes. Responding to increasing demand 
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among the growing migrant communities in Yunnan, Chinese merchants 
imported tremendous amounts of raw cotton, kapok, and cotton textiles. 
They purchased cotton at the large markets in Burma’s suzerain areas of Ava, 
Bhamo, or Hsenwi and pioneered relatively new routes to find cotton mar-
kets in Siam’s suzerain territory.43 At times, the Qing government sought 
to control or curtail the circulation of goods and merchants to Burma. The 
most important example was a postwar trade embargo placed on Burma 
after 1770.44
 Once the embargo was lifted in 1790, merchants rapidly rebuilt the cot-
ton trade. By the 1830s, Chinese mule trains transported large amounts of 
Chiangmai and Kengtung cotton into southern and central Yunnan. Some 
cotton merchants also went further in search of profits—to Luang Prabang, 
Nan, or Phrae. The Ava and Bhamo cotton markets sprang back to life as Chi-
nese caravans returned. The caravans transported into Burma Chinese silk 
and manufactures, such as porcelain and bronze implements.45 There are a 
few widely reported statistics that confirm the tremendous volume of the 
Yunnan-Burma trade. In the 1820s, John Crawfurd interviewed Chinese mer-
chants in Burma and made the following estimates: Chinese raw silk exports 
to Burma totaled approximately 162,000 pounds annually. Burmese cotton 
imports to China ranged from about 7 million to almost 21 million pounds 
annually.46 In 1855, Henry Yule visited Amarapura and learned that Yun-
nan’s annual imports of Burmese cotton totaled approximately 14.6 million 
pounds while silk exports had increased to approximately 242,360 pounds. 
In addition, Yule estimated that Burma’s suzerain Tai areas (Hsenwi, Bhamo, 
etc.) were exporting an additional 547,000 pounds of cotton annually to 
 Yunnan.47
 This remarkable trade volume could not have been produced without the 
merchants and caravaneers who plied the tracks between Burma and Yun-
nan. Of particular importance to this trade were the institutions and firms of 
Chinese merchants, for, in many cases, they reached from Kunming and Dali 
to Ava, Mandalay, and Amarapura. A particularly powerful set of institutions 
was the merchants’ native place organizations, which proved successful in 
overcoming some of the disadvantages of the long distances. Elsewhere I 
have argued that they provided the Chinese with a tremendous advantage 
over local indigenous elites and Southeast Asian merchants who vied to con-
trol long-distance trade flows.48
 The merchant’s organization (huiguan) was created when Chinese from 
the same hometown or region pooled resources to purchase land, erect a 
lodging house, and build a temple housing a distinctive deity. Members 
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and new arrivals from the home region could use the organization’s storage 
facilities and other services.49 These organizations were found throughout 
China and overseas. They were particularly important to Southwest China. In 
mining towns, for instance, the merchant associations became critical local 
institutions. By the late eighteenth century, Mengzi and the Gejiu mines had 
a tremendous number of merchant associations. The high level of merchant 
organization can be seen by the fact that there were five different associa-
tions representing Jiangxi merchants alone.50 These institutions would have 
been in contact with their brethren along important routes, whether to the 
Yunnan capital or to Guangxi Province, where each major trade town had 
merchant associations.
 Merchant associations were therefore far more than local institutions. 
Their members could travel to other trade towns, where similar associations 
had been formed, thus linking trade areas together in networks based on 
native place. For example, in the late seventeenth century, migrant mer-
chants from Jiangxi and Hunan established associations in the provincial 
capital, Kunming. The Jiangxi men built their Wanshou Temple while the Hu-
nan merchants built their Shoufo Temple. These were the same temples that 
Jiangxi and Hunan merchants established in frontier towns such as Mengzi. 
One can trace the expanding reach of Jiangxi and Hunan merchants by the 
dates of the Wanshou and Shoufo temples throughout the region. Once 
established, the network could be used to manage long-distance trade.51 
Such links were extremely important to maintaining the networks into the 
mining regions and from Yunnan to Guangdong; they were also central for 
the cotton merchants who worked between Yunnan and Burma.
 In Burma, Chinese merchants clustered in well-organized communi-
ties or neighborhoods, and they created networks to manage long-distance 
trade. At Ava and Bhamo, merchants built temples, much like the native 
place association temples in China. In Ava, for example, the Tengchong 
(Tengyue) merchants who dominated the Burma trade built a temple to 
Guanyin in the 1770s. This temple seems to have become a center for social 
and economic life in the Chinese community.52 It provides further proof that 
Chinese merchants continued to operate in Burma even during the Qing em-
bargo of Burmese trade.53 When the Burmese capital was moved to Amara-
pura, moreover, a new temple was built. One of the few accounts we have 
that provides an insight into how these temple/merchant associations oper-
ated comes from Henry Yule. Yule visited Amarapura in 1855 and met with 
the chief Chinese merchants at a central Chinese temple, which served “not 
merely as a place of worship, but as a house of resort or club.”54 The temple 
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was therefore a central meeting location for Chinese commercial agents who 
represented merchant businesses based in Yunnan.
 What Yule was observing was a set of business institutions that had be-
come increasingly sophisticated and complex. Historians of Yunnan date 
the founding of Yunnan’s first large-scale family-run firms (shanghao 商號) 
to the early nineteenth century. The earliest were founded by men from the 
major western trade towns, Dali and Tengchong, although there are also ex-
amples of them operating out of Guangxi and trading with Tonkin.55 These 
family firms, however, still maintained important connections to the mer-
chant associations. According to Yule, five or six of the “agency-houses” (the 
shanghao) dominated the Chinese trade with Amarapura, while there were 
an estimated two dozen smaller firms whose business amounted to about 
10 percent of the big houses. All were linked through the temple and its af-
filiated businesses, including Amarapura’s Chinese shopkeepers who sold 
imports purchased on credit from the major agency-houses.56
 The merchant-agents in Southeast Asia were connected to Yunnan 
through a network of settlements along the trade routes. Representatives 
seem to have lived in Bhamo, Manyun, and other small towns on the caravan 
highways to Tengchong and Dali.57 Even in the smaller towns, the role of the 
agent was to make money for the company. The permanent Chinese agents 
in Kengtung, for example, purchased and prepared cotton for the arrival of 
the caravans, thus speeding the turnaround time.58
 Merchant organization seems to have originated in native-place organi-
zations and family ties—a finding that is predictable both for China and 
for Chinese operating in Southeast Asia. As these institutions developed, 
though, they became more specialized, particularly in the transport indus-
tries that were so crucial to Southwest China and Southeast Asia. At Mengzi, 
for instance, merchant associations provided a base for men who then devel-
oped firms serving the local mining industry. The French adventurer J. Du-
puis provides a few insights into how these businesses operated. Although 
he journeyed to Mengzi during the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873) and found 
that trade had declined, Dupuis located merchants willing to do business. 
Local merchants, moreover, had developed specialized businesses for han-
dling the challenges of shipping copper and tin over long distances. At Lao 
Cai, merchants had organized a system for transferring goods from Tonkin 
barges to Yunnan barges during the winter months when water levels were 
low. The Yunnan barges were smaller and more nimble for passing over the 
rapids above Lao Cai. Dupuis was also able to contract with a local merchant 
to help him procure copper and tin from the Gejiu mines; he concluded a 
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separate contract with another merchant to provide warehousing and ship-
ping services.59 Clearly the transport and service industries were fairly spe-
cialized.
 The tendency toward increased specialization in transport was apparent 
throughout Yunnan, not just Mengzi. As time went on, the Yunnan-Burma 
caravan infrastructure became more elaborate as supporting businesses were 
developed. Dali, a major trade hub, expanded in the early to mid-nineteenth 
century as merchants built warehouses and shops to accommodate growing 
cotton commerce. In many caravan towns, enterprising merchants built inns 
to accommodate the mule trains. Whereas eighteenth-century caravaneers 
seem to have camped out, the nineteenth century saw an increasing number 
of caravanserai devoted to housing muleteers and their pack trains. In late-
Qing Ganyai, for instance, there were seven inns with the capacity to house 
2,000 people and their pack animals. Contemporary Manyun Market had 
five inns and four temples, which could accommodate 5,000 people. Lijiang 
town topped them all, with seventeen inns that catered to the tea caravans.60
 Merchant organization through the family firm and association was the 
key to Chinese domination of the caravan trade. This does not mean that Chi-
nese were alone in benefiting from the trade, for the Southeast Asian courts 
and local Tai rulers (tsaufas) could sell monopoly contracts or trade permits, 
collect caravan tolls, or even engage in some trade themselves. Nevertheless, 
it was Chinese merchants who developed and operated the most important 
business institutions that linked Yunnan, Southeast Asia, and South China 
across a terrain and in a climate that might generously be called “challeng-
ing.” Through their firms and associations, they mobilized capital, created 
regulations for managing mines, cooperated with the Qing state at times, 
and developed new businesses to meet the challenges of topography and en-
vironment.
 Under the influence of these changes in merchant institutions, south-
west Yunnan underwent important transformations. As merchants knitted 
together networks that linked Southeast Asia and Yunnan, local Chinese 
and indigenes began to buy and sell products that circulated through Yun-
nan and Southeast Asia. Although the Yunnan-Southeast Asia trade connec-
tions were ancient, it was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries that so many became incorporated into regional trade. By the early 
nineteenth century, indigenes throughout the borderlands—but especially 
those living in the circulation corridors—produced goods for sale in China 
or Burma. This economic geography, so dependent on copper and cotton, 
was changing Yunnan, but it was not permanent.
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after rebellion: changing circulation regimes
In the mid-nineteenth century, regional and global events helped transform 
the circulation regimes described above. These changes included an initial 
obstruction of long-established circulation patterns and the rise of new 
patterns and routes under the influence of changing transport technologies 
and colonial relationships. These changes are important because they dem-
onstrate how the economic geography of Southwest China could be trans-
formed by historical developments, both within and outside China.
 As the site where the Taiping uprising (1851–1864) originated, Guangxi 
Province’s Yu River basin succumbed to banditry in the 1850s. This reduced 
traffic along the river, thus cutting off the trade routes. There were reports 
that only armed trading parties could conduct Nanning’s trade with Beihai. 
There is also evidence of significant destruction. In the port of Hengzhou 
(横州), for instance, the entire town was destroyed, including the power-
ful Guangdong merchant association (huiguan).61 The destruction of the 
association deprived the town of a commercial institution that was crucial 
to maintaining the flow of goods between Yunnan and Guangzhou. Yunnan 
suffered even more from the Panthay (Hui) uprising of 1856–1873, a mas-
sive civil war pitting Muslims and non-Chinese against the Qing state and 
Chinese inhabitants. Centered in Dali, this massive rebellion interrupted the 
cotton and copper trades and left the province devastated.
 After the rebellions, long-distance circulation from Guangdong to Yun-
nan was the first to revive. By 1880, Baise had regained some of its earlier 
prosperity. Its merchant associations recovered as Cantonese merchants 
regained their foothold as the most important of sojourner traders. Once 
again those living in Guangxi Province could buy Yunnan exports, includ-
ing Pu’er tea, which was carried to Baise via the Guangnan route. To provide 
transport along these routes, boat operators and mule caravans went back 
into action.62 Guangnan markets again entertained Cantonese and Hunan-
ese sojourners. Marketgoers again had the option to purchase simple luxu-
ries shipped from Guangzhou, including imported Tanstikkor matches and 
China-made mirrors.63
 However, older circulation patterns were not simply restored. Before the 
Taiping and Panthay uprisings, Yunnan had exported cotton and copper to 
the Guangxi and Guangdong river basins. The uprisings first interrupted this 
trade, and then changes in the global trade patterns reversed the flow. By the 
1880s, steamers transported cotton from Rangoon to Canton, where some 
of it was shipped upstream to Baise and then overland by horse to Yunnan.64 
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Merchants also began to import cotton via the ancient routes that linked the 
Beibu Gulf ports with Yunnan via Nanning, Baise, and Guangnan. Increas-
ingly, the chief exports were not copper, but tin and opium.
 The volumes of goods shipped were still very large. In 1889, Imperial 
Maritime Customs (iMc) officials estimated that 50 percent of Beihai’s 
(Pakhoi’s) imported piece-goods and 67 percent of its imported cotton yarn 
found their way inland to Yunnan’s markets. In 1889, this meant that an esti-
mated 62,000 piculs of imported Indian yarn were shipped via Nanning bro-
ker agents to Yunnan. The estimated value of this yarn was 1,180,000 haiguan 
taels or, based on the 1889 exchange rate of Us$1.15 per tael, $1,357,000. 
One reason that the Beihai route was profitable, iMc officials and other ob-
servers believed, was that the post-Taiping domestic transit duty (lijin, likin) 
stations, operating along the Yu/West River, drove up costs, while the Beihai-
Baise-Yunnan route was relatively free of transit duties.65
 Rebellion and changing patterns of global trade and imperialism, com-
bined with new shipping technologies, influenced the circulation patterns 
of Yunnan. Evidence suggests that the Yu/West River route from Guangzhou 
flourished initially, but then declined. Similarly, the Beihai to Nanning to 
Guangnan route initially became a major trade corridor. In the aftermath 
of France’s conquest of Tonkin, both were eclipsed by the Red River route, 
which linked Haiphong to Mengzi. Although Beihai continued to be an im-
portant point of entry for some goods, most of the Hong Kong textile dealers 
moved their branches from Beihai to Haiphong—important evidence that 
the real action had shifted southwest toward Tonkin.66
 Gradually, cotton shipped via the Red River from Tonkin increased in vol-
ume and began to dominate, a finding first reported by Chiranan.67 This 
trade was managed from Lin’an, a small Yunnan port on the Red River. 
Lin’an merchants had agents or partners in Hong Kong who purchased cot-
ton goods and arranged for shipping from Hong Kong to Haiphong and then 
up the Red River to Mengzi. French steamers carried the cotton to Lao Cai or 
Manhao; it was then off-loaded and shipped overland to Mengzi and on to 
Kunming via caravan. The transition to cotton imports via the Red River was 
an important transformation of Yunnan’s relationship with maritime trade, 
and it represented a profound shift in merchant networks and cotton circu-
lation.
 In the aftermath of the Panthay uprising, the Burma cotton trade was 
slow to rebound. By the 1890s, overland cotton imports from Burma fell to 
an estimated 725,000 pounds annually. This was about 5 percent of the esti-
mated volume for 1855.68 A series of developments worked to diminish this 
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route of circulation. The Panthay uprising hit the west more seriously than 
it did southeastern Yunnan. Even a decade or more after the fact, travelers 
reflected on how many urban areas had not recovered their original popu-
lations or economic vitality. Particularly hard hit were some of the central 
trade entrepôts such as Tengchong, in western Yunnan, and Dali, which, 
along with Kunming, had been one of the province’s two largest urban areas. 
In other words, the urban areas that had grown along with the circulation 
patterns of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth lost population; 
marginalized from the main circulation regimes of the post-rebellion era, 
they did not return to their previous population and trade levels.
 This demographic disaster, however, was followed by other problems. 
Andrew Forbes has argued that the British seizure of Upper Burma and the 
French occupation of Tonkin resulted in these colonial powers seeking to 
redirect trade.69 The Qing, moreover, subjected the overland routes from 
Burma to Dali to numerous lijin and prefectural tax stations, a fact that led 
some observers to believe that internal Qing levies, rather than the cost of 
transportation, caused the decline in overland routes from Burma. Mer-
chants who transported Chinese cotton into Yunnan from Hubei and those 
who transported Indian, Burmese, or Eng lish cotton through Mengzi were 
subject to a single tax fee only, whether the lijin levied at the station on the 
Sichuan-Yunnan border or the import tariff levied at the Imperial Maritime 
Customs station in Mengzi.70
 Thus, the remarkable decline of the Burma cotton routes resulted from 
major changes both within China (the Panthay Rebellion, the rise of the lijin 
revenue system) and in global patterns of colonialism and trade. The decline 
in trade directly affected the ability of certain urban areas to rebound from 
the economic and demographic losses during the Panthay Rebellion. The 
British missionary G. W. Clark, who lived in Dali during the 1880s, knew 
that the Burma trade was down because the British were redirecting cotton 
exports to Rangoon and, via steamer, to Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Clark 
met merchants who lamented their business losses, and he also reported 
that many local Minjia (Bai) men, who had once earned money as muleteers 
and peddlers in the Burma trade, were now left without livelihoods.71
 Throughout the Qing period, Yunnan Province was involved in important 
patterns of circulation that linked it to coastal China, Tonkin, and Burma. 
As Li’s and Cooke’s papers demonstrate, if we are to understand the impact 
of Chinese merchants and the commodity flows they controlled, we must 
broaden our approaches to include inland circulation corridors and their 
connections to the coast, whether in South China or Southeast Asia. We must 
56 c. PaTTe rSon gi e rSch
also examine state policy and its impact on circulation.72 For Yunnan, the 
circulation patterns of copper and cotton influenced migration, urbaniza-
tion, and local economic changes. Yet these circulation flows were also sub-
ject to endogenous and exogenous events; once the circulation flows were 
transformed, moreover, they in turn transformed demographics and local 
economics. In order to understand fully the changes in Southwest China, 
therefore, we must place regional history within a larger global framework. 
The macroregional model may highlight some important aspects of regional 
society, but it lacks the type of dialectical analysis that David Harvey has 
found so necessary to the study of geography and perceptions of space.73
 The rising demand for copper that affected all of Eastern Eurasia had 
a profound impact on Yunnan and northern Tonkin, where tens of thou-
sands of Chinese miners migrated in the eighteenth century. Their arrival 
instigated important demographic and economic changes. Local urban 
areas attracted merchants who organized the long-distance transport of 
the precious metals. Local indigenous peoples sometimes reoriented their 
economies from subsistence to market production in order to sell grains 
or charcoal to the mining operations. The circulation of copper drew states 
into close relations with merchants and miners, leading to significant state 
activity in frontier regions, including the Qing mandate that nine provinces 
ship their copper via Guangxi. Networks and institutions were developed to 
make long-distance overland trade more efficient. Merchant associations 
helped orient and support migrant merchants who participated in transport-
ing copper or cotton. Merchant associations and merchant houses began to 
place agents in key trade towns along major routes. Whether in Burma or, 
later, in Hong Kong, agents handled the purchasing and packaging of goods 
so that caravan leaders or ship captains could quickly load up and move on. 
Over time, industries became more specialized, and the number of busi-
nesses devoted to transport, servicing caravans, or storage increased.
 In the aftermath of the great rebellions, there were fundamental trans-
formations of Yunnan’s circulation patterns. As new patterns emerged, 
they were shaped by both old and new conditions. Demand for cotton was 
a perennial condition, but this demand was met through new circulation 
corridors shaped by British and French colonialism, steamship technology, 
and the Qing internal tax regime. The goods that flowed out of Yunnan in 
exchange for these imports were changing, too; copper was replaced by tin 
and opium.
 With these changes in circulation flows, western Yunnan was increas-
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ingly marginalized. These were the areas that had once been central to the 
import of Burmese cotton and to the export of silks. After the destruction 
by the Panthay and then marginalization from the older circulation patterns, 
some of these towns did not fully recover in terms of population or trade, 
even decades afterward. Investigating Dali’s population in the 1930s, C. P. 
Fitzgerald noted how the ruins on the town’s southeast side attested to its 
former size and importance. According to James Lee’s calculations, Dali had 
over 100,000 people by the 1820s, but government figures placed the popu-
lation at 89,720 in 1939.74 To understand this decline, as well as the rise that 
had preceded it, we cannot focus on intraregional or macroregional changes 
alone, for it was interregional circulation patterns, managed in part by the 
Chinese merchants who traded with South China and the Nanyang, that also 
shaped the destinies of so many people in Southwest China.
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the soCial life of Chinese labor
Adam McKeown
Was Chinese labor a commodity? This question should be hard to avoid in 
a discussion of Chinese traders and commodities, because the mobiliza-
tion and exchange of labor were indispensable aspects of expanding mar-
kets and trade. Not only were migrant laborers important producers, con-
sumers, and transporters of goods, but the trade in labor itself was a major 
source of profit for many merchants. But thinking about labor as a com-
modity quickly raises analytical difficulties. The rapid expansion of market- 
and commodity-based cultures over the past three centuries has included 
an insistence that people are free agents who exchange things, not things 
that can be exchanged. Imagining labor as a personal possession that can be 
separated from the body and voluntarily exchanged partly overcomes these 
difficulties. But the terms under which such exchanges should take place re-
main a major issue of contention, with deep implications for how we inter-
pret the expansion of capitalism over the past three centuries.
 Rather than get mired in debates over the definition of commoditiza-
tion and free exchange, it is best to start by understanding the specific pro-
cesses, politics, and meanings of labor exchange within concrete social and 
historical contexts. In the words of Arjun Appadurai, value does not gener-
ate exchange, but “economic exchange creates value. Value is embodied in 
commodities that are exchanged. . . . The link between exchange and value is 
politics, construed broadly.”1 Commodities have social lives, with values that 
change over time and space as they pass through and create different social 
relationships. The essays in this volume amply demonstrate how the mean-
ing and value of objects like jade, birds’ nests, opium, and coins have shifted 
through the complicated processes of exchange, in which market relations 
are important but hardly the only creators of value. Such an approach is even 
more relevant for the exchange of labor, suffused as it is with a high-stakes 
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vocabulary of slavery, freedom, dignity, self-determination, contract, obli-
gation, indenture, protection, and development. Few things are more con-
tentious, political, and value-laden than the conditions under which labor 
is exchanged.
 A thorough history of the social life of Chinese migrant labor would be 
an immense undertaking. The aims of this essay are more modest: to intro-
duce some of the complexities of the politics of Chinese labor exchange in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, and to give a sense of what is at 
stake. While many histories of Chinese labor migration have uncritically 
appropriated the vocabulary of the “coolie” trade, indenture, and the “pig” 
trade, a more careful awareness of the specific politics, interests, and inco-
herencies that surrounded the production of these categories is warranted. 
Ultimately, the very meaning of “freedom,” the characterization of Chinese 
society, and the terms on which Asia is incorporated into world history are 
at stake.
labor as commodity
An attempt to think about labor as a commodity must contend with two 
pervasive conceptual anchors. The first is slavery, especially as exemplified 
in memories of the African slave trade to the Americas. The very body of a 
slave is under the power of others, treated as property, and subject to sale 
and exchange like any other thing. At the extreme, this commoditization can 
be seen as a form of “social death,” but, in practice, slavery includes various 
levels of autonomy, subjection, and integration into families or society. In-
deed, the biography of a slave can often be traced through periods of relative 
commoditization and social integration.2 However, the legacy of abolition-
ist discourse, with its stark dichotomy between freedom and slavery, has 
come to dominate much of the global imagination and obscure the many 
possible variations of slavery.
 The second conceptual anchor is labor as a service. Most economists 
speak of goods and services in the same breath, both subject to the laws 
of supply and demand that are grounded in the existence of free individu-
als making choices in their own best interests. Like any other good, labor is 
something that an individual can possess and should be allowed to dispose 
of as he or she chooses. Trading one’s own labor is seen as an exercise of 
freedom that is quite the opposite of trading other people who are not free 
to dispose of their own labor. Indeed, the commoditization of labor is often 
situated as part of a grander world-historical narrative of progress through 
the liberation of markets and men.
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 Marxist political economy constructs a similar narrative with a differ-
ent twist. Marxists share with other economists the concept of an evolu-
tion from slave to capitalist society in which labor is freed from other social 
bonds and commoditized in the context of an expanding market economy. 
But rather than understand this as the progressive realization of the natu-
ral laws of economics, they situate market relations as the manifestation of 
unequal power relations in the specific historical conditions of capitalism. 
Labor is not liberated but alienated and exploited. The value of labor and its 
products, previously determined by their specific use-values in the service 
of men and social relations, are now defined by market exchange-values far 
beyond the control of the laborer. Labor itself has become a commodity that 
can be quantified and made equivalent to things. The processes of produc-
tion and exchange have become the masters of men rather than the other 
way around.3 This diminishing control over the conditions and products of 
labor is sometimes referred to as “wage slavery.” More nuanced analyses em-
phasize how the very process of “freeing” labor from other social obligations 
is a necessary step in its commoditization and alienation from the person 
who labors.
 All of these approaches share a common belief in a historical trajectory 
from slavery to commoditized labor. They differ in their evaluation of the 
meaning of labor as a commodity. The same markets and property laws that 
can be seen to liberate human potential can also facilitate the subjection of 
people as property. The same process of commoditizing labor as service that 
can be described as the realization of free choice, consent, and the dignity of 
man can also be depicted as man’s subjection to capital and alienation from 
the world that he produced.
 These conceptual anchors have staked out a terrain of endless contention, 
not only because of the irreconcilable assumptions behind their evaluations, 
but also because none of them can adequately account for the myriad forms 
of labor exchange that actually have taken place in historical time. Debt, 
social obligations, family relations, adoption, rituals, job status, govern-
ment regulation, legal requirements, and physical coercion all complicate 
the meaning and politics of labor exchange. Even the apparently straight-
forward institution of indenture, rooted in the capitalist values of contract 
and market, has generated over two centuries of inconclusive debate over 
whether it is a new form of slavery, “neo-slavery,” or an effective exercise of 
personal consent that helps create labor markets and opportunities.4 In a 
similar vein, scholars of commodity exchange find that a stark distinction 
between market and gift relationships is hard to uphold, and that taste, dis-
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tinction, emotional bonds, obligations, and rational calculation pervade ex-
changes of all kinds.
 These conceptual anchors need to be historicized themselves if they are to 
remain helpful. The first step is to excavate actual practices of labor exchange 
and mobility on their own terms. What are the conditions under which the 
value of labor is most likely to be shaped by market relations or embedded in 
social, family, or ritual obligations? How is labor mobility organized within 
and across social units, be they class, kinship dialect groups, or political 
entities? To what extent are common meanings shared by different partici-
pants in the process of labor exchange? How do the meaning and organiza-
tion of labor change over time? In the nineteenth century, we quickly find 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to answer these questions in “native” 
terms. Actual practices were entangled in the ideals, assumptions, and de-
bates over the meaning and nature of free labor. These ideals and the insti-
tutions designed to enforce them often obscured the actual practices of mi-
gration.
 One issue at stake in the understanding of Chinese migrant labor is the 
origins and meaning of capitalism. The conceptual anchors generally posit 
an evolutionary story in which capitalism developed in Europe and then dif-
fused to incorporate the rest of the world. The essays in this volume all en-
gage with this world-historical narrative to some degree, demonstrating the 
great extent, impact, and sophistication of Southeast Asian market econo-
mies both before and beyond the impact of Europeans, while simultaneously 
describing the specific regional contexts and meanings that cast doubt on 
attempts to project Western economic values as universal truths. It is a deli-
cate balancing act, an attempt to recover the vitality of non-Western history 
while critiquing and modifying the Western narratives that have established 
the standards by which to evaluate vitality.
 Discussions of Chinese labor have often failed to maintain that balance. 
The voluminous documentation surrounding indenture has suffused dis-
cussions of Chinese migrant labor with a vocabulary of “coolies,” “abuses,” 
“pig trade,” and of corrupt Chinese officials and brokers. This vocabulary 
has marginalized Chinese migration from the main trends of world history. 
European migrants in the nineteenth century are routinely depicted as em-
blematic of the dislocations and entrepreneurialism of modernity, progres-
sive and creative settlers who opened frontiers and created nations. Chinese 
migrants, in contrast, are routinely depicted as backward, earthbound peas-
ants, unable or unwilling to participate in the sweep of modern migration 
history without the direct intervention, protection, and resources of Euro-
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peans.5 Causes of long-term migration patterns that have been discredited 
in European history, such as war, overpopulation, and despotism are still 
routinely used to explain Chinese emigration, as if the laws of supply and 
demand that shaped European labor migrations had to be imposed in Asia 
through political and economic domination.
 In fact, when we look beyond indenture we find that Chinese migrations 
were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to European ones. Fewer than 
4 percent of Chinese emigrants were directly indentured to Europeans. The 
bulk of the over 20 million Chinese who departed south China from the 
1840s to 1930s traveled under their own resources and organization. Peak 
emigration rates from Guangdong and Fujian were similar to peak rates 
from Italy, Norway, and Ireland. The 35 million Asians (including Indians) 
who moved into Southeast Asia from 1870 to 1930 were comparable to the 
39 million who moved into the United States. Despite their reputation as 
sojourners, Chinese return rates were only slightly higher than global aver-
ages. Chinese migration was part of an interconnected world on the move, 
flowing into factories, construction projects, mines, plantations, agricul-
tural frontiers, and retail networks across the globe.6
 However, this migration has not been remembered as part of world his-
tory. Most Western-language accounts of Chinese emigration only count 
2 to 8 million migrants. The trail of footnotes shows these numbers were 
ultimately drawn from three studies by Chen Ta, Chen Zexuan, and Arnold 
Meagher, all of which were explicitly counting only contract labor and 
“coolie” migration.7 The assumption that Chinese labor migrated only under 
conditions of direct European control has shaped the very collection of data. 
Chinese-language accounts often give a more accurate number of about 20 
million. But they emphasize that the contemporary descendants of Chinese 
in the world do not even amount to the population of Canada, and inter-
pret Chinese mobility as something other than a true migration of settlers.8 
While the basic insight that European power has critically shaped the social 
life of Chinese migration is accurate, it needs to be qualified with a more 
specific history of the social interactions that actually shaped mobility, labor 
exchange, and social relations.
 Two entwined discourses had a deep impact on the social life of Chinese 
labor: the vocabulary of contracts and consent as a foundation of political 
and economic freedom; and the vocabulary of abolition, with its black-and-
white dichotomies of freedom and slavery. These vocabularies proved en-
tirely insufficient to describe, recruit, and understand Chinese migration. 
Attempts to do so were suffused with contradictions and incoherencies, con-
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stantly undermined by the actual practices of migration. Despite this, the 
basic legitimacy of consent, freedom, and slavery as ways to frame labor 
exchange was never dislodged. One result of the continual attempts to re-
formulate these principles was to obscure the actual practices of migration 
under a haze of confusion. In the process, Chinese migration was largely 
erased from the historical memory as anything other than a collection of 
exploitative and uncivilized practices, reflective of Chinese society itself.
indenturing asians
British attempts to recruit Chinese contract labor in the 1850s were shaped 
by the experience and institutions of Indian indenture. These, in turn, were 
framed by the experience and debates of abolition.9 Plans to bring inden-
tured Indians to sugar colonies in the Indian Ocean and Caribbean regions 
materialized immediately after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, 
in 1834. Criticisms of those plans emerged just as quickly. Both sides ap-
pealed to freedom, progress, and the greater interests of the empire. Anti-
indenture activists drew on the ideals, personnel, and institutions of the 
antislavery movement to argue that the restrictions on personal liberty en-
tailed in indenture contracts were actually a form of pseudoslavery. During 
the period of indenture, contracted laborers could be punished, exchanged, 
and confined by their employers, with no power over the conditions or loca-
tion of their work. The empire had a responsibility to protect and assure the 
well-being of its colonial subjects. This was especially true for those who, 
whether due to ignorance or coercion, were unable to protect themselves 
against adventurers and self-interested capital.
 Pro-indenture activists spoke of how indenture was essential for the 
progress and prosperity of all parts of the empire. Contracts and cash ad-
vances “freed” impoverished migrants to circulate throughout the empire 
to places where they could work most effectively for the benefit of them-
selves and their employers. Indenture alleviated poverty and overpopulation 
in India while alleviating labor shortages in the sugar colonies. To suppress 
the right of Indians to freely move and enter into contracts was to under-
mine British ideals. As one Calcutta firm wrote to the Bengal government in 
1838, “It is a question involving the rights of British subjects (in principle, 
of all British subjects) to carry their manual labor to the most productive 
market. . . . Any other political doctrine, though practically extended for the 
present to only a particular class of men, must obviously be extensible to all 
classes alike; and to assert it, therefore, in this case, would be to establish a 
precedent of the most perilous nature to constitutional liberty.”10
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 By the 1850s, however, both sides tended to agree that a “free” migrant 
was an independent, self-willed individual, and that most Indians were not 
inherently free but enveloped in networks of obligation and ignorance, un-
able to achieve their own natural liberty. They continued to debate whether 
indenture contracts could work to “free” them, but agreed that some level 
of government surveillance was necessary to maintain a level of free consent 
that could make the system acceptable, disagreeing only over the extent and 
effectiveness of that surveillance. As investigations and reports continued 
to reiterate the pro- and anti-indenture positions, the British government 
established an intermediary position of “benevolent neutrality” that could 
enact mild regulation to objectively mediate between the two extremes. In 
effect, the “free” migrant did not exist through a lack of government inter-
vention but as a product of proper regulation. When abuses persisted, they 
could now be blamed on the activities of native recruiters, ignorance, and 
custom rather than on indenture itself.
 This modus vivendi worked for Indian indenture within the British Em-
pire until the rise of Indian nationalist sentiments in the the late nine-
teenth century, but its application to China was far from straightforward. 
Like India, China appeared to be a favorable site for labor recruitment be-
cause of a commercialized rural economy and dense population. Serious 
recruiting did not begin until the late 1840s, however, when the establish-
ment of Hong Kong and the treaty ports helped ease many of the Chinese re-
strictions on European traders. But Chinese indenture remained a vexed and 
relatively unsuccessful enterprise throughout the 1870s, when abuses and 
scandal led the Chinese and American governments to suppress all but the 
most highly regulated recruitment. Britons and Americans blamed most of 
the abuses on the incompetence of the Chinese government and the schemes 
and greed of non-Anglophone recruiters. Ultimately, however, the biggest 
problem was that Chinese indenture did not take place within the surveil-
lance of a single empire but across multiple frontiers. Migrants departed 
from China, Macau, Hong Kong, and Singapore to a variety of destinations, 
which included Hawaii, Peru, and British, Dutch, French, and Spanish colo-
nies. Private recruiters could easily evade regulations and shop for favorable 
forums. From one perspective, this international market could have signi-
fied a truly free market beyond the controls of any single government. But 
in practice, British diplomats forsook “benevolent neutrality” in favor of 
a systematic campaign against the unregulated private organization of the 
“coolie trade.”11
 The transposition of Indian indenture was also difficult because mar-
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ket relations with the Chinese were already on a different footing than with 
other Asian peoples. In European eyes, most native peoples were notable 
for their laziness and obstinate refusal to act according to the laws of eco-
nomics by selling their labor at market rates. Indeed, indenture was often 
seen as one of the methods to assimilate Asians into the laws of the market. 
Chinese, on the other hand, were often noted for their commercial acumen, 
industriousness, and willingness to conform to the laws of the market. Re-
ports from Penang, Melaka, and South China in the 1840s and early 1850s 
were aware of extensive Chinese-organized labor migration to mines and 
agricultural areas throughout Southeast Asia. Prevalent financing schemes 
in which the migrants’ passages were paid in advance in return for one year 
of labor abroad were described in terms that made them appear little differ-
ent than the indentured migration of Europeans to the Americas that had 
been prominent until the 1830s.12 As late as 1876, U.S. Minister to China 
William Williams responded to questions posed by an investigation com-
mittee from California in a way that compared the freedom of Chinese emi-
grants favorably to that of European emigrants. Despite some reservations 
about the “heathenish influences” of Chinese emigrants, he asserted that 
the debts used to finance migration to the United States demonstrated the 
positive effect of the market forces and political restraint of China and the 
United States as compared to the aristocracies, serfs, and deportations of 
Europe.
There is no caste among the Chinese, no privileged class or titled aristoc-
racy on the one hand claiming rights over serfs, or slaves on the other; 
and, consequently, no power inheres in the hands of one portion of so-
ciety to get rid of their drones, their criminals, their paupers, or their use-
less slaves, by shipping them to other lands. Those who arrive in Califor-
nia are free men, poor, ignorant, and uncivilized indeed, easily governed 
and not disposed to make trouble in any way, but hoping to get a good 
price for their labor. . . . The imperial government can no more control 
the movement of its subjects, or keep them within its territory, than the 
President can restrain those of our citizens; neither power can control or 
limit emigration or travel.13
 All of these reports seemed to point to the ease of establishing contract 
relations with Chinese labor. In 1851, British officials began to collect infor-
mation about the possibility of indenturing laborers from southern China 
to work in the Caribbean. A circular to South China consuls in 1853, asking 
if Chinese should be enticed through contracts and advances or left “wholly 
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free and unfettered,” received unanimous agreement that a contract and 
cash advance was necessary to get Chinese to migrate to an unknown land.14 
The issue was not that Chinese were impoverished and ignorant of migra-
tion, but that they already had access to well-developed migration networks 
and could make well-informed, commercially astute choices. Recruitment 
for the West Indies would have to be competitive. However, these attitudes 
changed as soon as the British actually attempted to break into this market. 
It quickly became clear that indenture functioned best when it could be seen 
as a means of extracting natives from backward, nonmarket conditions, not 
in conditions of open competition.
contracting chinese
The first attempts at recruitment in Amoy (or Xiamen, chosen for its long-
standing practices of labor migration to the outside world) not only failed 
to be competitive, but also caused riots against the Western companies that 
attempted them. The main complaints were that the Chinese recruiters en-
gaged by the companies were outsiders who relied on kidnapping and de-
ceit.15 Indeed, such practices were probably necessary in order to recruit 
Chinese to unknown lands on terms much less favorable than those in 
Southeast Asia, although the effect of rumors generated by competing Chi-
nese recruiters cannot be discounted. The British retreated to Hong Kong, 
where, despite repeated efforts over the next twenty-five years, they were 
never able to establish indenture recruitment on favorable terms and with-
out “abuses.”
 To many Europeans, the Chinese state was a major obstacle against a 
smooth regime of free emigration. They saw it as excessively authoritarian 
and opposed to free intercourse, yet incapable of enforcing its own laws 
against emigration. It was indeed difficult to engage Chinese officials on 
this topic because of the embarrassment of discussing the regulation of a 
migration that was officially prohibited. After the withdrawal from Xiamen, 
the Colonial Office instructed Hong Kong governor John Bowring to notify 
consuls in China that they were not to aid in the recruitment of coolies; 
however, “if the Chinese subjects of their own free will should prefer to risk 
the penalty attached to the transgression of the law . . . you are not bound 
to prevent, or even ostensibly be cognisant of, such acts, for it is the duty of 
the Chinese government to enforce its own laws.”16 However, this attitude 
did not prove sufficient to channel labor away from competing recruiters 
in China or Macau. An 1853 report from the Colonial Land and Emigration 
Commissioners recognized, in reference to China, that “it would appear dif-
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ficult to deal with abuses which take place in collecting foreign emigrants 
in a foreign country, having its own political and judicial organisation, and 
jealously alive to any interference with that organisation.” But they also 
feared that increased regulations in Hong Kong would drive recruiters to 
Macau and migrants to destinations outside of the British Empire.17 Indeed, 
the problem of obtaining a steady supply of “free” emigrants in an interna-
tional sphere beyond the regulatory efforts of any single government would 
prove elusive.
 Release from Chinese jurisdiction was also no guarantee that migrants 
themselves would become free. Rather, it only generated new ways to de-
pict the migrants as unfree and the cause of their own abuse. As early as the 
1840s, Hong Kong officials worried about their still tenuous control over 
the island argued that once Chinese were freed from the despotic control of 
the Chinese state, it could only be expected that a people with no habits of 
self-restraint would relapse into banditry and licentiousness. The very act 
of movement even selected for such people. As Chinese Secretary Charles 
Gutzlaff wrote in 1846, “It is very natural that depraved, idle, and bad char-
acters from the adjacent mainland and islands should flock to the colony 
where some money can be made. They are a roving set of beings, and com-
mitting depredations wherever it can be done with impunity; they cannot be 
considered as domesticated, and are in the habit of coming and going ac-
cording to the state of the trade.”18 Governor Bowring borrowed this image 
to explain the Amoy riots, explaining that emigration had become such a 
habit that the town was overpopulated by “the idle, vagrant and profligate,” 
who, when stimulated by greedy Western recruiters, made it impossible to 
establish “a quiet, steady and progressing system of well-digested emigra-
tion, giving time for the fit selection and becoming organization of proper 
bodies of Chinamen.”19
 British officials also identified Chinese customs and economic practices 
as major obstacles working against a migration that was free from abuse, 
even when those customs seemed similar to the basic principles of free con-
tracts. West Indian planters were adamant about the need for female emi-
grants to create a less “depraved” laboring population. James White, the 
emigration agent in China, argued that this would only be possible by offer-
ing bounties to men who traveled with their wives. This was based both on 
the perception of cultural restrictions against female emigration and on the 
sense that the sale of women and children was pervasive in Chinese society. 
White concluded that the distinction between marriage and a market trans-
action was trivial, and slavery was indistinguishable from the patriarchal 
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control over the household. Female emigrants could only be obtained by 
collaborating with local practices.20 This led to some discussion and ethno-
graphic reports on whether proper marriage even existed in China. The colo-
nial land and emigration commissioners ultimately agreed with White, add-
ing, “Whatever may be thought of the state of morality which renders this 
possible, we cannot but point out that, as far as the woman is concerned, 
the result will be to raise her from the state of slavery under Chinese, to that 
of freedom under British law. . . . We cannot help hoping that these con-
siderations will be held to constitute a substantial difference between the 
proceedings recommended by Mr. White and the Slave Trade.”21 Hong Kong 
Governor George Bonham, however, objected that Mr. White’s plan “would 
doubtless give rise [to] . . . a trade little different from the Slave Trade,” 
arguing that “the offer of a premium, without some official check, is a dan-
gerous experiment to try with so venal and money-grasping a people as the 
Chinese.” He stated that if such a plan were to be implemented,
The British authority should inquire carefully into every case of marriage 
so performed; should have the parties brought up before him, and the 
woman narrowly and strictly examined previous to shipment, and a dec-
laration made and signed by her, to the effect that she was a free and vol-
untary emigrant, that she freely and voluntarily married her present hus-
band, and that no compulsion or any other agency had been set at work 
to induce her to do so. Without some official control of this nature, the 
plan would be a bad one.22
 A system similar to Bonham’s was finally adopted as a solution that was 
“less abhorrent to our notions of freedom and less suggestive of abuse.”23 
From all perspectives, the Chinese condition in the absence of British inter-
vention was conceived as degradation and slavery. Indeed, the very com-
moditization of labor that framed the civilizing potential of indenture to free 
Asians from their traditional bonds and poverty was now seen as the source 
of Chinese corruption.
 A series of Hong Kong regulations to limit recruiting and transportation 
abuses largely succeeded only in pushing recruitment activities to Macau 
and the Chinese mainland. The British military occupation of South China 
from 1858 to 1861, during the Arrow War (also called the Second Opium 
War), created an opportunity that officials believed would provide “great 
facilities for conducting emigration on fair and humane principles.”24 Euro-
peans worked with local Chinese officials to develop a system of surveil-
lance similar to India’s. Governor-General Lao Chongguang issued orders to 
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local magistrates in April 1859, instructing them to punish all kidnappers, to 
make sure that emigrants were aware of all the conditions of their contract, 
and to reassure migrants that the government had no objection to their de-
parting with the foreigners once both parties had given their consent. Emi-
gration depots were established in October, requiring at least a forty-eight-
hour stay during which migrants were subjected to a joint examination by 
Chinese officers and foreign emigration agents, and given a chance to think 
more carefully before signing a contract. A public proclamation from the 
governor-general that month described the regulations and explained of the 
migrants that “their emigration is voluntary, and wholly different from that 
which is conducted by the kidnapper who sells his fellow-man. In order that 
this villainy may be stopped, and the difference between it and the former 
made patent to the world, such means of investigation and of inspection 
should be provided as will plainly denote a distinction.”25
 During the negotiations, Prince Gong of the Zongli Yamen (the Chinese 
foreign-affairs office) had also distinguished labor emigrants from other 
migrants by insisting, “Although they are employed by foreigners and re-
ceived monthly salaries, they are not selling their labor to foreigners, they 
should be considered as if China were loaning them to foreign countries to 
use. Therefore, even though they have left their homeland, they are still en-
titled to protection from the Chinese government.”26 This new surveillance, 
which for the Europeans meant a guarantee of the emigrants’ freedom, was 
for the Chinese a means of asserting government jurisdiction in the face of 
other powers and over migrants themselves. Those who departed without 
surveillance were not entitled to protection.
 The legitimacy of these arrangements was recognized in a provision of the 
Treaty of Beijing, signed between Britain and China in 1860, which declared 
that Chinese subjects “are at perfect liberty to enter into engagements with 
British subjects . . . and to ship themselves and their families on board any 
British vessels at the open ports of China.” However, surveillance was dif-
ficult to maintain in the international conditions of the South China coast. 
Chinese depots were rarely used because recruitment via Macau circum-
vented this system altogether. By the late 1860s, Europeans and Chinese in 
Hong Kong frequently protested activities in Macau. As British ships were 
prohibited from carrying emigrants from Macau, the British had little inter-
est in supporting the freedom of emigrants to depart from any port they 
wanted. In these conditions, accounts of Chinese indenture contracts grew 
overwhelmingly negative, depicting them as an abuse and infringement on 
individual freedom and calling for government suppression.
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 In 1867, Hong Kong Legislative Consul J. Whittall claimed that even the 
more rigorously monitored emigration from Hong Kong should be banned 
because it was a stain on the reputation of the colony. Indenture contracts 
should be made invalid in British courts, he argued, because “they shift the 
responsibility of the miserable coolie’s detention from the shoulders of his 
kidnappers to those of official authority. . . . Let voluntary emigration, pure 
and simple, be as uncontrolled from China as from Ireland, but let it be made 
criminal for British subjects to aid, abet, or in any way subserve, contracts of 
servitude for a term of years.”27
 London officials, concerned with justifying Indian indenture, were some-
what dismissive of these objections. Acting Colonial Secretary Henry John 
Ball in London responded that under existing arrangements Chinese emi-
grants knew what they were getting themselves into. He blamed the prob-
lems on the severity of existing regulations and even hoped that “a uniform 
form of contract might perhaps be settled on terms more just to the planters 
than that adopted by the Peking Convention [of 1866], which has caused 
nearly all honest and open emigration to cease, and has thrown the trade 
into the hands of unscrupulous parties, who care nothing for the Chinese 
Government or their Convention, thus actually increasing the evils which it 
was intended to suppress.”28 In more moderate terms the colonial secretary 
added that the suspension of emigration from Hong Kong would cause dif-
ficult international complications. He insisted that the British government 
fulfilled its duty to the migrants merely by ascertaining that the emigrants 
signed their contracts voluntarily and understood their decision.29 Opinions 
in Hong Kong were not so easily mollified. A series of scandals in the early 
1870s resulted in British- and Chinese-led international pressure to stop the 
labor trade from Macau, especially to Cuba and Peru.
 Between the accusations and counter-accusations, the vested interests, 
and the shifting of blame to crimps (local Asian recruiters) and subcontrac-
tors, the actual practices of migration were lost, never able to fit within the 
categories of voluntary or coerced. Both migrants and officials were even en-
couraged to obscure the modes of organization in order to fulfill the formal 
requirements of freedom. Migrants were easily trained to assert their volun-
tary adherence to the terms of a contract when undergoing inspection. On 
their part, Hong Kong officials found it in their best interest to deny knowl-
edge of any local activities in their port that might be interpreted as a coolie 
trade, a silence similar to that they had once criticized among Chinese.
 In 1854, the Hong Kong harbormaster wrote that the free emigrant and 
the coolie “are understood to be widely different, the former being a class of 
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persons who have paid their passage, while the latter are understood to be 
those who have had their passage paid for them under an agreement.”30 Such 
a categorization lumped kidnapped coolies into the same group as those 
who borrowed money from friends and family abroad, making it very diffi-
cult to make finer distinctions. By 1881, ignorance of alternatives to inden-
ture and self-payment had become the official stance of Hong Kong officials. 
That year, in response to requests from Australia to report on the free or un-
free nature of Chinese emigration, the attorney general of Hong Kong would 
only say that he had been consulted on the meaning of contract emigration 
and its relation to debt obligations many times. His answer was that he could 
only address concrete cases, not hypothetical ones.31 Only in 1910 did Hong 
Kong formally admit that many Chinese engaged in “kangany” emigration, 
in which a returned migrant gave assistance to new emigrants.32 These de-
velopments helped perpetuate an understanding of all Chinese labor mi-
gration as outside of legitimate social practice, something other than true, 
self-determined migration and free labor markets.
chinese labor in the Straits Settlements
Officials and planters in the Straits Settlements had a much more direct 
interest in the flow of Chinese labor. They remained fully aware of the ac-
tivities of Chinese brokers, becoming entrenched in a long struggle over 
the control of Chinese labor. The consistently high labor demands and en-
trenched laissez-faire ideology of the late nineteenth century generated a 
firm opposition against most plans to regulate migration and labor mar-
kets. But regulation still found a ready audience when formulated in terms 
of suppressing the perceived abuses and underground government of secret 
societies, countering the perceived antimarket practices of Chinese brokers, 
and preventing the seduction of labor to places beyond British colonies.33
 Secret-society riots of the 1860s and 1870s along with the wave of in-
denture scandals in Hong Kong set the stage for the discussion of migrant 
regulation in Singapore. In 1871 and 1873, groups of Chinese merchants and 
planters sent petitions to the legislative council requesting an inquiry into 
labor-recruitment practices that could lead to some sort of regulation. After 
praising the fame, paternal protection, and impartiality of Eng lish laws, 
the 1871 petition explained that “now-a-days we hear of ill-disposed people 
(vagabonds) that often make it their trade of the ‘Singkeks’ or new comers, 
who, on their first landing here, not happening to be acquainted with any 
one in the place, are by these vagabonds invariably deceived and cheated.” 
They requested “a trustworthy officer to superintend all the new arrivals, 
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and ascertain from the ‘Singkeks’ themselves where they intend to go, those 
of them willing to stay to be apprised that they are at liberty to act as free 
agents, that these vagabonds may not have the opportunity of deluding these 
‘Singkeks.’”34
 These complaints and suggestions resulted in the enactment of an 1873 
law that required all incoming Chinese laborers to register with the authori-
ties. At a public meeting held to protest the law, European employers and 
merchants complained that it was “impolitic because it interferes with the 
importation of free labour to this Settlement, and unnecessary, because it 
can never accomplish the object which it is supposed to secure.”35 In a peti-
tion to the legislative council, they explained that any abuses were surely the 
fault of the secret societies and their insistence on creating an imperium in 
imperio. Their suppression would help promote the establishment of a free 
market that could, by its very workings, offer the best protection against 
abuses.
Once landed in Singapore, and apart from this influence [of the secret 
societies], the competition for labor is so great as to obtain for the newly 
arrived Immigrant perfect security from extortion or unfair labor bar-
gains. The only danger which assails him is that he may be, either before 
landing or after, hurried and cajoled into engagements to work in coun-
tries outside of this Settlement, and in ignorance shipped away beyond 
the influence and protection of our laws.36
 Enforcement of the 1873 law was delayed, and a committee was appointed 
in 1875 to investigate the conditions of Chinese labor migration. Its findings 
elaborated on those from the 1840s and 1850s, describing a system of bro-
kers and agents that reached from Malayan plantations to Chinese villages 
and from European financiers to small headmen in charge of groups of ten 
to twenty migrants. Migrants who did not pay their own passage were dis-
tributed to local employers and obliged to work for six months or a year in 
order to pay off their passage, after which they were free to find employ-
ment on their own. The commission concluded that abuses were minimal 
and that “perhaps no stronger practical testimony could be borne to the re-
spectability of the mass of Chinese immigrants who arrive here than the fact 
that the system described above works fairly well for the employers.”37
 Employer satisfaction was not entirely true. In their testimony before the 
commission, Chinese brokers and planters consistently called for a govern-
ment depot and written contracts as a way to limit runaways. Europeans, 
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on the other hand, were more likely to complain about the unnecessary ex-
pense and obstructions of a depot and to imply that this would only further 
bolster Chinese control over the labor supply. Despite their satisfaction with 
the existing practices, the commission still found that a major source of 
abuse lay in the diversion of migrants to Penang and Sumatra against their 
will. They also agreed with Chinese brokers that the lack of legal recourse 
over runaway migrants was a problem. They argued that runaways should be 
treated as a police rather than a civil matter, because employers could rarely 
expect adequate compensation in civil proceedings, given that migrants 
owned little more than the clothes on their backs. The commission’s most 
serious concern, however, was about the lack of government surveillance.
The Government knows little or nothing of the Chinese, who are the 
industrial backbone of these Settlements; and the immense majority of 
them know nothing of the Government. We know that a certain number 
of Chinese arrive each year, and that a certain number go away; but how 
long they stay, how many come back a second time, what they think about 
and desire—as to all this we know nothing. . . . We believe that the vast 
majority of the Chinamen who come to work in these Settlements return 
to their country not knowing clearly whether there is a Government in 
them or not.38
As a consequence, whenever laborers got in trouble, they went to the secret 
societies rather than the government. Thus the commission proposed the 
establishment of a Chinese protectorate and government depot where labor 
contracts would be signed and direct contact with magistrates could be en-
couraged in case of trouble. A protectorate was duly legislated in 1877, along 
with a crimping ordinance that required all contracts signed by local resi-
dents to work outside of the colony to be signed at the protectorate. As in 
India, mild regulation would produce free migration and labor markets.
 The government did not build the depot, but licensed it out to Chinese 
boardinghouse owners. A court case in 1890 also interpreted the protector-
ate law to say that the protectorate did not have the power to compel any-
body to stay in a depot or sign a contract at its offices. These circumstances 
led, in 1890, to a new investigation into the conditions of migrant labor. 
By this time, the idea that the protectorate was designed to safeguard the 
interests of laborers rather than employers was already firmly entrenched. 
As the attorney general argued before the court in 1890, “The evil which the 
Ordinance was intended to meet was the virtual slavery which the immigrant 
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would be under to the man who had brought him down from China and paid 
his passage money, if he were free from the supervision of the Chinese Pro-
tectorate.”39 Such ideas helped frame new and more explicit attacks on the 
Chinese brokers as the main obstacle to free labor exchange.
 The actual findings in 1890 about the organization of Chinese labor mi-
gration were again little different than previous reports, down to the conclu-
sion that “the abuses of the current system are more sentimental than real.” 
The report even promoted the further expansion of the credit-ticket system 
(the main source of trepidation among Hong Kong officials) as a way to cre-
ate a more vibrant labor market.40 However, in the spirit of the protector-
ate, it developed an extended and detailed critique of the Chinese brokerage 
system as the main obstacle to smooth and abuse-free labor exchange. It 
argued that brokers drove up prices, obstructed the free flow of labor, and 
contributed to the labor shortage by pocketing money, providing unneces-
sary services, speculating on labor contracts, and forming a ring that ex-
cluded outsiders.41 Even the compensation paid by brokers to the families 
of lost coolies and for funeral expenses were criticized for driving up costs. 
The report complained that Chinese boardinghouse keepers were “generally 
of the most worthless class,” unsupervised, and “free to obtain men where 
and how they can so long as they avoid the displeasure of the authorities.”42 
Under existing conditions of minimal government surveillance, they could 
disrupt free markets by exerting undue influence over laborers through per-
suasion and deception.
While the Sin-Kheh is in the depot it is the keeper to whom he must look 
as his government, and it is the servants of this man who bring him from 
the ship, guard him in the depot, and eventually remove him to the scene 
of his future employment. The power which is thus placed in the hands 
of the depot-keepers, who are agreed on all sides to be unscrupulous, ap-
pears to us greater than should be entrusted to private individuals, and we 
consider, therefore, that the system should not be perpetuated.43
 The committee insisted that “it is important that the coolly should be a 
free agent, at liberty to choose the employment and country he prefers.”44 
The means by which to create free agents was to suppress Chinese busi-
nessmen in favor of expanded government control. The committee rec-
ommended that the government directly operate depots in Singapore and 
China, and facilitate direct recruitment by employers that excluded middle-
men and channeled each migrant from the very moment of recruitment to a 
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specific job in the straits. A free market in Chinese labor was to work for the 
benefit of consumers of labor, not traders or producers.
 The Chinese government was held up as the other serious obstacle to a 
free labor market. Citing diplomatic correspondence in which the Chinese 
government opposed the emigration of laborers who had not paid their own 
passage, the commission insisted that this helped to push the credit and 
labor market underground. “From this cause doubtless springs much of the 
iniquity of which we have here, and there obtained a glimpse; the bringing of 
subordinates, purchasing the silence of parents, and tutoring of emigrants 
to lie to those in authority.”45 Nearly all the Chinese brokers who testified 
before the committee denied that the Chinese government in any way inter-
fered with their activities. However, the commission insisted that even the 
limited efforts of the Chinese government, such as the public execution of a 
broker accused of kidnapping and attempts to hold brokers responsible for 
lost coolies, would dissuade more respectable Chinese from becoming in-
volved in the traffic. Effective regulation must be put on a more systematic 
basis through depots and surveillance from departure to arrival. It was not 
the existence of regulation, but the form of regulation and the interests it 
served that made a market into one that was free or suffused with abuse.
chinese labor as commodity
It is difficult to summarize these debates. Representations of a free and func-
tioning market in Chinese labor varied across time, place, and even indi-
viduals, dependent on the immediate interests and circumstances involved. 
In Hong Kong, the topic of contracts and obligations became so embar-
rassing that officials ultimately avoided it altogether, relegating it to a hazy 
zone of vaguely illegitimate native practice. Singapore planters and officials 
managed to develop a somewhat more systematic critique of Chinese bro-
kers for hindering the free market in labor, without adopting an abolition-
ist stance against labor contracts. In both cases, it is hard to determine the 
actual effects on migration flows. But one long-term legacy was to create a 
flexible and pervasive image of Chinese labor and society itself as somehow 
unfree and corrupt.
 This legacy had a direct impact on global migration patterns. For ex-
ample, in 1879 David Bailey, a former U.S. consul in Hong Kong, selected 
material from the extended local debates over Chinese indenture and the 
sale of women and children in Hong Kong to write a long treatise on Chi-
nese slavery and concubinage. He forwarded it to the U.S. State Department 
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with the comment “If Chinese emigration to the United States is to continue 
and increase with slavery or quasi slavery, and concubinage, inbred and per-
meating its every feature and organisation, so that they may be said to be an 
indissoluble part of its present system, is it not a subject to which American 
statesmen should turn their attention with some degree of anxiety?”46 His 
report was cited in congressional debates leading to Chinese exclusion, and 
in court decisions that validated exclusion. In 1884, in a reversal from earlier 
decisions that protected Chinese immigration under treaty agreements, Jus-
tice Stephen Field wrote that the actual practice of Chinese immigration did 
not live up to the “voluntary emigration” stipulated in treaties because it 
placed migrants “in the bond thralls of the contractor—his coolie slaves.”47 
It was a kind of labor exchange appropriate for colonies and uncivilized 
peoples, but unsuitable for a free republic.
 These decisions played an important role in the establishment of an ex-
clusionary barrier that kept Chinese out of the white settler nations of North 
America and Australia. From the 1850s to the 1870s, nearly 40 percent of all 
Chinese migrants traveled to these locations, the majority under Chinese 
financing and organization.48 By the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, this potential for a globally integrated system of migration was in-
creasingly segmented into distinct regional migration systems. These exclu-
sionary laws helped create a concrete geographic territory where labor was 
exchanged under conditions believed to be something other than freedom, 
and which could be relegated to a historical death at the margins of modern 
world history.
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opium as a Commodity in the Chinese nanyang trade
Carl A. Trocki
The irresistible propensity of the inhabitants of these districts to the use of opium 
appears to have long afforded the government . . . the most effectual and easy means 
of bringing again into circulation, and of attracting to the capital of Batavia, the 
specie and ready money which . . . would have otherwise accumulated in the interior 
and been exclusively hoarded up in the treasuries of the native princes and regents.
—T. S. Raffles, lieutenant-governor of Java, quoted in H. R. C. Wright, East-Indian 
Economic Problems of the Age of Cornwallis and Raffles
The story of opium in Southeast Asia is a long one. It was traded to China 
and used as a medicine as early as the Song Dynasty, and, as the recent work 
of Zhang Yangwen documents, it was used as a recreational drug and an 
aphrodisiac in the Chinese court as early as the sixteenth century.1 It was 
probably also by that time used by Southeast Asians, both as a work drug and 
as a recreational drug. Whether it was a true commodity may be debatable, 
but it was certainly an article of commerce that was manufactured in India 
and perhaps central Asia, then exported to the east and sold throughout the 
region. It was a luxury item, both as a medicine and as an indulgence, and 
its consumption was largely restricted to elites, but it was not yet fully com-
modified. At the time, it was probably considered to be in the same class of 
exotic, nature-based chemicals that China was obtaining from the Bornean 
rainforests.2
 By the end of the seventeenth century, the picture of the opium trade in 
East and Southeast Asia had undergone some important changes, including 
the way in which opium was used. Europeans had brought tobacco to Asia, 
and with it came the habit of smoking.3 Some of the first reports of opium 
smoking come from late-seventeenth-century Java, where opium was mixed 
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with tobacco and sold to the Javanese.4 At that time, the drug was carried 
from India by the Dutch, who dominated the trade to the east.
The change or shift in the commercialization of Indian opium was in-
stigated by the Voc [Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie] in the 1650’s. 
After experimenting with exporting Malwa opium from Surat to Batavia, 
the Company began exporting Bengal opium in the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury in increasingly larger quantities to Batavia for sale on Java and later 
in the Indonesian archipelago and the Malay world. The development and 
expansion of the sale of Bengal opium to Batavia for commercialization 
on Java by the Voc is well known. . . . The quantities exported from Ben-
gal to Batavia by the Company rose from 1,300 ponden (one Dutch pond is 
equal to 0.4 kilo) in 1659 to an annual average of 120,000 ponden over the 
decade of 1707–1717 with a reported gross profit margin of 46%.5
 According to Owen, it was probably the Dutch who spread the practice of 
smoking opium to Taiwan, and from there it became established in China. 
Somewhere along the way, however, the Chinese further refined the practice 
by dispensing with the tobacco and finding a way to smoke pure opium.6 
David Bello has noted that the first reports of smoking pure opium paste in 
China appear in the 1790s. The practice spread throughout the empire in the 
early nineteenth century.7
 Until the Battle of Plassey, in 1757, the production and marketing of “Ben-
gal” opium continued to be controlled by Indians, and was dominated by 
a group of merchants known as pykars. Once in control of Bihar, however, 
the British East India Company (eic) servants in Patna quickly assumed 
monopoly control over the local opium crop.8 By the 1760s, British coun-
try traders, together with their Parsi, Armenian, and Jewish affiliates, came 
to dominate the movement of opium from Calcutta to Southeast Asia and 
China. The country traders moved through Southeast Asia with variegated 
cargoes of Indian and European goods, mainly opium, cotton and cotton 
cloth, gunpowder, and arms. Their aim was to amass cargoes that would be 
saleable in China. This meant trading some of their cargoes for the products 
of Southeast Asia, usually tin, pepper, gold, and a range of other products 
from the jungles and seas of the region collectively known as “straits pro-
duce.”
 This trade brought the British traders into contact with the Chinese mer-
chants who were settled in the main trading ports of the region. Some of 
them had already been buying opium from the Dutch for shipment to China. 
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Others, according to Kwee Hui Kian, were involved in revenue farming activi-
ties in north Java.9 Although her work shows they were principally collecting 
the rice tax, James Rush shows that opium farms were already in existence 
by the mid-eighteenth century in Java.10 Souza and Leonard Blussé, among 
others, have noted that during the mid-eighteenth century, the Dutch were 
focused more on the collection of primary agricultural commodities such 
as rice, sugar, indigo, coffee, pepper, and also metals such as tin and gold.11 
Much of the Asian trade had fallen to others, especially the Chinese and the 
country traders.
 In the search for commodities, both the British and the Dutch entered 
the new production economy that the Chinese were developing in South-
east Asia. The junk traders who had been coming to Southeast Asia were a 
well-established phenomenon. Chinese traders, mostly based in Fujian, had 
been sailing to various parts of Southeast Asia since Song times.12 The chaos 
that swept China during the Ming collapse and the Qing takeover disrupted 
this trade and the role played by maritime Chinese. When the dust settled 
and the Qing government permitted a resumption of trade with the region, 
there appears to have been a considerable demand for the products of tropi-
cal Southeast Asia. The demand could not be met by the production of South-
east Asian labor on its own, and as a result, Chinese labor was introduced 
into Southeast Asia for the purpose of producing those goods.13
 This migration of “coolie labor” from China to Southeast Asia is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. There is no record of Chinese laborers coming to 
the region until the late seventeenth century or early eighteenth.14 Some may 
have come as refugees a few decades earlier following the Qing conquest, but 
those who arrived after 1685 appear to have been sojourners who intended 
to work and then return home. It is also important to understand that this 
migration seems to have begun largely as a response to the growth of the 
Chinese domestic economy and an increasing demand in China for prod-
ucts such as tin, gold, pepper, and sugar. During the period from 1685 to 
1720, there appeared in various parts of Southeast Asia the first settlements 
of Chinese laborers who went there expressly to produce commodities for 
shipment back to China.
 By the 1780s, a number of similar settlements had appeared all around 
the Gulf of Siam, the coasts of the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and Sumatra 
(see map 1). Of particular note were the pepper and gambier planters in Riau, 
tin miners in Bangka, gold-miners in Sambas and Pontianak, sugar planters 
in Kedah, and pepper planters in Brunei, Chantaburi, and elsewhere in the 
region. In addition to the production and export of these products, Chi-
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nese traders were increasingly involved in developing the rice trade between 
Southeast Asia and China.15
 These settlements of Chinese laborers represented a purely Chinese econ-
omy, a development that was unique in the region in that it was almost com-
pletely commercial. Laborers traveled to the various parts of Southeast Asia 
in Chinese ships for the sole purpose of producing specific commodities. 
They were supplied with food, provisions, and tools from outside sources. 
The laborers were essentially free, purchased their supplies from the mar-
ket, and also exchanged their labor for cash or shares. The exchanges were 
managed by Chinese merchants who not only supplied the settlements of 
producers, but also purchased their products and sent them back to China.
 This economic expansion seems to have been accompanied by a consider-
able upsurge of Chinese maritime activity. Chinese “pirates” were reported 
to be active, particularly along the coasts of Vietnam and in the Gulf of Siam. 
French missionary sources attest to the presence of Teochew pirates in the 
Gulf of Siam, and Dian Murray has written at length of the Cantonese sea-
farers in the Gulf of Tongkin in the late eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, 
some of them preyed on the settlers, while others attempted to manage their 
commerce.
 Often burdened by debts for their passage and initial supplies (what in 
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map 1 major chinese settlement areas in Southeast asia c. 1820, and major opium trading centers in 
South and east asia.
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commonly bound to monopoly arrangements with their suppliers and cus-
tomers. Pepper and gambier planters in Singapore and Johor in the nine-
teenth century were required to sell their products to specific merchants for 
a quarter of their value in the Singapore market. At the same time, they pur-
chased goods priced at four times their market value. One would assume that 
most laborers were locked into “company store” type arrangements with 
their respective capitalists, or taukeh.
 While these arrangements would have left the labor force in a completely 
dependent relationship, the workers were not without resources. The entire 
reason for their presence was the lack of labor in the first place. Labor was a 
valuable commodity and the taukehs were unable to police the settlements 
constantly, many of which were scattered in remote parts of the jungle. Far 
from being amenable to policing, the laborers were required to defend them-
selves against pirates, bandits, and other Chinese like themselves, particu-
larly in the mining areas. They were thus organized into kongsis, which not 
only provided defense but also served as economic partnerships allowing 
both laborers and taukehs to hold shares in their ventures. This organiza-
tional pattern was widespread throughout the region, and variations of it 
were found in Pontianak, Sambas, Riau, and Bangka as early as the mid-
eighteenth century. Similar patterns probably existed in places where they 
have not been formally documented, such as southeast Siam and on both 
sides of the Malay Peninsula. It is also likely that Chinese laborers gained a 
measure of solidarity through sworn oaths of brotherhood.
 While such institutions may have been quite serviceable for pioneer 
settlements in the wilderness, they posed unique problems during the nine-
teenth century, as Southeast Asia was bound into the global economy. The 
ritual and economic partnership between Chinese labor and Chinese capital 
came to be seen as a threat to both colonial and indigenous governments. 
Not only did the kongsi-type organization serve as a physical defense, it also 
served as a defense against economic exploitation. The kongsis could and did 
serve as institutions of governance and were, moreover, democratic, egali-
tarian, and communal.
 One might also argue they represented a kind of moral economy based 
on the ideas of justice embodied in the ideologies of the secret societies or 
triads. In a number of cases, these kongsis became virtually autonomous 
and waged organized warfare, defending themselves against outside forces, 
whether Southeast Asian or European. As such, they were an ideological, po-
litical, and economic threat both to traditional autocratic and status-based 
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governments of Southeast Asia, and to the colonial-capitalist regimes that 
Europeans were then organizing in the region.
 Despite the ability to occasionally invade, ravage, and destroy these settle-
ments, outsiders could not easily control them in the long term. Both colo-
nial and indigenous rulers came to realize that their own prosperity de-
pended on Chinese laborers. They were the geese laying the golden eggs. 
Not only did they outproduce indigenous labor because of their more de-
veloped skills, but they also had greater incentives because they were in the 
cash economy. Conquest, slavery, and systems of ritual dependence were all 
counterproductive.
 The key to capturing the fruits of both Chinese labor and Chinese capi-
tal was opium. In the eighteenth century, British country traders were in 
the habit of selling opium to the merchants who served the Chinese settle-
ments. Opium was an ideal commodity for these laborers. Isolated in virtu-
ally all-male communities, they lacked most of the amenities of normal life: 
entertainment, families, women, and medicine. Opium filled these empty 
spaces, helping the laborers forget their loneliness and isolation, and easing 
the physical pain that accompanied long hours of heavy work in the tropi-
cal heat. In addition, it eliminated the symptoms of dysentery, malaria, and 
other tropical fevers, which allowed them to keep working.16 Most impor-
tant, the laborers, unlike their brothers in China, had the cash to buy opium. 
Thus, it was arguably in Southeast Asia, not in China itself, that opium use 
first took hold among lower-class Chinese, for as the British mass-produced 
opium in India, they found a mass consumer market among the Chinese 
laborers of Southeast Asia.
 If opium was the “hook” that brought working-class Chinese into the 
opium economy, it was also the lever that pried open the kongsi brother-
hoods, converting them into “secret societies” and shifting the Chinese tau-
kehs and their wealth to the service of colonial and indigenous governments. 
In some respects, the wealthier Chinese had always worked with the local 
rulers and the colonial powers, in particular those Chinese who had estab-
lished themselves and their families as residents in the towns and port cities 
of Southeast Asia, and whose descendants were the locally born Chinese 
known as peranakan, Baba, or mestizo, depending on the location.
 A certain group of these men worked as tax collectors, or more correctly, 
as tax farmers. They were a species of entrepreneur who purchased from the 
government, usually at auction, the monopoly for the sale or collection of 
some item or the provision of some service. In the eighteenth century, under 
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the Dutch, they collected rice taxes and held other farms both for the colo-
nial power and for indigenous rulers. They also held farms for the sale of 
opium to the population.17 The opium farmers were often the only links be-
tween the local populations, whether Southeast Asian peasants or Chinese 
coolies, and the local government.
 Opium farms became a widespread phenomenon throughout Southeast 
Asia and could be found in every state of the region during the nineteenth 
century. For this reason, and because Chinese capitalists almost exclusively 
dominated opium farming, it is useful to discuss the role of opium as a 
commodity in Southeast Asia in the context of the opium-farming system. 
It is also important to understand that the system was not static, but rather 
evolved with changes in the regional economy and in the development of 
European colonialism.
The Stages of farm development
Three stages can be discerned in the development of the opium-farming 
business in Southeast Asia, and in each phase the nature of opium’s status 
as a commodity underwent significant changes. At the same time, the rela-
tions between Chinese labor, Chinese capital, and the local political units 
also changed. The first stage took place from about 1760 to about 1830, when 
British country traders supplied opium to settlements in Southeast Asia. The 
Chinese laboring kongsis remained relatively autonomous. Observers in the 
1830s considered the Hakka gold-mining kongsis of western Borneo to be 
democratic, self-governing republics.18 In about 1825, according to Munshi 
Abdullah’s report, Singapore’s Tiendihui was a largely autonomous organi-
zation dominating the pepper and gambier agriculture of the interior. Lee 
Poh Ping has styled it the “pepper and gambier society” to distinguish it 
from the “free trade society” of the town.19 Taukehs held key positions in the 
kongsis, but were probably reliant on the members of the kongsi for their 
power and influence. There is little information about the level of opium use 
by members of the kongsis, but one can probably assume that it was not ex-
cessive. Certainly, opium-farming systems were rudimentary, and the tau-
kehs who controlled the farms (most of whom were Babas) were, in many 
cases (Singapore, for instance), not the same taukehs who dominated the 
kongsis.
 The second stage of opium farming development emerged between 1830 
and 1880. During the 1830s and 1840s, colonial governments began to move 
against the kongsis. In Borneo and Bangka, the Dutch launched campaigns 
to dominate the mining kongsis, while in Singapore and Penang the British 
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took aim at the Ghee Hin (Tiendihui) and other “secret societies.”20 In Siam 
and Vietnam, indigenous governments undertook drastic military actions 
against the Chinese brotherhoods even when it required the massacre of the 
populations of entire towns.21
 These governments formed strategic alliances with Chinese revenue 
farmers. It was not long before secret-society headmen, men who were not 
Babas or even Hokkiens, aspired to revenue-farming roles themselves. In 
1846, a relative newcomer and a prominent secret-society leader, Lau Joon 
Teck, took charge of the Singapore opium farm in partnership with the Hok-
kien Baba, Cheang Sam Teo. By the 1850s, Lau was considered the “monied 
man” of the farms and the Ghee Hin had become his enforcement gang. The 
Dutch, too, found that opium farmers could subdue the kongsis.22
 In Singapore, in the early years, the farms had been dominated by Babas, 
or locally born Chinese, many from Melaka families. They spoke Eng lish and 
were locally domiciled, and thus the British felt they could be trusted. As the 
farms came to be more dependent on pepper and gambier coolies as con-
sumers, it became necessary for the Babas to form strategic alliances with 
the Teochew and Hakka taukehs who dominated the cultivation and who 
had contacts with the kangchus who ran the pepper and gambier settlements 
in the interior and in Johor. Many of these were either Tiendihui leaders or 
were closely associated with the other secret societies, as exemplified by Lau 
Joon Teck.
 As the farms grew, they came to be managed by rather large cliques of 
the most powerful merchants in the various colonies and settlements. They 
financed their syndicates by breaking them up into shares and selling the 
shares to other Chinese in the community. These syndicates, or kongsis, as 
they were also called, often had an ethnic basis and competed for control of 
the farms in their settlement. In Singapore there was a Hokkien syndicate, 
led by Cheang Hong Lim, in the 1870s and 1880s and a Teochew syndicate, 
led by Tan Seng Poh, in the 1860s and 1870s. In Saigon, a Cantonese syndi-
cate opposed the Hokkiens led by Banhap. In the absence of any other stable 
financial institutions (with the exception of European banks), the farms be-
came the favored instruments of capital accumulation among the wealthier 
Chinese. The need to draw funds from the entire community, as well as the 
need to provide investment opportunities for all, likely influenced the trend 
toward consolidation and compromise between ethnic cliques.
 Opium revenues soon became the major prop of the colonial states in 
Southeast Asia. In Singapore, the farm income varied between 40 and 60 
percent of local revenues. Opium-smoking coolies literally paid for Singa-
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pore’s free trade. In Java and Siam, the farms brought in about 35 percent 
of total revenues throughout the nineteenth century. The farms also spared 
these governments the burden of expense needed to police the tax-collection 
regime and served to police the Chinese community in general. The alliance 
between revenue farmers, particularly the opium and spirit farmers, and the 
ritual brotherhoods gave them a ready-made police force.
 At the same time, the heads of the opium farmers and their key inves-
tors took control of the economic enterprises developed by the kongsis. 
Thus, in Singapore between 1846 and 1880, the opium farmers also con-
trolled the pepper and gambier business. In addition, since the cultivation 
covered British Singapore, Dutch Riau, the Malay state of Johor, and British 
Melaka, the farms of these same locales were also amalgamated under the 
same leadership.23
 Similar constellations of opium-farming territories coalesced in other 
parts of the region. Each came to be grouped around a specific system of 
commodity production. Thus, in Penang and its vicinity, the revenue farms 
were largely focused on the tin-mining regions.24 In areas such as Java and 
Siam, where there were large populations of opium-using Southeast Asian 
peasants, the economics of the farms were often structured around rice pro-
duction and, especially in Siam, rice milling.25
 In all cases, opium use was connected to a local productive economy. 
Farmers not only drew a profit from opium sales to peasants and coolies, but 
were also the primary investors in their respective industries. They thus prof-
ited from both the consumption and the production of these essentially cap-
tive populations. In addition to being habituated (if not actually addicted) to 
opium use, the coolies and peasants were frequently bound to the farmers 
and capitalists by debts. These chains of addiction and indebtedness, by in-
suring a captive labor force, guaranteed supplies of saleable commodities 
at the cheapest possible prices. It was during this period that Singapore be-
came the key center not only for the opium trade, but also for the Chinese 
economy of Southeast Asia.
The role of British Singapore
The British trading center of Singapore, which was founded in 1819 by 
Thomas Stamford Raffles, brought together all the elements of the new 
order in Southeast Asia. Protected by the Royal Navy, the British free port 
was a place where the British country traders could unload their precious 
cargoes of the Indian drug and where Chinese and other Asian merchants 
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could gather and amass their fortunes without fear of the depredations of 
“native” chiefs.
 Singapore, in addition to lying beside the only clear, deep channel be-
tween the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, was at the center of a 
line, running north and south, that linked Dutch Batavia and Bangkok (see 
map). Between those two capitals lay most of the major kongsi settlements 
in Southeast Asia. To the north were the two coasts of the Malay Penin-
sula, Sumatra, and the Gulf of Siam. Beyond that lay the populous mainland 
states of Burma, Siam, and Vietnam. The west coast of the Peninsula was 
then being settled by groups of adventurous tin miners from bases in Penang 
and Melaka. On a tangent to the west were the pepper gardens of Aceh. The 
east coast of the Peninsula was dotted with settlements of Chinese, Malays, 
and Siamese producing rice, pepper, tin, gold, birds’ nests, and the vast 
range of forest produce always in demand in China. To the northeast were 
the pepper ports of Chantaburi, Trat, Chonburi, and Rayong, with sugar, 
tobacco, and endless supplies of dried and salted fish. Beyond those towns 
were Cambodia and Cochinchina and important supplies of rice, sugar, and 
timber.
 To the south was Riau, the port that had set the pattern for Singapore in 
the previous century. It still housed a settlement of several thousand Chinese 
pepper and gambier planters that centered on the Sino-Bugis settlement of 
Tanjong Pinang. It had only recently been occupied by the Dutch in 1818. The 
islands to its south—Lingga, Bangka, and Belitung (Billiton)—were major 
tin-mining areas. Bangka had been the site of major mining kongsis since 
the early eighteenth century, and they continued to be productive through-
out the nineteenth century. To the south was Java and to the east the Java Sea, 
Banjarmasin, Sulawesi, and the islands of the eastern archipelago. At either 
end of this axis were Siam and Java, which supplied foodstuffs to feed the 
burgeoning populations of miners and planters. This entire economic uni-
verse was dominated by Chinese opium farmers.
 Singapore became the center of the Chinese economy of Southeast Asia 
and of the opium trade. Therefore, traders who serviced the settlements came 
to Singapore for their supplies, enabling Singapore traders to acquire the 
products of surrounding settlements. As the center of Chinese trade, Singa-
pore was also where the junks from China landed, and it became the head-
quarters of Southeast Asia’s Chinese labor exchange. Laborers and coolies 
first traveled to Singapore, then were shipped out to the various mines or 
plantations in the surrounding areas. Singapore was thus not only the head-
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quarters of the opium trade, but also central to the labor trade, or the coolie 
traffic, as it was then known. This trade, too, was dominated by the taukehs 
who controlled the revenue farms, the secret societies, and the mines, plan-
tations, rice fields. Opium was the key to the entire constellation.
 Singapore was the source of capital and the source of labor. Naturally, the 
products of all Southeast Asia flowed back there. The port became the cen-
ter of the region’s commodity trade. As a trading port it did not really draw 
much trade away from other centers. John Crawfurd argued in 1824 that Sin-
gapore had, in fact, increased the overall trade of the region. In a matter of 
months after the founding of Singapore, Chinese junk traders, Bugis traders, 
and British merchants began to flock there. Within five years, Singapore’s 
trade grew to a value of over $13 million annually.26 Crawfurd argued that 
Singapore greatly contributed to an absolute increase in British trade in Asia. 
Answering critics who held that Singapore simply drew trade from Penang, 
he pointed out that in 1818 the whole of direct British trade with the Straits 
of Malacca, and generally with the eastern islands, excluding Java, centered 
at Penang, totaled $2,030,757 in exports. In 1824, however, the joint ex-
ports of Penang and Singapore were $9,414,464, of which $6,604,601 moved 
through Singapore.27
 What was the basis of this sudden increase in British trade? Certainly an 
important share of it was opium. From 1823 to 1824, $8,515,100 of opium 
was shipped to China. Even though not all of this landed in the straits, much 
of it did. Singapore’s location, moreover, was more advantageous than 
Penang’s. In addition to serving as a base for British trade, Singapore was 
better able to tap into the very active trade carried on by Chinese junks in the 
South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, and the Java Sea.
 An important shift occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century in 
relation to the final destination of the products exported through Singapore. 
At the time of its founding, Singapore had been able to make a place for itself 
in the trade from Southeast Asia and the West to China. That was one of its 
great strengths. By midcentury, however, goods from Singapore, particularly 
those produced in Southeast Asia, began to flow increasingly to the West. As 
European and American industry developed, products such as gambier (for 
tanning leather) and tin were drawn away from China. This took place at a 
time when China’s purchasing power was on the decline and when wealth 
was flowing out of China (mostly to pay for opium) faster than it was being 
replenished.
 This shift did nothing to damage the trade of Singapore, which flourished 
throughout the middle years of the nineteenth century. In many ways this 
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was the high point of the Chinese economy of the region that had grown 
up around opium farming, labor control, and commodity production. The 
breakdown, or perhaps break-up, of the system may have been caused as 
much by its success as by anything else. Farm values had risen exponen-
tially, making the Chinese capitalists who owned them among the richest 
and most powerful men in Asia. Their emerging power may have provoked 
the fears of the colonial elites, who began to tighten administrative controls 
on the opium economy and attempted to gain greater control over their own 
revenues. At the same time, the demand for tropical products in Europe, par-
ticularly raw materials, and the advance of colonial control and technology 
had brought other changes. Seeking investment opportunities, American 
and European corporations brought steamships, new mining technology, 
and new products such as rubber, all of which worked to diminish the im-
portance of the old Chinese economy based on opium and control of Chi-
nese labor.
The decline of the farming System
A number of trends became obvious during the 1880s, and it is significant 
that they were apparent throughout the region. The revenue farms con-
tinued to increase in value as populations expanded. While this meant that 
the farms could offer greater profits to the farmers, it also meant that they 
themselves needed deeper pockets and greater resources to obtain and man-
age the farms. It made economic sense for groups of local capitalists to com-
bine into even larger syndicates to manage the farms. This offered them a 
double advantage: they could eliminate competition and thus strife within 
the Chinese community, and therefore, in turn, offer the colonial govern-
ments lower bids for the farms. Whereas these governments had previously 
depended on competition to keep up the price of the farms and to obtain an 
appropriate return from the farmers, by the 1870s, in places like Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Cochinchina, the local farms had been subsumed into one 
large syndicate.28
 In response to only minimal increases in the bids, the different colo-
nial governments decided on a number of alternative strategies to regain a 
measure of control. One strategy was to invite investors from other settle-
ments. Thus, in 1879, John Pope Hennessy, the governor of Hong Kong, 
invited Gan Tin Wee, otherwise known as “Banhap,” the opium farmer of 
French Cochinchina and Cambodia, to form a syndicate to compete for the 
Hong Kong opium farm. Banhap (who had been born in Singapore) joined 
together with Cheang Hong Lim, one of the Singapore opium farmers, and 
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his Saigon partners, the three Tan brothers of Saigon.29 They were success-
ful in ousting the Cantonese syndicate which had controlled the Hong Kong 
farms for a number of years. Although Banhap and his associates were not 
particularly successful in holding and managing the Hong Kong farms, the 
colonial government had not only garnered an increase in the rent, it had 
actually strengthened its control over the farmers.30
 The following year the Singapore government used a similar strategy to 
discipline the syndicate that had controlled the farms of Singapore and its 
vicinity since 1870. They sought bids from Penang merchants. As a result, 
Koh Saeng Tat, an established straits Chinese merchant from that settle-
ment, took over the Singapore farms. The Singapore government gained an 
increase in rent, but Saeng Tat lost money due to smuggling and other acts 
of sabotage by members of the old syndicate. That did not discourage other 
hopefuls, however, and in the next auction another Penang taukeh, Chui Sin 
Yong, outbid the Singapore cliques and took the farms, giving the Singapore 
government yet another significant boost in rental income. He, too, faced 
difficulties in the form of smuggling and other problems. These events, how-
ever, provided an opportunity for Governor Fredrick Weld to crack down 
severely on the Singapore farmers and to begin investigations into their 
operations.31 In the end, the Singapore government gained much greater 
control over the farms.
 In succeeding years, in Hong Kong and in British Malaya, governments 
adopted increasingly rationalistic approaches to the farming system and to 
colonial administration in general. The idea that the Chinese should be gov-
erned under a system of indirect rule, with the opium farmers and secret-
society leaders as the key agents of the state, came to seem anachronistic. 
The account books of the farmers came under closer scrutiny, and the prac-
tices that led to the creation of permanent indebtedness among the coolies 
began to face calls for reform. While the measures by no means liberated 
the coolies immediately, they did begin to loosen the close ties that existed 
between opium farmers and the economy, a process made easier by the fact 
that the economy was becoming far more complex and the urban popula-
tion more diversified. Finally, colonial police forces, particularly in the urban 
areas, were more capable of enforcing the laws without the cooperation of 
private gangs of “revenue peons” and secret-society thugs.
 These measures did not destroy the profitability of the farms, nor did they 
prevent certain groups of wealthy Chinese from becoming even wealthier. 
Some farms remained in existence and continued to be profitable until the 
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early years of the twentieth century. It was at this point that a number of 
additional factors became pertinent. One was the increasing influence of 
the anti-opium movement in Britain and other colonial metropoles, which 
often focused on the farming system and on Chinese wealth. Then there was 
also the increasing instability of the farms. International syndicates bidding 
against one another for the farming concessions raised revenues, but the 
competition sometimes led bidders to overestimate their potential profits. 
If they overbid, or if the economic situation deteriorated, and commodity 
prices fell, opium consumption would likewise decline, and the farmers 
could be forced into bankruptcy. This is what happened in the mid-1880s 
and again in 1907. The result of pressures from metropolitan groups as well 
as threats to the stability of the revenue led colonial administrations to con-
sider the possibility of taking the farms into their own hands.
The creation of government monopolies
The final stage in the history of Chinese capitalism and opium farming came 
with the creation of government-controlled monopolies. There had always 
been a level of dissatisfaction with the farming system. The fact that it was 
a Chinese-dominated business led to jealousy on the part of European mer-
chants and indigenous elites, as well as distrust on the part of European 
colonial governments. In 1880, when Banhap was in the midst of his diffi-
culties with rival Cantonese cliques in Hong Kong, the Colonial Council in 
Saigon began a campaign to overthrow Banhap and his clique.32 As a result 
of their discussions, the government took full control of the farms and ran 
them as a government-controlled monopoly after this time.
 In 1881, the French colonial government set up the first government 
opium monopoly.33 The organization was not particularly successful in its 
early years. In many respects it was simply a somewhat disguised opium 
farm, since it was largely run by Chinese. Most of the employees of the 
Régie, as it was called, seemed to be Cantonese associated with the syndi-
cate that was the rival of Banhap’s Hokkien clique in Saigon. By the 1890s, 
however, the French government had gained more complete control over the 
system and was able to extract a reasonable profit from the monopoly.
 The farming system in Java came under closer government scrutiny during 
the 1880s as a result of the activities of Charles TeMechlen. When he was the 
Resident of Joana, in the early 1880s, he worked with the opium farmers to 
stop smuggling, organizing a naval task force to apprehend smugglers and 
ultimately devoting more and more of his time to antismuggling activities 
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and to strengthening the government’s control over the farms. TeMechlen 
attracted a great deal of notice for his activities, but won few friends due to 
his abrasive personality and the fact that he was Eurasian.34 While TeMech-
len was a major voice pushing for the reform of the farming system in the 
Netherlands East Indies, other voices were calling for an abandonment of 
the farming system altogether. The anti-opium movement in Holland and 
a number of anticolonial novels turned Dutch opinion against the farms 
and built support for a government monopoly. Between 1894 and 1898, the 
opium farms of Java were replaced with a government-run monopoly.35
 In British Malaya, colonial administrators seemed committed to the farm-
ing system despite the apparent success of the government-controlled mo-
nopolies in the Dutch and French colonies. By the middle of the first decade 
of the twentieth century, however, the same issues were beginning to influ-
ence them. The combination of moralistic pressures from the metropole, 
economic instability, a demand for rationalist administration, and growing 
concern about the economic and political power of the Chinese all led colo-
nial administrators in Singapore and Penang to the same conclusions as the 
Dutch and French had come to before them. Following the collapse, in 1907, 
of a very large opium syndicate that had been organized by members of the 
powerful Khaw family of Penang, the colonial government decided to end 
the farming system in favor of a government monopoly. The farming system 
throughout British Malaya, as well as in Dutch Sumatra and Siam (many of 
whose farms had been held by Singaporean or Malayan Chinese syndicates), 
ceased, and government monopolies took over, in 1910, in all countries.36
 The collapse of the Khaw syndicate is instructive of the relationship be-
tween Chinese capital and opium farming. Jennifer Cushman, whose work 
on this family is one of the classic studies of Chinese capitalism in Asia, has 
shown how the family reached a dominant financial position by the begin-
ning of the twentieth century.37 The Khaw clan had been founded by Khaw 
Soo Cheang, who came to Penang in about 1822 and began to trade in tin in 
southern Siam, particularly in Takuapa, Phang-nga, and ultimately Ranong. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, they had come to dominate the tin 
trade of the southern Siamese states and to hold most of the opium and 
gambling concessions of the region. The Khaws became the hereditary gov-
ernors of the Siamese province of Ranong, taking the Thai family name of 
NaRanong.38
 Under Khaw Sim Bee in the early twentieth century, the clan, organized 
as a large family kongsi based in Penang, attempted to create a major finan-
oPi um i n Th e ch i n e Se nanyang Trade 99
cial and industrial combination. Already controlling numerous mines and 
revenue farms, the family hoped to break through into the upper levels of 
the imperial economy. They organized a smelting company, an engineering 
company, steam dredges, an insurance company, and the Eastern Shipping 
Company. Part of the aim was to compete with major European firms such 
as the Straits Trading Company and the Peninsular and Oriental Shipping 
line, which then enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the long-distance trade of 
Malaya.39 It appears that much of this rather hastily organized financial em-
pire was rooted in the anticipated earnings of the extensive syndicate of 
opium farms controlled by another family member, Khaw Joo Choe. This was 
to be the cash cow of the entire enterprise. Unfortunately, when the econ-
omy went into a depression in 1907, Khaw Joo Choe went bankrupt, and the 
entire Khaw edifice began to disintegrate.40
 It is also important to recall that in 1907 the Colonial Office had appointed 
a commission to study the opium-farming system in Malaya, and given its 
influence and that of the anti-opium crusaders, pressures were placed on the 
colonial government to abandon the farming system. In truth, the crusaders 
really wanted an end to all opium consumption in Malaya. They pointed to 
the Americans, who had banned opium altogether in their newly acquired 
colony in the Philippines, and to the treaty that Britain had just signed with 
China (in 1906) to gradually decrease imports of opium over the next decade 
with the aim of totally ending the opium trade. Unfortunately for the South-
east Asian colonies, the opium trade did not stop with the farming system.
 With the collapse of the Khaw syndicate and the conclusion of their con-
tract in 1909, the opium and spirit farms of British Malaya became part of the 
government monopoly in 1910.41 This effectively marked the end of Chinese 
involvement with the legitimate side of Southeast Asia’s opium economy. It 
is true that Chinese continued to use opium, which was now processed and 
distributed by the government. At the same time, Chinese secret societies 
and some of the groups retrenched by the monopoly system began to join the 
illegal trade, which included not only clandestine opium, but also the new 
injectable chemical derivatives and pills: morphine and heroin.
 It is ironic that the anti-opium movement in the metropoles had such 
a decisive influence in bringing about the end of the farming system. The 
movement was launched and promoted by clergymen, missionaries, doc-
tors, former civil servants, and some merchants. It struck a significant moral 
chord in Europe and America at a time when imperial governments were 
defending their global enterprises as projects that would improve the wel-
100 c arl a . Trocki
fare of the native peoples. Whether it was the Dutch “Ethical Policy” or the 
French “mission civilisatrice,” or similar British or American policies, all of 
these discourses tended to characterize the Chinese as villains who were ex-
ploiting the native peoples. The colonial governments thus claimed they had 
a duty to protect their subjects from “foreign Asians.”
 They accomplished that end with the creation of government monopo-
lies, which removed the farms from Chinese control. Henceforth the profits 
of opium sales to colonial subjects went directly into the coffers of colonial 
states. Despite the dire predictions of those who defended the farming sys-
tem, the monopoly proved an almost embarrassing success. In 1909, the last 
year of the Singapore opium farm, the government collected $2,507,500 in 
rent. During 1910, the first year of the monopoly, the net profit to the govern-
ment was only $1,785,387; by 1911, however, the net profit was $3,040,716, 
and by 1914, it had risen to $5,321,480. By 1920, the Straits Settlements as a 
whole (including Penang and Melaka) netted nearly $20 million from opium 
alone. Contrary to the wishes to the anti-opium lobby, the colonies con-
tinued to sell opium and to reap increasing and unprecedented profits from 
the monopolies until 1920, when the first attempts to actually reduce sales 
were put into practice. By 1928, the Straits Settlements netted only $14 mil-
lion from opium sales, and due to the Great Depression, sales plunged to 
$9.7 million in 1929, and $8.8 million in 1930. Opium sales in Malaya were 
finally prohibited by the Colonial Office in 1943, after the colony had fallen 
into Japanese hands.42
opium the Prime commodity
For over a century, opium had been one of the major commodities of South-
east Asia’s economy. It was an integral part of the colonial system in Asia, 
whether British, Dutch, French, or Spanish. Each colonial power, together 
with its Chinese allies, relied on opium for a major portion of their tax base 
and thus for their overall fiscal well-being. In Singapore and the Straits 
Settlements, opium regularly accounted for 40 to 60 percent of the local 
revenue. In other colonies, such as French Indochina and the Netherlands 
East Indies, it comprised 25 to 35 percent of revenues. If opium revenues 
had been subtracted from colonial budgets, it would likely have been fatal to 
the entire imperial structure, to say nothing of profits made by British India 
and in China itself.
 More important, however, was opium’s contribution to the overall econ-
omy of the region, particularly to the Chinese economy of Southeast Asia, 
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where it served three major roles. First, as what David Bello has called an 
“addictive consumable,” it was one of the first mass consumer goods in the 
region. For Southeast Asian peasants as well as Chinese coolies, it served as 
one of the major incentives to enter the cash economy, to continue to work, 
and very often, to work until they dropped. Nothing kept a laborer work-
ing for a substandard wage more effectively than opium. And if the drug 
were made a part of his wages, he could be induced to work for practically 
 nothing.
 Opium was also the agency of capital accumulation for those Chinese 
who controlled the farms. All recognized opium’s facility for concentrating 
capital and making it available to those who built the superstructure of the 
colonial economy. Opium capital financed the production of all of Southeast 
Asia’s other major commodities: tin, pepper, gambier, gold, rice, and so on. 
As Wu Xiao An has shown in his essay on Kedah, the control of both opium 
and rice conferred great power on the Chinese allies of the sultan. Opium 
provided the foundation for the first great fortunes created by the Chinese 
taukehs. It backed fortunes that later created shipping lines, property em-
pires, factories, banks, insurance companies, and all the other components 
of the Asian economy.
 Finally, it helped to finance the accumulations of people and resources 
that became Asia’s great cities. Singapore, Batavia, Bangkok, Saigon, Hong 
Kong, and Shanghai were all built on opium capital. The trading and export-
ing economies that centered on these cities all depended on opium. For a 
century, opium was the main business of Asia’s great port cities.
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the LiDai Baoan and the ryukyu maritime tributary 
trade network with China and southeast asia,  
the fourteenth to seVenteenth Centuries
Takeshi Hamashita
The Ryukyu Kingdom (present-day Okinawa) was located at the intersec-
tion of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, facing South China and 
Kyushu. Long before the Ryukyu Kingdom period (1429–1879), the Ryukyu 
Kingdom was already alert to the advantages and opportunities offered by 
the sea and put them to use in its trade with East and Southeast Asia. Under 
the Ryukyu Kingdom, missions were sent to Southeast Asia to obtain goods 
for its tributary trade with China. Even after it was invaded, in 1609, by the 
Satsuma domain of Tokugawa-period Japan, Ryukyu continued to dispatch 
tribute envoys to Qing China. At the same time, it sent envoys to Tokugawa 
shoguns in Edo (present-day Tokyo) and maintained relations with Korea 
(see map 1).
 The period from the late fourteenth century to the early sixteenth century 
was one of the most prosperous in the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom, due 
in large measure to the far-flung trading activities of its people, who tra-
versed the East and Southeast Asian waters as enterprising agents of entre-
pôt trade for countries bordering those waters. Not only were the Ryukyuans 
in contact with China and Japan, but they also established and maintained 
relations with Korea and Southeast Asian countries. The story of the Ryukyu 
merchants’ trading enterprises constitutes an important chapter not only in 
Ryukyuan history, but also in the history of the tributary trade system in East 
and Southeast Asia as a whole. This account draws on the primary historical 
source on the Ryukyus, the Lidai Baoan (Rekidai Hoan in Japanese), or “pre-
cious documents of successive generations.”1
 The current Lidai Baoan represents a fraction of the original archive com-
piled under the auspices of the Ryukyu Kingdom. While incomplete, the 
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surviving documents nevertheless provide a partial record of diplomatic 
correspondence exchanged between 1424 and 1867, encompassing a period 
stretching from the third year of the reign of the Ryukyu king Sho Hashi 
to the twentieth year of the reign of King Sho Tai, the last monarch to rule 
the Ryukyu Kingdom before its dissolution and incorporation into the Japa-
nese state during the Meiji Restoration of January 1868. The collection thus 
spans the entire period from the twenty-second year of the reign of Emperor 
Eiraku (Yong Le) of the Ming Dynasty to the sixth year of Emperor Dochi 
(Tong Zhi) of the Qing Dynasty.
 The Lidai Baoan is a compilation of manuscripts, written in Chinese, re-
lating to Ryukyuan contacts with China, Korea, and eight Southeast Asian 
countries (or more precisely, port towns), covering a 444-year period, from 
1424 to 1867 (see fig. 1). The countries are Siam, Malacca, Palembang, Java, 
Sumatra, Sunda-Kelapa, Patani, and Annam. Lidai Baoan documents shed 
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table 1). In particular, they supplement and correct historical accounts re-
lating to South Sea countries, where the activities of Ryukyu merchants have 
been entirely ignored in existing chronicles and historical records.2
 The documents of the Lidai Baoan relate principally to the diplomatic re-
lationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and China, which developed from 
contacts initiated by Emperor Taizu in 1372. These initial contacts led to 
the subsequent development of an envoy-tribute relationship in which Ryu-
kyu administrations offered loyalty and goods to the Chinese imperium in 
exchange for diplomatic recognition and external protection. As a result, 
the kingdom became a subordinate member of a regional security and trad-
ing alliance dependent on Chinese military and economic hegemony. In this 
essay, I explore the trading history between Ryukyu Kingdom and China and 
Southeast Asia.
Trading relations between ryukyu and Siam
Merchant ships (manaban) from Southeast Asia came to be a familiar sight 
in the Ryukyu Kingdom during the latter half of the fourteenth century (see 
fig. 2). In response, Ryukyuan traders began to engage in return expeditions. 
figure 1 letter from lieutenant-
governor of fujian to king of  
ryukyu on 21st day, 12th month,  
26th year of kangxi. Source: 
lidai baoan, okinawa Prefecture 
library, 1992, 1:358.
table 1 list of ryukyuan Ships dispatched to Southeast asian Ports
Destination
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Records of these expeditions first appeared in the Lidai Baoan in the fifteenth 
century, during which time abundant references were made to contacts with 
Xianluo (Siam), Patani, Melaka (Malacca), Palembang, Jawa (Java), Samu-
dera (Sumatra), Annam (Vietnam), and Sunda (see table 1). Pioneers of this 
trade with South Sea countries were accompanied on their voyages by letters 
containing the king’s seal and gifts in anticipation of establishing formal 
trade relations with sister ports.
 The entrepôt trade that subsequently developed involved the export of 
goods such as Japanese swords and gold, which were traded for ivory, tin, 
table 1 continued
Destination
Year Xianluo Palembang Jawa Melaka Samudera Patani Annam Sunda












Number of ships sent
Xianluo 58 Melaka 20 Annam 1
Palembang  4 Samudera  3 Sunda 2
Jawa  6 Patani 11
○: Ships that safely returned
☓: Ships that wrecked
Source: Takara Kurayoshi, Ryukyu no Jidai: Ooinaru Rekishizou wo Motomete [Ryukyu’s centuries: 
In quest of a new image of its history] (Tokyo: 1980), 116–17.
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jewels, pepper, spices, and caesalpinia sappan for medicine or dyes; such 
goods were often re-exported to China, Japan, or Korea. Many of the Ryu-
kyu Kingdom’s Southeast Asian trading partners shared a similar tributary 
relationship with the Ming Dynasty, and as a result Chinese became a lingua 
franca for official communication and trade negotiations.
 The earliest document in the Lidai Baoan pertaining to Ryukyu-Siam rela-
tions is a dispatch dated Hongxi 1 (1425), but communication between the 
two territories is presumed to have begun in the late 1380s. The dispatch of 
1425 states, “From our royal great-grandfather’s time through the times of 
our grandfather and father down to this day, we have frequently dispatched 
our envoys.” The great-grandfather referred to is King Satto, the grandfather 
of King Bunei and father of King Shisho. It was in Hongwu 4 (1371) that Siam 
sent its first tribute to China, after it had received the envoy and imperial 
rescript from Emperor Taizu of the Ming. This was in the reign of Somdet 
figure 2 ryukyuan tributary 
ship at naha Port. Source: 
Tozen-zu (Tributary Ship), 
okinawa Prefectural library.
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Phra Baramarajadhiraj, the third ruler in the Ayutthaya dynasty of Siam. Ac-
cording to the Korean record, Koryosa (History of Koryo), a Siamese envoy, 
Nai Goung, came to Korea in the third year of the reign of King Kongyang 
(1391), having left Siam in the summer of 1388 and stayed in Japan for about 
a year before traveling to Korea. Again, in the second year of T’aejo of Cho-
sôn (1394), another Siamese envoy, Nai Zhang Sidao, arrived in Korea. As he 
sailed home, Japanese pirates raided his ship, and he was obliged to return 
to Korea the following year. He left Korea the same year, accompanied by 
Korean envoys returning the Siamese courtesy.
 Siamese interaction with Ryukyu must have begun about the same time 
that Siam established relations with Japan and Korea. For some time after 
King Satto of Chūzan began paying tribute to Ming China, sulphur and 
horses were taken as tribute, but from 1390, the tribute cargo included pep-
per, sappanwood, and other products of South Sea origin. It is presumed 
that these products were introduced as a result of Ryukyuan contact with 
Siam.
 Judging from the documents in the Lidai Baoan, it appears that while 
Ryukyuan ships went to Siam, no Siamese ships came to Ryukyu during this 
period of early Ryukyuan-Siamese contact. The Siamese entrusted their mes-
sages to the Ryukyuan envoys coming to their country, and there was no 
envoy dispatched from Siam to Ryukyu. A Siamese ship visited Ryukyu in 
1479, but this was under special circumstances and did not constitute a case 
of official relations.
 Prior to the earliest Lidai Baoan documents from the third decade of the 
fifteenth century, however, there is evidence of a slightly different Ryukyuan-
Siamese relationship. In 1404, the provincial government of Fujian wrote 
to the Chinese emperor about the accidental arrival of a Ryukyu-bound Sia-
mese ship, whereupon Emperor Yongle replied that Siamese intercourse 
with Ryukyu was praiseworthy in relations among the barbarian countries. 
He ordered the provincial government to have the ship repaired and provided 
food for the Siamese, so that they could proceed to their own country or to 
Ryukyu, whichever they wished to do, after waiting for a favorable wind.3 
This episode indicates that Siamese ships were traveling to Ryukyu early on. 
As was the case with Siamese contact with Japan and Korea, Siamese con-
tact with Ryukyu began as a result of the commercial activities of Chinese 
merchants living in Siam and other countries in the South Sea region. The 
influence of Chinese merchants living in these areas declined temporarily 
during the first half of the fifteenth century. With this decline, as ships from 
the south ceased coming, Ryukyuans headed toward the South Seas. The 
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decline of Chinese influence seems to have been a potent factor instigating 
Ryukyuan seafaring in Eastern waters.
 The nature of Ryukyuan missions across the seas can be discerned from 
documents exchanged between Ryukyu and Siam.
Lidai Baoan, vol. 40, doc. no. 8
The King of Chūzan, Country of Ryukyu, declares with reference to tribu-
tary affairs.
 This country has nothing that is appropriate as an article of tribute, 
and for this reason we are especially dispatching Chief Envoy Nanzatu 
and others to lead men and take ships with a cargo of porcelains, to 
proceed to your productive lands to purchase such goods as pepper and 
sappanwood, and then to return to our country to prepare our tributary 
needs.
 They shall also take some presents we have specially prepared for pre-
sentation to you to convey our sincerity. We hope that you will accept 
them. We would like to request that the members of the mission now 
departing be allowed to obtain sappanwood and other goods through 
mutually satisfactory arrangements and return to the country speedily 
with the wind.
 We desire that all within the four seas be regarded as brothers and that 
intercourse among us be maintained forever.
 We list our presents below. Let this dispatch be given to the addressee.
 The following goods:
 [Woven-]gold satin 5 bolts
 Ornamental satin 20 bolts
 Swords 4 [5?]
 Fans 20
 Sulphur 2,500 jin
 Big blue vases 20
 Small blue vases 400
 Small blue bowls 2,000
Dispatch to the Country of Siam
Xuande 4/10/10 [6 November 1429]
Lidai Baoan, vol. 39, doc. no. 1
The King of Chūzan, Country of Ryukyu, has received a dispatch from 
the Country of Siam in the sixth month of Xuande 5 [1430] [in which it 
was stated:]
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 We have read [the dispatch from Ryukyu, which stated:] “With refer-
ence to the matter of tribute to the Great Ming and other matters, we have 
few goods which are appropriate [as articles of tribute], and we still suf-
fer great inconvenience. We are specially dispatching our envoy Nanzatu 
Utchi and others aboard a seagoing ship, with a cargo of porcelains and 
local products, to proceed to the country [Siam] and purchase such goods 
as pepper and sappanwood, and then to return to our country to prepare 
our needs. We have also prepared our presents for you.”
 We have received this dispatch. Heretofore, you have purchased goods 
to make [necessary] preparations. Your [present envoys] are now depart-
ing at this convenient time with a favorable wind. Therefore, we list our 
return presents below and inform you through this dispatch. Let this dis-
patch be given to the addressee.
 The goods are as follows:
 Sappanwood 3000 jin
 Red oiled cotton cloth 20 bolts
 Variegated velvet carpets 2
 Soft Western silk 1 length
Dispatch to the King of Chūzan, Country of Ryukyu
Xuande 5/3/21 [13 April 1430]
 Both the Ryukyuan and the Siamese king recognized each other very 
clearly and understood the purposes of trade. Both expected trading activi-
ties under tributary relations with Ming China, and the correspondences be-
tween the two kings were regular and formal.
 Ryukyu ships searching for tributary commodities such as pepper and 
sappanwood in the South China Sea had to understand the changing net-
works of trade and had to find more lucrative and safer trade partners and 
trading ports.
Trading relations between ryukyu and Java
Chinese people had begun to reside in South Sea countries and to develop 
commercial enterprises there from about the late Yuan and early Ming peri-
ods. They settled in such places as Palembang and Siam, and probably also 
in Java. The time for Chinese settlement in Java may have been the latter part 
of the reign of Hayam Wurch (1350–1389), which was the golden age of the 
Majapahit dynasty in Java. The Chinese in South Sea countries were the driv-
ing force for the opening of trade relations. It is around the end of the four-
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teenth century when trade started between those countries and countries 
in the north like China, Japan, Korea, and Ryukyu. As for Ryukyu, Chinese 
residents there also served as important trade and navigation personnel, and 
contributed greatly to the beginning and continuation of the country’s inter-
course with South Sea countries, as well as with China.
 Ryukyuan contact with Java began in 1430. It is not apparent from the dis-
patch of that date that this was the first mission, but the Ryukyuan king’s 
dispatch dated Chengtong 3 (1438) says that in Xuande 5 (1430), the Ryuk-
yuan court sent its first contingent to pay courtesy to the country. A dispatch 
to Java dated Chengtong 5 (1440) mentions that in Xuande 5 presents were 
prepared and envoys dispatched to the said country for the first time.4 The 
country named was Java.
 In Ryukyuan history, King Shō Hashi of Chūzan is recorded to have sub-
jugated King Tarumi of Sannan in Southern Okinawa in 1429 and thus ef-
fected the unification of the whole island under his control. In 1428, rela-
tions were opened with Palembang, which in the late fourteenth century 
became a vassal state of the Majapahit dynasty on the island of Java. Palem-
bang was a port town where Chinese lived and carried on trade, and Chinese 
also lived and traded actively on the island of Java. The well-known prosperity 
of Palembang as well as of Javanese ports such as Gresik, Surabaya, and Tu-
ban, located near the capital of the state of the Majapahit dynasty in Eastern 
Java, was largely the result of the business activities of many Chinese living 
in those places. It is easily understood that the Ryukyuan people voyaging to 
the South Seas took every opportunity to reach Java through Chinese trade 
networks.
 There are six documents relating to Java in the Lidai Baoan, and they are 
all official dispatches from Ryukyu covering the period from 1430 to 1442. 
Chinese people were influential in maintaining relations between China and 
Java and other South Sea countries in which they resided, as well as in main-
taining Ryukyuan relations with China. International relations in East Asia 
at this time were conducted around China based on the Chinese tributary 
system, and Chinese living overseas naturally played a significant role in this 
system.
 The Javanese king at the time of the opening of Ryukyuan relations was a 
man mentioned in Chinese records as Yang Wei-xi-sha. It is recorded that in 
the ninth month of Hongwu 3 (1370), the Javanese king known in Chinese 
transcription as Si-li Pa-ta-la-p’u complied with the summons of Ming Taizu 
and sent his envoy to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor. Later, in Yongle 1 
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(1403), the “western” king of Java, by the name of Tu-ma-pan, sent a mission 
to offer felicitations on the enthronement of Emperor Yongle, and soon the 
“eastern” king of Java, Pen-ling-ta-hai, followed suit. Around this time there 
were two kings in Java, the eastern and western kings, who were rivals.
 At the time of Zheng He’s visit to Java in Yongle 4 (1406), a battle occurred 
in which the eastern king was defeated and his power destroyed. Some 170 
soldiers under Zheng He’s command, going ashore to do some trading, were 
killed by men of the western king. Later, probably at the time of Zheng He’s 
departure from Java, the western king dispatched a mission to China, and it 
is recorded that the king offered apologies to the Chinese for the crime com-
mitted by his men.5
 In Yongle 13 (1415), a tributary mission was dispatched in the name of 
the western king, Yang Wei-xi-sha, and this name is said to have been the 
new name adopted by Tu-ma-pan.6 In Chengtong 8 (1443), Political Counsel 
Zhangyan of Canton wrote to the emperor that the almost yearly payment of 
tribute by Yang Wei-xi-sha was too burdensome because visits by Javanese 
incurred great expenses for receptions on the part of the Chinese. Accord-
ingly, a decree was issued to the effect that Java, too, had to observe the rule 
of one tribute mission every three years like all other foreign countries send-
ing missions to China.7
formation of Tributary missions to china
As a general rule, the upper echelon of a tributary embassy consisted of the 
following personnel: the envoy representing the king of a tributary state, his 
assistant or deputy envoy, interpreters, the general manager in charge of the 
ship’s cargo (known in Chinese as caifu or zhiku; zaifu, chokko), the pilot of 
the ship (huochong; kacho), and his assistant.8 As far as tributary states were 
concerned, this official and private trade in goods was likely to have been 
the core of the tributary system.9 These goods were either those belonging 
to the king of the tributary state, those of the king and several powerful local 
chieftains of that state, or those traded by merchants of the state individu-
ally.10 A similar structure of tributary mission existed from Ryukyu to other 
tributary countries such as Malacca. It should also be noted that the Ryukyu 
king issued a certificate with a similar form with it, and this exemplified the 
tally system from Ming China.11
Lidai Baoan, vol. 42, doc. no. 3 (1509 Malacca)
King Sho Shin of Chūzan, the Country Ryukyu, in reference to tributary 
affairs, now makes this known. This country, being deficient in products 
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and lacking tributary goods, still suffers great inconvenience. For this 
reason, we are now dispatching Chief Envoy Kamadu, Interpreter Ko Ken, 
and others aboard a seagoing ship bearing the designation K’ang, with a 
cargo of porcelain and other goods, to proceed to the productive land of 
Malacca to purchase such products as sappanwood and pepper through 
mutually satisfactory arrangements, and then to return to the country to 
make preparations for the presentation of tribute to the Celestial Court 
of the Great Ming in a subsequent year.
 There is no special document, however, on which the members of this 
mission now departing can rely, and it is deeply feared that they may en-
counter the inconvenience of investigations and obstructions by officials 
along the way. Accordingly the Royal Court has now issued a certificate 
stamped with a seal bearing half each of the character Hsuan and the 
number 174, to be received and borne by Chief Envoy Kamadu and others 
in proceeding on their mission.
 In the event of investigation by guards at landings and by coastal patrol 
officers in the course of the voyage, it is requested that the mission be re-
leased and that no obstacles that might cause delay and inconvenience be 
put in its way. Let this certificate be given to the envoys.
 It is now stated [that the mission consists of ]:
 One chief envoy: Kamadu
 Two deputy envoys: Manyuku, Gurami
 Two interpreters: Ko Ken, Ko Ga
 Pilot: Ryo Jitsu
 General manager of the ship: Mabuta
 No. of personnel including crew: 150 persons
Cheng-te 4/8/18 [2 September 1509]
The above certificate has been issued for and received by Chief Envoy 
Kamadu, Interpreter Ko Ken, and others.
Certificate
 According to the list of Javanese envoys, most of the chief envoys in the 
Lidai Baoan had the title of alie. In the intercalary sixth month of Chengtong 1 
(1436), the Javanese king’s envoy Ma Yongliang is said to have reported that 
previously he had been appointed badi and sent to China to present tribute, at 
which time he was given a silver sash; and that since he had now come to pay 
tribute again, this time in the capacity of alie, he requested a golden sash.12 
He also requested silver sashes for Badi Nan Wu and others in his company. 
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Emperor Yingzong granted all his requests.13 The rank of badi (or bazhe) ap-
pears to have been below that of alie.
 About this time, another envoy from Java, Gao Naisheng, came to China. 
He requested that ship carpenters repair his wrecked ship, while promising 
to take responsibility for providing necessary materials and provisions for 
the work. Also found is the name of another Javanese envoy, Man Yong, who 
had the title of caifu bazhe. Gao and Man may have come to China on a dif-
ferent ship than did Ma Yongliang, but the two missions arrived at the same 
time. The title caifu bazhe may indicate a badi acting in the capacity of caifu; 
that is, a general manager of the ship with the title of badi. Man Yong was a 
Chinese. He was originally known as Hong Mouzi and had been a resident 
fisherman of the district of Longqi in Zhangzhou Prefecture of Fujian Prov-
ince, but was later taken prisoner by pirates, from whom he finally escaped 
and fled to Java. There he changed his name to reflect the Javanese style, and 
he was included as a member of the tributary embassy to China. In China, he 
requested permission to return to his original home and former occupation, 
whereupon Emperor Yingzong appointed him a civil servant, providing him 
with coolies and provisions and sending him back to his native district.14
 Ma Yongliang came to China as a tributary envoy of Java again in Cheng-
tong 3 (1438), also in the years 7 and 11 (1442 and 1446). In 1438, he was 
accompanied by the interpreters Liang Yin and Nan Wendan; they, like Ma, 
were men of Longqi in Fujian Province who had accidentally landed in Java 
during a fishing trip. In the sixth month of Chengtong 3, all three men, Ma, 
Liang, and Nan, were permitted to return to their native district, and Ma and 
Nan in particular were advised to build ancestral halls for the observance of 
ceremonies in honor of their ancestors.15
 The Javanese tributary envoy of Chengtong 2 (1437), Ya Mizhe, had acted 
as interpreter in missions dispatched during the periods of Yongle and 
Xuande (1403–1435) and had been given a silver sash by the Ming court. 
Now, in Chengtong 2, he requested a golden sash by virtue of having been 
promoted to the rank of alie, and asked also for a silver sash for Huang Qi, 
his company’s interpreter. Both requests were granted. Both Ya Mizhe and 
Huang Qi were also Chinese.16
 In Chengtong 11 (1446), Bazhe Ma Mo and Chen Mawu came to China 
as Javanese envoys at the time of Ma Yongliang’s visit. Also known are the 
names of Bianshi Bazhe, Li Fu, and the interpreter Li Ai.17 Again, in Tian-
shun 4 (1460), in the suite of the Javanese envoy Alie Guoxin were the inter-
preter Bazhe Ma Mo and Caifu Bazhe Ma Wu.18 All those mentioned here, 
possibly including Guo Xin, were Chinese.
lI DAI bAoAn  an d ryu kyu Trade 121
 Among the Javanese envoys coming during the periods of Yongle and 
Xuande, Bazhe Chen Weida, Li Qi, Li Tianshan, and others may have been 
Chinese, but it is difficult to ascertain the race of many of those chief envoys 
who had the title of alie. At any rate, many Chinese lived in Java and were 
appointed as chief envoys under the title of alie, and it appears that other 
important positions in a tributary mission, including interpreter, general 
manager, and pilot, were also held by Chinese.
 In Hongchi 14 (1501), there came drifting to the coast of Tianbo District 
in Guangdong Province the ship of a Javanese envoy calling himself Naihe-
dayamu. He and his men were sent to Guangzhou (Canton), where they were 
treated as members of a tributary mission and given provisions. A report 
was sent to the capital, and it was soon brought to light that Naihe-dayamu 
was a Javanese whose real name was Gengyisu, and that two men, named Li 
Zhaotie and Li Tingfang, both natives of Jiangxi Province in China, had con-
spired with a Fujianese by the name of Zhou Cheng and others to conduct 
secret overseas trade, for the purpose of which they had incited Gengyisu 
to load goods in Java to be taken to Canton. The false tally sheet carried by 
Gengyisu led to the disclosure of this conspiracy.
 Gengyisu was the son of the Javanese chieftain Badi Niaoxin, who had 
given his son a tally bearing the Chinese character Zhao and the number 3 
torn from the ledger book. This was the tally Gengyisu took for his voyage 
to China.
 Under the tally system of the Ming as applied to Java, one hundred tallies 
were prepared, each bearing the designation Zhao, which was the first of 
the two characters for Java, and also two hundred tallies, each bearing the 
character Wa, the second of the characters for Java. Two copies each of two 
ledger books for the respective types of tallies were also prepared. One copy 
of the Zhao ledgers and one hundred Wa tally sheets were given to Java; an-
other copy of the Zhao ledgers, one hundred Zhao tallies, one copy of the Wa 
ledgers, and one hundred Wa tallies were kept at the Board of Rites in Bei-
jing; and another copy of the Wa ledgers was placed at the Provincial Office 
in Canton, which was the designated port of entry for Javanese ships. Each 
tally bore the stamp of a character and a number, each of which was split in 
half, and each ledger book contained one hundred tallies bound together. 
The tally brought by a Javanese envoy was to be checked against its ledger 
in China, and the tally carried by a Chinese against its ledger in Java, and in 
this way the authenticity of an embassy was verified. A new series of tallies 
and their ledger books were issued for the period of each reign in China. The 
fact that Gengyisu carried the tally bearing the character Zhao and the num-
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ber 3 torn from the ledger naturally served to disclose the ruse. The Board 
of Rites held that the correct tally to be presented by the Javanese at this 
time was the one bearing the character Wa and the number 12. Hence it can 
be assumed that eleven of the tallies issued for use in the Hongchi period 
(1488–1505) had been used before that time. (The remaining tallies of the 
Chenghua period [1465–1487] had been returned to China by the first Java-
nese mission in the following period, Hongchi, according to the procedure 
stipulated by the Chinese for unused tallies.) On the back of each tally were 
entered the number and names of the men aboard the ship, the number of 
items in the ship’s cargo, and the like.
 The sham tally brought by Gengyisu bore the names of 109 Chinese and 
foreign people, together with a list of goods like pepper and garuwood. These 
names show that a Javanese tributary embassy in those days included people 
with Javanese names and those with Chinese names.19 And yet, though carry-
ing Javanese names, many persons occupying important positions were in 
fact Chinese.
 Chinese and their descendants were important members of the tributary 
embassies of Ryukyu and South Sea countries, and the roles to which they 
were appointed had been more or less fixed since the middle of the fifteenth 
century. In the case of Ryukyu, the general manager of a tributary ship who 
took charge of its goods was appointed from among native Ryukyuans. In 
the case of Java, however, such an official seems to have been chosen from 
among Chinese, and in this sense it can be assumed that direct Chinese in-
fluence was considerable in the conduct of Javanese tributary relations with 
China, more so than in the case of Ryukyuan tributary relations. What has 
been described above generally holds true for tributary relations which other 
South Sea countries, like Siam, Malacca, and Palembang had with China, as 
well as with Ryukyu.20
ryukyu Trade networks: Tribute Trade and Private Trade by the ryukyu king
According to the First Collection of the Lidai Baoan, Ryukyu engaged in com-
mercial transactions with various parts of Southeast Asia such as Siam, 
Palembang, Java, Malacca, Sumatra, Annam, and Patani. It is likely that 
Japan, Korea, and China were added to these Southeast Asian countries, 
thereby linking Ryukyu in an extensive trade network.
 The trade network, or what may be called the Ryukyu network, was 
founded on the Ryukyu tribute trade with China. Its trade with Southeast 
Asia was aimed at obtaining pepper and sappanwood, which were presented 
as tributes to China. This trade network had two distinctive features: that 
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trade with Siam and other Southeast Asian countries was vigorous between 
the early fifteenth century and the mid-sixteenth century; and that, as far 
as the records of Lidai Baoan show, the trade with Southeast Asia declined, 
while the trade with China and Japan increased.
 This phenomenon prompts two questions. What happened to the trade 
with Southeast Asia after the mid-sixteenth century? And what was the na-
ture of the trade with Manila and Luzon in the context of Ryukyu trade with 
Southeast Asia? In examining these questions, one must take into account 
that the Ryukyus were involved in two trade routes between South China and 
Southeast Asia. One route ran along the island chains on the eastern side of 
the South China Sea, from Luzon to Sulu, and the other stretched along the 
coast of the continent on the western side of the South China Sea, from Siam 
to Malacca.
 The eastern route started from Quanzhou (or Fuzhou) and connected the 
Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Sulu. This route carried not only the trade with South-
east Asian tributary states, but also, from the sixteenth century onward, the 
trade with Spain centered at Manila—exchanging silk for silver—and the 
trade with the Dutch East India Company centered on Taiwan. At the same 
time, the route ran farther north from Fuzhou, connecting with soybean 
and soybean-meal trade from North China. Thus the Ryukyus mediated the 
north-south trade along China’s eastern coast.
 The western route, starting from Guangzhou, runs along the coast link-
ing major Southeast Asian tributary states, including Siam, Malacca, and 
Sumatra. Major items traded on this route included rice, marine products, 
and spices. This route was therefore closely related to food production in the 
South China area, including Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan. Specifically, 
rice and sugar imported from Southeast Asia played a key role in supple-
menting such productions in South China. Related to this point, in 1666, 
ninety-six years after records of official trade with Southeast Asia stopped 
appearing in the Lidai Baoan, King Sho Shitsu applied for pepper, which was 
not produced locally, to be excluded from the list of tribute goods. The Chi-
nese court approved. This suggests that over the preceding century, the Chi-
nese were able to obtain pepper through non-official channels. Behind this 
development lay the increase in China’s rice trade with Siam, which brought 
more merchants from the Chinese coast to Southeast Asia. As a result, the 
Ryukyuans had to obtain pepper and sappanwood either by competing with 
the Chinese merchants trading in Southeast Asia or by direct purchase from 
them (thus increasing their uncertainty and costs.)
 This can also be explained by the record of annual extra export of pepper 
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and sappanwood by the Ryukyu king to China under the title of “attached 
commodities.” To fulfill the demand for these so-called “attached commodi-
ties,” the Ryukyu king continually needed to obtain pepper and sappanwood 
in ways other than trade missions to Southeast Asian countries.
Trading relations between ryukyu and manila
In 1571, an expeditionary force led by the Spanish general Miguel Lopez de 
Legazpi entered Manila and made it the seat of government. At that time, 
Luzon and Sulu were already bound in tributary relationship with China, 
with their own Chinatown and Japanese-town. When Spanish galleons con-
nected Manila with the American continents, large amounts of silver flowed 
into Asia. In return, the New World obtained Chinese raw silk, pepper, and 
other special products from Southeast Asia.
 In 1494, as stipulated in the Treaty of Tordesillas, Spain and Portugal split 
the world in half. The whole of central south America, not including Brazil, 
came under Spain, while Asia was basically given to Portugal. After setting 
up base in Manila, Spain could not trade directly with Asia. But she recruited 
Chinese merchants to participate in China-Manila trade, exchanging silver 
for raw silk. It is likely that Ryukyu merchants also participated in this trade, 
transporting into China not the usual products from Southeast Asia, but sil-
ver transiting Luzon. Ryukyu was cited fifty-nine times in Spanish records 
over 220 years of trade with Ryukyu (from 1519 to 1738), including the name 
and location of Ryukyu; the locations of exchange and trade; the shapes and 
forms of the various islands and their living conditions; and Ryukyu’s rela-
tions with Spain, Japan, and China. Besides these, the tributary relationship 
with China and the Satsuma invasion were also mentioned.
 A number of records document the silver–raw silk trade between Ryukyu 
and Luzon. During the sixteenth century, the Spanish recorded on Ryukyu 
that every year six to eight Ryukyuan junks called at Luzon islands and that 
the Ryukyu people there were presumed to be Chinese. Depending on the 
situation, there may not have been a contradiction between Ryukyuan and 
Chinese because many Hokkien people were involved in Ryukyuan trade with 
South Sea countries. The Spanish, extending their influence (in competition 
with the Portuguese) by spreading Christianity, targeted the wealth of China, 
Ryukyu, Java, and Japan. Ryukyu became rich by selling Japanese silver for 
Chinese raw silk, and since Ryukyu was a small country, it could not possibly 
have had a vigorous external trade.21
 From the above materials (though not necessarily immediately relevant), 
one gathers that in the latter half of the sixteenth century, Ryukyu secured 
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the conditions to expand its trade from one that was hitherto restricted to 
procuring tributary goods from Southeast Asia to a much bigger network 
with silver in Manila. Such conditions were created when a large amount 
of silver was supplied by Japan and the New World, turning East Asia into a 
silver-currency zone focused on China. The price ratio between gold and sil-
ver at that time was 1:13 in Spain, 1:6 in China, and 1:9 in Japan, thus making 
it profitable not only to trade with the Chinese for raw silk, but also to trade 
silver for gold.
 In this way, when Ryukyu expanded to a more popular, silver-based ex-
change system, its trade network was no longer limited to the framework 
determined by the tributary system. The trade activities of Ryukyu became 
more versatile, at times getting closer to the network of the Chinese traders, 
at other times specializing in Japanese trade. However, the Ryukyu kingdom 
did not necessarily premeditate such an expansion.
conclusion: Tribute System from Periphery
Under the tribute-envoy system, a tributary state sent periodic tribute mis-
sions to the Chinese capital, and each time the ruler of a tributary state 
changed, the Chinese emperor dispatched an envoy to officially recognize 
the new ruler. This tributary relationship was at the same time a political, 
economic, and trade relationship. Other than the exchange of tributes for 
silk products from the emperor, specially licensed traders accompanying 
the envoy engaged in commercial transactions at the Beijing Huitongguan 
(residence for tributary envoys). In addition, more than ten times as many 
merchants as these special traders were allowed to trade at the country’s 
borders or at the ports of call. The specific direction and points on the sea 
routes for Ryukyuan tribute envoys were established, thus confirming their 
position in their voyage to the port of Fuzhou. Also, making use of seasonal 
winds, they were able to establish points and lines through navigational 
charts and by monitoring the coasts and the movements of the stars. This 
tribute trade was not limited to Chinese merchants from East and Southeast 
Asia; Indian, Muslim, and European merchants also participated, confirm-
ing the link among coastal ports.
 A distinguishing feature of the Ryukyu Kingdom was the tributary trade 
in the East and South China Seas from the Ming to the Qing dynasties. The 
Ryukyuans obtained pepper and sappanwood, which were not produced 
locally in Southeast Asia, and presented them as tributes to China. This 
intermediary trade strengthened Ryukyu’s relationship with Fuzhou on the 
opposite shore while also allowing its involvement in the migration network 
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from South China to Southeast Asia. Taking advantage of duty-free trading 
permitted under the tributary system, important trading ports were inter-
connected via coastal routes or pan-oceanic long-distance routes.
 In 1839, it was decreed that the frequency of tributes from Siam, Burma, 
and Ryukyu would be reduced to once every four years, but this was not en-
forced in practice. An imperial edict issued by Emperor Daoguang on the 
sixth day of the fifth moon, 1839, states,
Up until now, Vietnam has continued with biennial tribute missions and 
dispatched an envoy to Beijing once every four years. These two were 
conducted concurrently. Ryukyu sent tribute missions once every two 
years; while Siam once every three years. These countries submitted their 
good faith sincerely without complaining. Regardless of the long dis-
tances they had to travel or the bad weather that they have encountered, 
they have made great contributions showing their loyalty. From now on, 
Vietnam, Ryukyu, Siam will each dispatch tribute envoys once every four 
years. By so doing, they will demonstrate their will to be a vassal state.22
 This was a major change for Vietnam, which was, beside Korea, the coun-
try closest to China politically; for Siam, China’s stable source of imported 
rice; and for Ryukyu, which had continued with biennial tribute missions. 
The Ryukyu king opposed this edict and petitioned repeatedly to continue 
traditional tributary relations. For reasons related to the jurisdiction of the 
LiBu, tributes continued in the case of Ryukyu.
 What could have triggered such a change in tribute policy as is evident 
in Emperor Daoguang’s edict? The year 1839 was a significant date, just be-
fore the start of the opium war. Traditional studies have emphasized that the 
opium war was a result of the West’s (Europe’s and America’s) need to ful-
fill their trade interests by forcing Asian nations to open up their markets. 
However, as seen in the change to tributary policy, the Qing court had be-
come more sensible in relations with its traditional tributary states and was 
seen to attempt to adopt a policy of mercantilism in order to centralize its 
financial power. In other words, the central government had, by changing 
tributary regulations, refocused their attention on Guangdong so as to reap 
the profits from trade there.
 One also cannot ignore the fact that in 1880, the Chinese Zongli Yamen 
(Foreign Affairs Office) took jurisdiction over all matters related to foreign 
relations. Thus, through consular offices, rather than the traditional inter-
ests in the king of a tributary state, the Qing foreign policy had shifted to 
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direct, cost-benefit relations with the parties concerned: overseas Chinese 
(huaqiao), overseas Chinese workers (huagong), and overseas Chinese mer-
chant (huashang).
 To summarize Ryukyu’s foreign relations, the Ryukyu king’s status was 
fixed by the tribute-envoy relationship with China; relationships with Korea 
and other Southeast Asian tributary states were maintained as equals; and 
while theoretically existing as an equal to Japan, Ryukyu was in reality re-
garded as a part of the Satsuma domain and thus expected to be subordinate 
to it. As the evidence suggests, the interrelationship among various South-
east Asian nations and regions was determined by the hierarchical ranking 
system.
appendix: The ryukyus and Java
1430 Java
Lidai Baoan, vol. 40, doc. no. 9
The King of Chūzan, Country of Ryukyu, with reference to matters of courtesy, sends 
this statement from afar.
 You, the subject of China, are loyal, kind and broad-minded, and you look after the 
people of the country so that they enjoy their duties and live in peace. You give good 
treatment to [men coming from] all directions, and it is because of your great virtue 
that [people of ] various countries come to you.
 For a long time we have wanted to dispatch envoys bearing felicitations, but to our 
regret our small country lacked pilots well acquainted with the seaways, and thus we 
have been greatly remiss in showing courtesy.
 We now have men who are well acquainted with the waterways, and we have pre-
pared some trifling presents and are specially dispatching Chief Envoy Nan-zatu Utchi 
and others to proceed aboard a ship to your country, taking gifts with them to be offered 
as a small token of our sentiments. We shall be happy if you will accept them.
 It would be our good fortune if you would facilitate trading for the men now being 
dispatched and let them depart as soon as possible to come back to the country with 
the wind. We hope that, by long maintaining intercourse, all men within the four seas 
will be united as brothers.
 We list our gift items below. We now close this dispatch. Let this dispatch be given 
to the addressee.
 The following goods:
 Gold satin 2 bolts 
 Golden gauze 3 bolts
 White satin 20 bolts
 Swords 5
 Big blue vases 20
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 Small blue vases 400
 Small blue bowls 2,000
Dispatch to the Country of Zhaowa [Java]
Xuande 5/10/18 [3 November 1430]
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CoChinChinese Coin Casting and CirCulating  
in eighteenth-Century southeast asia
Li Tana
While much has been written about Chinese business networks in mod-
ern Southeast Asia, there has been little discussion about the coins used in 
the various trade ports and their origins. Moreover, when they have been 
studied, coin casting and circulating have been examined mostly within spe-
cific local contexts, with only vague references to China and the Chinese.1 
In this essay I explore the links of the coin business between eighteenth-
century Cochinchina and the different ports of Southeast Asia. The new evi-
dence seems to indicate that close connections existed on this important 
front of Chinese business, particularly between mining in Tongking, copper 
and zinc importing from Japan and China, coin casting in Cochinchina, and 
circulation in the neighboring countries of China, Cambodia, and Siam, in 
the eighteenth-century archipelago.
china-Tonkin
A basic observation on the history of coinage exchange between Vietnam and 
China, up to the eighteenth century, is that traffic flowed in primarily one 
direction, from China to Vietnam. This direction reversed in the eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth. Both Dang Trong (Cochinchina, or southern 
Vietnam) and Dang Ngoai (Tonkin, or northern Vietnam) cast an enormous 
number of coins, and both types of coinage made their way to China. Al-
though the coins from Tonkin were mainly of copper, and those of Cochin-
china were of copper mixed with zinc, they shared two characteristics: first, 
coin casting was largely a Chinese affair; and second, in both areas it was a 
collaborative project between the Chinese and the local rulers and nobles.
 Some historical figures hint at the magnitude of coin casting in Vietnam 
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and its impact on China’s economy in the early nineteenth century. In 1829, 
the Guangdong governor reported repeatedly to the great council ( junji chu) 
of the Qing court that 60 to 70 percent of coins circulated in Guangdong 
were Vietnamese, and that in Chaozhou (Teochiu) that percentage went 
even higher.2 This was confirmed by an Eng lish source in 1836: “The Cochin-
Chinese have a copper coin resembling the Chinese, and a great deal of it has 
been imported and circulated in the Province of Canton.”3 By 1840, 40 per-
cent of coins circulating in Fujian were reportedly Vietnamese.4 Vietnamese 
coins were also used in the cities of northern and western China, such as 
Jinan (Shandong Province), Chongqing (Sichuan Province), and even Bei-
jing, in this period.5 An archaeological dig in Huichang (Jiangxi Province) in 
1985 unearthed 54 kilograms of coins, most of them Vietnamese. Huichang 
was the major junction of water traffic between Guangdong and hinterland 
China.
 This information leads to a comment made by Do Van Ninh, an authority 
on Vietnamese coinage. He called the abundance of coin in Tonkin a “phe-
nomenon of Canh Hung,” that “the weakest king cast the most numerous 
coins.”6 Indeed, at least seventy-two types of Canh Hung coins were cast 
within a span of forty-six years (1740–1786), while all the previous Viet dy-
nasties (from the tenth century to the seventeenth) cast a combined total 
of a dozen.7 However, a closer examination reveals that 80 to 90 percent of 
the Canh Hung coins were cast not by the weakest king himself, but by the 
province officers or the Nung chiefs, and in collaboration with the Chinese. 
This was because province officers and the Nung chiefs could open mines, 
and these were predominantly copper mines. In the 1760s, according to Viet-
namese records, “high officers, royal families, and provincial officers were 
encouraged to take the responsibilities of one or two mines each, invest 
their own money and choose the local chiefs to work with them, and recruit 
laborers. The mines would receive five years tax-free.”8 Some mines hired as 
many as 10,000 workers, most of them Chinese.9
 Where did the copper go after being mined? Was it exported to other 
parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Java, by Chinese junks?10 At present my 
sources indicate that Tonkin copper was for the most part consumed locally, 
a small percentage was exported to China, and only a minimum amount 
was exported to other parts of Southeast Asia, if at all.11 The copper that 
remained in Tonkin contributed to the coin-casting boom that took place 
there from the 1740s to the 1780s, and it was mainly private-cast copper 
coins rather than raw copper that made it to China.
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The Story of dang Trong
If coin casting in Dang Ngoai remained a story of the Gulf of Tonkin, that 
of Cochinchina and Cancao (Hatien) went much further in the South China 
Sea region and down to the Malay archipelago.
 Up to the early eighteenth century, the coins that circulated in Cochin-
china came from two sources: Japanese coins (old or counterfeited ones) 
during most of the seventeenth century and Chinese coins from the late 
seventeenth century to the early eighteenth.12 From the late seventeenth cen-
tury, however, the Tokugawa government put limits on the copper trade, and 
the China market was pressed by its own increasing demand for copper, both 
factors affecting the coin casting in their respective countries.13 As the two 
sources dried up, Cochinchina was increasingly affected negatively. Between 
the late seventeenth century and 1770, the price of copper increased by 44 
percent.14
 At this important juncture of influences, zinc was first brought to Cochin-
china, in 1745.15 The Nguyen lord of Dang Trong, Nguyen Phuc Khoat, em-
braced this metal and cast 72,396 quan (string) of zinc coins between 1746 
and 1748.16 This quantity was not large, comprising only 70 percent of the 
quantity brought in by the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Voc) alone 
in the seventeenth century.17 Why was it, then, that unlike the seventeenth-
century imports, the eighteenth-century castings led to a disastrous infla-
tion?
 The central similarity in coin casting between eighteenth-century Dang 
Trong and Dang Ngoai rested on two factors: ready and abundant casting 
material, and large numbers of Chinese in both regions. While Dang Ngoai 
used copper mined by the Chinese, however, Dang Trong employed zinc 
brought in by junks from Canton. This metal, cheap and abundant, met the 
requirement of the rapidly growing commercial economy of Cochinchina 
of the 1740s. Zinc soon made up the bulk of Sino-Cochinchina trade, as 
Pierre Poivre, a French merchant visiting Cochinchina, reported in 1749–51: 
“The huge profit they [the Chinese] make on this substance has led them 
to abandon or suspend trade in all other articles.”18 In 1767, for example, 
zinc formed the single most important cargo from Canton to Bassac (5,890 
piculs), Cochinchina (9,868 piculs), Cancao (1,589 piculs), and Cambodia 
(1,014 piculs).19 The total number of piculs could be cast into at least 616,929 
strings of coins, even if no other material was added to the mix, which was 
usually the case with private casting.20 The private cast in 1767 alone was 
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thus eight to ten times the three-year total of the Nguyen official cast in the 
1740s.
The importance of canton connections
Yunnan began to produce zinc in the late seventeenth century. Because of 
Canton’s proximity and the convenience in transportation relative to Amoy, 
zinc prices differed remarkably between the two markets in 1737 (6.6 tael in 
Canton as opposed to 8.1 tael per picul in Amoy). Furthermore, merchants 
in Amoy had to wait for up to five months to receive the cargo they had 
ordered.21 This trade imbalance elevated Canton’s importance two decades 
before the Qing government made Canton the only official port open to over-
seas trade, in 1757. Zinc was thus an important stimulus for Canton trade 
and gave Canton an advantage in its competition with Amoy. This was par-
ticularly the case in terms of Sino-Cochinchina trade: zinc was the mainstay 
of trade between Cochinchina and Canton, as the figures on zinc exported 
from Canton in 1767 show.
 A related trade between eighteenth-century Canton and Cochinchina was 
gold, but it contained an enigma. Before the 1760s, Western merchants con-
sistently bought gold from China, as gold was about 60 percent cheaper 
there than in Europe.22 As a result China exported gold and imported silver. 
However, at the same time, junks from Cochinchina were bringing gold into 
China. In fact, Cochinchina was one of the three gold sources (the other two 
being Suzhou and Nanjing) for the Hong merchants from the 1710s to the 
1730s, according to Wen Eang Cheong.23 This was because buying Chinese 
coins with Cochinchinese gold was more profitable, and at the same time 
fulfilled the country’s acute need for gold.24 As a result, Chinese coins were 
exported to Cochinchina in large quantities, particularly from Canton in the 
late seventeenth century, as Bowyear confirmed in 1695: “From Canton is 
brought cashes, of which they make a great profit.”25
 Chinese merchants, on the king’s behalf, undertook gold speculation. 
When zinc coins flooded the Cochinchina market in 1750, for example, 
Lord Vo Vuong Nguyen Phuc Khoat used his zinc money power to “buy up 
all the gold in his kingdom,” as recorded by Poivre.26 Gold was then brought 
to China for speculation. In 1767 alone, some 386 gold shoes were brought 
from Cochinchina, a year when “gold from Cochinchina [was] extremely 
limited,” according to H. B. Morse.27 A contemporary Vietnamese source 
went as far as to estimate that no fewer than 1,000 gold shoes were brought 
to Cochinchina’s port, Hoi An, every year to sell to the Chinese.28
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 There was a good reason, it now seemed, that the eighteenth-century his-
torian Le Quy Don singled out Truong Phuc Loan, the most powerful and 
corrupt mandarin and the uncle of Vo Vuong, who monopolized the gold 
revenue of the country in the 1760s. The Nguyen Chronicle also pointed out that 
there was a Chinese merchant whose family name was Cai (Tsja in Hokkien), 
and who worked with Truong Phuc Loan on the main ports collecting reve-
nues illegally.29
 Truong Phuc Loan may or may not have participated in the forgery of the 
1750s, but many Nguyen officials inarguably did. They eagerly took part in 
this profitable economic activity and gained the lion’s share, according to the 
French merchant Poivre. In 1750, Poivre proposed to circulate “piastres to be 
marked with the stamp of the king . . . but the mandarins secretly opposed 
this edict’s being issued. As they are all counterfeiters they would have for-
feited a huge profit and would not have enjoyed the same ease in forging 
piasters as counterfeiting cash. They aroused suspicions in the king’s mind, 
which became publicly known, and by an astonishing quirk the money fell 
into a state of disrepute.”30 That Nguyen officials actively participated in 
counterfeiting activities was also confirmed by Vietnamese sources: “Rich 
and powerful people competed to cast coins.”31 The same situation took 
place in Tonkin during the same period. The map of coin casting or counter-
feiting in mid-eighteenth-century Cochinchina involved over one hundred 
furnaces around the capital area, most owned or sponsored by the Nguyen 
officials.32 Further to the south, coin-casting permission had been given to 
the Mac in Hatien (Cancao) in the 1730s,33 and thus a considerable num-
ber of coins were also cast there. The focus of coin casting in the 1760s to 
1770s, however, seemed to be the Mekong Delta, particularly the Bassac 
area. The situation was so rampant in 1770 that the scholar Ngo The Lan 
wrote an urgent petition to the Nguyen lord, requesting that coin casting 
be prohibited in Bassac. Court officials retained his petition so that it never 
reached the king, according to the Chronicle.34 Remarkably, the Tay Son rebel-
lion broke out the following year, in 1771, which eventually brought the end 
to the Nguyen rule in Cochinchina.
further links: canton, cochinchina, and the malay archipelago
None of these coin-casting activities could have been possible without the 
raw material, the source of which centered on a group of leading Chinese 
merchants in Hoi An. According to the records of the Minh Huong commu-
nity, there were ten such merchants, all of them called laoye. The term led 
Chen Chingho to speculate that these merchants served as government offi-
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cials either in China or Vietnam, but more likely in the latter.35 The top four 
Chinese families of the eighteenth century were Yan, Zhou, Huang (Oey in 
Hokkien dialect), and Cai (Tsia in Hokkien).36
 When the list of Hoi An merchants was examined together with Paul Van 
Dyke’s recent research on Canton, there emerged clear links in the indi-
vidual business connections between Canton and Cochinchina in the eigh-
teenth century. To begin with, the Yan family was one of the most promi-
nent Hong merchants in Canton, and a major Hong that engaged in trade 
with eighteenth-century Cochinchina (see table 1). From the links shown 
between Canton, Cochinchina, and the Passiak, it is evident that a major 
associate of the family, Beau Khequa, traded extensively in Cochinchina’s 
gold.37 Another link that almost certainly could not have been incidental: 
an important associate of the Yan family was Tsia Hunqua, who shared the 
same family name with the Chinese who participated in monopolizing the 
gold revenue with Truong Phuc Loan.38 More links seemed to have existed 
to the Huang in Canton, Hoi An, and the archipelago.
 Simon (Huang Ximan, Oey) was the major partner of the Yan in the 
1740s.39 Incidentally, as was the case in Java in the same period, the Nguyen’s 
coin mint was farmed out, to a Chinese named Huang (Oey in Fukien dia-
lect), in 1746.40 Although zinc was exported from China, Cochinchinese 
records stated that this man, surnamed Huang, suggested buying zinc from 
the Dutch to cast coins, and Vo Vuong accepted his proposal.41 Thus the 
Nguyen record stated the earlier source of the zinc brought into Cochin-
china, and pointed to a major link between zinc and the Chinese in the Dutch 
East Indies. It is remarkable that in the 1740s, both the Chinese kapitains in 
Tegal and Semarang were named Huang (Oey). According to Kwee, when 
the Oey in Tegal, a mint farmer himself, complained about the difficulties 
on the tax-farm of minting lead picis, the Semarang Chinese captain Oey 
Tjenkong helped him to pay the first three terms of the lease.42 It is most 
likely that these Oeys (and other Chinese towkays) in the Dutch East Indies 
were behind the scenes, working through the mint farmer Oey of Cochin-
china, when the Voc offered to cast coins for Cochinchina in 1754.43 These 
links better clarify the existing but fragmented information on the trade be-
tween Cochinchina and Batavia in the eighteenth century. Le Quy Don, for 
example, mentioned casually that Cochinchinese tinsmiths were skillful 
in making fine wares and that tin was cheap in Cochinchina, a place that 
produced no tin.44 When this information was viewed in combination with 
Poivre’s report, it became clear that the tin came from the Dutch-controlled 
areas and was bought by the Chinese from the Dutch.45
table 1 canton Junks to Southeast asia, 1762–1769
Year Junk name Chinese Hong name Destination
1762 Eckhing
Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Cochinchina
1764 Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Cochinchina
Fongschyn 豐順 Fongzun Hang
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang
Samkonghing 三廣興 Thatfong Hang Batavia
Sihing 瑞興 Mantack Hang Batavia
Tainganschyn Caucong
1765 Eckhing Cochinchina
Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Batavia
Fongschyn 豐順 Fongzun Hang Siam
Hingtai 恆泰 Wu Heguan Cochinchina
Quim Contay Passciak
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang Cambodia
Samkonghing 三廣興 Thatfong Hang Cochinchina, Batavia
Sihing 瑞興 Mantack Hang Cochinchina, Batavia
Tainganschyn
Wansun 源順 Mantack Hang Siam
1766 Eckhing Cochinchina
Ecksun 益順 Mantack Hang Passicak, CC, Cambodia
Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Batavia
Kimfong Cochinchina, Siam
Quim Contay Passiak, Manila
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang Cambodia, Passiak
Samkonghing 三廣興 Thatfong Hang Batavia
Wansun 源順 Mantack Hang LO: Cambodia
Winghing
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 More strikingly, Cochinchinese coins could have been directly circulated 
in Java from the 1750s. As in Cochinchina, there appeared in this period a 
notable need for small currencies in Java. As Peter Klein points out, “The 
process of economic penetration, extension and innovation was accelerated 
by about 1750. . . . It had a rising need of small currencies which would 
serve this purpose.”46 As a result, some semi-lead (zinc?), semi-copper coins 
(picis or kepengs) were used as small change in central and east Java. Because 
the Mataram court had forsworn its minting rights in the 1743 treaty with 
the Voc, these kepengs were all imported, and appeared as coins of China, 
Japan, and Tonkin.47
 A closer examination, however, suggests that many of the so-called 
China, Japan, and Tonkin coins were in fact forgeries of eighteenth-century 
table 1 continued
Year Junk name Chinese Hong name Destination
1767 Eckhing Cochinchina
Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Batavia
Quim Contay Passiak
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang Passiak
Samkonghing 三廣興 Thatfong Hang Cochinchina
1768 Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Cochinchina
Kimfong LO: Cochinchina
Quim Contay
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang Passiak
Samkonghing 三廣興 Thatfong Hang Batavia
Tayli 泰利 Tayschoen Hang Cochinchina
Tayon 泰安 Tayschoen Hang Cochinchina
Wansun 源順 Tayschoen Hang Batavia, Cochinchina
1769 Ecktay 益泰 Mantack Hang Batavia
Samjeck 三益 Fongzun Hang Passiak
Santay 新泰 Tayschoen Hang Cochinchina
Tayon 泰安 Tayschoen Hang Passiak
Source: Paul Van Dyke, “The Yan Family: Merchants of Canton, 1734–1780s,” Review of 
Culture, International Edition 9 (2004): 73.
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Cochinchina. According to Ta Chi Dai Truong, the authority on coins of 
Cochinchina, molds of coins of the Tang and Song dynasties arrived from 
China, Japan, and Tonkin in the eighteenth century.48 There were many coin 
specimens to copy, which private coin casters in Cochinchina then further 
developed, multiplying the number of coin types. There were fifty-three 
types identified as Dang Trong coins, but the list of “unidentified species” 
unearthed in Saigon and the western part of the Mekong Delta (Mien Tay) 
area was even longer.49
cochinchina coins in the malay archipelago
A recent book on coins found in Bali provides a chance to test the theory of 
connections between Cochinchinese coins and the archipelago. This book 
contains photos of three coins, each of which was Cochinchinese cast. One 
is Thieu Binh phong bao.50 Thieu Binh was the title of Le Thai-ton during 
his reign (1434–1441), but the coin Thieu Binh phong bao did not exist in 
fifteenth-century Tonkin; it was one of the private casts of Cochinchina in 
the eighteenth century.51 Another coin was the Khoan Vinh thong bao, sup-
posedly a Japanese coin cast between 1624 and 1643, but again it was in 
fact an eighteenth-century Cochinchinese imitation.52 Even more obviously 
Cochinchinese was the An Phap nguyen bao, which was cast of good quality 
copper in Cancao in the eighteenth century.53
 It was most likely the Canton junks that brought the coins cast in Cochin-
china, Bassac, and Cancao to the archipelago. Cochinchina’s, Bassac’s, and 
Cancao’s connections with Batavia are now evident, with the detailed reports 
on the destinations of Canton Hong merchants from 1762 to 1772. Thanks 
to Paul Van Dyke, we now know that while some junks visited Cochinchina, 
Bassac, or Batavia alternately in different years, other junks visited Cochin-
china and Batavia within the same year (see table 1).54 This meant that the 
junks stopped in Cochinchina before heading for Batavia, and Cochin-
chinese coins would have been used for purchasing Canton goods, while 
some were brought to Batavia.
 In particular, Cochinchina, Bassac, and Cancao were the most important 
coin-casting bases that provided coins to southern Vietnam as well as to 
Batavia and Canton. They could do so because of the specific water frontier 
nature of the Lower Mekong Delta in the eighteenth century.55 Two impor-
tant elements existed in the region: ready and abundant casting material, 
and large numbers of Chinese. As many Chinese were active either in up-
stream and downstream trade or in coastal trade, and the individual capital 
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and trade volume were never large, coins were the most useful intermediary 
in such trade.
 The newly found and published Kung kuan (Gongan bu, or Minutes of the 
board meetings of the Chinese Council) material in Batavia provides further 
evidence that coins were widely used among the Chinese in Batavia as small 
change, for donations and on gambling tables.56 They were sometimes also 
used for large spending; one of the minutes, for example, stated that a Chi-
nese spent 189,000 cash to buy eleven slaves in Bali in 1788.57 Remarkably, 
coins circulated in Bali were made of zinc, according to John Crawfurd in the 
early nineteenth century.58 A considerable proportion of these coins would 
have been from Cochinchina and Cancao.
circulation among neighbors
The largest percentage of the Cochinchinese cast went to China, although 
Chinese sources of the eighteenth century did not record much about them 
as they did in the early nineteenth century. It is clear, however, that Cochin-
chinese cast contributed 80 to 90 percent of the coins recorded as “uniden-
tified” in one of the Chinese sources, if one compares the descriptions of 
them with the photos and descriptions made by Ta Chi Dai Truong on the 
coins cast in eighteenth-century Cochinchina.59
 As Singapore’s second most significant trade partner (the first being 
Bangkok) in its earlier years, Saigon must also have imported some coins 
into Singapore. According to William Milbourne, the Spanish dollar was the 
principal coin, while Chinese cash was used in small payments.60
 In Cambodia, too, which was increasingly under the control of Cochin-
china from the late seventeenth century, the coins of Cochinchina circu-
lated widely, although Battambang coinage circulated throughout the coun-
try until the early eighteenth century.61 One Cambodian coin, a small silver 
coin stamped with a chicken, was most likely the “chicken silver” recorded 
in eighteenth-century Cochinchinese records and used in exchange with 
Chinese and Vietnamese.62
 Cochinchinese coins were used in Cambodia from the eighteenth century 
to the late nineteenth. A Vietnamese manuscript entitled “Tran Tay phong 
tho ky” (Customs of Tran Tay, i.e., Cambodia in the early nineteenth cen-
tury) stated that Cambodia’s silver was not pure and thus one tien of silver 
(3.5 grams) was worth only 40 Vietnamese cash.63 A French observation in 
1867 gave further details on Khmers using Vietnamese coins: “The common-
est [coin] is made of a brittle composition, whereof the chief ingredient is 
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antimony. . . . 2,400 of these little coins made up the value of one Siamese 
tical. They are universally in use among the people of Cambodia, who may be 
seen carrying them in cumbrous bundles from place to place. In Bangkok the 
same coins are employed as counters at the public gaming tables.”64
 It was at the gambling table that copper coins were introduced to Siamese 
society. Besides the gambling function, these pieces often served as small 
change in outlying provinces. Chantaburi must have been one such place, as 
gambling tax collected from Chantaburi was the highest in southeast Siam 
in 1809.65 It was also where Chinese and Cochinchinese were concentrated 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. “Ever since the counters 
made their first appearance—about 1760—there existed in circulation some 
bronze coins of the value,” one scholar noted.66 In the 1760s, too, copper 
coins began to circulate in Siam, and large numbers of private coins began 
to be cast in Bassac.
 Close relations existed between eighteenth-century Chantaburi, Cancao, 
and Cochinchina. Chan Bon (Chantaburi) and Thungyai appeared frequently 
in the Vietnamese sources of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.67 
Such traces can also be found in Siamese chronicles. In 1782, for example, 
Nguyen Anh, the future king of Gia Long, and his followers were on the edge 
of starvation on an island when a Chinese junk saved them. According to Sia-
mese chronicles, this junk was owned by a Chinese married to a Vietnamese 
woman from Chantaburi. They were carrying rice to sell to Ca Mau and Rach 
Gia.68 A similar event had been observed a decade earlier in Siam, with Tak-
sin and his followers. With more people having died of starvation than had 
died in the war, in 1768 Taksin “bought rice from ships coming from Pon-
tameas (Cancao or Ha Tiên) at the high cost of three to five baht per thang to 
distribute to the people.”69 It thus appears that both baht and Cancao coins 
were accepted at the markets.
 Reflecting the rather frequent economic intercourse in the region, Viet-
namese coins and currency of the early nineteenth century were used as ten-
ders in Siam and Laos, and were submitted by Thai or Lao people as taxes. 
According to Puangthong Rungswasdisab,
If the suai ngoen (tax in money/silver) came straight from the northeast 
and Lao towns, it also contained Thai baht but mixed with various kinds of 
local monies, including Lao coins and others called ngoen naentu and ngoen 
naenrang that originated in Vietnam. . . . The value of local silver coins was 
usually reduced by the smelting fee. Local officials in Battambang and 
Siemreap, however, made no difficulty in accepting other currencies that 
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seem to have been in common use among the local people. This suggests 
that the cross-border trade between Siam, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 
was long established.70
 The regular exchanges of coins and currencies between Vietnam and her 
neighbors must have had some impact on the prices of commodities in the 
region. We can find one such example in the inflation of the price of rice in 
Siam in 1803, after the Nguyen started casting coins in that year. According 
to Junko Koizumi,
Causes of price increases were not always natural disasters. In 1803/4, 
a brisk trade in rice with provincial officials and merchants who came 
by boat to buy rice to trade with other countries, and the increased con-
sumption for official purposes in the capital, resulted in a shortage of rice 
and its price increase in the capital. The king, in this case, coped with the 
problem by prohibiting the sales of rice to junks and sailboats, except for 
the case in which royal permission was granted.71
 One wonders whether this tightening rice trade in Siam was a response 
to the large-scale coin casting under the new emperor Nguyen Anh, in 
1802–1803.72 Between 1789 and 1799, Anh granted 27,000 quan of cash to 
his troops; on his ascension to the throne, in 1802, he rewarded them with 
65,000 quan, and in 1803 he awarded another 56,800 quan.73
 Thus one sees an almost instant jump of the price of rice in 1803. Accord-
ing to the Nguyen Chronicle of February 1803, “Rice price is high in Gia Dinh 
and people are hungry. [The court] ordered soldiers at different passes to not 
let merchant junks to carry rice out.”74 The same situation occurred in Bang-
kok, although 1803 was a good year of harvest, and there was no record of 
drought or flood.
further connections?
The large scale of coin casting in present northern and southern Vietnam 
happened in the greater context of the eighteenth-century Chinese migra-
tion to southwest China and Southeast Asia. If the contact points between 
China and Southeast Asia were limited to the few ports before this period, 
when tens of thousands of Chinese miners were employed in the same 
mine in northern Vietnam, and the same number of Chinese were settled in 
the Mekong Delta, the old contacting points were a hundred times multi-
plied. Cochinchina cast coins were useful not only in that they circulated in 
Cochinchina and were brought to China, but also in that they were used as 
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small change in ports of such locations as Batavia, Palembang, Cambodia, 
and Laos, and in that they were used as gambling money among the Chinese 
settlements. In short, they were used predominantly where there were size-
able Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.
 It was not unimaginable that a kind of Chinese network existed in mid-
eighteenth-century Southeast Asia, which interwove the matrix of mining, 
export and import of the metals, minting, and exports of coins for circula-
tion, if one notes that coin casting existed in eighteenth-century China.75 
According to a report made by the deputy minister of industry (gongbu) in 
1739, there were two official casting sites, at Bao Yuan and Bao Quan, in Bei-
jing, with seventy-five heads of furnaces, who were nonetheless from but a 
dozen families.76 In other words, only a few families controlled the business 
of coin casting of about one million strings per year.77 (It would be illumi-
nating, if one had the details of families who controlled the copper and zinc 
mining in eighteenth-century Yunnan, to see the extent to which they were 
connected to the merchants in Canton.)
 To be sure, the huge span of mining activities spread out from eighteenth-
century Yunnan to Tonkin, and the zinc trade and coin casting by the Chinese 
were not controlled by only a few Chinese families. What I am interested in 
and what I have been trying to illuminate are the connections between the 
events that happened in this region, which seemed to be individual, inciden-
tal, and local, but were in fact connected to a larger context, and moreover, 
in what manner they may have been connected. As Hans-Dieter Evers points 
out, the peddling trade, though carried out by individuals on a small scale, 
was not anarchic. Van Leur stresses, quite rightly, the flexibility of this kind 
of trade, but neglects the systematic aspects of the trading networks that 
made its persistence possible.78
 Whoever controlled the finance sector also dominated the mercantile 
economy. The lucrative trade between eighteenth-century Canton and South-
east Asia, both of which stretched to their respective hinterlands, could not 
be removed from the aspects of cash flow surveyed above. One note on pri-
vate casting in Cochinchina and the Mekong Delta observed that in China, 
forgery was most widespread in the areas near copper- and zinc-producing 
areas such as Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou.79 However, neither Cochin-
china nor Cancao produced copper or zinc. This implies active trading of the 
mineral material in the region and thus that connections overseas (Canton 
and Batavia) might have decided the status of the Chinese families in Hoi 
An, and vice versa.
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import of prosperity
luxurious items imported from china to Siam during the  
Thonburi and early rattanakosin Periods (1767–1854)
Masuda Erika
The Chinese used to do their hair in topknot style but they switched to the pigtail 
style to obey the orders of the Lord of Tartar.
They wore elegant coats and hats, and also shoes wrapped with leather.
There are countless cities full of people where it is possible to travel freely as one 
wishes.
Kungtang [Guangzhou] is an exciting city incomparable to any other.
People are enchanted to watch the variety of products.
Numerous ships line up on the surface of water even during the night.
—Verses engraved on the walls of pavilions in the Pho temple (Wat Pho) to explain 
the presence of foreigners during the latter half of the third reign
This Siamese verse about China was composed during the latter period of the 
reign of Rama III (r. 1824–1851).1 Previous studies on the rise and fall of the 
Sino-Siamese junk trade demonstrate that after the trade reached its peak 
within the framework of the Chinese tributary system in the early 1830s, it 
started to decline gradually, and Siam reacted keenly to its decay and finally 
seceded from the trade.2 These studies give the misleading impression that 
Siam abruptly stopped paying attention to China and that the latter disap-
peared entirely from the former’s external perspective.3 However, Siamese 
documents show that the degradation of China’s political prestige due to 
the opium war and the loss of the economic privilege of trade in Guangzhou 
under the tributary system did not soon change the prosperous image of 
China, or of Guangzhou, although Siam gathered information concerning 
political turmoil in East and Southeast Asia, in the middle of intense human 
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communication between Guangzhou and Bangkok (see fig. 1). Moreover, 
the Siamese rulers’ fondness for Chinese artwork continued even after Siam 
stopped sending tributary missions to China in the middle of the nineteenth 
century.
 In order to analyze these cultural preferences and the underlying values, I 
focus on the Siamese ruling class’s taste for luxurious or ornamental items, 
which were exported from China to Siam during the early Rattanakosin 
period.4 Not only did the Siamese ruling class enjoy these items, but the 
latter sometimes embellished the Siamese monarchs’ power.5 While these 
imported items did not represent a substantial amount of the trade be-
tween the two countries, they nevertheless preoccupied the minds of the 
Siamese ruling class. These commodities were a small window into the Sia-
mese rulers’ understanding of China and their relationship with the Chinese 
courtiers and traders who acted as go-betweens. Examining how the Sia-
mese ruling class related to Chinese luxury items may also clarify Siam’s in-
digenous perception of her external relationships and diplomatic practices, 
which have been overlooked since the advent of western diplomacy.
figure 1 map of guangzhou drawn in Siam during the nineteenth century. Source: Santanee Phasuk 
and Philip Stott, Royal Siamese Maps: War and Trade in nineteenth Century Thailand (Bangkok: river 
Books, 2004), 182–83.
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The fall of ayutthaya in 1767: The Turning  
Point of Siam’s understanding of china
The distinctive nature of Sino-Siamese interaction during the Thonburi era 
(1767–1782) merits observation, given that the kings of the early Rattanako-
sin dynasty perpetuated the basic pattern of King Taksin’s external relation-
ships, which emphasized Siam’s interactions with China. The reign of King 
Taksin stands out in its peculiarity within the nature of Sino-Siamese rela-
tions in comparison with former ages. Since the tributary order was disrupted 
by the fall of Ayutthaya, in 1767, China was aware of the extinction of the royal 
line of the kingdom of Ayutthaya. Detailed descriptions of Siamese political 
turmoil in Chinese documents reflect China’s interest in the aftermath of the 
Burmese destruction.6 This Chinese response was the first case in the his-
tory of Sino-Siamese interaction. In the beginning, King Taksin’s endeavour 
to reopen tributary relations was hindered by the obstructionist efforts of 
Mac Thien Tu of Hatien, who had thorough knowledge of Chinese diplomatic 
practices and alleged that King Taksin was a usurper.7 This situation forced 
Siam to seek investiture from China in an effective and achievable way that 
would not stir up problems either in the Siamese or in the Chinese courts.
 A notable example of Siam’s effort to overcome a critical moment in its 
contacts with China can be found in a misleading piece of correspondence 
between the two courts. Having acceded to the throne, Rama I (r. 1782–1809) 
sent his letter to China on 15 May 1782, approximately two months after he 
had executed King Taksin, in early April in the same year. In this letter he 
said: “On 23rd of the second month in the 47th year of Qianlong [5 April 
1782], as a great misfortune befell my father, Zhao, he perished from a dis-
ease. In his last moments, he admonished Hua, ‘Be prudent in adminis-
tration and do not change the old regulation. Attend to the country with 
devotion and obey the Celestial Court.’”8 Rama I, who had been a military 
commander under King Taksin, referred to himself as Taksin’s son in his let-
ters, which were written in Chinese. It is noteworthy that in Chinese docu-
ments there are no references to King Taksin’s fall from power, which was 
characterized in contemporary Siamese and Western sources as having re-
sulted from his mental derangement. This ruse was never exposed, and even-
tually Rama I received investiture from China, in 1787.9
 A letter written by the governor-general of Liangguang and presented to 
King Taksin’s last mission in 1781 illustrates the same kind of distortion, 
which occurred when the Siamese court received a letter from the Chinese 
side.
152 maSu da e ri k a
A letter of the governor-general of Liangguang to the great Phra Khlang 
of Ayutthaya.10 The gist of the matter is as follows. This time <Ayutthaya> 
appointed envoys to carry a royal letter and royal gifts for chim kong.11 In 
Guangzhou, Hu iau and Hai iang were ordered to send the envoys, the 
royal letter and the royal gifts from Guangzhou to Beijing on 21 August 
in 1781. Personnel to carry the letter and gifts by forming a procession 
on the land route and the waterway were prepared according to custom. 
After the envoys finished the official mission in Beijing, they returned to 
Guangzhou. [We] let the envoys go back to report the course of the offi-
cial mission on 3 March 1782. However, the envoys said that the monsoon 
was too severe to go against the wind and in December a tail wind would 
come. Then Luang Phakdi Wanit, a captain of a junk, came to receive the 
envoys by a Husong junk. Luang Aphai Chonthi and Khun Phakdi Kan-
laya bore a letter whose contents are as follows. The old King passed away 
already. The new King ascended the throne. This was reported to Somdet 
Phra Chao Munpi already.12 He knew this matter and thought as follows. 
The old King did not love his subjects and was apt to oppress them un-
justly. Thus, he deserved death. As for the new King, he is adored by the 
subjects. Please accept royal gifts.13
It is important to note the evaluations given by the Chinese emperor to the 
Siamese kings. It is clear that “old king” and “new king” indicate King Tak-
sin and Rama I. Although the Chinese side initially regarded King Taksin as 
a usurper, they gradually acknowledged his efforts to restore the country. 
Thus, negative valuations such as “he deserved death” must have resulted 
from the translation process.
 Although the remarkable ascendancy of Chinese courtiers during the 
last period of Ayutthaya has already been demonstrated, it is worth em-
phasizing that the Siamese ruling class’s concern with the nature of tribu-
tary relationship with China is hardly reflected in Siamese and Chinese 
source materials, even during a Chinese courtier’s service of Phra Khlang, 
the highest executive of foreign affairs.14 On the contrary, contemporary 
Chinese sources reveal that in the period following Ayutthaya’s destruc-
tion, the Siamese court started to take into consideration the Chinese diplo-
matic practice of paying tribute, as they wanted to maintain smooth rela-
tions with China to find a way out of political turmoil after the Burmese 
destruction. Without going into detail about the extent to which King Tak-
sin’s personal intentions in contacts with China are reflected in the Chinese 
documents, it can be noted that during the premodern period, the Siamese 
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ruling class and the Chinese intermediaries, who negotiated directly with 
the Chinese officials in Guangzhou and Beijing, represented Siam’s con-
tacts with China.
 During the early Rattanakosin period, the intentions of the Siamese kings 
in interaction with China gain greater clarity in Siamese sources.15 Yet, the 
possibility of cover-ups should not be overlooked, since Siam was victorious 
in its competition with Hatien for dominance of the trade with China in the 
Gulf of Siam. Once Siam’s disrupted tribute to China was restored, China 
no longer attempted to intervene in the domestic affairs of Siam.16 In other 
words, despite the frequent dispatch of tributary missions to China, the Sia-
mese rulers did not have to adapt themselves to the ideology of the Chinese 
tributary system. The Siamese ruling class started to show significant inter-
est in imported commodities from China under these conditions of exter-
nal negotiation with the Chinese, and given a greater understanding of the 
diplomatic contacts than in former ages.17
imported commodities from china in the mind of the Siamese ruling class
In analyzing the pattern of imports and exports between Siam and China dur-
ing the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth, Jennifer Wayne Cush-
man observed that Siam’s imports from China were composed of “manufac-
tured items for popular consumption.”18 On the other hand, Cushman also 
mentions briefly the high-quality goods ordered by the king and nobility.19 
Dhiravat na Pombejra provides, in his study on Siamese court life during the 
seventeenth century, many examples of luxury goods and rarities ordered by 
the Siamese king and nobles in their contacts with foreign countries.20 Dur-
ing the early Rattanakosin period, it seems reasonable to suppose, the fre-
quent dispatch of tributary missions to China offered the Siamese elites the 
means to acquire those varieties of commodities. Phraya Mahanuphap, one 
of the envoys of King Taksin’s mission to China in 1781, portrays rich and 
abundant merchandise sold in various shops in Guangzhou.
After making consultations, the governor-general came to pay respect to 
the royal letter and all the Siamese envoys.
 The envoys went by wagons carried by men along a wide street.
 Beautiful stones paved the street.
 Countless strange-looking stores elaborately made of rain trees stood 
along both sides of the street.
 There were golden boards engraved with the names of products in ver-
milion in front of the shops for customers to know what was on offer.
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 Censers and candles were painted with golden patterns, and beautiful 
bedsteads were arranged in rows.
 As for merchandise for decoration, there were so many sundry riches.
 There were dazzling silk clothes in various colors and the materials of 
which the clothes and curtains were made were luxurious.
 There were countless bowls, earthen jars, plates, and chan-ap.21
 Some people carried goods on their shoulders and drew the attention 
of customers skilfully, while others tried to do so by beating on pieces of 
wood.22
 Siamese kings and nobility often ordered tributary missions or mer-
chants, who in many cases were Chinese, to purchase or request rare and 
high-quality goods in China. A list of merchandise ordered by a Siamese 
noble in 1844 provides an insight into the pattern of desired goods ordered 
(see table 1).
 This list is excerpted from the documents concerning the import and ex-
port of commodities by ships sent to China, outfitted by Siamese nobles 
from 1843 to 1845. Although further discussion is needed if the catalogued 
goods indeed represent the general pattern of Siam’s imports from China 
during the early Rattanakosin period, most items in the list correspond to 
products cherished by the Siamese elites during the same era, which can be 
found in contemporary Siamese, Chinese, and Western language sources.
 The testimony of a tributary mission in 1843 describes how Cantonese 
Ratkot-silk was ordered. On their return from the imperial audience in Bei-
jing, while waiting in Guangzhou for the ship bound for Bangkok, the envoys 
received an order from the king to purchase the silk. The first envoy, with the 
mahatlek Mr. Phu, the captain and the lata of the Chinda Duangkaeo, spent 
two days locating a shop that could provide the requested item.23 It is safe 
to assume that the cloths were first sent to Chamun Waiworanat, a Siamese 
noble who was the ship-owner, and then offered to the king.24 F. A. Neale, 
who stayed in Siam less than a year, in 1840, remarked while enumerating 
a list of imported goods from China to Siam: “In such a place as Bangkok, 
where the fashion is to wear as little clothing as one possibly can, and where 
such a thing as a tailor’s bill was never heard of, silks and satins are of course 
in small requisition.”25 However, as Cushman refutes this view by utilizing 
Western sources on Siamese external economic activities, it is important to 
say that Neale’s judgment is totally unsound.26 Silk cloth was in demand in 
the Siamese court as an item to bestow on nobles as rewards.27
 The second noteworthy group of commodities in the catalogue was that 
table 1 commodities imported from guangzhou by the Thepphakosin outfitted 
by chamun waiworanat on 2 June 1844 i
Captain  Mr. Kaeo,
Lata ii   Chin iii Nu,
88 crews
1) 10 blocks of rectangle-shaped stone.
2) 10 blocks of round or rectangle-shaped stone.
3) 1 rectangle-shaped stone for a column with lotus-shaped decoration. There is 
an example. Length: 1 wa 3 khup. Made according to a sample.
4) 20–30 blocks of big marble. Buy as much as it would be possible.
5) 5,000 plates of rectangle-shaped marble for paving. Length: 18 niu.
6) 2 blocks of white stone, big enough to make 1 sok-high stone image.
7) Loy-Stone [?], big enough to make 2 or 3 beautiful round-shaped incense pots 
in Chinese style. 2 or 3 square ones are also needed if possible.
8) Branch or log-shaped red stone big enough to carve 2–3 niu-high’s Buddha 
image is needed if possible.
9) Stone with pattern for handrail of a staircase 8, for column 8 total: 16.
10) Tung-stone [?] as much as they could buy.
11) 5 blocks of marble.
12) [Statue of ] cow, water buffalo in life-size. 5–6 for each. Similar to those at 
pillar of the round shaped pagoda in the Phrakaeo temple.
13) [Statue of ] middle sized hog deer and pig, 5–6 for each. [Statue of ] peafowl 
2–3. [Statue of ] chicken, egret, 5–6 for each. Made of glazed ceramic, some 
stand up, sleep or fall face down.
14) A model of a junk ship, made of glazed ceramic, with sailor, green or red 
head. length:1 wa 1 sok.
15) 2 models of a cart, made of glazed ceramic, with a driver with harness. 
Length: 1 sok.
16) 4 glazed ceramic images of male, female, child, nobles, and commoners.  
1 wa 6 khup high. Poses of standing up, sitting, sleeping.
17) 20 different models of Chinese pavilion. Made of ceramic. The same size as it 
was ordered last time.
18) Tiles with small holes. Dark yellow 1000, white 1000, dark blue 1000, green 
1000, pale yellow 1000, total 5000, all in the same design.
19) 100 brass lanterns in hexangular shape.
20) 20 brass lamps.
21) 10 big brass lanterns. Diameter 1 wa 1 sok.
22) 20 flag of yellow tiger with wings, with no edge. Flags of dragon, centipede in 
5 colors (dragon 200, centipede 100, total 300), total 320.
23) 300 bolts of Cantonese Ratkot-silkiv in good quality, 100 percent silk.
24) 40 bolts of silk in Chinese design of gardenia.
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of stones, tiles, and Chinese-style stone images. These materials were used 
in the construction of royal palaces and residences of nobles, especially 
during the second and third reign when Chinese-style architecture and 
gardens decorated the homes of the nobles who resided in the capital. The 
royal chronicle tells of Suan Khwa (The garden of the right), a garden in 
the Chinese style built in the Grand Palace by Rama II. In 1818, when tribu-
tary envoys returned from China, they reported to the king that in China, 
even wealthy commoners laid out palatial gardens. After this report, Rama II 
ordered Prince Chetsadabodin (Rama III) to construct a magnificent gar-
den on the right side of the royal palace.28 Boat races that took place on 
the artificial ponds of the garden among the king’s concubines, who wore 
beautiful silk dresses, are vividly described in the chronicle. Court officials 
table 1 continued
Captain  Mr. Kaeo,
Lata ii   Chin iii Nu,
88 crews
25) Cantonese gold brocade with no pattern. Yellow color 100, different colors 50, 
total 150. Cantonese gold brocade with pattern in different colors 50. Total 
200.
26) Kin-silk [?] in different colors. Red and green are much needed while navy blue 
is less needed. Total 80 bolts. White is not needed.
27) Kalamphak,v as much as can be purchased.
28) Black horns to make snuff pipe [?], as much as can be purchased.
29) Your Lordship ordered to make 4 old style silver trays. Diameter 4 sun. Each 
should weight 9 tamlung.
30) Silver tray with high stand. Diameter 6 sun: 1. 15 sun: 1.Total 2.
31) Copper alloy tray with high stand. Weight: 8 tamlung 3 bat 1 fuang. Teapot 
shape. Large: 1, small: 1, Total: 2. There is an example.
32) 1 silver altar. Length of a side: 1, 3 chia.
33) A pair of glasses with golden-coated frame. Strong enough for a 60-year old 
person.
i. The noble Chamun Waiworanat was Chuang Bunnak, who played a dominant role in 
the government in the mid-nineteenth century.
ii. The clerk in Chinese seagoing junks of that time.
iii. The title Chin is used to signify that the person is of Chinese origin.
iv. The term ratkhot refers to cloth used to tie up one’s body.
v. Kalamphak is a kind of herb.
Source: Records of the Third Reign, cs 1206–49, Manuscript Division, National Library of 
Thailand.
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and palace ladies of the inner court took royal orders to compete with each 
other in adorning Chinese pavilions and floating houses on the ponds. “Life-
size stone images in sitting or standing poses,” altars, and lanterns were 
among the decorations.29 Kanthika Sriudom suggests that courtiers sought 
those decorative items chiefly from China.30 These materials were also used 
in temples. Ordered in the same year as the Thepphakosin was dispatched 
were a Chinese pavilion made of stone for the Pho temple and tiles to deco-
rate the round pagoda of the Arun temple.31
 Ceramic constitutes the third cluster of import merchandise from China 
during this period. The ruling elite ordered not only ware for decorative pur-
poses, but also a large quantity of functional ware such as bowls and jars. 
Wares characterized by the most distinctive features of this period were 
bencharong, multicolored enamelled porcelain with Siamese-style motifs, 
and lainamthong, gold-washed ware. They were exclusively for export from 
China to Siam and used only by royalty and nobles. Bencharong started to be 
produced in China in the seventeenth century, and the early Rattanakosin 
period is known as the greatest period of their production, while lainam-
thong were mostly made during the early Rattanakosin period.32 Occasion-
ally, Siamese craftsmen were sent to China to supervise the production of 
these enamels.
 It is well known that members of tributary missions were given indi-
vidual rewards from the Chinese emperor in Beijing and Guangzhou, as well 
as in cities en route (see table 2). Some of these gifts may have been used 
as offerings to the court or sold to the nobility and the king. Furthermore, 
envoys spent around nine months in Guangzhou before and after their trip 
to Beijing. It is possible that this period was used to purchase goods that 
were ordered by the ruling class. When Rama IV (r. 1851–1868) dispatched 
a tributary mission to China in 1852, he required the envoys to order or buy 
merchandise in Guangzhou.33 In a letter to the second envoy of the mission 
in January 1853, Rama IV reproached Kham, one of his trusted mahatlek, 
very harshly on the grounds that the envoys sold him inferior merchandise 
because they thought he could not offer high prices.34 What infuriated him 
all the more was that they sold merchandise of better quality to nobles who 
belonged to the front palace of the second king, whom he saw as his formi-
dable opponent.35
He made people in the king’s palace look much more impoverished than 
in another person’s palace. Mr. Nak and Mr. Sombun do not serve me 
from the start. Thus they can be excused. But Kham, a fool, though he is 
table 2 gifts given to the Siamese mission in 1843–18441
January 1844 in Jiangxi
For each envoy: Fur clothing 1, kin-silk [?] 1 bolt, box of tea 4, Chinese orange 1.
For each attendant: clothes stuffed with cotton 1.
February 11, 1844 at the guesthouse for envoys in Beijing
For each envoy: Flower vase made out of glass 1, glass bottle for snuff 1, cup made 
out of glass 1, tea cup 1, saucer 1, box of tea 2, big box for a bag [?] 1, small box 
for a bag [?] 1, Chinese orange 5.
February 16, 1844 at the guesthouse for envoys after seeing the emperor at  
Wu Men in Beijing
For each envoy: phayun fish [?] 1, fur wrap 1, satin surfaced fur clothes 1, clothes 
stuffed with cotton 1, socks stuffed with cotton made of satin 1 pair, shoes made 
of black satin 1 pair.
For each attendant: fur hat 1, fur wrap 1, belt 1, cloth surfaced fur clothes 1, 
clothes stuffed with cotton 1, trousers 1 pair, socks 1 pair, shoes 1 pair.
February 19, 1844 at Zi Guang Ge palace in Beijing
For the first envoy: satin 14 bolts, pao [?] 3 pairs.2
For the second and third envoy and the manager: satin 10 bolts, pao [?] 3 pairs. 
Each item was given to each.
March 14, 1844 at Wu Men in Beijing
For the whole mission: silk 575 bolts, other varieties of cloth 360 bolts.
March 13, 1844 in Jiangxi
For each envoy: Box of tea 4, gauze 4 bolts, cup with a lid 10, folding fan 10.
1. Departing from Bangkok, the mission arrived in Guangzhou on 1 June 1843. They 
stayed in Beijing from 6 February to 27 March of the following year. They returned to 
Guangzhou on 20 June and left for Bangkok on 8 November, reaching Bangkok on 29 
November. The Siamese tributary mission to China was usually composed of the first, 
second, and third envoys, a manager, an interpreter, and attendants.
2. In contemporary Thai, “pao” means “to blow” or “to perform on wind instrument”; 
however, I am not able to determine its meaning here.
Source: Phra Sawat Sunthon Aphai, “Khamhaikan thut ruang chamthun phraratchasan 
ok pai krung pakking cho. so. 1205” [A testimony of a mission which brought a royal 
letter to Beijing in 1843], Thalaenggan prawattisat 14.1 (1980): 88–109.
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my personal attendant, when he came back this time, saw me as an un-
fortunate person who lost a wife. He showed great disrespect! He let the 
server women, royal concubines, and wives of nobles in the front palace 
possess higher quality articles than those of the king’s palace. He made 
the king’s palace into the palace of a thief. He thinks only about profit.36
On the other hand, when the king proclaimed Siam’s secession from the Chi-
nese tributary system, in 1868, he reproached the Siamese kings and nobles 
for their behavior in the past, when they had allowed themselves to be sub-
ordinate to the Chinese emperor, dazzled as they were by luxurious mer-
chandise and gifts brought by Chinese traders in their contacts with China.37 
“[Chinese who acted as go-betweens] chose rarities of the best quality in 
Guangzhou as an offering to the Siamese king and praised craftsmanship in 
Guangzhou to the skies. The king received those gifts and nobles received 
bribe from the Chinese. They were very much pleased, as they were blind 
with greed.”38 Rama IV historically reviews the Sino-Siamese commercial 
relationship under the tributary system of China in the proclamation. He 
repeatedly mentions the treasures brought to the Siamese elites by Chinese 
traders and courtiers, who acted as intermediaries in Siam’s contacts with 
China, yet he never refers to manufactured consumer products, which repre-
sented the largest percentage of Siam’s imports from China. This may reflect 
the fact that Rama IV himself shared with his Siamese contemporaries a 
taste for the abundant riches from China, as was shown in his letter to the 
second envoy.
 During the early Rattanakosin period, luxurious goods and rarities from 
China were often purchased by Chinese traders, and by tributary envoys in 
some cases. Mahatlek were among those sent to China.39 This may reflect 
one aspect of the interests, especially the commercial interests, of the court 
in the early Rattanakosin period, where the king, nobles, foreign courtiers, 
and merchants were linked by very personal interconnecting ties, often de-
veloped through the gift-giving practice. In these circles, high-quality goods 
from China played a significant role in developing human relations.40 At the 
same time, while these luxury commodities enhanced the court, members of 
the nobility and temple residents also played a part in forming a prosperous 
image of China, especially Guangzhou.
Siam’s Sinicization: Visible but undocumented
Taking the translation of Chinese literature and Chinese influence in archi-
tecture and decorative arts as examples, David K. Wyatt suggests identifying 
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the early Rattanakosin era as the period of “Sinicization” of Siam’s intellec-
tual life.41 Chinese political influences were certainly more noticeable dur-
ing this era than in previous times. Did the eagerness of the Siamese elites 
to decorate their court with imported items from China reflect their effort to 
adapt themselves to the Chinese tributary ideology?
 In comparison with other East Asian kingdoms such as Korea, Japan, 
and Ryukyu, Siam seems to be indifferent to the influence of the ideology 
of the Chinese tributary system, since Siam did not belong to a cultural area 
where Chinese characters played a role in the process of communication. 
Toby finds that Siam followed the tributary convention of China in order 
to attain commercial profit and rejected the ideology of tribute when she 
was away from China.42 However, the Siamese ruling class did not have to 
“reject” the ideology of the Chinese tributary system, since Chinese politi-
cal ideology did not exercise direct influence over actual political and so-
cial scenes within the political sphere of Siam. In other words, they could 
choose what they wished to gain from China according to their “Siamese-
centric” worldview. Maurizio Peleggi points out that before the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, especially after the foundation of the Rattanakosin 
dynasty, the Siamese elite recognized the social and symbolic meanings of 
Sinic civilization, namely “imperial recognition” from the Qing court and 
“material wealth” from maritime trade with China.43 If one uses the term 
“imperial recognition” in the Chinese sense, it would be more appropriate 
to state that the value was appreciated by Chinese courtiers, who played an 
intermediary role between Siam and China, and had an affinity with China’s 
ruling ideology. Another group of subjects who could have been sensitive to 
the political implications of Chinese investiture was the Chinese population 
of the kingdom, particularly residents in Bangkok, the kingdom’s center of 
communication with China.
 This raises the question of the values the Siamese ruling class acknowl-
edged in their junk trade and relations with China. Rama II’s intention in 
constructing Suan Khwa provides a hint on this point: “Even wealthy com-
moners are able to construct a garden to enjoy. If we, the monarch of a 
vast country, cannot have a place to glorify honor of the country, foreigners 
would disdain us as a small country. Thus, we should build one to enter-
tain people from foreign countries and our tributary states, and let them 
say unanimously that the Siamese king has such a fantastic place.”44 This 
statement reveals the Siamese ruler’s keenness to demonstrate the king-
dom’s glory to both its subjects and foreign visitors. John Crawfurd, who 
visited Siam during the second reign, describes the Siamese as a “ceremo-
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nious people” and the importance they attached to ceremonies as “undue 
and ridiculous.” According to him, breaches of ceremonial rules in Siam are 
“rather considered in the light of political crime than offences against mere 
etiquette.”45 However, for the Siamese during that period, the importance 
attached to ceremonies such as coronations, funerals of the king and nobles, 
and the reception of envoys sent by foreign monarchs was hardly “undue 
and ridiculous,” as the grandeur of these ceremonies promoted a prosperous 
image of the ruling class to subjects and foreign visitors alike.46
 Naturally, the ceremony of sending tributary missions to China was also 
included in those occasions, since the royal letter, an engraved golden mis-
sive to the Chinese emperor, was an important part of the ceremony.47 Pro-
cessions of envoys were dispatched from the royal palace and marched along 
the city of Thonburi/Bangkok to the Chao Phraya River once a year, from 
King Taksin’s last mission to China in 1781 to Siam’s last tributary mission 
to China, in 1852. These impressive scenes enhanced the king’s power by 
stressing a close relationship with China, which brought wealth to Siam via 
the junk ships of tribute to China. In particular, Guangzhou, from which 
the busy seaborne traffic transported various merchandise and passengers 
to Bangkok, embodied prosperity (see fig. 2).48
 Consequently, the Siamese adulation of China or Siam’s Sinicization can 
be more obviously observed in the rarities and luxury goods imported from 
China and in the adornment of Siamese courts, palaces, and temples with 
these products, rather than in the recorded documents that recount Siamese 
efforts to adapt to the Chinese tributary order.49
 In addition, the impact of Chinese fashions on the Siamese elite during 
the early Rattanakosin period has been passed down in the form of oral rec-
ollections and family images, for example, that of the Kanlayanamit family, 
one of the few Chinese families whose genealogy can be traced back to be-
fore the third reign. Kanlayanamit, the founder of the family, was born in 
Siam in 1784, the third year of the first reign. This ennobled Fujian merchant 
mandarin is known as a trusted subject of Rama III, with whom he shared 
the profits of the junk trade with China.50 A scene with Chinese-style per-
sons and ships in mural paintings of the Kanlayanamit temple, built on the 
riverside of the Chaopraya by To’s fund in 1825, implies a shared image of 
the family’s connection to China (see fig. 3).51
 A portrait of Rama III in Chinese costume found in a book of Kulap 
Kritsanon, an author of various articles and essays on the history of Siam 
during the late nineteenth century, is another curious example (see fig. 4).52 
This picture does not necessarily imply the king adopted the costume accord-
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ing to his liking for Chinese fashion.53 Rather, it could be considered one of 
the visual images of the past shared by people in the late nineteenth century 
regarding Chinese cultural elements in early Rattanakosin court life.
 Well-known portraits of Rama IV, Rama V, and two nobles in the Chinese 
imperial robes should be evaluated in the political context in addition to 
the cultural one.54 During the late period of the third reign, when the court 
started to obtain news on the political and economic disadvantages China 
was facing from defeat in the opium war, the king of Siam started to assess 
the nature of the Chinese world order critically for the first time in the his-
tory of Sino-Siamese relations.55 Moreover, the court also had to be cautious 
about how the Chinese in the kingdom responded to the Siamese ruler’s 
diplomatic policy toward China. Social disturbances caused by the increase 
in the Chinese population since the late period of the third reign made the 
rulers realize that the well-organized groups of Chinese could be hazard-
ous to the security of society.56 It could be said that the king, not Chinese 
go-betweens, had to come to terms with China’s ruling ideology after the 
figure 2 mural of 
the Suthat temple  
(Bangkok, the third  
reign). Source: 
Santi leksukhum,  
Chittakam thai samai  
ratchakan thi sam 
[Thai mural paintings  
during the third reign]  
(Bangkok: muang  
Boran, 2005), 164.
figure 3 mural of the kanlayanamit temple (Bangkok, the third reign). Source: Santi leksukhum, 
Chittakam thai samai ratchakan thi sam [Thai mural paintings during the third reign] (Bangkok: 
muang Boran, 2005), 172.
figure 4 Portrait of rama iii. 
Source: muang Boran, ed., Suan 
Khwa [The garden of the right] 
(Bangkok: muang Boran, 1997), 69.
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middle of the nineteenth century, when Siam stopped laying stress on inter-
action with China in her external relationships.57
 At the same time, even after Siam cut off the tributary relationship with 
China, Rama IV and Rama V (r. 1868–1910) continued to admire the cul-
tural aspects of their relation with China as their predecessors had done.58 
This continuity has been overlooked by prior studies on the Sino-Siamese 
junk trade, which characterize Siam’s view of China by the middle years 
of the nineteenth century as being determined only by commercial profit, 
and which portray an oversimplified picture of bilateral communications 
between the two countries. There is still a need for a careful examination 
of the various aspects of Siam’s indigenous diplomatic view of China and 
its historical background before the conclusion of the Bowring Treaty with 
Britain in 1855, a view that may change over time. This view may provide a 
better understanding of the many characteristics of Siamese society during 
the Thonburi and early Rattanakosin periods.
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lows: “Around eleven in the morning, this street started to become very crowded, and 
this never ceased all day and night. We walked along trying to avoid the people passing 
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a sino-indonesian Commodity Chain
The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the late Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
Heather Sutherland
We usually analyze the social structure of early modern long distance trade 
in Asia in terms of ethnicity, seen as the basis for merchant networks, or, 
with a more cultural emphasis, as expressed in diaspora.1 This emphasis also 
fits the categories used by our main sources, whether they are the archives 
of the great European trading companies or Chinese annals.2 Given, how-
ever, that trade is driven by the search for profit, it would be more logical to 
use primarily economic models. Relationships can then be located within 
political economies, rather than seen as expressions of (essentialized) socio-
cultural entities. This is easier said than done, as in societies where there 
is a relatively low level of institutionalization, both legal and bureaucratic, 
security is sought through personal relationships (from kin to patronage), 
and hence poorly documented. We usually only glimpse aspects of complex 
transactions (often as recorded by European competitors or regulators), and 
there is little quantitative information, let alone long series of data.
 Chinese traders in Indonesia were once commonly defined in terms of 
their relationships with European powers, as facilitators of Voc (Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie, or Dutch East India Company) expansion, or 
as “middlemen” in the service of (pre-, post-) colonial political elites. De-
colonization, the resulting shifts in historiography, and the development 
of Asian early modern history have discredited this view. An emphasis on 
the deterritorialized Chinese community of the diaspora has become more 
popular. But this homogenizing emphasis on an assumed fixed, even static, 
ethnic identity ignores both the dynamic of ethnogenesis in migrant soci-
eties, and differentiation within the category “Chinese.”3 It also underesti-
mates the instrumentalist use of both ethnic and trans-ethnic ties, and the 
pliable nature of boundaries.4
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 The idea of “diaspora” reflects current preoccupations, including a sim-
plified Sinocentrism implicit in the idea of the “Han civilizational state,” 
the influence of modern identity politics, including that of long-distance 
nationalism, and fears of Chinese economic competition, as manifested in 
a “bamboo network.”5 This concept also encourages the dissolution of spe-
cific identities into “the Chinese” and excessive emphasis on connections 
with China. Furthermore, it tends to suggest that all overseas Chinese are 
the same, underestimating both the range of available identities (various 
“Chinese,” mestizo, and local) and the institutionalized roles that negoti-
ated difference among “Chinese” and indigenous communities. At least in 
trading ports, both these categories—indigenous and Chinese—could be 
subdivided into localized, floating, and “homeland-based” groups, with the 
caveat that individuals were geographically and socially mobile.
 Identity was relatively flexible, and a major factor in ensuring access to re-
sources. Social capital (trust, norms, networks) was mobilized through per-
sonal ties, which were often—but by no means always—organized around 
ideas of cultural identity.6 It is essential that the distinction between cate-
gories of analysis and categories of practice be clear. Social actors may use 
“ethnic” labels to construct their own frames of reference, reflecting social 
norms, but this is not to say that ethnicity was actually decisive in deter-
mining behavior. Class, for example, might prove to be a more productive 
analytic tool. Moreover, the different communities were hierarchical; intra- 
and intercommunal vertical patron-client ties and horizontal instrumental 
friendships were fundamental to success. In immigrant communities, de-
pendent for security and income on exploiting and developing niche oppor-
tunities, self-interest and (limited) trust created essential bonds. These alli-
ances pooled the resources, such as knowledge, capital, technology, and 
access to labor, which were essential to maintaining commodity chains, the 
sequence of transactions moving goods from producers to consumers.7
 Commodity chain analyses are often used to highlight inequalities, for 
example, between cores and peripheries in world-systems theory. In Waller-
stein’s classic formulation the typical exchange of manufactured goods from 
the center for raw materials from the periphery always benefited the core, 
as in (neo)colonial exchange.8 At first glance, much early modern trade also 
appears exploitative, as prices paid in the production zones are extremely 
low compared to those in the areas of consumption.
 However, as Michael Pearson has shown in his discussion of the trade be-
tween India and East Africa, what appears to be a malign, unequal exchange 
can actually be of mutual benefit if the commodities have a significantly dif-
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ferent use-value in the two zones. This was so in the case Pearson discusses: 
ivory and gold were cheap in East Africa, where wealth was measured in 
terms of cattle and women, but worth a great deal in India.9 In such circum-
stances all may benefit, particularly if needs are complementary and depen-
dence reciprocal or even exclusive. Contemporary commodity-chain models 
stress the role of transnational capital and knowledge-based activities, such 
as management, technology, or marketing.10 At different levels in the chain, 
different forms of knowledge are appropriate and profitable, often forming 
the basis for a division of labor. This also applies to trade in the early mod-
ern period.
 In this essay I consider the traffic in sea products between eastern South-
east Asia and China, specifically the tortoiseshell trade between Makassar 
and Amoy (Xiamen) in the seventeenth century and the eighteenth. Docu-
mentation is fragmentary, but contextualization enables me to extract the 
maximum possible information. While “ethnicity” was a basic category in 
organizing and describing the marine-products commodity chain, trans-
communal interdependence was exemplified in complementary forms of 
social capital, knowledge, and access to finance (in particular credit). Shifts 
in business practice also indicate that ethnic specialization was not inher-
ent, but contingent, as location within the chain changed over time.
The context: makassar and Trade
The geographical facts of an excellent site determined Makassar’s location, 
a sheltered harbor on the southwest peninsula of Sulawesi (Celebes), facing 
the Makassar Straits between Borneo and Sulawesi.11 However, the timing 
of Makassar’s rise was due to politicoeconomic developments in Europe, 
China, and the region—particularly in the strategic Straits of Melaka and 
Maluku (the Moluccas or “Spice Islands”). South Sulawesi had participated 
in trade with China and India since before the thirteenth century, but only 
indirectly, via the southern Philippines and the northeast coast of Java.12 
Makassar itself lay on a commercial backwater and produced few commodi-
ties, so its traders had to tap into trading flows at other locations, where 
local and transit goods were accumulated and exchanged (see map 1).
 The main sea lanes linking China to Melaka, Java, and Maluku bypassed 
the Makassar Straits, running down through the Sulu Sea, or past the north 
Borneo sultanate of Brunei, or via Java.13 Makassar’s own exports were not 
rich enough to attract traders when more valuable cargoes (notably Maluku 
spices) could be picked up elsewhere. In the early sixteenth century, before 
Makassar became a major commercial player, the Portuguese Tomé Pires 
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noted that it exchanged rice, foodstuffs, and gold for Gujarati, Bengali, and 
Coromandel textiles. Vessels from Makassar sailed to Java, Melaka, Borneo, 
and Siam, and “all the places between Pahang and Siam.”14 Most of these 
ships may have been owned and crewed by Makassar-based traders of out-
side origin, such as Malays or Javanese, rather than by local Sulawesians.15 
Commerce was probably of less importance to local elites than control of the 
wet-rice fields that had provided the basis for centralizing power.
 However, during the first half of the sixteenth century, various imperial 
ambitions combined to make Makassar an attractive trading center. The gal-
leon link between Manila and Acapulco (1565), Central Javanese Mataram’s 
P A C I F I C








































map 1 makassar’s sphere of influence before 1669.
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conquest of the north Java ports (1625), and, in the 1620s, campaigns to 
establish a spice monopoly in Maluku by the Voc all drew traffic toward 
the Makassar Straits. By the 1630s Makassar was receiving one junk a year 
from Macau and two or three from Maluku.16 After the Dutch took Melaka, 
in 1641, some Indian Muslim, Portuguese, and Malay merchants left to seek 
friendlier harbors, and Makassar benefited. These men brought their con-
tacts, capital, and market knowledge with them, as well as their ambition.17
 The exchange of Indian textiles for “smuggled” Maluku spices became 
Makassar’s main attraction for European and Indian merchants, but it was 
by no means the only commerce. Makassar transhipped eastern archipelago 
commodities like wax, tortoiseshell, slaves, gold, and sandalwood, as well 
as ironware and textiles. Certain consumption goods, including sugar, to-
bacco, horses, and textiles were destined for internal use, while some locally 
produced textiles, coins, rice, and iron were exported.18
 Merchants focused on distant markets found many of these items un-
interesting, either because of cost-profit calculations, or because they could 
be more easily obtained elsewhere. But after the 1620s, as the relative avail-
ability of spices attracted more traders, the resulting opportunities drew 
other profitable commodities to Makassar, such as Chinese goods from 
Macau and Manila. The once peripheral harbor emerged as an important 
port of call. By the mid-seventeenth century, Makassar had joined Brunei 
and Sulu as a central link in the regional trade in sea and forest products.19
 Makassar may have benefited from the Voc’s military expansion in 
Maluku, but it soon had to pay the price. The company’s obsession with 
safeguarding the spice monopoly required strong action against “smug-
gling,” so Makassar had to be brought under control. After a series of ulti-
mata, blockades, and military campaigns, the Portuguese and Eng lish were 
expelled, and it was decreed that Chinese and Indian goods could be ob-
tained only from Dutch Batavia. The company finally conquered Makassar, in 
1666–1669, generating a wave of refugees who settled throughout the Malay 
world, creating networks that were to help shape later political and commer-
cial trends.20 However, a Chinese trading presence remained in Makassar 
and was able to tap into the energy released with the dramatic expansion of 
Chinese trade and migration following the consolidation of Qing control 
in the 1680s.
The chinese, the VOC, and the Bugis
We know little of Makassar’s Chinese community before Dutch documenta-
tion began in the early seventeenth century, although we do know that they 
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had their own residential area, and some acted as trading partners and inci-
dental advisers to the ruler and the company. Chinese identified with Voc 
patrons were vulnerable to political tides before the conquest, but benefited 
after the war; conversely, those closest to the court were more likely to move 
on once the Dutch took over in 1669.21 After the conquest, the victorious 
Admiral Speelman listed nineteen Makassar Chinese, noting that about half 
had been resident in the town before the war, and the rest had arrived sub-
sequently.22
 It might be assumed that the Chinese community would expand rapidly 
under the Voc, but growth was slow in the seventeenth century.23 A casual 
reader of the 1688 census might have been impressed by a “Chinese” com-
munity said to number 627, but few (perhaps only the men) would have 
been of full Chinese descent, as the category included not only 52 men, 52 
women, and 112 children, but also 342 slaves and 69 debt-bondsmen.24 It 
is true that Ongwatko (captain of the Chinese, 1669–1701) was one of the 
two most prominent traders of the postwar years (the other being the Indian 
Muslim Mapule), but when he was succeeded by his son Ongieko, in 1701, 
the Voc referred disparagingly to the “small handful” of Chinese.25 A pera-
nakan group of locally born creoles had developed, of mixed ancestry, but in 
1701 the Voc did not yet rate them as Chinese, hence the dismissive “hand-
ful.”26 In 1724, the company reckoned there were just forty Chinese inhabi-
tants of Makassar.27
 The Makassar Chinese community seems to have been smaller and less 
stable than some other comparable groups, such as that of Ambon, which 
was also active in agriculture.28 Indeed, Voc officials hoped that it might 
be possible to eliminate Chinese trade in the waters around Sulawesi and 
Maluku; in 1727 they restricted traffic in the hope that Chinese commerce 
around the Spice Islands would “die out.”29 In 1731 Chinese trade east of 
Makassar was banned.30 This had the unexpected effect of making Makassar 
more attractive as an entrepôt, and it seems that just as the Dutch were be-
coming optimistic about the decline of their competitors, the fundamental 
changes that were to lead to the “Chinese century” were gathering momen-
tum.31 In Makassar, the origins of these changes lay in an increasing Chi-
nese appetite for trepang, the unprepossessing sea slugs known also as bêche-
de-mer.32
 Trepang fishermen are first mentioned in the Makassar archives in 1710, 
but such references quickly became common. In 1732 the Voc decided to 
appoint a lieutenant of the Chinese to assist the captain, because Chinese 
commerce was increasing, driven by growth in the trepang trade.33 Although 
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at first this was primarily routed through Batavia, the establishment of an 
(initially) erratic direct junk trade with Amoy after 1746 initiated a further 
expansion of the Chinese community.34 In 1759 Chinese immigration was 
subjected to supervision, but restrictions seem to have become serious only 
in the 1780s, when the economic power of the Chinese created problems for 
Makassar’s Dutch administration.35
 For the Voc, trade control was a priority; some products, such as spices, 
were subject to monopoly, others were restricted, while ship movements 
were channeled through systems of passes.36 This was more difficult in some 
regions, and for some commodities, depending on the geographical dis-
tribution of production and markets. Forest and marine commodities (ex-
cept pearls) were particularly difficult to manage, with their dispersed col-
lecting zones and multiple potential exchange sites, while highly localized 
spice production was particularly amenable to monopoly.37 Local Dutch offi-
cials were often less interested than Batavia in limiting commerce, perhaps 
because they themselves, and the communities they administered, derived 
such benefits from it. Already in 1695, Makassar indignantly rejected Bata-
via’s suggestion that tortoiseshell was being smuggled into the port.38
 Voc bases were few, and their patrols easily evaded. Much trade went 
underground, developing connections beyond Dutch control. Sulawesi Bu-
gis and Makassarese, Chinese and, particularly after 1760, country traders 
operating out of India were all, in varying degrees, in competition with the 
company. For the trade in sea products, this was particularly true in the 
waters around Borneo, the Sulu Sea, southern Maluku, and the arc of islands 
further south known as Nusa Tenggara.39
 Chinese and “Bugis” (that is, anyone from South Sulawesi) were crucial 
to the integration of local networks into long-distance commerce. Follow-
ing Bugis dispersal at the end of the seventeenth century, their trade became 
focused on an axis centered on Johor-Riau to the west and Makassar to the 
east. Indeed, despite the company’s attempted stranglehold, Bugis activity 
increased.40 Chinese traders, the second major integrating factor, were re-
garded by the Dutch with profound ambivalence. They may have played an 
essential role in Voc settlements, but the company was deeply suspicious 
of their role in competitive trading systems.41 The sultans of both Ternate 
and Tidore, however, were hostile to Dutch attempts to limit the lucrative 
Chinese presence.42 Geography, profit incentives, and the resilience of Asian 
networks ensured that the newcomers from the north remained marginal to 
entire economic sectors, despite the military dominance of the Voc.
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The Trade in marine commodities
Sea products such as tortoiseshell, pearls, coral, and seaweed had been 
valued imports into China from at least the time of the Sung. Tortoiseshell 
came from Champa, the Philippines, Java, Borneo, Sumatra, Malaya, and 
Thailand; Borneo and Sulu, easily accessed from Makassar, were specifically 
listed in the early fifteenth century.43 Apart from an occasional reference to 
India, tortoiseshell is given as coming from Southeast Asia. Late Ming tax 
lists include Indonesian products such as aromatic woods, resins, plants, 
spices, seeds, rhinoceros and deer horn, ivory, skins, feathers, birds’ nests, 
and sea products. The most important marine commodities were agar-agar 
(seaweeds) and tortoiseshell, of which the most valuable came from the 
hawksbill turtle. The plates that comprise the shell were described as being 
yellowish brown with black streaks, and were known to the Dutch as karet, 
a word of West Indian origin.44
 Eastern Indonesia first joins Sulu and Borneo as a supplier of tortoiseshell 
in the late sixteenth century, with turtle populations being reported at north 
and west Sulawesi, particularly the Gulf of Tomini; Menado was the site of a 
major trading center. Roderich Ptak believes most of this trade was in local 
hands: “The Chinese, if they took part in it, certainly came to eastern Indo-
nesia by way of Java, as private merchants from Fujien or Kwangtung or as 
settlers from the western part of Indonesia. Few, if any, seem to have sailed 
the ‘eastern route’ that travelled down from the Sulu archipelago via Mina-
hassa, the Moluccas and Banda islands.”45
 The catchment areas and collecting markets for turtles and trepang over-
lapped, but trade in the former was much older, smaller, and more diffuse. 
If trepang virtually all went to China, tortoiseshell was a desirable product 
in many markets; moreover, the differences between hunting turtles and 
gathering trepang meant karet could not develop into a bulk commodity like 
trepang. Nevertheless, the expansion of fishing fleets and markets would 
have intensified the trade in turtles. As was the case with trepang, the tor-
toiseshell commodity chain involved skippers and fishermen, intermedi-
ate traders, wholesale merchants, and shippers. Chinese generally provided 
marketing and product expertise, and most of the capital; Sulawesians and 
Malays were prominent traders, although peranakan Chinese gained ground 
in the late eighteenth century, while Buginese and Makassarese did much of 
the gathering and fishing.46 But one particular group specialized in turtle-
catching: the “sea nomads” or “sea gypsies,” or Bajo, as I will call them here-
after.47
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 Turtle-favored environments are characterized by shallow seas offering 
seagrass beds for feeding and access to sandy beaches which serve as nesting 
sites; the Sulu Sea in the southern Philippines and the coastal waters of east-
ern Indonesia met such needs, and consequently were rich in turtles.48 So 
it is not surprising that Brunei, in northeast Borneo, and the southern Phil-
ippine sultanates of Sulu and Maguindinao were early centers of the turtle 
trade. They also claimed hegemony over Bajo communities’ home waters. 
Although these groups were widely distributed throughout Southeast Asia, 
major concentrations were to be found around the Riau-Lingga archipelago, 
east and northwest Borneo, the coasts of south, east, and north Sulawesi, 
the Sulu Sea, and Nusa Tenggara. Typically, these were shallow waters dotted 
with coral reefs and islands.
 The eastern archipelago Bajo was described by François Valentijn at the 
end of the seventeenth century, and then by J. N. Vosmaer over a hundred 
years later.49 Vosmaer, a trader who spent months in Sulawesi, was famil-
iar with the tortoiseshell trade and the Bajo. Like modern biologists, the 
Bajo distinguished four sorts of turtle; the most sought after was the hawks-
bill, the source of karet, the thirteen or more plates of which the shell was 
composed. The Chinese preferred a shell with regular markings in black 
and white; they were prepared to pay extraordinary prices for such “white 
turtles.”50 The Voc labeled this white and transparent shell “Japanese”; the 
other top-quality type, “Surat,” was clear and well “flamed,” but much less 
valuable.51 The Chinese would also pay up to fifty guilders for the hind feet of 
turtles, if they weighed more than half a kati which was, however, very rare.52 
The combined karet from one turtle rarely exceeded 3 kati (nearly 2 kg.) in 
weight, although it was said that occasionally 4 to 5 kati could be taken from 
one animal.53
 By the early seventeenth century, the Voc was already interested in tor-
toiseshell as a cargo to be exchanged in Japan and India for, respectively, 
metals and textiles. In fact, the first reference to tortoiseshell in the com-
pany’s Generale Missiven refers to the latter; in 1614 it was reported that there 
was great potential for ambergris and tortoiseshell sales in India. In 1617 the 
Dutch estimated that they could dispose of 4,000 to 5,000 pounds in Surat 
each year, while Cambay and Masulipatnam were other promising markets. 
However, before they could sell their karet, they first had to buy it, in in-
creasingly fierce competition with other merchants, including the Eng lish 
and the French. The former, by far the most important, had established their 
Makassar lodge in 1614 primarily to access foodstuffs, but by the mid-1620s 
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they were increasingly interested in high-value commodities such as spices 
and tortoiseshell.54
 The local royal courts also benefited from the expansion of trade: in 1638 
Voc officials recorded that the ruler of Makassar drew taxes from rice, tor-
toiseshell, cloves, wax and pepper, copper and iron.55 By the mid-seventeenth 
century, the Dutch were emphasizing the strong grip of the Makassar Chi-
nese on the tortoiseshell trade, noting in 1657 that they could only obtain 
karet “through our Chinese creatures.”56 The Eng lish experienced similar 
difficulties in obtaining supplies, and in 1665 they complained that the Voc 
was giving 5 percent commission to their Chinese agents, who then used 
credit to monopolize imports.57 After the Dutch conquest, in 1669, the Eng-
lish were expelled, but the key Chinese role in Makassar’s tortoiseshell trade 
actually increased, in parallel with the early-eighteenth-century boom in the 
China-focused trepang industry. Consequently, the Voc was always frus-
trated in its efforts to develop regular access to karet.
 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the company re-
peatedly tried to tap into marine-commodity circuits by using a combina-
tion of naval and political pressure to open up areas of supply, particularly 
in the Southwest and Southeast Islands (Zuidwestereilanden and Zuid-
oostereilanden) of southern Maluku.58 These were a source of spices as well 
as of sea products, and consequently irresistible to traders the Dutch called 
“smugglers.” As early as 1645, they complained that small seasonal fleets 
and occasional vessels, primarily from Sulawesi, were collecting ambergris 
and tortoiseshell there, and making handsome profits on sales in Makassar: 
700 percent in the case of tortoiseshell.59 Buyers in Makassar would have 
re-exported the shell to markets such as that in Surat.60
 Batavia wanted more of this valuable shell and was always dissatisfied 
with the efforts of their Makassar merchants to obtain it; they in turn com-
plained that they could not compete against Bugis and Makassarese “smug-
glers” on the one hand, or Chinese commercial networks, credit, and pricing 
on the other. In October 1696 Makassar’s Voc officials wrote to Batavia: “It 
is certain the Noble Company here will never get one pound [of tortoise-
shell], because the Chinese know how to secure their advantage, by collect-
ing it secretly from the Turijene fishermen, called Bajo in Ternate, and carry-
ing it without paying duty, which we call smuggling, but that is by no means 
the case with the above mentioned fishermen or natives, who bring it to 
market here.”61
 In 1697 the Makassar governor was more specific, complaining that while 
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in theory they could expect to obtain tortoiseshell and birds’ nests, in reality 
the Chinese Captain Ongwatko controlled this traffic “almost on his own 
and ruin[ed] it for other, small traders, by providing goods a year in advance 
against the supplies for the following year.”62 A year later, when Batavia de-
manded extra vigilance against turtle smuggling, Makassar’s officials replied 
they could only do more if they carried out extremely rigorous searches of 
Chinese sloops just before they sailed. They warned that this would be seen 
as an unreasonable violation of custom and would ruin trade, so they would 
rather continue as before. The Dutch could never replicate Chinese success, 
the Makassar governor continued, as “it [would] not be practicable for us . . . 
to obtain tortoiseshell like the Chinese do, who send small boats with their 
slaves or hired men to the surrounding islands . . . to exchange old iron, or 
lengths of cloth with the Turijene [Bajo] or fishermen, scraping together the 
tortoiseshell two or three at a time . . . against commodities which are put 
out on long-term credit.”63
 The amount of time and effort that it took to collect a cargo is illustrated 
by the journey of a Chinese ship en route to Mindanao that was seized in 
1693. The cargo of wax, tortoiseshell, and tobacco was only worth 1,076 rds 
(rijksdaalders), but had taken the captain forty-three months to assemble.64 
For the Dutch, such small-scale scouring of the seas was out of the ques-
tion. Moreover, they complained, their Chinese “vrunden” (friends) grabbed 
many a juicy cargo by offering higher prices for “smuggled” goods.65 All the 
company servants could do was to try friendly persuasion on the fishermen, 
because the private traders always outbid them, and no amount of vehement 
protest helped.66
 That sweet-talking was less effective than high prices was hardly surpris-
ing. So the following year the Makassar authorities advanced captain Ong-
watko 400 rds to deploy as credit on their behalf, hoping to obtain more tor-
toiseshell, but the results remained poor. Neither fishermen nor merchants 
could be persuaded to sell for less. When the captain’s “blacks” came back 
to Makassar with two piculs (about 124 kg.) he offered them to the company 
officials at the going price of 100 rds, but they did not dare exceed the Voc 
limit. Moreover, the law-abiding company—if not officials acting on their 
own behalf—always ended up paying 10 percent more than the “smugglers,” 
so the governor proposed that all goods in which the company itself traded 
should be freed of duty.67
 The Voc was thus advancing money to the Kapitan China, who used it 
to outfit his “blacks” voyages to fish and barter with locals lower down the 
commodity chain, such as (Bajo) gatherers or petty part-time traders. Typi-
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cally, there were several intermediate levels between the company and pro-
ducers. A description from February 1703 confirms this complexity. Tjako, a 
Chinese trader from Makassar, told the Dutch in Ternate that sixty Buginese 
had established a settlement in Banggai, and twenty or thirty Buginese ves-
sels were sailing through the islands, even to the inner coasts of the Gulf of 
Tomini and Gorontalo, exchanging textiles for wax and tortoiseshell. Con-
sequently, the people of Banggai now put such a high value on the shell (one 
salempuris—an Indian cloth—per turtle) that Tjako himself did not dare buy 
on behalf of his master. He added that he had heard that all these vessels be-
longed to the Kapitan China of Makassar, Ongwatko. When these Buginese 
brought the goods to Makassar, they would be stored in private houses, and 
no duty was paid.68 Presumably the Buginese obtained their stock for barter 
from Ongwatko, who then had privileged access to their cargoes.
 Besides the local Chinese, Buginese, particularly the efficient traders 
from Wajoq, were also outperforming the company.69 In 1715 the Makassar 
governor wrote that Wajorese were able to buy all the locally available tor-
toiseshell (more than 20 picul) for sale in Batavia, as they were willing to pay 
110 to 115 rds per picul. This made it impossible for the inhibited company 
to fulfill its quota. The governor was as impatient with his subordinates as 
Batavia was with him, accusing them of laxity. He complained that Wajor-
ese boats from Selayar, without Dutch passes and laden with textiles, were 
being allowed to sail past Buton to Southeast Sulawesi. These smugglers 
from Wajoq, noted the governor, avoided Voc restrictions by claiming to 
be Bajo: “They pass themselves off as fishermen, sail the Banda and Ternate 
seas and with their petty trade make themselves master of all the tortoise-
shell.” This could not be stopped unless the smaller Voc outposts blocked 
such activities; however, their efforts would no doubt have been as ineffec-
tive as those of Makassar itself, and for the same reasons.70
 Other regional markets were also active in the tortoiseshell trade, in-
cluding the old centers round the Sulu Sea, or, more locally, at Kutei and 
Berau on the east Borneo coast, where Chinese and Malays exchanged tex-
tiles for karet; these ports were still regarded as too “perilous” for the Dutch 
to visit.71 Banjarmasin was also a wealthy market offering tortoiseshell, as 
well as pepper, gold, and aromatic woods, while the ruler of Brunei offered 
to provide gold, pearls, wax, tortoiseshell, birds’ nests, and other attractive 
commodities to the company in 1719.72 But Ternate remained the main port 
shipping tortoiseshell to Batavia, collecting it from southern Maluku, the 
Gulf of Tomini and, later, from new if equally unreliable sources such as 
Mindanao. It is clear that the company’s main competitors here were “Bu-
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ginese” (including Makassarese, Wajorese, and, particularly in the Gulf of 
Tomini, Mandarese), many of whom would have been supplying Chinese 
merchants.73
 The Voc was unable to break into the commodity chain at any level: they 
were ineffective in controlling production zones and could not compete in 
the various markets, ranging from beachside barter to wholesale deals in the 
ports. Holding to the principle of buying cheap and selling dear, the com-
pany capped the amounts officials could offer, so the Chinese regularly out-
bid them. However, bowing to reality in 1704, Batavia allowed its Ternate 
and Tidore agencies to raise the tortoiseshell price to 70 rds per picul in the 
hope of attracting Gorontalo karet to Dutch Maluku, while urging that Chi-
nese be discouraged from buying the shell.74 Company attempts to expand 
their supplies over the next few years followed a familiar pattern, combining 
intimidation with adjustments in prices and permitted trading zones.
 Despite all these efforts, the indications are that marine commodities 
continued to flow through primarily Chinese circuits outside Voc control. 
A spike in supply occurred in 1730, when the Ternate governor threatened 
to search all Chinese houses; suddenly karet stocks were discovered in many 
forgotten storerooms. Chinese and Sangirese sold the officials an impres-
sive 851 lbs. of tortoiseshell, while Menado provided 62 lbs. and Gorontalo 
22 lbs.; the result—935 pounds of karet—exceeded the total collected in the 
preceding fifteen years. This energetic governor brought in 3,597 pounds 
weight of tortoiseshell in the course of his four-year tenure.75 As a result 
of this squeeze on the Chinese, Batavia was reasonably satisfied with sea-
product supplies in the early 1730s, but this was to prove the high point of 
the company’s trade in tortoiseshell.76,77
 The Dutch lacked the knowledge and contacts needed to work with the 
dispersed populations who provided karet, and the company was unwilling 
to match prices in the port itself. From the mid-seventeenth century, at least, 
Chinese in Makassar and Batavia had cornered tortoiseshell supplies by pro-
viding credit to intermediate traders who were able, in turn, to connect with 
fishermen and Bajo. The rapid development of the trepang business from the 
early eighteenth century onward led to further commercialization of such 
networks. Producing areas were drawn into the market as exports of trepang 
created the opportunities and provided the means to buy imports, many of 
which were of Chinese origin.78 One result was an ongoing Sinification of 
the middle levels of the marine-products trade in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century.
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 Until the mid-1700s the trade between Makassar and China had been in-
direct. The most important and best documented of the intermediate ports 
was naturally Voc Batavia, though other independent rendezvous, such as 
Banjarmasin, must not be discounted; even in Batavia the buyers were Chi-
nese, not the company. In 1746 an intermittent direct junk connection be-
tween Makassar and Amoy was established, but Dutch policy vacillated.79 In 
1769, however, strong pressure from the local Voc and the ruler of Bugis 
Bone finally forced a reluctant company to allow annual visits. Soon after 
1770 Amoy passed Batavia as Makassar’s main trading partner. The junk 
brought in large quantities of tobacco, tea, silk, pans, and linen; on the re-
turn voyages the cargo was more uniform, dominated by trepang, accompa-
nied by small amounts of wax, birds’ nests, and tortoiseshell; this last was by 
far the most valuable sea product per unit. Other marine commodities were 
much less important. Seaweed (agar-agar) exports did become significant 
by the 1770s, but not via the Amoy junk. The seaweed was exported through 
Batavia, probably because the junk was fully loaded with trepang.80
 With the massive growth of the trepang trade, Makassar’s economy be-
came clearly China-centered, as can be seen in the local Voc’s shipping reg-
isters.81 Exchanges with Nusa Tenggara also surged, as Makassar became 
the central entrepôt in a south-north traffic exchanging trepang for com-
modities like porcelain, tobacco, or textiles.82 If in the 1720s the main items 
traded in Makassar were Indian cloth, Javanese tobacco, rice, and salt, by the 
1760s the main imports were arrack from Batavia, rice, raw cotton, coconut 
oil, and trepang, while the dominant (re)exports were trepang and seaweed 
to Batavia (to meet the Chinese junks), and cash being sent to pay for im-
ports. The pattern in the 1770s was the same, but now much trepang was 
going straight to Amoy in addition to Batavia. The 1780s showed a similar, 
but more intense pattern.
 The Makassar harbormaster’s registers also provide more detailed in-
sights into the tortoiseshell trade, enabling us to locate the sources of ship-
ments and the ethnicity of captains. In the 1720s the dominant points of 
origin for Makassar’s karet were Solor, a small island to the east of Flores 
(with 81 percent), and Barru, on the central west coast of south Sulawesi (19 
percent); both had become politically and hence economically subject to the 
Dutch after 1669.
 However, by the 1760s tortoiseshell came from two quite different areas, 
both politically independent of the Voc: the sultanate of Buton, off the 
southeast arm of Sulawesi (94 percent), and the Bugis territories of the 
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southwest peninsula (6 percent). The volume of tortoiseshell traded had 
grown, riding the intensification of trepang fishing. Such independent areas 
chose to trade at Makassar, despite Dutch regulations and fees, because of 
the direct junk link with Amoy. This trend is confirmed by the data from the 
1780s, with Banda producing 30 percent, Bugis 23 percent, Buton 20 per-
cent, Ternate 19 percent, and Bonerate 8 percent of Makassar’s karet. The 
emergence of Maluku as a major source of supply is striking. Banda and 
Ternate had traditionally shipped their tortoiseshell to Batavia, but the junk 
connection drew supplies away from the Dutch center and into exports to 
China via Makassar. This was a significant realignment.
 There were also important shifts in the proportions of tortoiseshell-
carrying skippers as classified by ethnicity. In the 1720s all were of Sulawesi 
origin (44 percent Wajorese, 41 percent Makassarese, and 15 percent Bugin-
ese). Dutch policy confined their voyages to a zone stretching from Batavia 
through Nusa Tenggara, so the marine products available in these seas rep-
resented a significant remaining opportunity for Sulawesians; the previously 
important Straits of Melaka and Maluku waters had become forbidden ter-
ritory.83 Chinese, however, were still permitted to sail to the east, and they 
played an important role in exchange between Makassar and Maluku. By the 
1760s the category “Wajorese” had disappeared from Makassar’s trade regis-
ter.84 Their role was taken over by the ill-defined “Company Subjects” (which 
probably included many Wajorese) who were bringing in 83 percent of tor-
toiseshell. Chinese were responsible for a further share, with peranakan log-
ging an impressive 14 percent and Chinese 3 percent of the total.85
 The Chinese proportion of tortoiseshell imports had soared by the 1780s; 
peranakan had maintained their 14 percent, but Chinese now claimed 66 per-
cent, so together they were responsible for 80 percent of karet coming into 
Makassar. It is unlikely that Chinese hunted turtles; the dramatic growth in 
their import share reflects commercialization in once-peripheral islands, as 
increasing market penetration made it easier for them to buy tortoiseshell. 
In 1787 more than half the Chinese captains were peranakan (13 of 24 skip-
pers), most of whom (12) arrived from Buton. The non-peranakan Chinese, 
on the other hand, were more wide-ranging, importing karet from various 
sources (Bugis, 3; Banda, 2; Ternate, 1), or exporting to Batavia (4) and Amoy 
(1). Unfortunately, 1787 is the only year for which there is a breakdown be-
tween Chinese and Chinese peranakan, but it suggests that the latter con-
centrated on short-haul imports, while the former were more diversified im-
porters (from South Sulawesi and Maluku) and exporters.86 Malays were also 
quite significant in this later period.87
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conclusion
The advantage of a commodity-chain approach is that it places relationships 
within an explicitly commercial context, in which a complementary search 
for profit transcends divisions between political entities and ethnic groups. 
The exploitation of comparative advantages enables participants to benefit 
from the difference between expenses incurred and receipts generated as 
they pass products on to the next link in the chain. The trepang business sus-
tained an ongoing integration, involving financers, outfitters, and various 
levels of merchants and traders, as well as fishermen. It was so important 
to the economy of eighteenth-century Makassar that the Voc, the Chinese 
Captain, and major traders cooperated to stabilize prices.88 Tortoiseshell 
was a much more valuable commodity, but supplies were also less predict-
able. Diving or dredging for trepang in appropriate waters guaranteed a re-
sult, whereas the only reliable opportunity for finding turtles was during 
the west monsoon nesting season (December, January, and February).89 This 
was also the time the trepang fleets were out accumulating their cargoes, 
and those sailing near known nesting beaches probably hunted turtles as 
a profitable sideline. Increased killing would have intensified pressure on 
turtle populations and might explain the disappearance of the hawksbill 
from Sulawesi’s Togian islands, famous for their karet in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.90
 In the seventeenth century, local rulers and Chinese merchants supported 
tortoiseshell-seeking trading and collecting expeditions, manned by motley 
crews that probably included slaves, clients, free men who had taken goods 
on credit in order to trade, traditionally subaltern Bajo, or simply fishermen 
who sought the protection of their lord before sailing. It remains very diffi-
cult to know to what extent such relationships and activities were economi-
cally based, either as a business partnership or a calculated investment.91 But 
the development of the trepang industry seems to have further commercial-
ized the tortoiseshell trade, and as fishing groups became more aware of the 
value of their products, they demanded higher prices.92
 The Dutch failed to gain a foothold in the marine-products market. Their 
attempts to control the production zones were ineffective, and they were 
unable to compete in trading centers like Makassar. If in the late 1600s and 
early 1700s the company was castigating its servants for their failure to pro-
vide tortoiseshell, by the mid-eighteenth century the Voc in Makassar was 
no longer interested in the issue. There was a clear dwindling in Batavia’s tor-
toiseshell imports in the second half of the eighteenth century, while Makas-
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sar’s imports and exports grew.93 But East Indonesia’s karet increasingly 
went straight to China, bypassing the company completely. This position as 
outsider seems to have been readily accepted for trepang, which was a spe-
cifically Chinese product, but had earlier been a source of great frustration 
to the Dutch, anxious as they were to obtain tortoiseshell for exchange in 
Japan and Surat. However, by the mid-eighteenth century they had given up 
on tortoiseshell as well as trepang. Despite the need for cargoes that could 
be used in China to obtain tea (a major reason for the country traders’ inter-
est in marine products), the Voc seems to have become resigned to its own 
nonparticipation.
 This Dutch failure reflected their inability to operate effectively in the fine 
channels of commerce, where small numbers of commodities were slowly 
collected from diffuse and unpredictable sources. Outposts on forsaken 
beaches, like that in Aru, proved incapable of building the necessary rela-
tionships and were too expensive for a company operating on tightly con-
trolled calculations of profit and loss.94 This precluded paying the prices 
Asian merchants were willing to offer. The Chinese in Makassar drove prices 
upward, because they knew the market could sustain their purchasing 
policy. Before 1750 most of the tortoiseshell that passed through their hands 
may have been bound for Batavia, but it was destined for Chinese traders 
accumulating junk cargoes, not for the Voc. This Chinese-dominated com-
plex operated under the company umbrella, but may have been linked to 
other, independent and hence less-documented markets where Makassar 
karet could be sold. Such harbors would have included Kalimantan ports 
and Sulu, established points of rendezvous for the China trade.
 Tortoiseshell must have remained an important commodity in Bugis, Chi-
nese, and country trader networks that avoided the Voc. In this respect the 
Wajorese are intriguing. In the 1720s, these efficient traders had been the 
major importers of tortoiseshell into Makassar (44 percent) and dominated 
exports to Batavia (83 percent), only to disappear from the harbormaster’s 
administration after the 1730s. This shift parallels two other trends: the de-
cline in Batavia’s tortoiseshell imports, and the growing Chinese domina-
tion of Makassar’s sea-product trades after the Amoy link was established in 
1746. Two, by no means exclusive, hypotheses might explain this. According 
to the first, Wajorese “smugglers” left Voc-controlled circuits and operated 
out of areas under Buginese rule, entering “Bugis” networks trading to Sulu, 
Brunei, and various Borneo, Sumatra, and Melaka Straits ports, notably 
Riau.95 These links, supported by scattered Bugis settlements, helped re-
constitute Makassar’s old east-west trading connection, broken by the Voc 
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in 1666. Insofar as Wajorese remained in Makassar, they probably became 
“Company Subjects.” This might have had the advantage of freeing them 
from intervention by the Bone kings, who were prone to meddle in the com-
munity’s affairs.96 The second hypothesis is that this east-west link remained 
insignificant, that the Wajorese, like other Indonesian peoples, had lost their 
commercial capacity, and that the picture presented in Makassar’s shipping 
register shows the new reality: a Chinese-dominated commercial world.
 A compromise scenario, with less emphasis on ethnic segregation, seems 
most likely, that there were cross-cutting relationships connecting the cir-
cuits avoiding Dutch restrictions with those making use of company ports. 
The former were exemplified by Sulu, where Bugis, Chinese, and European 
country traders accessed commodities, including those proscribed by the 
Voc, such as guns and opium, as well as textiles, sea products, and China 
goods. It is possible that there were Bugis (or other) chains that chose, for 
political or religious reasons, to isolate themselves from Chinese or Euro-
pean networks, but their extent is impossible to judge. However, since the 
exploitation of different commercial environments offered complementary 
advantages, the search for profit probably created links between apparently 
separate systems of exchange.
 Uneven documentation makes it impossible to know how far Makassar 
merchants may have participated in commercial circuits not sanctioned by 
the company. It is quite possible that capital accumulated by Makassar Chi-
nese was also invested in “smuggling” circuits operating out of other ports. 
This raises the interesting point of why it was Makassar that became the 
center of the trepang trade. Geography was important, but Voc policy must 
have been crucial, as the company jealously restricted the junk trade to a few 
select ports, including Makassar. Company fleets may have been unable to 
shepherd the movement of small perahu, but a junk of up to 200 tons burden 
with several hundred men on board was much easier to police. But other fac-
tors might also help explain why neighboring harbors, notably Banjarmasin, 
could not compete effectively with Makassar in the trepang trade.
 Banjarmasin was a port of comparable size and shipping activity to 
Makassar, but independent until the Voc established a supervisory trading 
post there, in 1747. If for some reason the Amoy junk did not come to Makas-
sar, as happened occasionally in the mid-eighteenth century, trepang traders 
took their cargoes to Banjarmasin or Batavia in the hope of connecting with 
a China-bound vessel. Pepper had always drawn Chinese merchants to the 
Borneo port, but nonetheless Makassar proved more attractive as a transit 
point for trepang. One possible reason for this is that the Borneo junks left 
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fully laden with pepper and had no room for trepang, just as Makassar’s 
agar-agar was carried to China via Batavia, as vessels leaving the Sulawesi 
port preferred to use their holds for trepang. But another explanation may 
be more relevant.
 The success of a commodity chain depends on efficient movement be-
tween different stages, including shifts from one place to another, or to an-
other organizational level (retail to bulk, or vice versa), or alterations due to 
(semi) processing. Each mutation required certain types of knowledge, tech-
nology, and coordination that, in early modern times, were closely linked to 
social capital. In the case of the commodity chain of marine goods, Bajo, 
Bugis (that is, Sulawesian), and Chinese all brought specialist skills to their 
various but not static points in the chain.
 Makassar’s trade in sea products was probably shaped by patterns devel-
oped earlier in Sulu or perhaps Brunei, areas familiar to the Bajo, who also 
frequented Sulawesi waters. Skills and contacts acquired there became in-
creasingly valuable in Makassar as the availability of spices attracted more 
traders after 1620. The Dutch conquest initiated several decades of stagna-
tion, until the explosion of the trepang trade in the early eighteenth century, 
when experience in the tortoiseshell trade enabled some key players to con-
nect Chinese demand with local supply.
 The Chinese Captains were such players; the central role Ongwatko played 
in the late seventeenth century was neither unique nor temporary. In 1742 
Captain Lianko petitioned the Voc for the traditional captains’ privilege of 
sending a vessel to the Gulf of Tomini for tortoiseshell and trepang.97 But 
the Bajo were also crucial, and while they were numerous in Sulu, North Bor-
neo, the Sulawesi seas, and around Ternate and Nusa Tenggara, they were 
not common west of Pulau Laut, off the Borneo coast. So in contrast to the 
Sulawesi courts, Banjarmasin had no tradition of working with Bajo, which 
would have limited its direct access to karet. In Makassar, on the other hand, 
Dutch permission (and perhaps protection) for the junk traffic; Chinese 
credit, purchasing, and marketing networks (in Southeast Asia and China 
itself ); Bajo maritime expertise; and Bugis links to Bajo and their own skills 
in shipping, fishing, and trading all combined to create the trepang industry, 
building on the established tortoiseshell trading network. This is an example 
of the “organizational learning” that underpins complex commodity chains.
 Cooperation between Southeast Asian knowledge and technology (of 
fishing sites and techniques, shipping) and Chinese expertise (in marketing, 
finance, and credit) was fundamental to the marine-commodities trade. In 
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the case of trepang, the difference in use-value was absolute: only Chinese 
ate trepang, and while tortoiseshell was used in local handicrafts, the profits 
in overseas trade were considerably more attractive. Ethnic differentiation 
was important in that it related directly to relevant knowledge about pro-
duction and consumption, and to social capital embodied in networks of 
trust. However, these networks were not, and could not be, limited to any 
one community. The very basis of the successful trade in sea products lay in 
transcommunal transactions.
 In the course of the eighteenth century, however, there was a growing 
appetite for imported goods in once-peripheral regions, which, because of 
trepang, now had commodities they could export. Chinese earthen- and 
metalware were popular, so traders with easy access to this merchandise 
acquired a commercial edge. There was a partial “Sinification” of the sea-
products trade, as the Chinese expanded their role from that of wholesale 
purchasers of trepang into shipping and direct trade with the producers. Up-
stream levels of the trade, once dominated by Sulawesians, were successfully 
penetrated by the Chinese, perhaps aided by an effective use of local knowl-
edge by the peranakan.
 Over a period of a century and a half, changes in commodity chains 
moved Makassar from the periphery of commerce to the center. For several 
hundred years, Makassar’s skippers had sailed out to connect with long-
distance trade in other harbors, as the main shipping routes bypassed South 
Sulawesi. After the sixteenth-century rise of Gowa-Talloq, Makassar became 
a more useful source of foodstuffs, particularly rice, but was not, in Michelin 
terms, worth a detour. From the 1620s, however, political distortion of the 
spice trade redirected these extremely attractive goods to Makassar, draw-
ing more merchants to the port. This increased the number of potential 
purchasers for other commodities, including Borneo pepper and tortoise-
shell. The arrival of Portuguese and Eng lish, Spanish from Manila, and, in 
the mid-seventeenth century, a new wave of Portuguese and Indian Muslim 
merchants fleeing Dutch Melaka all added to the international synergy driv-
ing commerce. The Voc conquest put a stop to that, but from the beginning 
of the 1700s trepang emerged as a new staple product, generating rapidly 
swelling commodity flows from Makassar to China, and creating feeder 
routes for importing trepang and distributing exchange cargoes through-
out eastern Indonesia. The ramifications of new sources of credit and trade 
opportunities linking many small settlements transformed the commercial 
landscape of the region.
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from Baoshi to Feicui
Qing-Burmese gem Trade, c. 1644–1800
Sun Laichen
“A base [ feicui] stone wastes so much money; it is indeed a monster thing (wuyao 
物妖).”
—Xu Zhongyuan, Sanyi bitan 三異筆談 (1920)
“The price [of feicui jade] far exceeds the genuine jade (zhenyu 真玉) [from Xinjiang]!
—Ji Yun, Yuewei caotang biji 閱微草堂筆記 (2001)
As a preliminary inquiry into an understudied but significant topic in Sino-
Southeast Asian economic history, this essay has two goals. First, it intends 
to clarify some issues surrounding the spread of Burmese jade ( feicui) to 
China.1 With the increasing consumer interest in Burmese gems (jade in 
particular) since China’s economic reforms in 1978, academic interest in the 
history of Burmese jade exports to China has also surged. Two issues have 
been hotly debated: when did Burmese jade spread to China? And when did 
the Chinese first apply the term feicui to Burmese jade? The first issue will 
be dealt with in a separate paper in greater detail (mentioned in passing 
below).2 As for the second issue, the earliest use of the term feicui, this paper 
points out that all the available studies have tackled the problem outside the 
Yunnan context, thus making it difficult to reach a correct conclusion. Care-
fully sifting through the many hitherto ignored Chinese sources and exam-
ining the feicui issue within the Yunnan context, one is on safe ground to say 
that in 1719 the term feicui was first applied to Burmese jade.
 Second, a better understanding of the gem trade during the Qing period 
requires comparison with that of the Ming dynasty. For half a century, the 
scholarly inclination to lump together Ming and Qing trade has hidden criti-
cal differences between the two eras.3 Careful comparison of the two eras 
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reveals that an important change took place: while the baoshi (including 
rubies, sapphires, and tourmaline, but excluding jade and jadeite, according 
to the Chinese usage)4 dominated the gem trade during the Ming, during the 
Qing, especially from the eighteenth century on, jadeite or feicui (as a type 
of jade or yu 玉) started to overtake the baoshi. This change can be traced to 
shifting fashions in the Chinese court, for often it was the taste of the Chi-
nese emperor and his consorts that dictated the mining and trading of gems 
in northern Burma.
 This research concludes with the argument that China was (and still pri-
marily is) the driving force behind the whole gem business, particularly 
jade mining and trade. In other words, one can say that from its inception 
through the first half of the twentieth-century trade in gems was a “Chinese 
business” as it was instigated by Chinese demand. Using the example of the 
Qing-Burmese gem trade, I highlight China as an external stimulus on the 
development of Southeast Asian history.
Burmese gems and yuan-ming china
Although Burmese jade and rubies were discovered at some Pyu sites (from 
the third to the eighth centuries), gemstones from Burma did not appear in 
China until the late thirteenth century, with the invasion of Burma by the 
Mongols, who had introduced gemstones from Western Asia to China not 
long before. It is likely that the growing demand for gems in China gave 
rise to the relatively large-scale mining of Burmese gemstones. Although 
Chinese sources still do not specify the gems, they probably included jade, 
rubies, and amber. In other words, it was the Mongols who jump-started 
gem mining in Upper Burma and the gem trade with China.
 Despite the distaste of the (Han) rulers of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) 
toward Mongol culture, they not only inherited the Mongol craze for gem-
stones, but dramatically popularized them across China. Particularly from 
the mid-fifteenth century, a “gem fever” (more for baoshi than for jade) 
started by Wan Guifei, the favorite consort of the Ming emperor Xianzong 
(r. 1465–1487), spread quickly throughout the country. This intensified the 
mining and export of Burmese gems and precipitated the emergence of two 
Shan principalities in Upper Burma—Mongmit and Mohnyin—which con-
trolled gem sources and benefited from the trade.5 Again, China acted as a 
primary mover for the Asian gem trade in general and the Burmese gem trade 
in particular.
 An end to Ming court procurement of gems in 1599 in Yunnan cooled but 
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did not extinguish the gem fever. As late as 1639, when the famous Ming 
traveler Xu Xiake was in western Yunnan, he witnessed Burmese gems on sale 
in the market and local gem traders being harassed by gem searchers sent 
by local officials, which suggests that gems were still prized and sought by 
the Chinese. For example, in Dali, he saw gem merchants from Yongchang 
(modern Baoshan) selling “baoshi, amber, and jade” from Burma, while in 
Tengyue (modern Tengchong) he himself was offered jade.6 The Chinese fas-
cination with baoshi in particular did not end with the dynastic transition 
from the Ming to the Qing in 1644.
The Transition of the gem Trade (c. 1644–1719)
The earliest account of the Qing-Burmese gem trade was written by Liu Kun 
in 1680.
Merchants collect the stones and return to the frontier passes. Those 
rubble-shaped ones are called “rough stones” [huang shi 荒石]. The work-
men in Tengyue grind them with shellac [zigeng 紫梗] and smooth them 
with small stones [baosha 寶砂], and then they start to shine [baoguang 寶
光].7 The red-[colored] ones are the best, such as “rose-water” [meigui shui 
玫瑰水], “pigeon-blood” [gezi xie 鴿子血], and “garnet color” [shiliu hong 
石榴紅]. All these are good ones, whereas those called “old red” [lao hong 
老紅] are valueless. The blue ones are called yaqut [yaqing 鴉青], the white 
ones cat’s-eye [maoeryan 貓兒眼], the green ones zumurrud [zumulü 祖母
綠].8 But only the extremely shiny ones are excellent pieces. Those as big 
as peas are called “hat top” [maoding 帽頂], those as big as soybeans and 
mung beans are called “precious stones” [baoshi 寳石], while the smallest 
ones are called “ghost eyelash” [gui jieyan 鬼睫眼].9
This account reveals precious information on the classification of gems and 
the gem trade in the late seventeenth century. Far more effectively than the 
descriptions of Song Yingxing (1587–1666) and Gu Yingtai (1620–90), Liu 
Kun contributes to the terminology of gemstones in general and of Bur-
mese rubies and sapphires in particular.10 For example, he uses, for the first 
time, gezi xie and gui jieyan to describe gemstones, and applies meigui (hong) 
and shiliu (shui) to Burmese rubies and sapphires, illustrating that Chinese 
knowledge of these gems had deepened. Indeed, either the Chinese or, more 
possibly, the Arabs invented the term “pigeon’s blood” and the Burmese bor-
rowed this term (kuiswe) to refer to the best kind of ruby.11
 During the early Qing, the gems from Burma desired by the Chinese were 
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still dominantly baoshi (as during the Ming times), not jade (yu). This is seen 
from the fact that Liu Kun writes with elaborate detail on baoshi, despite the 
fact that his zumulü may refer to jade. Three other accounts written in or con-
cerning Yunnan between 1687 and 1694 reinforce the view that the Chinese 
were still primarily fascinated with baoshi, not jade. All of them mention 
Burmese baoshi, and two have relatively detailed descriptions, while only 
one mentions jade (biyu 碧玉).12
 The Chinese probably could not purchase the best baoshi, including 
rubies and sapphires, as the Burmese king had monopolized the mines since 
the late sixteenth century.13 Many Chinese sources of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, including the one by Liu Kun, attest to this.14 For ex-
ample, Liu Wenzheng stated in 1625, “Now it is up to the barbarians (the 
Burman and the Shan) to provide [baoshi], whereas in the past [the Chinese] 
could choose at will and set the price. Thus the prices are getting increasingly 
high, while the good ones are harder to obtain.”15
 Xu Jiong, who was sent to Yunnan as an inspector, wrote around 1688 on 
Burmese baoshi. He first quotes Liu Wenzheng’s observation above, then 
provides his own comments.
Also, in the barbarian land there is much poison, and on the way the 
bandits are rampant. [Baoshi traders] who take shortcuts to avoid cus-
tom duties suffer heavily [from these dangers]. I hear that in recent years 
the barbarians guard baoshi even tighter; those who take [baoshi] out 
of [Burma] will be immediately executed. There are big baoshi, [but they 
have to be] broken into smaller pieces and then smuggled out [to China]. 
Even the small ones are not cheap! At present these [gem] stones in the 
capital (Beijing) are from Yunnan, but in Yunnan they are not as good as 
those in the capital (Beijing). This is because [in Yunnan] females do not 
use them as decorations, and the Luoluo [Yi people] favor black color. 
Thus beautiful stones mostly reach the capital while it is difficult to ob-
tain locally [within Yunnan].16
The last sentences of this passage suggest huge demand for Burmese gems 
in the capital Beijing, while the demand in Yunnan was small.
 Unlike Burmese jade which was solely exported to China up to the twenti-
eth century, rubies, sapphires, and other gemstones were in demand among 
Chinese and Burmese, as well as among Indians and Europeans. By the end 
of the sixteenth century, the Chinese were the largest buyers, but after the 
Burmese court took control of the mines the quantities and quality of baoshi 
exported to China must have dwindled.
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The debut of feicui (c. 1719–1763)
Up to the mid-eighteenth century, it appears, baoshi still dominated the 
Qing-Burmese trade. Nonetheless, Burmese jade was gaining momentum. 
As Burmese jade increased in popularity, soon to replace baoshi as the pri-
mary export to China, the term feicui was introduced.
 The transition from baoshi to feicui can be observed in the writings of the 
historian Ni Tui, who arrived in Yunnan in 1715. In his 1719 work, Dian xiao 
ji, he wrote a lengthy passage entitled “Baoshi,” which not only includes im-
portant information on the historical development of baoshi in China and 
baoshi trade during the Ming times, but also lists various types of Burmese 
baoshi.
The green ones: luzi 瓐子 and zumulü; the blue ones: soft blue [ruanlan 軟
藍] and feicui; the white ones: diamond [ jin gang 金剛], and tan yangjing 
賧羊精 [literally “(color of ) goat semen”]; the yellow ones: cat’s eyes 貓
睛, and jiuhuang fen 酒黃粉 [literally “(color of ) powder of yellow Chinese 
chives”]; the red ones: tourmaline or garnet [biyaxi 比牙洗]; and so on, 
which cannot be all enumerated.17 It is unknown whether they are from 
the same mine or not.18
 This is a valuable account. First, Ni Tui provides new classifications of 
baoshi, including tan yangjing, which had never before appeared in Chinese 
records, while jin’gang and biyaxi are applied to Burmese baoshi for the first 
time. Biyaxi is a loan word from the Arabic bijādī, with its Persian form being 
beejād.19 The Chinese transliteration of bijādī is various, with the earliest one 
being bizheda 避者達 in Tao Zongyi’s 陶宗儀 Nancun cuogeng lu 南村輟耕錄, 
written in 1366.20 The Tengyue prefect Tu Shulian provides the most detailed 
description on bixiaxi: “Besides baoshi there is bixiaxi. It has five colors, with 
the crimson and clear [toushui 透水] ones being the best, and purple, yellow, 
green, and moon white colors being inferior, while the worst ones are white 
and black colors. They are also produced in Mongmit, perhaps belonging to 
the baoshi type.”21
 Second and more important, Ni Tui used the term feicui, probably for the 
first time, to refer to Burmese jade, albeit lumped under the rubric of bao-
shi. This creative use of the word feicui was influential, as it would soon be 
employed to refer to Burmese jade exclusively. Looking at the Chinese ter-
minology for Burmese jade from the mid-Ming times, one realizes that the 
Chinese, the Yunnanese in particular, had been trying to find a suitable term 
for Burmese jade for a long time (see table 1).22
table 1 Burmese gems in chinese accounts (c. 1455–1890s)
Ming Dynasty
1455 Hupo 琥珀 (produce of Mohnyin/Mengyang 孟养)
c. 1475 Yudai 玉帶, Lüyu 綠玉, Zumulü 祖母綠
1488 Yushi 玉石 (presented by Yixi or Mohnyin natives 迤西夷人)
1510 Hupo 琥珀, bitian 碧瑱 (produce of Mohnyin)
1583 Baoshi 寳石, cuisheng wenshi 催生文石, hupo 琥珀, baiyu 白玉, biyu 
碧玉
Lüyu 綠玉, heiyu 黑玉
1619 Yunnan biyu 雲南碧玉
1621 Baoshi 寳石, baosha 寳砂, cuisheng shi 催生石, shuijing 水晶
lüyu 綠玉, moyu 墨玉, bitian 碧瑱，biyu 碧玉
1632 Baoshi 寳石, hupo 琥珀, lüyu 綠玉, heiyu 黑玉, cuisheng shi 催生石
Moyu 墨玉，biyu 碧玉
1639 Baoshi 寳石, hupo 琥珀, cuisheng shi 翠生石, biyu 碧玉
1611–71 Yunnan bi 雲南碧
Qing Dynasty
1680 Hongzhu 紅珠/baoshi 寳石: meigui shui 玫瑰水, gezi xue 鴿子血， 
shiliu hong 石榴紅, yaqing 鴉青, maoeryan 貓兒眼
Zumulü 祖母綠, maoding 帽頂, baoshi 寶石, guijieyan 鬼睫眼
1687–88 Baoshi 寳石
1688 Hupo 琥珀, biyu 碧玉, zhenbao 珍寶
1691 Caiyu 菜玉，moyu 墨玉，cuisheng shi 催生石
1694 Hupo 琥珀, biyu 碧玉, zhenbao 珍寳, baoshi 寳石
1702 Hupo 琥珀, shuijing 水晶, caiyu 菜玉, moyu 墨玉, cuisheng shi 
催生石
Baosha 寳沙, baoshi 寳石
1719 Baoshi 寳石: luzi 瓐子, zumulü 祖母綠, ruanlan 軟藍, feicui 翡翠, 
jingang 金剛
Tan yangjing 賧羊精, maojing 貓睛, jiuhuang fen 酒黃粉, biyaxi 
比牙洗
1733 Yongchang biyu 永昌碧玉
1736 Hupo 琥珀, shuijing 水晶，caiyu 菜玉, moyu 墨玉, baosha 寳砂,
Baosha 寳砂, haijinsha 海金砂, baoshi 寳石, cuishengshi 催生石, 
ziyingshi 紫英石
1741–53 Baoshi 寳石: meigui 玫瑰, yinghong 映紅, yingqing 映青
c. 1763 Baoshi 寳石, hupo 琥珀, feicui 翡翠, manao 瑪瑙
1764 Yunnan yu 雲南玉
1769 Bixiya 碧石先砑
c. 1769 Yushi 玉石, baoshi 寳石, biyaxi 碧牙西
1769 Hupo 琥珀, baoshi 寳石
1769 Bixiaxi 碧霞璽




1772 Yunnan yu 雲南玉
1772 Feicui 翡翠
1772–82 Dianyu 滇玉, baoshi 寳石, bi(xia)sui 碧(霞)髓, feicui shi 翡翠石, 
cuisheng shi 催升石




1782–95 Yu 玉, baoshi 寳石
1790 Baoshi 寶石, bixia 碧霞, yinhong 印紅, zhubao 珠寶, baiyu 白玉, 
cuiyu 翠玉, moyu 墨玉, hupo 琥珀, bixiaxi 碧霞璽, baosha 寶沙
c. 1790 Baoshi 寳石: yinghong 映紅, yinglan 映藍, bixiaxi 碧霞洗
1793 Feicui yu 翡翠玉，lüsongshi 綠松石，biyaxi 碧鴉犀
1795 Feicui 翡翠
1799 Yu 玉, feicui 翡翠, baiyu 白玉，cuiyu 翠玉, heiyu 黑玉, baoshi 寳石
Bixiaxi(pi) 碧霞璽(玭), bixi 碧洗, kulani 苦剌泥, bitian 碧瑱, yinhong 
印红, haozhu ya 豪猪牙，ruanyu 软玉
1802 Feicui 翡翠
1804 Feicui yu 翡翠玉
1816 Feicui yu 翡翠玉
1827 Boashi 寳石, feicui 翡翠, bixi 碧璽, Yunnan yu 雲南玉
1839 Feicui 翡翠
1848 Yushi 玉石, hupo 琥珀, baoshi 寳石, lihong 瓅玒
c.1852 Hupo 琥珀, baoyu 寳玉
mid-1900s Feicui 翡翠
mid-1900s Feicui 翡翠, bixi 碧璽
mid-1900s Feicui 翡翠
1862 Feicui 翡翠
1864 Cuishi 翠石，feicui shi 翡翠石
1871 Yu 玉, ruanzan 軟瓚, baoshi 寳石, bixi 珌璽, feicui 翡翠, cuiyu 翠玉
1875 Yushi 玉石, hong baoshi 紅寶石, yaqing 鴉青
1875 Yushi 玉石
1879 Yushi 玉石
1886 Yu 玉, hupo 琥珀, baoshi 寶石, bixia(xi) 碧霞(犀)
1887 Jade category 玉属: bixia baoshi 碧霞寶石, yinhong baoshi 印紅寶石
Hongla baoshi 紅剌寶石, yushi 玉石, hupo 琥珀, manao 瑪瑙, 
shanhu 珊瑚
1890 Biyu 碧玉, Yunnan yu 雲南玉, feicui 翡翠
1890 Feicui 翡翠, yushi 玉石，baoshi 寶石, maojing shi 貓睛石, hupo 
琥珀
1890s Yushi 玉石, baoshi 寳石, cuiyu 翠玉
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 The history of Burmese jade in China can be traced according to the evi-
dence presented in table 1, for which the abundant information on Burmese 
baoshi for the Ming period has been omitted in order to highlight the Bur-
mese jade. Burmese jade possibly started to reach China in the late thirteenth 
century, but the “gem fever” of the mid-Ming gradually lent it visibility and 
importance. For example, prior to 1475, jade from Burma was not recorded, 
and the 1455 gazetteer of Yunnan mentions only that Mohnyin (Mengyang) 
produced amber (which had entered Yunnan centuries before). Around 1475 
appeared hard written evidence showing that Burmese jade was prized and 
sought (and even sent to Vietnam as gifts) by a Ming eunuch. No doubt, 
some amount of Burmese jade had arrived in Beijing and other places in 
China with large quantities of baoshi. Interestingly, it was already called yu 
玉, lüyu 綠玉, and zumulü 祖母綠 by the Chinese, emphasizing, correctly, the 
green color of the Burmese jade, as the word lü 綠 indicates. An account of 
1488 even records that people from Mohnyin presented jade (yushi 玉石) to 
the Ming court. The 1510 gazetteer of Yunnan accordingly updated the pro-
duce of Mohnyin by adding green jade (bitian 碧瑱), referring to the Burmese 
jade and stressing its green color (bi 碧). The firsthand account of 1583 sug-
gests that western Yunnan and Upper Burma (particularly Mohnyin) pro-
duced many kinds of jade: cuisheng wenshi 催生文石, baiyu 白玉, biyu 碧玉, 
lüyu 綠玉, heiyu 黑玉. Actually, they should have all come from Mohnyin.23 
The 1621 account states, “Foreign-produced amber, crystal, green jade (biyu), 
Gula (Assamese) brocade, Western Ocean cloth, and drugs such as asafoetida 
and opium are gathered and distributed [by Yunnan merchants], and walk to 
the four directions without legs.”24
 The green jade no doubt came from Mohnyin. This suggests that jade from 
Upper Burma circulated in China to a certain degree, and the earliest archeo-
logical find of jade in fact testifies to this circulation.25 One hastens to add 
that, comparatively speaking, the amount of Burmese jade in China was still 
small (vis-à-vis the much larger quantities of baoshi), hence it is not surpris-
ing that archaeological finds are still very rare.
 However, from around 1475 to the end of the Ming dynasty (and later), 
the Chinese had been searching for a better name for Burmese jade. During 
this relatively long period (about 170 years), about ten different names (yu 
玉, lüyu 綠玉, zumulü 祖母綠, bitian 碧瑱, yushi 玉石, cuisheng wenshi 催生文
石, cuisheng shi 催生石, cuisheng shi 翠生石, biyu 碧玉, heiyu 黑玉, moyu 墨玉, 
and even possibly baiyu 白玉 [for non-green color Burmese jade]) were used. 
Even Xu Xiake himself used two names (cuisheng shi 翠生石 and biyu) to refer 
from bAoSH I  To fe ICu I  211
to the same thing, showing the fluidity of the Chinese terminology for Bur-
mese jade.
 Despite these various terms, most accounts emphasize the green color or 
shade, indicated in words such as lü, cui, bi, and even mo and hei. The word 
cui 催 is apparently a mistake for cui 翠 (which means “green,” greener than 
ordinary lü), as Xie Zhaozhe, using the term cuisheng shi 催生石 in 1621, ex-
plained that the gem had “green color with white spots” (secui er jianbai 色翠
而間白).26 Xu Xiake makes clear that people in Yunnan favored the pure cui 
ones (chuncui zhe 纯翠者). This demonstrates that the Yunnanese had, from 
the very beginning, noticed the special green color in Burmese jade and ap-
plied the word cui to it. This usage of the word cui led eventually to the term 
feicui for the Burmese jade in the eighteenth century, starting from Ni Tui in 
1719.
 Burmese jade was not known to the Qing court until 1733, when the Yun-
nan governor Zhang Yunsui presented a piece of “Yongchang green jade” 
(Yongchang biyu 永昌碧玉) to the Qianlong emperor. The possible origins of 
the Burmese word for jadeite, kyok’ cim’ (literally “green stone”) are worth 
examining. Such a popular usage in modern Burmese actually has a rela-
tively short history. It first appeared in the early seventeenth century, around 
1637–1638, and probably did not become popular until the nineteenth cen-
tury.27 Prior to the seventeenth century, at least in the Burmese chronicles, 
mra or mra kyok’ were used for jadeite (or green-colored gems).28 This Bur-
mese usage is corroborated more by the Burmese-Chinese dictionaries com-
piled by the Chinese for official translation by the sixteenth century (and 
updated in the early eighteenth century). In these dictionaries, the Burmese 
word mra was transliterated as 比呀 (biya) or 麥剌 (maila) and translated as 
“玉 (yu),” while mra kyok’ was transliterated as 哶繳 (miejiao), 麥剌繳 (maila-
jiao), or 麥賴繳 (mailaijiao) and translated as “玉石 (yushi).”29 In view of the 
long emphasis by Chinese from the late fifteenth through the early seven-
teenth century on the “green” (lü, cui, and bi, etc.) color or shade of the Bur-
mese jade, and the appearance of the Burmese word kyok’ cim’ in 1637–1638, 
one may speculate that the coining of this Burmese new word was due to 
Chinese influence. This should not be surprising, as the terminology and 
classification of Burmese jade have been dictated by the Chinese. Moreover, 
up to the early eighteenth century, the term feicui had not entered the official 
Chinese usage, and it still took more time to popularize it.
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The Triumph of feicui (c. 1763–c. 1800)
From the 1760s on, feicui start to appear more frequently in Chinese records. 
Indeed, Burmese jade, quite literally, began to show its true colors to the 
Chinese people.
 Zhang Yong, in his work Yunnan fengtu ji (c. 1736), described the bustling 
market in Dali, western Yunnan: “Precious and exotic goods are bought and 
sold, such as baoshi, amber, feicui . . . Burmese tin, Burmese brocade. . . . Enter-
ing the market, [one sees] all kinds of precious and exotic things, goods and 
people are as many as ten thousand everyday.”30
 This was indeed a huge market for Burmese commodities, especially 
gems. Though it seems that baoshi still dominated as it is listed first, feicui 
(third on the list) clearly refers to Burmese jade. It must be that the Yunnan-
ese had adopted Ni Tui’s word feicui, which had first appeared in 1719. From 
1764 to 1772, in Chinese records, including Qing palace archives, Burmese 
jade is much more frequently mentioned than baoshi under the names Yun-
nan yu, yushi, and especially feicui (in 1771). After that, the Yunnan official Wu 
Daxun wrote extensively on gems and other minerals based on his personal 
experiences during 1772–1782, referring inter alia to “Yunnan” (actually Bur-
mese) jade ([Dian] yu [滇] 玉), baoshi 寶石, tourmaline (bixiasui 碧霞髓), feicui 
stone ( feicui shi 翡翠石), and cuisheng shi 催升石. This account is significant 
because it indicates that the previous emphasis on Burmese baoshi had now 
shifted to Burmese jade, which received enormous attention. Burmese jade 
now was divided into three categories and classes: yu, feicui shi, and cui-
sheng shi. The first and the third, according to Wu Daxun, were of inferior 
quality and hence not worth much, while the green type of feicui shi was 
worth as much as baoshi: “Regarding the quality of feicui stone, the whiter 
the better; as for its cui 翠 [green], the deeper the better. There are two types 
of cui, qing 青 [darkish green] and lü 綠 [yellowish green], while the qing kind 
is even better, and its value equals to baoshi.”31
 This emphasis on the cui color is typical for Burmese jade. During the 
1770s–1780s the value of feicui soared, and the best feicui could even com-
pete with baoshi. Another decade or two witnessed feicui’s overtaking 
China’s traditional type of jade (nephrite) in price. Moreover, Wu Daxun 
was the last person who employed the term cuisheng shi; after him, it com-
pletely disappeared. After two centuries in circulation—it had been coined 
in 1583—cuisheng shi was abandoned partially because the Yunnanese had a 
better term: feicui, which was on the rise in China, both in popularity and 
quantity.
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 Indeed, during the second half of the eighteenth century, Burmese jade 
made a great leap forward in China, in two senses. First, the term feicui crys-
tallized. From its debut in 1719 up to 1799, the usage of the word feicui be-
came more widespread. It was mentioned in 1771, between 1772 and 1782 
intermittently, and again with exactitude in 1777, 1779, 1780 (twice), 1796, 
and 1799, and then even more frequently in the nineteenth century. From 
this period on, though other names were still used for Burmese jade, feicui 
became most popular, and has remained so to the modern times. Second, 
the volume of Burmese jade exported into China must have increased dra-
matically. The Tengyue zhouzhi by Tu Shuliang reflects the situation by 1790. It 
first points out that because gems gathered in Tengyue, their collective street 
name was changed from Babao jie 八保街 to Baibao jie 百寶街 (meaning “street 
of 100 kinds of gems”). Then the account states,
Today the commodities purchased [from Burma] by merchants to Teng-
yue include, first, gems [zhubao] and, second, cotton. Gems [bao] come 
in their uncut form [pu 璞], while cotton is carried in bales. [These are] 
transported on mules and horses which crowd the roads. Currently at the 
provincial capital there are many jade-cutting shops [ jie yu fang 解玉坊], 
the noise of cutting goes on day and night. [The jade] is all from Tengyue, 
while the cotton bales travel to Guizhou.32
 Apparently, zhubao and bao mainly refer to Burmese jade as the word pu is 
used exclusively for jade, while jade-cutting shops are clearly mentioned. It 
is notable that this source lists jade before cotton, demonstrating the crucial 
role of jade in the Qing-Burmese trade during this period.
 Another source also demonstrates the large-scale jade trade between 
Burma and China. By the 1790s the price of feicui had surpassed the age-old 
conventional type of jade from Xinjiang. In 1793, the famous scholar Ji Yun 
紀昀 (1724–1805) wrote,
The value of things is dependent on the fashion of their time and [hence 
cannot be] fixed. [I] recall when I was young, ginseng, coral, and lapis 
lazuli were not expensive, [but] today [they are] increasingly so; turquoise 
and tourmaline were extremely expensive, [but] today [their prices are] 
increasingly reduced; feicui jade [ feicui yu 翡翠玉] of Yunnan at that time 
was not considered as jade . . . [but] at present it is seen as precious curio 
[baowan 寳玩], [and its] price far exceeds the genuine jade [zhenyu 真玉] 
[from Xinjiang]. . . . Prices of goods are so different in fifty to sixty years, 
let alone in several hundred years!33
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 Table 1 contains some post-1800 information in order to show the tri-
umph of feicui. Despite the records of baoshi, the term feicui overwhelmingly 
dominates the picture. The 1887 edition of the gazetteer of Tengyue arranges 
all the gems under the rubric of yu, or jade, in a sharp contrast to Ni Tui’s 
1719 arrangement, which includes all the gems under the baoshi category. 
This demonstrates that baoshi and feicui had switched places, with the latter 
dominating, if not monopolizing the export trade. Statistics are lacking for 
the gem trade between China and Burma for the period prior to 1800, but 
large quantities of jade were exported to China during the nineteenth cen-
tury and the early twentieth.34 Jade consumption in China in these two cen-
turies had reached a new high.35 By contrast, there are no statistics on bao-
shi, which implies that, relative to jade, it was far less important.
conclusion: The gem Trade as a chinese Business
The first written Chinese record of Burmese jade appeared around 1475, 
while the term feicui referring to Burmese jade appeared in 1719. However, 
the appearance of the term feicui is significant not only in itself, but also in 
that it registers a transition from an “age of baoshi” to an “age of jade” in 
the history of Sino-Burmese gem trade. Its emergence demonstrates that 
Chinese tastes in gemstones had shifted. Behind this shifting were deeper 
social and cultural forces at work.
 Feicui’s trajectory in China coincides with the trend of jade consumption 
in Qing China as described by Yang Boda. The first 115 years (1644–1759) 
comprised the first, or slow-growth, phase. This was a transitional period 
from the Ming to Qing, when style was still dominantly Ming and few jade 
works were made. The next fifty-two years (1760–1812) comprise the sec-
ond phase, or the booming period, which witnessed the socioeconomic re-
covery of China. Many jade-cutting shops were opened, especially after the 
Qing started to control the sources of jade in Xinjiang, after the rebellions 
there were suppressed. Hence, in terms of raw jade supply, places of jade 
works, procedures of jade-cutting, the distribution of jade craftsmen, clas-
sifications of Qing jade, techniques of jade carving, as well as the size of jade 
works, this was a peak period in the history of jade in premodern China.36
 In particular, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1795) was an especially 
ardent jade lover and connoisseur, and his personal hobby became the most 
important driving force behind the “jade mania” in Qing China. One mod-
ern scholar states that Qinglong “shiyu chengpi 嗜玉成癖” meaning his being 
obsessed with or addicted to jade, and he composed 848 poems altogether 
on jade (though none on Burmese jade).37
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 China’s impact on Southeast Asian history is exemplified by the Sino-
Burmese gem trade. One probably can say with justification that it was the 
Chinese who gave life and history to Burmese gem mining and exports, par-
ticularly jade. It started with the Mongol invasion of Burma in the thirteenth 
century, and the Mongols’ search for local gemstones. The Mongols taught 
the Han Chinese people to appreciate gemstones, including those from 
Burma, and the Chinese after the Mongols indeed followed that teaching. 
The huge demand in Ming times, especially from the mid-fifteenth century, 
created a fever for gemstones, particularly baoshi, across China and thus in-
fluenced Burmese history (the rise of the Shans in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries) in a significant way.
 If Burmese baoshi benefited from a mix of Burmese, Indian, and Euro-
pean stimuli, then Burmese jade was a thoroughly Chinese business (hardly 
surprising, as the Chinese have been jade-lovers since prehistoric times). 
Indeed, Burmese jade had nothing to do with Indians and Europeans. The 
Europeans had been fascinated by Burmese rubies since the fifteenth cen-
tury and left with numerous accounts.38 But they did not mention jade and 
the jade mines in Upper Burma until the early nineteenth century, when un-
familiarity led them to call it “noble serpentine.”39 As late as the nineteenth 
century, one Chinese source commented that “[Burmese] green jade [cuiyu 
翠玉] is only exported to China, whereas Westerners prize rubies.”40
 This is true to this day, as the Chinese people within China and overseas 
continue to dominate the jade market. Important events and consumption 
waves in China have substantially influenced Burma’s gem business in the 
past, and do so still. For instance, for the wedding of the Qing emperor 
Tongzhi, in 1872, four lakhs (400,000) of rupees were expended at Guang-
zhou in buying Burmese jade, and “a great impulse was thereby given to 
the jade trade in Burma.” The total cost of Guangxu’s (Tongzhi’s successor) 
wedding, in 1889, was 5,500,000 liang of silver, with 80 percent on purchas-
ing dowries, clothes, gold and silver vessels, pearls, jade, and jadeite, and 
so on.41 Chinese consumers since the Reform Era in the twentieth century, 
especially in recent decades, have been driving the mining of and trade in 
jade in northern Burma. Even now, the terminology and classification of fei-
cui follow the Chinese convention.42
 Even the Burmese demand had little to do with the jade business by 
the eighteenth century and thereafter. The long title of the Burmese king 
throughout history—such as “Proprietor of all kinds of precious stones, of 
the mines of Rubies, Agate, Lasni, Sapphires, Opal; also the mines of Gold, 
Silver, Amber, Lead, Tin, Iron, and Petroleum . . .”—which in slightly vari-
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ous forms frequently appears in Burmese chronicles and other historical 
sources, never includes jade.43 It was not until the late eighteenth century 
that the Burmese king started to realize the value of jade and thus to regulate 
it.44 From around the 1820s the Burmese king added “jade” to the numerous 
possessions in his title (“possessor/owner of mines of gold, silver, rubies, 
amber and noble serpentine [jade]”), and meanwhile also presented jade to 
the Chinese emperor and some European monarchs.45
 The Chinese gave life and history to Burmese gems, particularly jade. Thus 
the history of Burmese jade well illustrates how China, in its desire for luxu-
ries, has been a driving force behind the discovery and export of exotic goods 
from Southeast Asia, and by extension, this region’s economic growth and 
state formation.46
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Junks to JaVa
chinese Shipping to the nanyang in the Second half of the eighteenth century
Leonard Blussé
The sea is the most extensive of all things. In the southeastern islands barbarians 
live in great numbers, infinitely far away between the clouds and the waves. There-
fore men of letters did not go there in the past. Now that the virtue and splendor of 
the emperor has spread everywhere, the maritime world is tranquil. Every year ships 
sail to faraway barbarian lands, stable and safe on the waves, as if they were coming 
and going over flat land.
—Phan Huy Chu, “Hai trinh chi luoc 海程誌略” [Summary of a sea voyage], Recit som-
maire d’un voyage en mer (1833)
These idyllic lines open the travel account by the mandarin Phan Huy Chu, 
who departed in 1833 from the Vietnamese port of Hoian on a diplomatic 
mission to Batavia for the emperor of Vietnam. He sailed on a Chinese junk 
in an era when the predominance of these ships as carriers of the South 
China Sea trade was being challenged by the Western square-riggers that 
frequented these tropical waters in ever greater numbers. His poetic words 
are quite revealing. Because Confucian men of letters, that is to say writers 
of flowery travel accounts, hardly ever hazarded their lives on the stormy 
seas, Phan felt an urge to commit his own adventures to paper. It turned out 
not to be a hair-raising peregrination but actually quite a comfortable trip, 
“stable and safe” as if passing over land. By these words, the Vietnamese 
mandarin not only meant that the sea route was as trodden as a footpath—a 
wagenspoor, as the Dutch sailors used to call the oceanic route from Holland 
to Java in those days—he was also alluding to the peaceful conditions in the 
coastal waters of Vietnam since imperial peace had been restored after the 
chaos of the Tay Son rebellion.
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 The notable lack of written evidence about Chinese shipping amounts to 
a formidable obstacle for the historian who wants to restore life to China’s 
maritime past. “Lack of surviving evidence” and “well-trodden paths”: this 
almost amounts to a contradiction in terms. Yet it cannot be denied that, 
unlike Western long-distance navigation, which has produced a wealth of 
travel writing by sailors and adventurers high and low, the Chinese maritime 
tradition has left us very few useful travel accounts. Chinese sailors them-
selves may have been so accustomed to life at sea that they saw little use 
in writing up experiences that they took for granted, assuming they could 
write at all. In 1821, an Eng lishman who met the crew of the first junk visit-
ing Singapore that year was surprised to discover that the sailors possessed 
neither maps nor ship’s papers, nor any log book about the course they had 
steered.1
 Thanks to a number of Chinese rutters (sailing directions) dating as far 
back as the Song dynasty, we do know exactly what navigational trunk routes 
Chinese shipping took toward the tropical regions. Overseas traffic to Viet-
nam, Cambodia, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and the Indonesian archipelago 
skirted the western rim of the South China Sea along the so-called Xi Yang 
西洋, or Western Ocean route. Chinese junks heading for Luzon, Mindanao, 
and onward in a southern direction to the Spice Islands in the eastern Indo-
nesian archipelago would choose the Dong Yang 东洋, or Eastern Ocean route, 
island hopping along the eastern side of the South China Sea. For centuries, 
these two beltways served as umbilical cords connecting the islands in the 
“Southern Seas,” the Nanyang 南洋, with the mountains of Tang, Tang Shan 
唐山, as the Chinese sailors used to call their mother country. Both sailing 
routes have been well documented in the Chinese rutter Zhinan Zhengfa 指
南正法 of 1720, which painstakingly records the sailing distances between 
promontories, islands, shoals, and other natural hazards that the junks 
passed.2
Time and Space
In terms of time perspective, the Chinese junk trade to the Nanyang in the 
second half of the eighteenth century has some very interesting features. 
During the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1736–1796), the overseas trade 
of China’s southeastern coastal provinces expanded as never before. Pro-
pelled by the northeastern monsoon, year after year Chinese junks carried 
tens of thousands of people abroad, thereby creating pockets of Chinese 
settlement all around the rim of the South China Sea. If under the preceding 
reigns they had mainly delivered “guest workers” such as artisans, peddlers, 
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and horticulturalists to the commercial hubs of Ayutthaya, the Siamese 
capital, and of Manila and Batavia, the Spanish and Dutch headquarters 
in the east respectively, they now began to carry large numbers of laborers 
to tin- and gold-mining camps on the Malay Peninsula and West Kaliman-
tan (Borneo), gambier plantations on the Riau archipelago and panglong or 
lumber operations on Sumatra. Swarming out on the northern monsoon, 
Chinese traders and fishermen also connected with the intra-archipelago 
networks of the marauding Iranun bands from the Sulu archipelago or the 
Bugis traders and Makassar fishermen of Sulawesi (Celebes), who roamed 
the Indonesian waters as far as Sumatra in the west and New Guinea and 
Australia in the east, and who could provide all kinds of maritime products 
for the Chinese kitchen, such as sea cucumbers, swallows’ nests, turtles, 
and so on. To the two main thoroughfares to the Indian Ocean, the Sunda 
Strait and the Melaka Strait, junks from China brought finished commodi-
ties such as tea, paper umbrellas, iron utensils, and ceramics of all kinds to 
exchange for what came to be known as “straits products,” that is, “raw” 
commodities like tin, rattan, pepper, and of course also sea cucumbers and 
edible birds’ nests. At these crossroads the Chinese sailors also began to 
meet with interloping Eng lish country traders who increasingly challenged 
the hegemony of the Dutch East India Company (Voc) in the archipelago 
by bringing in opium and textiles from the Indian Ocean.3 This period of 
formidable Chinese trade expansion toward Southeast Asia, which reached 
well into the nineteenth century, has sometimes been characterized as the 
“Chinese century.”
 During the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company had been 
the most powerful trading power in the Eastern Seas, but in the second half 
of the eighteenth century it was confronted with increased competition 
from European rivals in the China trade and their intrusion in the seas of 
Maluku, which the company had successfully sealed off from foreign com-
petition for more than a century. It revamped the routes of its own shipping 
to and from the Middle Kingdom while trying to protect its Maluku spice 
monopoly, and attempted to force the Chinese junk trade to continue sailing 
to its headquarters at Batavia, on Java. In retrospect, Voc documents refer-
ring to the dogged efforts by Chinese junk skippers to dodge Dutch regula-
tions help us understand how and why the Chinese junk traders ultimately 
chose destinations other than Batavia. The shifting patterns of trade made 
it far more attractive to sail to new ports rather than to continue sailing to 
malaria-infested Batavia.
 Some twenty years ago I hinted at these late developments in a chapter 
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about the administrative problems the Voc had in controlling the junk trade 
to Batavia during the two hundred years of its existence.4 Based on newly 
discovered material, I shall presently focus on the period between 1750 and 
1800, and deal in greater detail with the changing fortunes of Chinese ship-
ping to the Indonesian archipelago. This will enable me to rephrase some 
earlier conclusions or to underline them in greater detail. Why begin in the 
1750s, and why draw a seemingly abrupt dividing line at the end of that cen-
tury? Both periods are significant in the decline of the Dutch East India Com-
pany as the hegemonic playmaker in Indonesian waters and the concurrent 
rise of the Iranun pirates, the Bugis traders, and Western country traders—
in short, in the shifting balance of maritime trade in the Eastern Seas.5
 These developments were not yet apparent in 1755, when the manage-
ment of the Voc, the Gentlemen XVII, decided to establish a direct ship-
ping link between the Netherlands and Canton at the expense of its head-
quarters in the Orient, Batavia. This change of policy had a big impact on the 
existing trading link between Canton and Batavia, which had hitherto been 
an inherent part of the company’s intra-Asian trading network. Fifty years 
later, in 1800, when the bankrupt Voc was dissolved as a trading organiza-
tion and all connections with the Dutch Republic were broken off as a result 
of the Napoleonic Wars, the rules of the game in the trade between China 
and Java changed fundamentally again. American ships moved in to save the 
Dutch on Java and in Canton and Nagasaki, and what was left of the junk 
trade to Batavia continued to hold its own, although not without undergoing 
important changes in organization and management. In the two decades 
that followed, the so-called ocean guilds, Yanghang, which had been running 
the Chinese shipping business with Batavia for almost one hundred years, 
went into decline and were replaced by independent shipping companies, 
the Shang Hang. Why the Chinese overseas security merchants were replaced 
by independent traders on the shipping lanes to the Nanyang is an interest-
ing question that begs an answer, but basically the same developments were 
taking place in European shipping, where independent shipping firms were 
replacing the chartered East India companies, the dinosaurs of the ancien 
régime.
 Now that the scene and the time period of this essay have been fixed, let 
us join again our learned Vietnamese voyager and follow him on his way to 
Batavia. Phan Huy Chu’s ship sailed the centuries-old course that all Chi-
nese junks used to steer toward overseas destinations in the Nanyang, once 
they had crossed over from China’s southernmost island, Hainan, to the 
Vietnamese coast. Propelled by the northeastern monsoon, the vessel sailed 
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southward, coasting the Indochinese Peninsula, “plowing through the wild 
waves that roared like ten thousand galloping horses,” as Phan put it. This 
particular stretch of the sea route is indeed known for its choppy seas be-
cause of its shallow waters. The crew of Phan’s junk plumbed the sea bottom 
to be no deeper than twenty to thirty fathoms and at shallower spots only 
five to ten fathoms.
 A few days later, Cape Varella was passed and a new course was plotted to 
Pulau Condor (Con Lon), lying just below the southernmost point of Viet-
nam. Once this island had been passed in the night, the junk arrived in the 
“converging waters,” marking the interface between Vietnamese waters and 
the Java Sea. Here the author meant the dark seas of the Gulf of Siam, the 
greater depth of which, as he remarked, soon produced a much gentler and 
longer wave pattern. After two more days and nights, Phan and his crew 
sighted the island of Tioman, near the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula 
and a traditional rendezvous where passing ships used to fetch fresh water.
 From Tioman, the junk pursued its course via Riau and Lingga and headed 
for Selat Bangka, the strait between the mountainous island of Bangka and 
Sumatra. On passing these narrows, the junk headed south straight for Pulau 
Seribu (Thousand Islands), which stretched along the horizon in an emerald 
line, “like a flock of green birds floating on the water.” The ultimate destina-
tion was almost in sight, because these isles formed the perimeter of the Bay 
of Kelapa (Sunda), or Batavia. On the outer roads, European square-riggers 
rode at anchor; closer inshore was the anchorage for Indonesian craft and 
the large trading junks from Amoy.
 The indefatigable George Windsor Earl, who roamed the Eastern Seas in 
the early 1830s, describes in vivid detail how thrilling the yearly arrival of the 
junks from China was for those living abroad.
The first junk, which arrives generally a little before Christmas, is most 
anxiously looked for, and when its approach is notified by the crew of 
a Malay sampan which has been on the look out to the eastward, the 
greatest bustle pervades the Chinese community: some running along 
the streets to communicate the important intelligence to their friends, 
come in contact with others rushing from the opposite direction, and 
many hasten off to the vessel to learn the news from China, every thing 
that will float, from a sampan to a cargo boat, being put in requisition.
 The first boat reaches the junk when she is still several miles distant, 
and as she nears town, she gains an accession of bulk at every fathom, 
until at last the unwieldy mass slowly trails into the roads, surrounded by 
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a dense mass of boats, having the appearance of a locust which has inad-
vertently crossed an ant’s nest, and is dragging after it countless myriads 
of the enraged inhabitants attached to its legs and feelers. As the decks of 
the junk are always crowded with emigrants, the greater proportion of the 
visitors are obliged to remain in the boats, and these endeavour to gain as 
much information as they can by shouting out questions to the people on 
board.
 The Chinese sailing-master, who struts about on the top of the 
thatched habitation on the quarter deck, with all the importance of a 
mandarin with a peacock’s feather, endeavours in vain to make himself 
heard above the noise, so that the junk is generally brought up in the outer 
roads until sufficiently cleared of its visitors to render it safe for it to enter 
into the inner anchorage.
 Other junks soon arrive, and although these do not excite quite so 
much interest as the first, the same scene is acted over in each. For a day 
or two after their arrival there is little business transacted, as the crews are 
all engaged in building roofs over the vessels to shelter the wares which 
are exposed for sale on the decks. When these arrangements are com-
pleted, the fair commences and the junks are surrounded from morning 
till night by the boats of the Chinese traders from the shore.6
lack of Quantitative data
Not much precise serial source material has been preserved about the Chi-
nese shipping figures along the eastern and western trunk routes, but there 
are a few notable exceptions. Throughout the eighteenth century, the arrival 
and departure of all junks that sailed along the western route to Batavia were 
duly noted by the shahbandar, or harbormaster, of Batavia. The shipping lists 
give the port of departure in China, the approximate tonnage of the vessel, 
and the total number of crew and passengers on board. These data on the 
Chinese junk trade have been entered into a database that is now available 
on the Internet. Some of this has also been published in the form of graphs 
and diagrams.7
 In the late 1970s, a team from Leiden University fed into a computer all 
quantitative data about outgoing and returning Voc shipping during the 
two hundred years of the company’s existence, and then made these data 
available to the general public.8 A similarly detailed database cannot be cre-
ated for the Chinese junk trade because there is (with a notable exception) 
no precise serial information available under headings like the names of the 
junks, duration of voyage, names of nachodas (Chinese supercargoes), num-
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bers of people on board, ports visited en route, and total value of the cargo, 
to say nothing of the home voyage and the occasional shipwreck.
 What is more, almost no serial data are available about the cargoes of the 
junks that sailed annually from China to Batavia, because as early as 1644 
the Collectors of Revenue in this Dutch emporium gave up inspecting the 
merchandise carried by the Chinese vessels as this caused too much hag-
gling and quarreling with the nachodas and the many itinerant peddlers on 
board. An entry in the Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek describes in detail how 
the Chinese merchants complained: “They always arrived in the midst of 
the rainy season and were forced to have their vessels examined by the tax 
farmer and his servants and have everything which was in the hold of the 
ship piecemeal fashion noted down, before they were allowed to bring the 
merchandise under a shelter. During these procedures part of the merchan-
dise was either broken or got wet and rotted away owing to the recurrent rain 
showers.”9
 The Batavian harbor authorities therefore decided to slap a “redemption” 
fee on the total cargo according to the size of the vessels and their port of 
origin. As time passed, these fees were adjusted. In the period under study 
the redemption fees were levied as shown in table 1.10
 The cargoes from Amoy were considered less valuable than those from 
Canton and Ningpo. The levies were intended to be equal to about 5 percent 
of the cargo’s actual value. This would mean that the value of a large Amoy 
junk was about 40,000 rijksdaalders (rds). The junks from Canton generally 
carried large cargoes of tea (estimated value 60,000 rds), while those from 
Ningbo were said to bring large quantities of Japanese copper (estimated 
value 70,000 rds). The junks from Xiamen primarily served the Fujianese 
settlements overseas by furnishing all sorts of ceramics and utensils, and 
more important, they brought to the Batavian labor market large numbers 
of itinerant workers and settlers whose actual “value,” of course, cannot be 
expressed in terms of money.








Large junks 2200 rds 3000 rds 3600 rds
Small junks 1680 rds 2800 rds 3000 rds
Source: Zhou Kai, Xiamen zhi (Xiamen: 1832), chap. 7 on taxes, 关赋略·关税科则.
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 Owing to these tariff regulations, which continued until the end of the 
junk trade, hardly any data are available about the quantities or value of the 
commodities imported into and exported from Batavia.11 We find occasional 
references to the quantities of tea that were brought in the ledgers of the 
Voc factory in Canton. The company also enumerated the commodities they 
sold to foreign ships calling at Batavia, including the junks. However, these 
were aggregate lists, and it is impossible to figure out what share of the 
goods was sold to the junks.
Paroles, Paroles, Paroles
Throughout the eighteenth century, a discussion dragged on between com-
pany officials in the Dutch Republic and Batavia about the significance and 
the utility of the Batavian junk trade to the treasury of the company. Nobody 
denied that the Chinese connection was of enormous economic importance 
to the prosperity of the company’s headquarters in Asia, in particular its 
Chinese population, and also Batavia’s trade with its satellite ports in the 
archipelago. The junk trade attracted Bugis and other Indonesian traders and 
fishermen, who collected the bulk of the forest and marine export commodi-
ties for the China market and transported them to Batavia where they could 
barter their wares for Chinese commodities as well as textiles or opium from 
the Indian subcontinent. All this was an asset to the company because most 
of the ceramics and utensils imported into the archipelago by the Chinese 
were of little value to Europeans and came from ports where the latter were 
not admitted.12
 The stockholders of the Voc in the Low Countries nonetheless could not 
help wondering how this trade with Chinese bottoms actually benefited the 
company, which made a great deal of money on the profitable tea trade with 
China. The question of whether it would be preferable to establish a direct 
shipping link between the Netherlands and China without having to involve 
Batavia in these operations was posed over and over again. Throughout the 
seventeenth century, the company had persistently sought openings in the 
direct trade with China and sent Voc ships from Batavia to Guangzhou, Xia-
men, and Fuzhou. The continuous problems regarding the China trade even-
tually became a nightmare for the management, as the company’s executive 
director, Pieter Van Dam, remarked.13 The Gordian knot was cut through in 
the 1690s when the high government at Batavia decided to give up trading 
in China using its own vessels. The transactions there yielded such meager 
profits and were so hindered by the local mandarins that the same ships 
could ply more remunerative routes in the Indian Ocean.14 At the time, this 
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conclusion was natural and sensible because Chinese junks from Xiamen 
were already serving Batavia, which provided Batavia with most of the com-
modities it needed from China.
 To prove the wisdom of his decision, in 1694 Governor-General Willem 
van Outhoorn reported to the Gentlemen XVII in the Netherlands that in that 
year, twenty-one Chinese junks and one Portuguese vessel from Macau had 
sold to the company 108,498 rds of imported merchandise from China but 
had purchased from the company more than double that amount, 230,581 
rds, in export wares. In addition to this, the junk trade yielded 17,665 rds 
in customs fees, poll taxes imposed on the crews while they were in Bata-
via, safe-conduct fees (for the protection of the junks against pirates), and 
so on.15
 The discussion flared up again in the 1720s, when the conditions in 
the China trade had changed considerably for a few reasons. Several years 
earlier, in December 1716, the Yong Zheng emperor had suddenly issued a 
proclamation forbidding any Chinese shipping from sailing to the South-
ern Ocean. Recurrent piracy along the coast and illegal shipments of rice to 
overseas destinations so irritated the Son of Heaven that he ordered an end 
to all relations with Manila and Batavia, “asylums for the Chinese outlaws, 
and headquarters of Chinese pirates.”16 This sudden halt in China’s long-
distance navigation played havoc with the Batavian economy, and although 
the traffic was stealthily resumed, the Dutch authorities drew the lesson that 
in the future such a dependence on the Chinese network had to be avoided 
at all costs. The imperial Haijin, or maritime prohibitions, were not formally 
lifted until 1727, after persistent requests by the Fujianese provincial au-
thorities.
 There was yet another reason why the Gentlemen XVII in the Dutch Re-
public were eager to reconnect with the China market. Facing increasing 
competition in the tea trade from European rivals, they felt a need to estab-
lish a direct shipping link between Europe and China. The Eng lish East India 
Company and the Oostende Company of the Spanish Netherlands were al-
ready sending ships to Canton, where they could select and purchase tea on 
their own terms, whereas the Dutch in Batavia were completely dependent 
on the quality and quantities selected and shipped in Chinese junks.
 J. de Hullu has described in detail how the Dutch China trade with Voc 
ships to Canton was resumed in 1727, showing that between the 1730s and 
1750s this new trade connection did not reap the expected profits owing to 
organizational problems. The ongoing trade in Chinese tea via the Amoy 
junk network to Batavia also remained a formidable competitor.17 Indeed, 
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the Batavian authorities were unhappy with the initiatives taken by the Voc 
management in Holland because they feared that Batavia’s economic posi-
tion would be undermined if the company’s ships began competing with 
the junks and bypassed Batavia. One member of the Council of the Indies 
in particular, Wijbrand Blom, showed himself a vocal advocate of the junk 
trade and a vociferous opponent of the directors’ new policies, which he dis-
missed as nothing less than a nightmare.18 His forebodings turned out to 
be wrong because the Canton-bound ships from Holland continued to call 
at Batavia on the round trip and did not seem to impinge on the activities of 
the junks from Xiamen. The junk traffic continued at the same pace with an 
average of about seventeen junks a year until the year of calamity, 1740, when 
almost all the Chinese living within the walls of Batavia were slaughtered.19 
After an initial slump, the number of annual visits soon picked up and varied 
between five to eight junks a year until the collapse of the company in the 
1790s (see table 2).
 In November 1752, Governor-General Jacob Mossel sent his “Consider-
ations over the Intrinsic State of the Company” to the Gentlemen XVII, in 
which he voiced his concerns about the marked decline in the company’s 
trade within Asia.20 He believed that the company’s establishment in Can-
ton could play an instrumental role in redressing this unfortunate situation, 
because of the enormous profits then being made in the tea trade between 
China and Europe. He conceded that many other European nations were also 
sending ships to Canton, but hastened to add that the position of the Voc 
table 2 number of Junks Visiting Batavia, with Ports of origin, 
per five-year Period
Total Xiamen Ningbo Guangzhou Others
1751–55 37 26 4 6 1
1756–60 39 33 1 5 0
1761–65
1763 missing
34 23 2 9 0
1766–70 33 27 1 5 0
1771–75
1772 missing
21 20 1 0 0
1776–80 25 25 0 0 0
1781–85 33 22 0 11 0
1786–90 52 13 0 11 28
Source: Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC 
Batavia (Leiden: Foris, 1986), 146.
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was much more advantageous than that of its rivals, who did not command 
such an extended intra-Asian trading network as the Dutch. Batavia could 
send local products—tin, pepper, cotton, wax, spices, and other goods—to 
Canton, but their competitors in the China trade who were sending their 
ships directly to Canton from Europe had to pay for Chinese tea with pre-
cious metals.
 In March 1754, the Gentlemen XVII responded to Mossel, whose basic 
arguments they agreed with.21 However, they differed fundamentally with 
his proposals on the China trade. They announced that they envisaged a com-
plete reorganization of the Canton trade. Not only did they believe that many 
of the commodities Mossel proposed to sell in China could be sold in Europe 
as well and perhaps at even better prices, they also complained about the 
company vessels idling on the Batavia roads before they proceeded to China 
or returned to Patria. They pointed out that because Dutch ships called at Ba-
tavia, their European rivals were able to ship their cargoes of the new tea har-
vest much faster to Europe, where they consequently arrived on the market 
in better shape. One year later, the Gentlemen XVII emphatically determined 
that the tea trade should henceforth bypass Batavia. In 1755, they decided to 
assert full control over this domain of trade and set up the “China Commit-
tee,” which from then on was authorized to manage the direct trading link 
between the Netherlands and Canton. By 1757, the high government in Bata-
via had effectively lost its grip on the company’s trade with China.22 This time 
the reforms made an impact on Batavia, the receiving end of the junk trade.
chinese reforms
No less important than the changing attitudes toward the junk trade to Java 
were the sweeping institutional reforms introduced on the Chinese side on 
the lifting of the maritime prohibitions in 1727. It is really against the back-
ground of the Qing imperial court’s new rules about the overseas trade that 
we should look at the developments in junk shipping in the following de-
cades. According to the Qingchao Wenxian tongkao (1747), new regulations 
were introduced that applied to the securities given by the merchants par-
ticipating in a commercial venture, the ownership of the junks, the composi-
tion of the crews, and the enforcement procedures concerning the return of 
those who went abroad. Under the new regulations, there was a considerable 
difference in the duties imposed on the ocean junks leaving from Guang-
zhou and Xiamen. The Cantonese ships were measured according to length 
and beam and subdivided in four categories of size (charters). Junks of the 
first and largest charter had a length of 7.3 zhang and a beam of 2.2 zhang 
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or more. One zhang being approximately 3.3 meters, this meant in effect a 
vessel of 25 meters long by 7 meters wide, measuring about 400 tons. The 
Fujianese vessels were measured likewise by taking different dimensions.
 The Yanghang or “authorized ocean firms” that were introduced as a new 
form of overseas trading guild under the new regulations consisted in effect 
of ya hang, or brokers, whom the authorities provided with brokerage certifi-
cates allowing them to manage the foreign trade. Henceforth the Yanghang 
purchased the cargo of the junk, assessed its total value, paid the export tar-
iffs, and stood surety for the traveling merchants and were held responsible 
for their behavior abroad.23 These Chinese junks also had to pay on their re-
turn to China the usual import taxes on various overseas commodities. These 
taxes are presented in table 3, which describes the taxes in the thirteenth 
year of the Yongzheng reign (1735).24
table 3 import Taxes on overseas commodities
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 Inevitably there was plenty of pilfering by the provincial and military per-
sonnel, who did not care much about the official rules. In 1768, a coastal 
defense commander, Huang Shijian, complained in a report to the throne 
that local officials had extorted from the crews of returning ships 500 to 
several thousand yuan (Mexican dollars). Informed of this matter, the Qian 
Long emperor ordered an investigation. The results were shocking. Accord-
ing to the secretary of the Ministry of Punishments, the Yanghang had to 
bribe local mandarins with gifts like edible birds’ nests, silver, camlets and 
other cloths to a value of no less than 36,900 dollars per year. All echelons 
of the provincial hierarchy from the governor-general all the way down to 




































百斤 二钱 一钱六分 惟暹罗者一钱八分
Source: Zhou Kai, Xiamen zhi (Xiamen: 1832), chap. 7, on taxes, 关赋略·关税科则.
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The economic importance of the Junk Trade
The importance of the junk trade to China’s domestic economy is illustrated 
by the following discussion, which took place at the Chinese imperial court 
in the aftermath of the massacre at Batavia in 1741. The debate focused on the 
issue of whether to continue trading with Batavia or to prohibit it. Among 
the defenders of the trading system, the voice of Qing Fu, the governor of 
Guangxi and Guangdong, was without doubt the most stridently insistent. 
This high-ranking mandarin declared that the promulgation of another over-
seas trading ban should be out of the question. According to him, more 
than one hundred vessels from the southern coastal provinces annually plied 
the waters of the Nanyang, providing 500,000 to 600,000 people in South 
China’s coastal provinces with export and import trade-related jobs. A new 
prohibition would cut off an annual inflow of 10 million taels of silver coins: 
“The resulting situation would render people homeless and cause them to 
wander from place to place, as there would be no food left for thousands of 
persons, because neither would the merchants have merchandise, nor would 
the farmers have produce.”26
 A spectacle similar to the roaring reception of the first Chinese junk to 
reach Singapore or Batavia at the beginning of the wet monsoon could be 
seen elsewhere. The visits of the junks in Southeast Asian port principalities 
were likened to annual fairs, where people from all walks of life came flock-
ing in to gape at the articles displayed, to spend their money, or to steal what 
they could not afford or were unwilling to pay for.
 This was the case in the port of Banjarmasin on the south coast of Bor-
neo, where every January one or sometimes two wangkang (a junk of about 
250 tons) from Amoy would arrive at the mouth of the Barito River. Sixty 
to eighty small prahu towed the junk upriver until it reached the temporary 
abode of the sultan in Tatas. On being informed of the junk’s arrival, the 
sultan would come down from his kraton at Kota Inten with a large troupe 
of two to three thousand followers, including ronggeng dancers, clowns, and 
children in fancy dresses. A great number of prahu decorated with flags and 
pennants carrying princes and princesses in their most beautiful garb would 
also welcome the Chinese junk. Aboard the wangkang, ashore and in the 
Chinese quarter, hundreds of stalls were set up displaying silks, glassware, 
earthenware and iron pans, and sweet delicacies. The local people came in 
flocks to purchase these exotic articles on credit, giving goods and even 
people as securities for their outstanding debts.
 A Dutch commissioner who happened to be visiting Banjarmasin when a 
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junk arrived and tried to maintain some order among the buyers and sellers 
promptly drew the ire of the local ruler.27 In Banjarmasin as well as in Makas-
sar, on the island of Sulawesi, where the ruler of Bone, a staunch ally of the 
Voc, insisted on the yearly visit by a Chinese junk, the local nobility were 
esteemed by their people because of the annual visits of the junks, which at-
tracted many visitors from the surrounding regions.
attempts at Batavian intervention
On various occasions the high government at Batavia tried to discourage or 
even to forbid outright Chinese junks from trading in Banjarmasin, Makas-
sar, and Melaka, but each time it had to relent in the face of local opposi-
tion or because the junk skippers simply chose to risk arrest and stubbornly 
continued to come.
 On 28 January 1746, the Batavian administration forbade navigation to 
Makassar and Banjarmasin, because the Chinese tax farmer of Chinese-cut 
tobacco in Batavia had complained about the “illegal” import to Java via 
these two ports. Nonetheless, on 25 November of the same year, a Chinese 
junk showed up in the Makassar roads feigning distress and actually got 
away with it, so happy was everybody about its unexpected appearance.28 
On 9 July 1754, one Chinese junk was allowed into Makassar (despite a pro-
hibition of 8 May 1753), and one or two sailed to Banjarmasin. In the latter 
case, this was done in order to “cajole” the sultan into cooperation.29 In 1765 
and 1766, the high government again tried to close down the junk trade to 
Malacca and Makassar but Chinese shipping to Makassar was reopened in 
1769 on the insistence of the ruler of Bone. It was not hard to acquiesce to 
the wishes of this ruler, because in retrospect the Batavian Chinese agreed 
that one junk a year to Makassar could hardly make a dent in their own busi-
ness. Many Chinese in Batavia partook in this Makassar venture. The annual 
public auction (in Batavia) of the pass allowing the navigation from Amoy 
to Makassar and vice versa actually contributed a hefty sum of money to the 
company treasury.30
 Probably the most enlightening policy statement on the junk trade and 
the limited power of the company to curtail it was that of 9 April 1778, when 
Governor-General Reinier de Klerck and the Council of the Indies spoke 
their minds about the navigation and trade of Chinese junks in the archi-
pelago. Only in those regions where the company reigned as heer en meester 
could it afford to prohibit this navigation. Elsewhere, in places like Treng-
ganu, Patani, Sangora (Sonkhla), or even Johor, where Chinese junks used 
to sail to purchase pepper, the company simply could not prohibit such 
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trade. Of course, it was suggested the sultan of Banjarmasin be bought off 
by promising him 2,000–3,000 rds a year if he would surrender his rights to 
the visits by junks from China, but the latter had no intention of doing so.
 The evidence produced by Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland on the 
importance of the junk trade to the local economy of South Sulawesi, and 
the fascinating monograph by Jim Warren on the links between the Chinese 
junk trade and the prosperity of the Sulu sultanate at the end of the eigh-
teenth century, leave no doubt about the relative importance of the visits of 
the junk vessels to Southeast Asian regional economies.31
 The selling of commodities and the purchase of tropical products from 
the hinterland of course required resident Chinese all over Southeast Asia, 
but the Chinese junk trade also connected with other circuits of trade and 
shipping such as the Bugis network, in which the Chinese themselves played 
little or no direct role. Using information about shipping movements de-
rived from harbormasters’ registrations, Gerrit Knaap has cogently illus-
trated this aspect in his study on the Pasisir trade of Java, Shallow Waters, 
Rising Tide. He discerns a three-level hierarchy, with Batavia serving as the 
international emporium. Pasisir ports like Surabaya, Gresik, Semarang, and 
Cirebon functioned as small emporia linking Java to other islands in the Java 
Sea, and finally Banten, Tegal, Jepara figured as gateways to the production 
centers of agricultural products in the hinterland. Knaap makes the point 
that the flourishing economy of Java’s northeast coast produced a marked 
increase in coastal shipping. This Voc “granary” and “timber yard” under-
went considerable growth after coming under company control in 1755, and 
it contributed a great deal to the growing importance of Batavia as the hub 
of local shipping networks.32 Knaap’s optimistic assessment, however, does 
not tally well with the pessimistic opinions of contemporary Batavian au-
thorities, who, without exception, spoke about the rapid decline of Batavia 
as a trade emporium.33
 Even if the attempts of the Voc to concentrate in Batavia the Chinese junk 
trade serving Java were quite effective, there was no way in which the com-
pany could deal with junks sailing to Malay ports that fell outside its control. 
When increasing numbers of junks started to sail to previously peripheral 
ports like Pahang, Johor, Siak, Riau, and Trengganu, the Dutch could do 
little but watch control of the Chinese trade in the archipelago slip out of 
their hands. Haphazard measures were the result: the easily policed Melaka 
Straits were temporarily closed to junks, a move that drew justifiable pro-
tests from the Chinese community in Melaka itself, which now saw all trade 
go to neighboring Johor and the Riau archipelago.
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 A few general remarks about the shifting balance of trade at the end of the 
eighteenth century seem necessary here. It is easy for a contemporary his-
torian to throw out observations on “increasing numbers” of junks, “flour-
ishing and declining” economies, the “rise of the country trade,” the “ex-
pansion of the Bugis and Iranun networks,” and so forth, as though we are 
dealing with developments that were plainly visible and clear to contempo-
rary observers when they occurred. The contrary is true, however. These were 
all phenomena that occurred over a period of several decades, and although 
they were indeed noted with alarm when they became apparent, the causes 
remained very difficult to point out, insofar as it makes sense to speak about 
“causes” in history.
 Anyone who has lived through the last few decades, when we are much 
better informed about global economic developments, will agree that even 
nowadays it is very difficult to develop farsighted policies within the con-
straints of the sociopolitical environment in which we are living. It was no 
different in the eighteenth century for the directors of the Voc or the high 
government in Batavia, who had to guarantee a continuous flow of goods 
from a complex and diffuse network in Monsoon Asia to Europe. In that 
context, the decision in 1755 of the Gentlemen XVII to reform the tea trade 
with China and the establishment of the largely autonomous “China Com-
mittee” should be seen as a dramatic step, and one they knew would deal a 
heavy blow to the prosperity of Batavia.
The Trading figures of 1750–1759
Once the die was cast, the directors tried to find out how the direct shipping 
link between Canton and Holland might affect the imports and exports of 
the Chinese junk trade to Batavia.34 Thanks to that question, we have a rare 
glimpse behind the scenes. At the request of his superiors, the shahbandar 
of Batavia, Christiaan Elsevier, drew up a list of all Chinese shipping to and 
from Batavia in the years 1750–1759.35 In his report Elsevier regretted that he 
was unable to give detailed information about imports because of the regu-
lation of 22 September 1752, which stipulated that incoming junks only had 
to pay redemption fees. On the other hand, he was able to provide data on 
the ships, their size, the names of the nachodas, and the cargoes they ex-
ported from Batavia to three different destinations in China, not forgetting 
the number of passengers they carried. However, the data on the passenger 
traffic were totally false and unreliable.
 What does table 4 tell us? Between 1750 and 1759, some forty junks 
visited Batavia one or more times. A few came quite frequently: Thaij Assien 
table 4 accounted for in Rijksdaalders (rds) and Stuivers (st)
1750 13 junks
10 fr oM eijMUij  (XiaMen)
Name of the junk Name of nachoda







Oijee Sientjioen Po Pieko
Jonghien Que Ti Ecko
Gansoen Que Quanko
10 junks, cargoes unknown, each junk 100 last
[1 last is approx. 1,500kg], people on board 3,066 men,
each junk paying in import and export levies
2,200 rijksdaalders: in total rds 22,000
3,066 men pay 12 stuivers each: in total rds 766:24
(Taxes in) total rds 22,766:24




3 junks, each junk 100 last, crew 548 men, 3,000 rds 9,000
548 men pay 12 st. each rds 137
total rds 9,137
1751 8 junks
5 fr oM XiaMen
Soehoengoan Kan Engko
Hok Eeng Swa Ki-Ecko
Khidie Lim Phouwko
Ouwpo Que ti Ecko
Cai-asien Que Maseeng
3 junks, each junk 110 last, 2,200 rds each rds 6,600
2 junks, each junk 60 last, 1680 rds each rds 3,360
1,913 men 12 st each rds 478: 12
total rds 10,438: 12
table 4 continued
1751 8 junks (continued)
2 fr oM gUangzhoU
Inaangtijauw Kinjoeko
Kenwantjouw Ang Siequa
2 junks of 80 last 2,800 rds each rds 5,600
329 men 12 st each aboard rds 82: 12
total rds 5,682: 12
1  fr oM niMPho (ningB o)
Japoentjouw Tyan Tjiecko
1 junk, 100 last, 3,600 rds rds 3,600
166 men rds 31: 24
total rds 3,631: 24
1752 8 junks and 1 brigantin
4 fr oM XiaMen
Tay Assies Aque Kanko
Opho Kouw Kouw Heijonko
Hock Eng Lim Phoko
Toea Sieeng Ong Eng Sioeng
4 junks, each junk 100 last, 2,200 rds rds 8,800
793 men rds 198: 12
total rds 8,998: 12
3 fr oM gUangzhoU
Sun Thaij Eauw Jak
Tian Tjoen Tjoa Pinko
Koe Kieauw Kung Tjoequa
3 junks, each junk 100 last, 3,000 rds rds 9,000
631 men rds 157: 36
total rds 9,157: 36
1  fr oM ningB o
Soenghap Tan Tyapko
1 junk 80 last rds 3,000
101 men rds 25: 12
total rds 3,025: 12
table 4 continued
1752 8 junks and 1 brigantin (continued)
1  fr oM TonQUin (TonKin)
Brigantin De Hoop Lieutenant Chinese Tan Wanseeng of Batavia
Ship arrived new and empty from Java, and paid export duties on:
50 piculs powdered sugar à 12 st rds 12,24
40 piculs candy sugar à 24 st rds 20
Pass and seal money rds 20
total rds 52:24
1753 7 junks and 1 brigantin
6 fr oM XiaMen
Kede Kau Hijongko




Ton Sonhie Tan Tjenkyko
6 junks, each junk 100 last rds 13,200
1,513 men rds 378: 12
total rds 13,576: 12
1  fr oM ningB o
Consie Tan Siqua
1 junk, 80 last rds 3,000
110 men rds 27: 24
total rds 3,027: 24
1  fr oM TonKin
Brigantin De Hoop Lieutenant Chinese Tan Wanseeng of Batavia
Paid import fees on commodities from Tonkin
50,000 salted eggs
20,000 porcelain bowls
1,000 nests of lacquered boxes
100 iron pans
In total 16000 rixdollars import taxes at rate of 6/100 rds 960
Export taxes on 50 piculs candy sugar à 24 stuiver per picul rds 25
Pass and seal money rds 20
total rds 45
table 4 continued
1754 6 junks and 1 brigantin
5 fr oM XiaMen
Tona Kientsien Lim Houko
Opo Kouw Himgko ?
Kiedje Que Ti Etko
Soehoengoan Lim Timko
Taij Assien Lim Oeijko
Hapsoen Que Kanko
5 junks, each junk 100 last, a 2,200 rds rds 11,000
1 junk, 60 last, 1680 rds rds 1,680
80 coyang export rice à 2 rds rds 160
1,781 men rds 445: 12
rotal rds 13,285: 12
1  fr oM ningB o
Souw Haptjauw Ang Pacqua
1 junk, 100 last rds 3,600
147 men rds 36: 36
total rds 3,636: 36
1  BriganTin fr oM 1754 TonKin
Brigantin De Hoop Lieutenant Chinese Tan Wanseeng of Batavia
Bringing from Tonkin
1,000 pieces lacquered boxes
3,000 bowls
300 piculs tin
300 pots with salted eggs
10 pieces of cloth
In total 22,500 rds taxed at 6/100 in total rds 1,350
1755 6 junks and 1 chaloupe
6 fr oM XiaMen
Thee Kienhien Ong Pacqua
Thoa Hongoan Kan Hinko
Taij Assan Lim Hoeijko
Tjaij Thien Tan Tijellon
Kioe Giet Kanko
Hoopho Kouw Hiongko
6 junks, each junk, 100 last rds 13,200
3,916 men rds 979
total rds 14,179
table 4 continued
1755 6 junks and 1 chaloupe (continued)
1  fr oM TonKin
Chaloupe Catharina Lieutenant Chinese Tan Wanseeng
 (150 last)  of Batavia
Paid export duties on:
150 piculs powder sugar à 12 st per picul rds 37: 24
80 piculs candy sugar à 24 st per picul rds 40
Pass and seal rds 20
total rds 97: 24
1756 5 junks
5 fr oM XiaMen
Tan Tyeeko Thoa Ongoan
Thoa Kienghien Lim Phouko
Khiedie Que Kanko
Soen Hoengoan Lim Oeijko
Taij Assien Que Kienhien
5 junks, each junk 100 last rds 11,000
2,399 men rds 599: 36
total rds 11,599: 36
1757 9 junks
7 fr oM XiaMen
Kiem Tjikseeng Lim Pouko
Tjoa Hoengam Lim Koenko
Teassen Lim Panko
Khiedie Que Tynhoen
Tan Tjapsoen Que Lanijong
Sie Tjongsiem Tsoa Teenko
Siang Losien Lim Oeijko
7 junks, each junk 100 last rds 15,400
2,671 men rds 667: 36
Total rds 16,067: 36
690 piculs of powdered sugar à 12 st rds 172: 24
1  fr oM gUangzhoU
Kim Kaijtijon Ong Katko
1 junk of 100 last rds 3,000
151 men rds 37:36
100 piculs powdered sugar rds 25
total rds 3,062: 36
table 4 continued
1757 9 junks (continued)
1  fr oM ningB o
Samphan The Binko
1 junk of 100 last rds 3,600
99 men rds 24:36
total rds 3,624:36
1758 10 junks
5 fr oM XiaMen
Kiem Tijikseeng Tan Tyecko
Teekseng Tjauw Lie Trjongko
Tay Assien Liem Oeijko
Soen Hongoan Ong Tijamko
Tjoa Kinhing Lim Koenko
Khiedie Que Ganglong
6 junks, each junk 100 last rds 13,200
3764 men rds 941
1,350 piculs powder sugar a 12 st rds 337: 24
total rds 14,478: 24
3 fr oM gUangzhoU
Toa Soenie The Ingko
Ojoe Poen Tyauw Tyong Koko
Soey Hiena Lim Houko
3 junks, each junk 100 last, 3,000 rds 9,000
373 men rds 93: 12
500 piculs powder sugar a 12 st per picul rds 125
20 coijang rice a 2 rds per picul rds 40
total rds 9,278: 12
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visited eight times; Khidie, seven times; Soen Hongoan, six times; Thoa Hongoan 
and Tjoa Kinhing, three times; others only once. Fifty-one different nacho-
das sailed on these ships; one person, Liem Oeijko, sailed quite frequently 
(seven times), the rest at most twice, but generally only once. This is a strik-
ing observation. Some persons may have sailed along the Batavia corridor as 
private merchants before they served as a nachoda, but even then it is notice-
able that they were not necessarily appointed to this responsible position 
based on their prior experience of Batavia.
 The size of the junks was very similar. They were all middle-sized wang-
kang, measuring about 200 tons. The tonnage of the junks increased dra-
matically around the turn of the century, when the number of junks declined 
and the Batavia administration, instead of curtailing large numbers of immi-
grants as it had done in the past, actually encouraged the Yanghang to bring 
more people. This is borne out by the fact that junks were then built with two 
decks, making it possible to transport more people. In addition to a crew 
of 250 persons, these two-deckers were allowed to bring 500 passengers.36 
table 4 continued
1759 8 junks
6 fr oM XiaMen
Toa Kienghiem Tijan Tjoeko
Thoa Hongoan Lim Kamko
Kinghiam Soa Tjetko
Khidie Que Ganglong
The Singtyauw Que Tayko
Thaij Assien Lim Koenko
6 junks, each junk 100 last rds 13,200
1,145 men rds 286: 12
total rds 13,486: 12
2 fr oM gUangzhoU
Soenian Lie Thehoe
Souhin Jauw Lim Hoanko
2 junks, each junk 100 last rds 6,000
421 men rds 105: 12
total rds 6,105: 12
SOMMA rds 200,904: 12
Source: Voc 4387, Batavia, 15 August 1760.
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Because the pre-emption fees due on arrival remained unchanged, it made 
sense to build bigger ships once a large number of passengers was allowed.
People on Board
The numbers of people on board noted in table 2, which are based on the 
data provided by Elsevier, are unreliable. This came to light in 1760, when it 
was discovered that traders were smuggling people. According to the offi-
cial data, eight junks were supposed to have brought 1,527 people, but one 
ship that had reported 220 crew members was found to have carried 700 
persons.37 In the following year, four junks were supposed to have brought 
1,509 persons, but the junk Soe Ongoan, a frequent visitor to Batavia, was 
rumored to have carried between 600 and 700 men instead of the 425 pas-
sengers it had reported. According to the regulations it was not supposed to 
carry more than 110 crew members.
 When large fines were imposed, the Chinese supercargoes complained 
that they dared not face the shipowners in Xiamen. Their argument is inter-
esting because it explains how the shipping network was run. These super-
cargoes pleaded that they were newcomers, which, given the above data, 
is quite probable. They also confessed that their superiors had forced them 
to transport a multitude of passengers under the express condition that all 
these people would return to China with the same junk. They asserted that 
the transportation of passengers was a very lucrative business, especially 
when trading transactions were less profitable owing to the arrival of too 
many junks in town.
 The Chinese officers of the Council of Batavia, the Kong Koan, who were 
responsible for enumerating the newcomers and for the distribution of per-
mits to those who wished to remain in Batavia, added that every Chinese 
merchant needed to be accompanied on his voyage by at least two assis-
tants. If these traders were not allowed to bring the necessary personnel, 
they would back out of the voyage and refuse to load their wares, with disas-
trous results for the shipowners, who would be unable to load their vessels 
fully.
 They also described another interesting feature of the junk trade. Sailing 
south along the Chinese coast, the junk was continually boarded by people 
from the port towns who sought either to deliver letters or to take them per-
sonally to Batavia. These letter carriers actually made a living from this long-
distance commute. Anybody who has ridden long-distance buses in China 
will immediately recognize a system of delivery that is still practiced nowa-
days.
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 The outcome of the discussions with the nachodas and the Chinese offi-
cers was that henceforth the junks were allowed to carry more passengers 
in addition to their already enormous crews: 200 passengers instead of 140 
passengers for smaller junks, and 250 instead of 160 for larger junks.
commodities
Apart from certain goods such as tin, cloves, and pepper, which the Chinese 
supercargoes had to purchase from the company itself, all the other com-
modities were products destined for the China market that could not pos-
sibly have found any customers in Europe. In other words, the Chinese junk 
trade generally tapped different sources than the Voc. Also notable is that 
each of the markets of Canton (Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Ningbo, and 
Tonkin sought its own particular products. The goods shipped to Canton 
were used partly as payment for cargoes of tea and porcelain or for pack-
aging purposes (rattan). The primary demand in Amoy was for commodities 
used for local consumption. How the various commodities were consumed 
in China still awaits further analysis.
 Not included in shahbandar Elsevier’s lists are the doubtless sizeable 
sums of silver money that overseas sojourners sent as remittances to family 
and business relations at home. Thanks to the Batavian Chinese population’s 
resistance to the colonial authorities’ attempts to stem this outflow when-
ever the urban economy ran short of cash, we know that this money was sent 
in small bags and letters often amounting in total to no less than 50,000 
rds.38 The governor-general and council of the Indies agreed that the dis-
patching of remittances was “an old custom” on which many thousands of 
people in China depended. Nevertheless, in 1798, when the treasury really 
threatened to become totally depleted, the export of silver dollars to China 
was limited to 20,000 rds.
 The figures in table 5 show the composition of the cargoes that the Chi-
nese junks carried home. Almost everything had been brought to Batavia 
by Voc ships or native and Chinese shipping from all quarters of the Indo-
nesian archipelago.
decline
After the 1750s, the junk trade gradually declined. By the end of the 1770s, 
the Batavian authorities became thoroughly worried about the prospects of 
the junk trade “which in the past was very considerable [in size] but now has 
gone into steep decline to the detriment of the local inhabitants.” They again 
J u n kS To JaVa 24 7
ordered the Chinese navigation to Melaka to be halted and wrote about this 
to the Yanghang in Amoy, requesting that junks should no longer be sent to 
the Melaka Straits, but directly to Batavia. The answer they received was tell-
ing. The Chinese shipping guilds wrote that, although it was a big blow for 
them to be shut out of Melaka, they were willing to accept that situation. 
But they made it clear that they could not afford to stay away from neighbor-
ing Johor on the Malay Peninsula. If forced to do so, they would have to give 
up their shipping enterprise itself for the simple reason that it was the only 
place where they could find all the timber necessary for repairing their junks 
and for making new rudders and masts. That was, of course, only part of the 
story. The navigation to Johor and other ports near the straits had fundamen-
tally changed the flow of Chinese trade.39
 Chinese tobacco and many other wares from China were now transported 
straight to Johor and from here distributed all over the archipelago, even to 
places as far away as the east coast of Java, thereby undermining the Voc tar-
iff system. As Batavia lost its position as the terminus of Chinese trade to the 
free ports on the Malay Peninsula, the Batavia Chinese sought other lines of 
work and moved out of town into the hinterland. This trend was observed 
by Councillor of the Indies Isaac Titsingh in an address he handed over to 
the governor-general and his fellow councillors on 24 September 1793. He 
claimed that the decline in the economy due to the virtual disappearance of 
the junk trade afflicted all business in town and forced Chinese inhabitants, 
who had previously made a living from the trade with China, to close their 
doors and move out into the countryside to start a new life there.40
conclusion
Having begun with an idyllic ride aboard the junk of a Vietnamese mandarin, 
let us now end with the last trip of the Tek Sing, which ended in a tragic dis-
aster.
 In the early morning of 14 January 1822, as the ebb tide started to flow 
out of the bay of Amoy, the nachoda Io Tau Ko ordered the heavy ironwood 
anchors of the gigantic two-deck junk Tek Sing (True Star) to be raised. A few 
hours later this majestic vessel of more than a thousand tons could be seen 
sailing past Da Dan island with all its sails set, heading for the sea.41 In all 
respects, this promised to be another swift voyage along the western ocean 
route, a trip that this same ship had made five years in a row to Batavia, “calm 
and smooth like overland.” The junk was well ballasted with a load of tomb-
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lain down the holds. Porcelain was an ideal cargo in the age of sail because, 
stowed below, not only did its weight serve as ballast, but it was also a com-
modity that did not smell. Therefore, it was safe to stow a load of tea on top 
of it, and on top of that the usual array of trinkets needed for Batavia’s local 
community: writing paper, ink, umbrellas, axe heads, iron pans, and other 
miscellaneous items.
 The Tek Sing was extraordinarily large, a sea castle towering high above 
the waves. No doubt the crew and passengers on board felt safe on such a 
ship. Its high bulwarks provided a fine defense against pirates. In addition 
to the normal crew of about 400 sailors and merchants traveling with their 
wares, no less than 1,600 passengers were aboard this vessel, which must 
have looked like a floating stadium, as most of the passengers slept on deck, 
save those who had secured a bunk in the reed-matted cabins high on the 
poop of the ship. One reason why there were so many people aboard was that 
it was by now the only junk sailing from Xiamen for Batavia.
 After passing the Riau archipelago, instead of heading straight for the 
Bangka Straits, Io Tau Ko decided to pass through the less well-known and 
still uncharted thoroughfare between Bangka and the island of Billiton, the 
so-called Selat Gelasa or Gaspar Straits. There disaster struck: on the eve-
ning of 5 February, the Tek Sing hit a shoal and sank almost immediately. An 
Eng lish merchantman, the Indiana, which happened to be sailing nearby, 
managed to save about a hundred survivors drifting on wooden rafts and 
other floatable materials. More people perished in this disaster in tropical 
waters than died after the Titanic hit an iceberg, in 1912.
 In April 1999, Captain Mike Hatcher, the diver who made a fortune from 
his discovery of the porcelain-filled Voc East Indiaman Geldermalsen, dis-
covered the wreckage of the Tek Sing near the Belvidere Reef north of Selat 
Gelasa, while looking for another Dutch ship. In the following months, he 
was able to salvage some 350,000 pieces of porcelain and earthenware from 
the sea bottom.42
 The wreck of the Tek Sing closed the book on a long era of sea transport in 
which Batavia was served by the large Yanghang junks. Smaller junks con-
tinued to sail in the years that followed, but they were completely replaced 
by square-riggers after the opium war, when the southeastern Chinese ports 
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Chinese books and printing in  
the early spanish philippines
Lucille Chia
By the mid-seventeenth century, the first sizeable Chinese diaspora had re-
sulted in settlements throughout Southeast Asia, some with inhabitants in 
the thousands. The most dramatic growth occurred in the Spanish Philip-
pines, chiefly around Manila, where the number of Chinese (known there 
as Sangleyes) increased from perhaps 100 just before the Spanish established 
control to approximately 20,000 by 1603. The figure never dropped below a 
few thousand, even after the largest expulsion in the 1760s. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the number of Chinese immigrants peaked at 
about 100,000 in the 1880s and 1890s.1 Trade and the search for a better liveli-
hood motivated the sojourners and settlers, nearly all of whom came from 
southeast China, specifically the coastal area of southern Fujian  (Minnan).
 The arrival of both humans and goods led to the introduction of many ele-
ments of Chinese culture into Southeast Asia: religious practices, foodways, 
languages, architecture, performing arts, as well as a variety of social orga-
nizations and practices. What is striking is that so little of Chinese culture 
was introduced through print. Indeed, of the myriad commodities carried by 
Chinese junks in the Nanyang trade, books may have been the one item that 
was largely missing. Moreover, except briefly between about 1593–1607 in 
the early Spanish Philippines, books in Chinese were not printed in South-
east Asia until the early nineteenth century. Reasons for this centuries-long 
lacuna include the generally low educational level of the Chinese sojourners 
and settlers in the Nanyang, whose motives for going overseas, in any case, 
had little to do with books, and the restrictions imposed on them by the dif-
ferent regions’ ruling powers, both indigenous and European. Such a void 
meant not that Chinese literary culture did not spread at all to Southeast Asia 
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in the early modern period, but that we cannot attribute the dissemination 
mainly or directly to the Chinese who went to the Nanyang.
 This essay explores such issues by looking at the anomalous phenomenon 
of book-printing and the availability of Chinese books in the early Spanish 
Philippines—topics whose treatment by previous scholars has suggested 
some of the questions posed here. For example, how might Chinese books 
and the way they were printed have changed as a result of encounters with 
Western religious, linguistic, and bibliographic ideas? In addition, could 
there have been an overseas market for books printed in China? Because 
the sources are few and not very forthcoming, my answers remain neces-
sarily speculative, but they should help us to appreciate the complexities of 
the circumstances that allow books and book culture to be exportable com-
modities, and to think of ways to study these questions in greater detail in 
the future.2
chinese Books in the early Spanish Philippines
About a year after arriving in the Philippines in 1588, Juan Cobo, the Domi-
nican missionary, remarked in a letter that most of the Chinese in the Phil-
ippines were literate. Supposedly, out of a thousand of these Sangleyes, only 
ten did not know many Chinese characters, in contrast to the peasants in his 
native Castile, where literacy rates were far lower.3 As one of four Domini-
can friars assigned to minister to the Chinese, Cobo made a serious effort 
to learn Chinese; at one point, he was reputed to have mastered some 3,000 
characters. Like so many other early Spanish missionaries, Cobo saw his 
missionary work among the Chinese in the Philippines as preparation for 
the much greater goal of converting China. Thus, in addition to learning the 
language, he also collected Chinese books and tried to translate books from 
Chinese into Castilian or the other way around.4
 Of Cobo’s own works, two are extant: a Confucian anthology that he 
translated into Castilian, and a book that he wrote in Chinese.5 The latter, 
entitled Xinke sengshi Gaomu Xian zhuan Wuji tianzhu zhengjiao zhenchuan shilu 新
刻僧師嗃呣羡撰無極天主正教真傳實錄 [A printed edition of the Veritable 
record of the authentic tradition of the true faith in the Infinite God, by the 
religious master Gao Muxian (Juan Cobo)] (henceforth Shilu), was one of 
the first two books blockprinted (i.e., using xylography) in the Philippines 
in 1593.6 Cobo’s remark about the literacy of the Sangleyes was most likely 
a great exaggeration, but his impression may have spurred his own literary 
efforts as part of his missionary activities.
 The publication date of Cobo’s Shilu indicates that he had been learning 
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Chinese—certainly the southern Fujian dialect, or Minnanese, in order to 
minister to his Chinese parishioners—for about four years when he wrote 
this work.7 Since it is in classical Chinese, however, Cobo almost certainly 
could not have written it without a great deal of help from educated Chinese, 
most probably the interpreters assigned to work with the Dominicans.
 Cobo’s Shilu largely resembles in appearance books produced in China at 
that time: the blockframe surrounding the text, the ruled columns, and the 
arrangement of four of the illustrations above the text on the page (fig. 1)—
not at all surprising, given Cobo’s examination of books from China, and 
that the text was written by a Chinese scribe and the blocks engraved by 
Chinese carvers.8 Several features do depart, however, from the usual Chi-
nese imprints: most significant are that the text is printed on both sides of 
the sheet and that the work has several fold-out sheets containing diagrams 
demonstrating Western ideas of geography and astronomy.9 This would have 
been an innovation among Chinese books, in which there were illustrations, 
diagrams, and tables spread over an entire leaf. But since each leaf was often 
folded in half, the image had to be viewed either in two parts by turning the 
page or as the facing sides of two consecutive leaves. Such a modification 
figure 1 Xinke sengshi Gao 
Muxian zhuan Wuji tianzhu  
zhengjiao zhenzhuan shilu 
新刻僧師嗃呣羡撰無極天主
正教真傳實錄, by Juan cobo. 
illustration from the eighth 
zhang 章 (“how animals know 
what they should eat and drink”) 
showing a crab using a stone to 
keep open the shell of an oyster.  
convento de San gabriel, 
manila, 1593. Source: Biblioteca 
nacional (madrid), R/33.396.
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may seem trivial, but has great implications for clarifying and thus further 
empowering the presentation of information through images.
 Certainly much effort was put into the production of Cobo’s Shilu, but for 
whom was it meant? In his postface, Cobo said that he edited several chap-
ters and had them engraved on blocks to disseminate them for those joining 
the faith to study deeply the meaning of this book [. . . 校正數章梓以廣傳
為冀從教者深習此書之旨]. His phrase guangchuan 廣傳 is found in numer-
ous prefaces of Chinese imprints and claims that a book was being printed 
to disseminate it. But since the work was written in classical Chinese, few 
of the Chinese in the Philippines—even those who knew many characters—
would have been able to understand much of it, not only because they lacked 
the necessary education, but also because nearly all of them spoke exclu-
sively Minnanese. Perhaps his fellow missionaries who knew some Chinese 
could have read it to improve their language skills, but they would also have 
been primarily concerned with mastering spoken Minnanese to minister to 
their parishioners. Finally, the price of the book was officially set at four 
reales, making it a rather expensive item, as Governor Dasmariñas admitted, 
and probably not something that many Chinese, even catechumens, would 
have bought. As a rough comparison, four reales would have bought four 
arrobas (about sixteen gallons or sixty litres) of palm wine, or one buffalo, 
or twelve hens, or thirty fine porcelain dishes.10
 Without rejecting Cobo’s expressed purpose for publishing the work, 
however, one can also argue that the Shilu was written to show what the 
Dominicans were capable of in their task of converting the Chinese. Thus, 
although Cobo wrote that he did not presume to compare his Chinese to that 
of other Frankish priests, he probably did want to demonstrate his progress 
in the language. The “Frankish” priest that he almost certainly had in mind 
was the Jesuit Michele Ruggieri, who had already published his Tianzhu shilu 
天主實錄 in China in 1584.11 In addition, as van der Loon argues, when the 
governor of the Philippines sent to the Spanish court in 1593 a catechism in 
Castilian and Tagalog and another in Chinese, the latter was most probably 
Cobo’s Shilu, rather than a later work. There may not have been very many 
copies of the Shilu printed if its chief purpose was to show off the Domini-
cans’ achievement rather than to be distributed broadly to potential con-
verts. It may also explain why another Dominican, Diego de Nieva, could 
already in 1605 mistakenly claim that his own book was the first to be printed 
in Chinese in the Philippines.
 As for the Mingxin baojian, which Cobo and his Chinese assistants trans-
lated into Castilian, it was apparently never printed. However, how the origi-
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nal Chinese work came to the Philippines tells us something about the book 
trade in Fujian and its likely market in Manila. One late Ming edition of the 
work lists (quite possibly fictitiously) Li Tingji 李廷機 ( js 1583, d. 1616) as the 
collator.12 Li was a native of Jinjiang in southern Fujian who had placed first 
in the provincial and metropolitan examinations and second in the palace 
examination of 1583, and he became a grand secretary in the early seven-
teenth century. Because of his high status, his spectacular success in the 
government examinations, and his Fujian origin, Li has been credited as the 
compiler or annotator of many Fujian commercial editions of examination 
essays, commentaries to the classics, and collections of sayings culled from 
the classics. One in the last class of works was the Mingxin baojian, which had 
been reprinted several times and was highly popular in Fujian. As a collec-
tion of short passages from Confucian works rather than a scholarly work 
replete with lengthy commentaries, it appealed widely to readers other than 
the highly educated, such as merchants and tradesmen, and was brought 
over to the Philippines, where it attracted Cobo’s attention. Indeed, some 
sixty years later, another Dominican, Domingo Navarrete, made his own 
translation of this same work, the first he had read on arriving in China.13
 Cobo’s Shilu and another work, the Doctrina christiana in Castilian, in Taga-
log in the native baybayin script, and in romanized Tagalog, were printed in 
1593 by the Dominicans in their monastery of San Gabriel, making them the 
first publications in the Philippines.14 The latter (fig. 2) was not a surprising 
choice, since doctrinas were the first work printed in several parts of Span-
ish colonial America, including the 1539 edition in Castilian and Nahuatl in 
Mexico City. The Philippine edition, however, was unique in that it was an en-
tirely blockprinted book, showing that xylography was technologically ade-
quate for printing in three very different scripts. Nevertheless, perhaps the 
technical challenges of engraving a polyglot text meant both longer produc-
tion times and greater labor costs than finishing a blockprinted book in one 
script. Hence economic considerations may well have figured in the switch 
to movable-type printing. Evidence from slightly later imprints shows that 
while a few more works were blockprinted in Chinese and Tagalog, no more 
were thus produced in Western languages. Books in Castilian, Latin, as well 
as later ones in Tagalog and other Filipino languages were printed in mov-
able type beginning around 1604.
 One of the remaining blockprinted books in Chinese, a Doctrina christiana 
en letra y lengua china (fig. 3), was printed c. 1605 by a Chinese, Keng Yong, in 
the Parián, the Chinese quarter just outside of Manila.15 On the title page, 
which is in Castilian, the authorship of the work is attributed to the Domini-
figure 3 Doctrina christiana en letra y lengua china. Published by keng yong in the Parián, manila, 
c. 1605. Source: Vatican library, riserva, V, 73.
figure 2 Doctrina Christiana, en lengua española y tagala, corregida por los Religiosos de las ordenes 
Impressa con licencia, en S. Gabriel, de la orden de S. Domingo en Manila, 1593. Pages showing the 
text of the lord’s Prayer in castilian, Tagalog romanization, and then Tagalog baybayin script (last  
two lines of page on the right). Source: library of congress lessing J. rosenwald collection.
3b Part of the hail mary and part of the 
apostles’ creed. each prayer ends with phrase  
“yamin Shixi” (amen, Jesus), which also serves  
to separate the texts.
3a Title page.
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cans ministering to the Sangleyes, although again, the Chinese interpreters 
working with the Spanish missionaries were probably responsible for much 
of the actual translation. Moreover, unlike Cobo’s Shilu, the text was clearly 
composed for Minnanese readers and listeners. The physical appearance of 
the imprint, as well as the notable difference in language styles between the 
first and second parts of the work, suggest that this was a commercial pub-
lication by a printer aware of the potential of a book market in Manila and 
who was not associated with, or at least not supervised by, the missionar-
ies.16 Indeed, this potential market was not limited to the Sangley residents 
in the Philippines but included the hundreds or thousands of Chinese who 
annually came on the junks and returned to China.17 We do not have a price 
for the Chinese Doctrina, but being smaller in size than Cobo’s Shilu, con-
taining about only half as many leaves, and lacking illustrations, it probably 
was a cheaper book, probably even cheaper than the Doctrina in Castilian and 
Tagalog that had about the same number of leaves and sold for two reales.
 Despite the success of these early xylographic imprints, the Spanish mis-
sionaries seemed uncomfortable with blockprinting for Western and Fili-
pino languages and were anxious to perfect movable-type printing, which 
they considered to be the proper technology. Around 1604, another Domi-
nican friar, Francisco Blancas de San José, had printed, using movable type, 
his Libro de las quatro postrimerías del hombre en lengua tagala y letra española [Book 
on the last four years of man’s life, in Tagalog in roman letters]. In his dedi-
cation, Blancas wrote,
We now have in these our islands complete and perfect printing for a 
more perfect fulfilment of our ministry. For we shall now be able, not only 
verbally by preaching but also in writing, to teach these our brothers, and 
write for them, either in Spanish characters for those who know how to 
read them, or in their own Tagalog script, everything which will seem to 
us to further the progress of this mercy which the Lord has done to them 
in making them Christians. I have prepared other works before this one 
. . . but the new craftsman has not dared begin his business except with 
this smaller work.
Blancas, after learning Tagalog in order to preach and write religious works 
in that language, had found a Chinese Christian named Juan de Vera (“the 
new craftsman”) to produce the movable type. And if the descriptions in 
the two Dominican histories are reliable, then Juan de Vera practically “re-
invented” the technique, cutting the punches, striking the metal matrices, 
and casting the metal type. In his admiring account, Diego de Aduarte wrote,
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Since there was no printing in these islands, and no one who understood 
it or who took it up as a trade, he [Blancas] planned to have the printing 
done by means of a Chinese, a good Christian, who, seeing that the books 
of Father Fray Francisco were sure to be of great use, bestowed so much 
care upon this undertaking that he finally (aided by some who told him 
some details they knew) achieved everything necessary to do the printing; 
and he printed these books.
Indeed, there is no historical evidence that any equipment or craftsmen for 
movable-type printing technology were brought over from Spain, the Ameri-
cas, or even Macau. The Jesuits, who began movable-type printing in Goa 
in 1556, in Macau in 1588, and in Japan around 1590, apparently did not ex-
pend any effort on such activities in the Philippines until 1610 at the earliest. 
Nevertheless, Juan de Vera could not have developed his types in a vacuum, 
and it may be that he and his workmen learned enough about typographic 
technology from the Chinese on the mainland or from the Westerners from 
Macau or from Mexico.18
 Even the front matter in Castilian for the few blockprinted Chinese books 
after 1605 utilized movable type, including the Memorial de la vida christiana 
en lengua china by yet another Dominican friar, Domingo de Nieva. Ironically, 
Nieva’s argument in his preface, that converts should be taught in their own 
language, was written in Castilian. The printer responsible for both the type-
setting and the block engraving was Pedro de Vera, the younger brother of 
Juan de Vera, who also produced Tomás Mayor’s Símbolo de la Fé, en lengua y 
letra China (1607), in which the front matter in Castilian was also set in mov-
able type.19
 Nieva’s Memorial and Mayor’s Símbolo had another thing in common—they 
were both adaptations into Chinese of the works of the Spanish preacher 
and mystic Luis de Granada (1504–1588), one of the best-selling authors in 
Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century and the seventeenth. By 
the late sixteenth century, all his works had been published and translated 
into a number of European languages; the Memorial alone had been reprinted 
124 times before 1600. Granada’s works figured prominently and frequently 
in the reading materials of passengers on ships from Spain to the Americas, 
in the booksellers’ consignments to the Spanish colonies, and in the per-
sonal libraries of not only clerics but also lay readers there.20 Thus it was no 
surprise that both the missionaries in Asia would so quickly choose to trans-
late Granada’s works into Chinese and Japanese.21
 Blockprinting continued to be utilized where it was convenient and eco-
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nomical, for images rather than for text, as suggested by one recorded in-
stance. For All Saints’ Day (1 November) in 1602, pictures of the saints of the 
year in the form of slips were printed in the Jesuit college and distributed to 
the people of Manila.22 Such a use of woodblock images was well known in 
Europe and predated the development of movable type in the mid-fifteenth 
century. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, stock woodcut illus-
trations were used repeatedly, within a single work, or in different imprints 
from the same publisher, or loaned by one printer to others.23 That both the 
text composed in movable type and the images carved in woodblock could 
be printed together made this the most economical combination of illus-
trated imprints that was employed until the late sixteenth century. In Tomás 
Mayor’s Símbolo, at least one of the illustrations in the Chinese main text was 
copied from the 1584 edition of Luis de Granada’s work, Introducción del sím-
bolo de la fé. Both pictures were woodcuts.24
 For texts, however, the missionaries in the early Spanish Philippines very 
quickly chose to print books using exclusively movable type and mostly ro-
man letters. For works in Western languages, such as Castilian and Latin, 
this trend simply conformed to what the Spanish understood printing to be. 
For works in Tagalog and other Filipino languages, printing in roman letters 
together with or in place of the original baybayin script served several pur-
poses. First, missionaries felt that the baybayin graphs did not convey with 
sufficient precision the pronunciation of the words, a task better served by 
roman letters. For this reason, Blancas, in his later work Memorial de la vida 
christiana en lengua tagala, advocated the use of romanized script.25 Second, 
Hispanization was part of the conversion of native Filipinos to Christianity, 
a process facilitated by using the roman alphabet for reading as many differ-
ent languages as possible. Consequently, after the first decade of the seven-
teenth century, doctrinas and other religious works in the various Filipino 
languages were printed using romanized scripts.26
 Chinese, however, was a language for which the Philippine missionaries 
were reluctant to use in print the romanization they had been developing, 
so that all works in Chinese were xylographically produced.27 On the other 
hand, competent blockcarvers were available. Thus the question remains 
why no Chinese books were printed by any method after the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, either by missionaries or commercial publishers 
in the Philippines, for another three centuries. Records show that a number 
of the missionaries who sought to convert and minister to the Chinese con-
tinued learning at least to speak Minnanese, and some became highly pro-
ficient in the language. Their enduring interest in Chinese is supported by 
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the grammars and vocabularies that they produced, of which we have manu-
script but no print copies, suggesting that such works circulated among a 
limited readership. But did the missionaries in the Philippines lose interest 
in providing the Chinese with catechisms, confessionals, and other religious 
works? If so, did commercial printers in the Parián, Binondo, or another area 
with a sizeable Chinese population take up the publishing of these books? 
But other than the Doctrina christiana of Keng Yong in 1605, we know of no 
imprint in Chinese other than a few more produced by the Dominicans. It 
is possible, of course, that the missionaries wished to maintain control over 
the production of such texts and prevented commercial publishers from ob-
taining the needed license for publication.
 It is also possible that by 1632, when Dominicans finally gained a foot-
hold in Fujian, religious books were printed there and exported to the Phil-
ippines.28 We have, however, neither extant samples of such works nor 
mention of such shipments. Moreover, since the Dominicans established 
themselves first in northeast Fujian (Mindong), where the language differed 
greatly from the Minnanese spoken by the Chinese in the Philippines, and 
where the missionaries made contact with the local literati elite, who pre-
ferred using classical Chinese, it is unlikely that suitable doctrinas and other 
religious works in Minnanese would have been produced for the Philippines, 
at least until the Dominicans also founded missions in Zhangzhou 漳州. In 
fact, as the vocabulary for translating religious terms became more stan-
dardized, the later Dominicans suppressed the earliest imprints from the 
Philippines, such as those by Cobo, Nieva, and Mayor.29 Perhaps the Domi-
nicans in Mindong imbued their colleagues in the Philippines with a dis-
dain for the latter’s poorly educated and not very pious parishioners, so that 
the friars increasingly settled for teaching the converts simply to memo-
rize the basic tenets of their faith.30 As a result, there was no large market 
for religious works in Chinese in the Philippines. In fact, despite the two 
book prices we have, for Cobo’s Shilu and the Doctrina christiana in Castilian 
and Tagalog, the early Dominican publications were not commodities; quite 
possibly shorter imprints were treated as religious tracts to be given away 
rather than sold, much as later Protestant missionaries distributed their ma-
terials in Asia.31
 Thus, to consider Chinese books as commodities, we must explore the 
possible import of traditional kinds of works from China, including popular 
works of entertainment and literature (collections of songs and plays, illus-
trated novels and stories, joke books), medical texts (such as materia medica 
or bencao 本草, and simple manuals for lay readers), general household refer-
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ences, almanacs, the Confucian classics, and school primers. After all, a real-
istic estimate of the number of Chinese in the early Spanish Philippines who 
could read to some extent must fall between Cobo’s starry-eyed assessment 
and the highly negative opinion of other Spaniards. Sources record the exis-
tence of Chinese booksellers (libreros) in the Manila area, who probably sold 
books from China and possibly Spanish books as well. One whom we know 
by name was a pagan Chinese by the name of Zunhu, who had a shop in the 
Parián around 1606.32
 Of the Chinese books that could have been exported to the Philippines, 
at least three likely publishers were located conveniently in the chief port for 
the China-Nanyang trade during the late sixteenth century and early seven-
teenth: Haicheng 海澄 in Zhangzhou prefecture in southern Fujian. Among 
other works, these publishers produced collections of popular dramatic 
acts, operatic arias, and songs of the time, works that would have greatly 
appealed to the southern Fujianese in the Philippines, who staged theatrical 
performances on a variety of different occasions, including the safe arrival 
of a junk, Christian religious festivals, and the Chinese New Year.33
 Juan Cobo viewed these theatricals quite unfavorably, considering them 
full of superstition and idolatries. Not only the Chinese but also the Fili-
pinos and Spanish flocked to the performances, where they, “covered by the 
dark cloak of night, did many things which ought not to be done in Chris-
tian lands.” Cobo persuaded his vicar-general to threaten with excommu-
nication those who went to the plays, but it is hard to know how success-
ful their efforts were. The Spanish Inquisition did not have jurisdiction over 
the Chinese or the Filipinos, and its commissar in the Philippines limited 
himself to inspecting Western-language books brought over by ships from 
Mexico.34 Consequently, any effective censorship of Chinese books could 
only come from the vigilant efforts of the missionaries themselves—a task 
made immensely difficult by the very few clergy able to read Chinese trying 
to inspect any books they could find in the junks that came from China, as 
well as the offerings of the Manila booksellers. As for banning theatrical 
performances, the vicar-general might have had some success temporarily, 
but apparently one of the added attractions of the highly popular gambling 
houses in Manila run by the Chinese and frequented by non-Chinese as well, 
including prominent and high-ranking Spaniards, was the performance of 
acts from plays. Over two hundred years later, the Augustinian friar Martínez 
de Zúniga voiced much the same complaints.35
 For the Chinese who could read or listen to texts of plays and songs, 
commercial publishers in late Ming China offered a wealth of plays, dra-
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matic arias, and popular songs.36 The format of two of the three extant col-
lections of songs and dramatic arias in Minnanese resembles that of simi-
lar works published in the same period (late sixteenth century to the early 
seventeenth) in Nanjing and Jianyang (northern Fujian), then the two largest 
book centers in China, and of the later chapbooks from all parts of the coun-
try, for which we have examples from the seventeenth century onward.37 
Such cheaply printed chapbooks have always appealed to fans of theatre and 
popular songs regardless of their educational level, so works like the two 
Zhangzhou imprints shown in figure 4 may well have made their way from 
Fujian to the Philippines.
 Moreover, the oldest extant work in Minnanese (a play) and at least one 
of two surviving song collections in Chaozhou speech were printed in Jian-
yang by commercial publishers, whose own dialect was very different, but 
who knew what would sell, suggesting that such books were quite popular.38 
Furthermore, evidence from the imprints published in Haicheng mentioned 
above—the design of the printer’s colophon (fig. 5) and the name of one 
figure 4 Xinkan xianguan shishang zhaiyao ji 新刊絃管時尚摘要集 [newly engraved selection from 
fashionable melodies for string and wind instruments]. late ming-early Qing. Source: Sächsische 
landesbibliothek, dresden.
4b apparently, this particular song in 
minnanese for zhang gong 張拱, the male 
lead in the play Xi xiang ji 西廂記 [Story of the 
western chamber], has no corresponding  
version in the standard speech.
4a Page from the table of contents stating, 
“Published in Xiazhang (zhangzhou) by  
hong zhiheng” 霞漳洪秩衡梓行. many song 
collections were printed in this chapbook  
format, for which we have extant examples  
from the late ming onward.
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of the printers—suggests that these men might have moved from Jianyang 
to Haicheng, hoping to take advantage of the opening of a new book mar-
ket overseas. Haicheng was not known as a printing center in the late Ming 
and Qing periods, and when it was displaced by nearby Xiamen as the chief 
port for the Nanyang trade, its publishing business probably disappeared as 
well.39
 It is also useful to consider books in Chinese that the Spanish thought 
worth acquiring, primarily through the efforts of missionaries in China or 
the Philippines. For example, on his first journey to Fujian in 1575, the Au-
gustinian friar Martín de Rada bought copies of Chinese books in Fuzhou, 
the provincial capital where, according to Rada’s Fujianese hosts, the best 
imprints were produced.40 The governor of Fujian, who had been quite curi-
figure 5 Printers’ colophon blocks. The lotus-leaf design was a universally recognized trademark 
of ming Jianyang printers, so that its use in an imprint from haicheng in zhangzhou suggests 
connections with Jianyang.
5a Xinke zengbu xidui jinqu daquan mantian 
chun 新刻增補戲隊錦曲大全滿天春 [all-embracing 
Spring: newly engraved comprehensive collection  
of dramatic acts and operatic arias] (hanhai  
[haicheng]: li Bifeng and chen wohan, 1607).  
cambridge university library.
5b Xuke Wenling si taishi pingxuan gujin 
ming wen zhuji 續刻溫陵四大太史評選古今
名文珠璣 [Supplemental edition of the gems 
of famous writings of the past and present,  
chosen by and with commentaries by the  
four great Taishi of wenling] (Jianyang: 
yu liangmu (Shaoyai) zixin zhai, 1595).  
national central library, Taiwan.
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ous about European books and received a breviary from Rada’s party, origi-
nally had offered to provide his visitors with as many books as they wanted, 
but then failed to deliver on his promise, perhaps out of concern that the 
Spaniards were intent on gathering information about China that would 
have strategic military value. According to a surviving list, Rada managed 
to obtain gazetteers (descriptions of the entire country, the provinces, and 
neighboring countries, as well as tributes and taxes owed to the govern-
ment); histories; technical works on shipbuilding and military technology; 
works on building and architecture; medical works; agricultural manuals; 
works on astronomy; Confucian classics; law codes; general household 
encyclopedias; divination texts (on geomancy, oneiromancy, chiromancy, 
almanacs, etc.); and manuals on musical instruments and songs.
 Rada and his fellow travellers brought these books back to Manila, but 
they probably did not survive for long the hot humidity and insects of the 
islands.41 Nevertheless, some of the Chinese books acquired by Rada and 
other missionaries probably ended up in collections such as that of the royal 
library in San Lorenzo de El Escorial and others in Spain and throughout 
Europe. Thus the holdings of Chinese rare books in European (and Japa-
nese) libraries have copies of Chinese books not extant in China, includ-
ing a number of popular (that is, nonscholarly) works, such as household 
encyclopedias, cheap writing manuals, and illustrated fiction and drama.42 
5c fengyue jin nang 風月錦囊 [Brocade satchel of 
lyric arias] (Jianyang: zhan family Jinxian tang, 1553). 
The sole extant copy is held in the royal library of 
San lorenzo de el escorial.
ch i n e Se BookS i n Th e Ph i li PPi n e S 27 3
Such imprints have survived in part because of the broader or more tolerant 
interests of European collectors who acquired imprints that Chinese bib-
liophiles of the time would have disdained to buy either because of their 
perceived shoddiness or because of their frivolous contents. Unlike the mis-
sionaries in Asia who originally amassed the works, most of the earlier Euro-
pean buyers and collectors were probably quite ignorant of Chinese culture 
and bought a work for its pictures or for its exotic value. When such books 
reached Europe, some would be split up, with different fascicles of a single 
work going to different collectors. Today, different libraries may own por-
tions of the same imprint, a minor inconvenience compared to the good for-
tune of the work’s survival.43
 The survival of the Philippine incunabula discussed above is attributable 
figure 6 excerpts from songs about liang Shanbo and zhu yingtai.
6b The song is in standard speech 
(zhengyin 正音). Source: fengyue jin nang 
風月錦囊 [Brocade satchel of lyric arias] 
(Jianyang: zhan family Jinxian tang, 1553). 
The sole extant copy is held in the royal 
library of San lorenzo de el escorial.
6a The lower register is the first page of 
excerpts from a play in minnanese about 
liang Shanbo and zhu yingtai. Source: 
Xinke zengbu xidui jinqu daquan mantian 
chun 新刻增補戲隊錦曲大全滿天春 [all-
embracing Spring: newly engraved 
comprehensive collection of dramatic acts 
and operatic arias] (hanhai [haicheng]:  
li Bifeng and chen wohan, 1607). 
cambridge university library.
274 luci lle ch ia
to similarly fortuitous circumstances. All extant copies of the blockprinted 
books from the Philippines and the few collections of songs and plays in 
Minnanese are found in Europe.44 Given the unfavorable conditions for the 
survival of such books in the Philippines, it is a wonder that we have any ex-
tant copies, even had printing of Chinese books continued after the first de-
cade of the seventeenth century.
Some concluding remarks
Of all the areas in Southeast Asia where there were sizeable Chinese settle-
ments in the early modern period, it is ironic that books in Chinese were 
printed only in the Philippines—ironic because in studying the history of 
the Chinese in the Nanyang, the Philippines have generally proven to be 
the most difficult area of study due to the scarcity and recalcitrance of the 
sources. Through the interest and determination of the Spanish missionar-
ies, both xylography and typography were introduced into the Philippines 
soon after it was colonized, and the print quality of these incunabula from 
the late sixteenth century through the first decade of the seventeenth shows 
the potential for a book-publishing industry that was not realized for books 
in Chinese.
 For instance, while books in Filipino languages continued to be printed 
using romanized script that the Spanish missionaries developed, no corre-
sponding attempt was made for Chinese. One important reason was that 
in the colonial Philippines, the civil and religious authorities, as well as the 
non-Chinese population, including the native Filipinos, the creoles, and 
even the Chinese mestizos (the children of Chinese fathers and Filipina 
mothers and their descendants), harbored economic and social resentment 
against the Chinese and saw them as a foreign group that required constant 
control. During most of the Spanish occupation, the colonial government 
viewed the Chinese as unassimilable—efforts to Christianize and Hispanize 
them were far less successful than with the native Filipinos and the Chinese 
mestizos. In fact, the Spanish authorities consistently attempted to drive a 
political, economic, cultural, and religious wedge between the Chinese and 
all other ethnic groups in the Philippines. This resulted in a low-conscious 
receptivity to Chinese written culture, certainly less than in some other parts 
of Southeast Asia. Thus until the Philippine Chinese themselves began look-
ing to China for diplomatic and political support, until the Chinese gov-
ernment grew more responsive to the needs of overseas Chinese, and until 
reformers and revolutionaries began to instill nationalistic feelings among 
Chinese living abroad, there was little interest in Chinese learning. Even at 
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the end of the nineteenth century, there were no Chinese schools in the Phil-
ippines and early Chinese newspapers did not survive for long.45 In fact, after 
the early sixteenth century, the Philippines became more like other regions 
of Southeast Asia, none of which showed any inclination among its Chi-
nese population to publish books or newspapers before the late nineteenth 
 century.
 Concerning Chinese books, another comparison among Southeast Asian 
areas is worth noting. By the early seventeenth century, Spanish mission-
aries in the Philippines appeared to have given up proselytizing among the 
Chinese there through the printed word. Thus, their early publishing efforts 
in the Philippines are dwarfed by those of the British and American Prot-
estant missionaries of the nineteenth century. It was the Protestants who 
systematically investigated the comparative cost-benefit aspects of various 
printing technologies (xylography, typography, lithography) as they geared 
up for ambitious large-scale publishing projects. Various Protestant mis-
sionary societies considered the translation and retranslation of the Bible 
into Chinese and other Asian languages a matter of great urgency, and 
mounted a campaign to print a million copies of the New Testament in the 
mid-nineteenth century.46 Perhaps it was the Protestant missionaries’ fer-
vent belief in the power of the written word that led them to distribute reli-
gious tracts for free and Bibles for low prices—to the point of saturation, by 
walking the streets and visiting ships in harbors, and even chartering boats 
to cruise along the coast of China and throughout insular Southeast Asia, 
undaunted by the low literacy rate of many, if not most of the recipients of 
their literature.
 The Catholic missionaries in the early Philippines and the later Protes-
tant ones in Southeast Asia, however, shared one important objective—their 
desire to proselytize in China. Once they could enter China—the Dominicans 
in 1632, and the British Protestants after the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing—they 
largely lost interest in the overseas Chinese as linguistic and cultural infor-
mants. Indeed, the London Missionary Society closed down its Chinese sta-
tions in Penang, Malacca, Singapore, and Batavia, and moved its resources 
(including printing presses) to China. Thus, in Southeast Asia the printing 
of books in Chinese and of Chinese works in translation would occur chiefly 
when the overseas Chinese themselves or interested readers and writers of 
the host cultures assumed the work of publishing, starting in the late nine-
teenth century. Ironically, in that later stage, the Philippines would be the 
least receptive of all the areas in Southeast Asia. Just as the Spanish mission-
aries’ first efforts at proselytization led to the production of a few Chinese 
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books, the eventual success of Christianity also meant Hispanizing both the 
natives and Chinese mestizos and turning both groups away from Chinese 
culture. The result was the formation of a modern Filipino culture that di-
verged in essential ways from those of other regions of Southeast Asia.
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21. For example, an abridged version of Granada’s most popular work, Guide for Sinners, 
was translated from the Portuguese and published by the Jesuits in Japan in 1599. See 
Chan, Chinese Books and Documents in the Jesuit Archives in Rome, 260–61.
22. Horacio de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1961), 202–3.
23. See, for example, David Bland, The Illustration of Books (London: Faber and Faber, 
1962), 49–51.
24. Reproduced in van der Loon, “Manila Incunabula,” pt. 1, 34 and 35.
25. Information about the Memorial comes from a second-generation reprint from 
Mexico. See Retana, Orígenes de la imprenta Filipina, 72–75; and van der Loon, “Manila In-
cunabula,” pt. 1, 38–39. For a discussion of the missionaries’ rejection of the baybayin 
script and adoption of romanized Tagalog, see Vicente L. Rafael, Contracting Colonialism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 44–54.
26. How the Spanish missionaries, despite their admiration for (some of ) the Filipino 
languages, changed them in their discourses, and how the native speakers resisted 
such changes are briefly discussed in T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Una memoria de Anda y Salazar 
(Manila: La Democracía, 1899), 58–59n12, which is translated in Blair and Robertson, 
The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 50:147–48.
27. Extant manuscripts from the early seventeenth century show that missionaries like 
Miguel de Benavides and Juan Cobo had worked hard at developing romanization for 
Minnanese, as well as vocabularies and grammars. See van der Loon, “Manila Incu-
nabula,” pt. 2, esp. 95–100; Yue, “The Min Translation of the Doctrina christiana”; and 
Klöter, Written Taiwanese, 41–58.
28. At the end of the sixteenth century, few Spanish missionaries except the Jesuits had 
succeeded in entering China to proselytize, but in 1632 the Dominican friar Angelo 
Cocchi arrived in Fuzhou and was invited to Fuan where he began his missionary work. 
For the first years of the Dominicans’ presence in (north)eastern Fujian (Mindong), see 
Eugenio Menegon, “Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: The Localization of Christianity in 
Late Imperial Mindong (Fujian, China), 1632–1863,” Ph.D. diss., University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, 2002, esp. 57–59 and 102–15.
29. Chan, Chinese Books and Documents in the Jesuit Archives in Rome, 230–31, cited in Mene-
gon, “Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars,” 59n101. Before the suppression, however, two of 
Mayor’s works so impressed Dominicans in China that they reprinted them (Domingo 
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the end of the “age of CommerCe”?
Javanese cotton Trade industry from the  
Seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries
Kwee Hui Kian
Studies on cotton textiles have inspired many theories on the rise of Indus-
trial Europe and the concomitant underdevelopment of Asian societies. Eco-
nomic historians working on South Asia are at the forefront in discussing 
how the Eng lish manufacture of fine cotton yarns and textiles using steam-
run machinery (and the dumping of these products in India) resulted in 
the failure of Indian society to advance from proto-industrialization to full 
mechanization. Along similar lines of argument, Hiroshi Matsuo also ex-
plains that the Dutch imitation of Eng lish technology and subsequent ex-
ports to Java interrupted the development of Javanese cotton textile pro-
duction in the nineteenth century.1 Anthony Reid proposes that signs of 
underdevelopment were already at play in Southeast Asia prior to the Indus-
trial Revolution. In view of the thriving Southeast Asian import trade of 
Indian cotton cloth in the period from the 1500s to the 1680s, Reid has ar-
gued that the drastic fall in the demand for Indian textiles from the late 
seventeenth century marked the beginnings of poverty, or the end of the 
“Age of Commerce” in the Southeast Asian region.2
 With regard to Matsuo’s theory, more up-to-date research by Alfons van 
der Kraan and Peter Boomgaard has shown that dwindling domestic pro-
duction did not necessarily connote deindustrialization. Instead, they con-
sider yarn-spinning and textile-weaving to be laborious, time-consuming 
tasks. The decline of the industry would thus enable the “restructuring of 
the island’s economy,” as such releasing labor for other purposes, like pro-
ducing food and commercial crops for sale.3 Experts on textile history also 
argue that European cotton imports helped the Javanese batik textile indus-
try to take off. Due to the shorter fiber and climatic conditions, the types 
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of yarn spun from cotton varieties in Java were coarse in quality. Dutch-
produced yarns were much stronger; textiles woven from these yarns were 
thus smoother in texture. As such, more intricate batik patterns could be 
drawn.4 In other words, use of European cotton products enabled batik art 
to ascend to the prime of its development. Very beautiful north Javanese tex-
tiles were created and produced in this period.
 This chapter offers an alternative explanation to Reid’s observation of 
the falling demand for Indian textiles in early modern Southeast Asia. Using 
Dutch archival materials, it first discusses the development of the Javanese 
cotton textile industry and intra-Asian trade, and how Indian cloth came to 
occupy a niche in the Southeast Asian markets. Emphasis is placed on how 
Chinese merchants and Javanese rulers and lords came to assume key roles 
in the production and circulation of these commodities. In contrast to Reid’s 
argument, the essay also shows how the fall in demand for Indian textiles 
was more a function of switching back to domestic and regional production 
with the price inflation of the Indian supplies, than it was a sign of poverty 
on the part of Southeast Asian consumers. Furthermore, it looks at how 
the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Voc), 
which began to participate in the textile trade in Java from the seventeenth 
century, could only gain a share of the market after collaborating with the 
existing interest groups in the manufacture and commerce of these com-
modities.
Javanese Textile Production and Trade: developments from  
the ninth century to the eighteenth
Manufacturing cotton textiles involves the following processes: cotton grow-
ing, spinning, yarn preparation (washing and dyeing), winding and warping 
of threads, weaving, and finishing. For the famous Javanese painted cloth or 
batiks, an additional process is required before the finishing, namely, orna-
menting the cloth using the wax-resist method. Patterns are drawn on the 
plain cloth with wax, and subsequently dipped into dye solutions. Repeated 
sequences of waxing, dyeing, and drying eventually yield the desired motifs 
and colors.5 These multiple processes can generally be divided into three pri-
mary categories: yarn-spinning, textile-weaving, and batikking.
 In terms of the origins, weaving was probably first introduced to Indo-
nesia by bronze- and iron-using peoples, who brought with them a simple 
back-tension loom.6 Through her analysis of the Javanese court kakawin lit-
erature and the sima charters, J. Christie has shown that Javanese textile 
weaving dated back to the first millennium.7 Although Indian textiles were 
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exported to central and east Java, most Javanese households appeared to 
produce the majority of the cloth they consumed, utilizing a type of body-
tension loom still in use in some parts of Indonesia in the recent period. By 
the eleventh century, there were also professional dye processors (mangapus), 
weavers (acadar), and other textile support industries in most Javanese vil-
lages, as well as peddlers (atukel, abasana, amalanten, amananten) who special-
ized in cotton yarns and other textile products.8 Materials needed for manu-
facturing textiles, like cotton, and also various kinds of dyestuffs, such as 
indigo, mengkudu or Indian mulberry, safflower, and so on, had become tax-
able trade items as well. In other words, the production of cotton yarn and 
textile in early Java was not confined to the subsistence sector, but formed 
a commercial operation as well.9 Chinese sources from the Sung dynasty 
(960–1279) have also listed cotton cloth and cotton piece goods among the 
export items from Java.10
 Meanwhile, the first forms of batikking apparently developed in Java 
in the twelfth century. During this period, this method was known as tulis 
warnna or “decorated with drawings in colour.” The term batik entered the 
Javanese vocabulary only in the seventeenth century.11 Whether this method 
was generated locally or introduced from outside is far less clear. Neverthe-
less, Indonesian textile experts, citing local myths and legends, are quite 
convinced that it was foreign, and more specifically, that the method came 
either from China or India.12
 Textiles in Java were used for clothing, decorative hangings, screens, cush-
ion covers, covering-cloths for containers, and ritual receptacles, as well as 
to sit upon.13 In fact, they did not function only as clothing or accessories 
but had socio-religious import. By the tenth century, distinctions in terms of 
types and colors of textiles, as well as who was allowed to wear and use them, 
had also emerged. Those presented to the royal family and high officials were 
of a finer weave, like the cadar cloth and bananten cloth, and of much higher 
value compared to those used by commoners. Furthermore, the latter would 
normally wear cotton textiles of red (rangga) and blue (angsit), while aristo-
crats could don a wider range of colors such as pinks, ruby red, vermilion, 
orange, and saffron pink.14 Cloth bearing patterns like nagasari flowers, split 
lotus, yellow seeds, vegetal patterns, and rock motifs in specific colors were 
also worn during certain ritual occasions such as making offerings (wali ) 
and life-crisis rituals (pras).15 From fourteenth-century Javanese records, 
the gringsing design, in particular—which subsequently became an impor-
tant batik motif—is said to have been used by the king’s entourage in the 
annual royal procession.16 This tradition of demarcating social differentia-
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tion through colors and patterns of textiles persisted into the early modern 
period. Dutch company sources recorded that, in 1786, Yogyakarta sultan 
Hamengkubuwana I confiscated textiles with the larangan motif sold on the 
market, as these were to be worn only by Javanese courtiers.17 Under the pro-
prietary decree of 1769, the jelamprang motif—an eight-rayed rosette set in a 
modified square, circle, or hexagon—was also reserved for the susuhunan of 
Surakarta and his family.18
 In early modern Java, high-quality cotton textiles served as a form of 
property, and luxury textiles conferred prestige and were used as gifts and 
dowries or at funerals.19 Javanese rulers would also present gifts to their 
subordinates and vassals during ceremonial occasions such as the annual 
Garebeg day, when vassals would travel to the kraton (palace) of their over-
lord to pay homage.20 By the sixteenth century, besides locally produced lux-
ury textiles, those produced in the Coromandel coast, Surat, Bengal, and 
other parts of the subcontinent were also highly sought after in Java and 
the Indonesian archipelago as a kind of wealth and status symbol. Indian 
traders would sometimes acquire decorative designs from their Southeast 
Asian buyers and commission Indian producers to manufacture textiles fol-
lowing these patterns.21 Thus, for many centuries, these cloth products were 
among the main commodities brought by South Asian traders to exchange 
for the fine spices produced in the Indonesian archipelago.
 High-quality textiles, whether locally made or imported from India, have 
been regarded as markers of wealth and status not only in central and east 
Java, or Mataram Java, but also in many parts of the islands of Borneo, Sula-
wesi, Sumatra, as well as the eastern Indonesian archipelago.22 Together 
with the imports, textiles produced in the region were also traded in differ-
ent parts of the archipelago. Some specialized regions had also appeared by 
the seventeenth century. From the little that is known, central and east Java 
imported raw cotton and cotton yarn from Bali and occasionally also from 
Palembang, which converted to growing cotton and spinning cotton yarn 
when pepper prices fell.23 Moreover, by the early modern period, there was a 
high degree of market specialization. European merchants found that Malay 
traders would not buy the Coromandel cottons they brought as these had “a 
little narrow white edge” when there should be none.24
 The importation of Indian textiles to maritime Southeast Asia decreased 
in the late seventeenth century, however. From about 40,000 rijksdaalders 
(rds) worth of Indian textiles brought to central and east Java in the late 
1670s, these imports diminished by a staggering 90 percent to about 4,000 
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rds thirty years later.25 The re-export of Indian textiles from Batavia to the 
north coast of Java by private traders also declined substantially, from 41,234 
pieces in 1680 to fewer than 10,000 pieces twenty years later (see table 1). 
This phenomenon was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in cloth pro-
duction in Java. In the early 1680s, the Batavia high government—the com-
pany’s highest administrative body in Asia—noted that the Javanese had 
begun to prefer the batiks manufactured in their own region to those im-
ported from the Coromandel coast.26 The Pasisir, or the north coast of Java, 
exported not only batik textiles, but also plain cloth. Javanese textiles were 
exported predominantly to Sumatra, Kalimantan, the Melaka Straits, and 
also China.27 By 1695, there was a noticeable increase in weaving activities, 
causing a Dutch resident to comment that there were as many looms as there 
were households.28 A similar phenomenon occurred in other polities as well. 
Palembang and Jambi also drastically reduced their purchase of Indian tex-
tiles and turned to those produced locally and also in Cambodia, Siam, and 
Java instead.29
 Reid has interpreted this late-seventeenth-century phenomenon as a 
sign of impoverishment of the island Southeast Asians during this period. 
More specifically, he has argued that indigenous traders gradually lost out 
in the economic competition against the Europeans who had appeared in 
the region in the sixteenth century. By the late seventeenth century, the local 
table 1 exports of indian Textiles from Batavia to Java’s northeast coast by 








1672 37,893 1695 26,923 1720 14,043
1675 38,857 1700  8,440 1725  8,820
1680 41,234 1705  4,838 1730  7,635
1685i 57,970 1710  7,844 1735  3,015
1690 41,143 1716  4,635 1740  1,919
i. The rise in private import amounts of Indian cloth in 1685 reflects the fact that 
from that year on, the company withdrew from the direct sales of the commodity 
on the Pasisir and sold cloth to Chinese traders at the company’s auctions in Batavia 
(Nagtegaal, Dutch Tiger, 147–48).
Source: L. Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast 
Coast of Java, 1680–1743 (Leiden: KiTlV Press, 1996), 148, table 12.
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peoples had become so impoverished that they could afford only cloth made 
in the region instead of the luxurious ones manufactured in the Indian sub-
continent and elsewhere.30
 However, Reid’s explanation is questionable since the textiles produced 
in the region were of comparable quality to those of Indian origin and in-
cluded very luxurious ones too. Reporting to their superiors in the Nether-
lands in the early 1680s, company administrators for Java wrote that Javanese 
batik was scarcely inferior in its dyeing to that of the Coromandel cloth, and 
in terms of durability it was actually superior.31 In her study of the cloth trade 
in the southeastern part of Sumatra, B. Andaya also shows that, from the late 
seventeenth century, Palembang court ladies began to import much raw silk 
and gold thread to weave high-quality luxury fabrics.32 The reason was that 
these court ladies were unhappy that for the same price, Indian textiles were 
poorer in quality compared to those produced in the earlier decades.33
 Furthermore, the prices of Indian textiles had markedly increased in the 
last two decades of the seventeenth century. War on the Coromandel coast, 
whose textiles were among the most coveted among Southeast Asian con-
sumers, drove up the prices of the commodity.34 More importantly, after 
about 1680, Indian calicoes became very popular not only among Asians, 
but in Europe as well. As the various European companies competed fiercely 
for the textiles on the subcontinent, the prices of the commodities became 
inflated.35 The cost of Indian textiles in Jambi and Palembang, for instance, 
rose by 8 to 10 percent in the 1690s.36
 In contrast to Reid’s impoverishment thesis, it seems more probable that 
the consumers of the Indonesian archipelago, who had the technology to 
manufacture textiles, including very fine ones, had considered it more cost-
effective to undertake the production themselves. Unhappy that they were 
not getting value for money in the purchase of Indian products, Southeast 
Asians began to weave their own or get textile supplies from within the re-
gion. Figures from Dutch shipping lists show that regional centers of tex-
tile production began to increase their output and their manufactures were 
widely traded in the Indonesian archipelago in the eighteenth century. In 
1719, only one corge—cloth measurement unit of twenty pieces—of Cam-
bodian cloth was exported to Palembang between January and April. How-
ever, during the same period in 1759, 515 corge of Cambodian cloth and 255 
corge of Siamese ones arrived in Sumatran port towns.37 In the 1720s, an 
annual average of 5,100 pieces of the cloth produced in the Bugis, Selayar, 
and other Sulawesian areas were exported to the archipelago, a figure that 
climbed steadily to about 130,000 pieces in the 1770s.38 The actual numbers 
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were possibly greater, since smuggling activities were rife in the Indonesian 
archipelago as traders sought to evade the customs at the ports controlled 
by the Dutch East India Company in the eighteenth century.39
 Central and east Java featured most prominently among these centers 
of textile manufacture. There had been production prior to the seventeenth 
century, with Madura and Tuban as two of the better-known production 
areas since the early sixteenth century.40 When Batavia demanded its resi-
dents on the Pasisir acquire indigo from 1693, it was noted that virtually 
every coastal regency grew the indigo plant in modest quantities for the 
local textile industry.41 Javanese textiles were sold to neighboring polities 
in Sumatra and Borneo as well.42 Palembang, for example, had been buy-
ing rough cloth from Java since the early seventeenth century to cater to the 
commoners, but increased its imports of Javanese textiles in the eighteenth 
century. In 1719, 64 corge of Javanese cloth are listed. By 1758, the amount 
had reached 728 corge. Over 400 corge were registered for the October ship-
ments of that year. The pattern continues through the century so that, from 
September to October 1793, it was noted in the Dutch shipping lists that 
2,745 corge of Javanese cloth had reached Palembang.43
 By the 1760s, it was common for vessels, be they manned by Chinese, Bu-
gis, Javanese, Malays, or Dutch burghers, leaving from the Pasisir to other 
ports to carry some Javanese textiles with them. The quantity each brought 
along ranged from fewer than ten to as many as one hundred corges.44 In 
general, from the 1720s to the 1770s, exports had increased by about five 
times. For example, in the first nine-and-a-half months of 1720, 16,360 
pieces of cloth were exported from Semarang to Borneo and the areas sur-
rounding the Melaka Straits. From 1774 to 1777, during the same period, 
the average quantity of Javanese textile exports to these places had risen to 
75,853 pieces of cloth.45
dutch intervention in Javanese cotton Textile and yarn Production
The Dutch East India Company considered the development of the Javanese 
cotton textile industry a threat. In the seventeenth century, it had been imi-
tating South Asian and other regional traders in importing Indian textiles 
and opium to exchange for fine spices and other commodities from the Indo-
nesian archipelago. Following their treaties with the rulers of the north coast 
of Java, as well as south Sulawesi in the 1670s and 1680s, the Dutch com-
pany administrators could quite successfully drive away all the Indian and 
Arab traders from the Indonesian archipelago region.46 However, almost 
simultaneously, the Javanese cloth practically priced the company imports of 
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Indian textiles out of the market in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Melaka Straits 
region. Company administrators tried to stop this trend. In 1684, they com-
missioned weavers on the Coromandel coast to make batik cloth in the Java-
nese style so as to undercut the Javanese producers. Much to their dismay, 
however, the Coromandel batik textiles not only were five times as expensive 
as the Javanese ones, but also proved to be less durable. In 1686, the high 
government in Batavia even considered prohibiting imports of beeswax into 
Java, as this product was indispensable to the production of batik cloth. It 
gave up the idea when the coastal personnel reported that the strategy was 
impossible to implement.47
 By 1683, the company warehouses in Batavia lay overstocked with unsold 
Coromandel textiles. Hopes that the demand would again improve were not 
given up. In fact, the Batavia high government continued to import Coro-
mandel cloth to Java in the next few years. However, by 1687, the high gov-
ernment had lost its optimism and instructed the personnel at the South 
Asian port town not to send any cloth above the specified quantity.48 By 1685, 
the Batavia high government also decided to withdraw from the direct sales 
of Indian textiles on the Pasisir. It did not give up the monopoly on Indian 
textiles, however. Instead, the high government sold these imported cotton 
goods to private traders, most of whom were Chinese, at the company’s auc-
tions in Batavia.49
 Javanese textile production was largely left to develop on its own after 
the 1690s, but only for a few decades. By the 1740s, the Dutch company had 
begun to interfere in the Javanese textile trade again, this time because of its 
interest in acquiring cotton yarn from the region. From this period on, there 
was a reasonable market for the commodity in India and the Netherlands.50 
Factories in the Netherlands kept up their demand for cotton yarn from the 
Indies through the rest of the eighteenth century.51 In 1761, the governor-
general noted that the popularity of the product there had generated a 237 
percent profit for the company, and that the supplies thus far were insuffi-
cient to satisfy demand.52
 Hence, it is no wonder that when the Dutch East India Company admin-
istrators gained governance over the north coast and eastern part of Java in 
1743, a region they called “Java’s Northeast Coast,” they lost no time in utiliz-
ing their political supremacy to acquire the desired commodities. In the con-
tract signed with the Batavia high government that year, besides cession of 
his rule over the Pasisir, the Mataram ruler was also obliged to deliver some 
products yearly to the company. Among them were 300 piculs of cotton yarn. 
In more concrete terms, the Javanese ruler had to arrange for his bupatis, or 
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his vassal lords on the north coast, to deliver annually to the company the 
first, second, third, fourth, and “dispense” (dispens-soort) qualities of cotton 
yarn at the fixed prices of 40, 30, 20, 16 and 10 rds per picul respectively.53 
These prices were certainly much cheaper than what the company had to pay 
in the Batavia market, namely, 45, 35, 24, 18 and 12 rds per picul for the re-
spective grades of yarn.54 Furthermore, to discourage the use of cotton yarn 
among the Javanese, Java’s Northeast Coast government also imposed a high 
export tax of 25 percent, compared to the usual 8 percent on most goods, on 
the Javanese textiles.55
 This was not to say that the company employees managed to acquire the 
products as they had planned. Though the regents were obliged to send 300 
piculs of cotton yarns to the company yearly, they continued to be deficient in 
the deliveries.56 As Batavia saw it, these regents were unhappy with the low 
price and would do the deliveries “more out of pressure than willingness.”57 
Faced with the unsatisfactory deliveries, the Batavia high government re-
sorted to ordering their residents to buy the yarn from market.58
 When the Batavia authorities tried to use bans in the trade in cotton yarn 
to ensure that they could acquire the product, they also noted that private 
traders resorted to chicanery to beat the rule. For example, in the early 1740s, 
the high export toll of 25 percent was imposed only on white cotton textiles. 
What some Chinese traders did was to dye the cloth and wash the dye out 
after exporting them, such that the Batavia high government had to impose 
a similar heavy tax on colored fabrics.59 Despite the placards announcing the 
bans in cotton-yarn trade in 1761 and 1766, the high government observed 
that cotton yarn was imported from Palembang to Batavia in 1768.60
organization of Textile Production and Trade in Java
It is thanks to the Dutch company’s keenness in competing against the Java-
nese textile trade, and subsequently in the yarn trade, that we can gain some 
insight into the organization of trade and production of these cotton goods. 
By comparison, the Javanese babads are silent about these details, as is often 
the case with regard to the economic workings of the society. From Dutch 
documents, it appears that various ports on the northeast coast of Java had 
become key export centers of Javanese textiles by the 1770s. The most pre-
eminent among them were Semarang, Gresik, and Surabaya, where exports 
were mostly sent to the Borneo and Melaka Straits regions (see table 2).
 Tegal, Pekalongan, and Sumenep could each export about 1,500 to 2,000 
pieces annually.61 Notably, even in these towns of middle-range production, 
the export value could be substantial. In Pekalongan in the late 1740s and 
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early 1750s, the average annual export value of Javanese textile was 20,000 
Spanish reales.62 Notably, these port towns served not only as centers of 
textile manufacture, but also as points of collection of textiles from smaller 
port towns and more inland areas. Goods exported from Gresik and Tegal 
were mostly from the core Mataram realm, located at the south central part 
of the island of Java. The former was connected by the Solo River with the 
heartland of the Mataram realm, while the latter was easily accessible to the 
south-central region of Java via land routes.63
 While every Javanese town apparently had weaving villages that produced 
cloth for domestic consumption, it is difficult to discern from the Dutch 
documents the precise centers of textile production for export purposes. 
One main center of the textile industry was Kartasura, where company em-
ployees had noted since the mid-seventeenth century that the susuhunan 
and other courtly nobles set thousands of women to do spinning, weaving, 
embroidery, sewing, and “painting”—probably batikking—in their various 
dalem, or residence and compound of a Javanese lord, producing textiles in 
relatively large weaving mills.64 With the shift of the susuhunan’s court from 
Kartasura to Surakarta in the late 1740s, the textile manufacture center was 
duly relocated. Surakarta and Bagelen were big textile production centers 
table 2 exports of Javanese textiles from Semarang, gresik, and 
Surabaya to the named areas, in Pieces
pieces %
Semarang Total 90,800 100
Java 8,465 9
Melaka straits 57,160 63
Kalimantan 24,735 27
Other 440 1
Gresik Total 9,250 100
Java 905 10
Melaka straits 4,755 51
Kalimantan 3,075 33
Other 515 6
Surabaya Total 32,100 100
Java 1,930 6
Melaka straits 20,445 64
Kalimantan 7,885 24
Other 1,840 6
Source: G. Knaap, Shallow Waters, Rising Tide: Shipping and Trade in Java around 1775 
(Leiden: KiTlV Press, 1996), 132, table 20.
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in the early nineteenth century.65 Sumenep was another place where weav-
ing was done for export purposes. It was in this port town that the so-called 
Banda type of textile was produced, presumably for sales in Banda in the 
eastern Indonesian archipelago. The “Madurese cloth” brought to Palem-
bang was probably from Sumenep, which was located on the eastern end of 
the island of Madura.66 Production of yarn was also concentrated in the in-
terior of Java until the 1760s, when the Dutch company encouraged spinning 
activities in the coastal region.67
 While the higher-quality textiles were manufactured in the dalems, 
coarser types of textiles were made through household production, or “cot-
tage industry.” That is, commoners did the spinning and weaving in the 
off-peak seasons of agricultural activities and sold the surplus textiles to 
peddling traders.68 From nineteenth-century reports, it appears that there 
also existed a “putting-out system,” wherein although the work was done at 
home, spinners and weavers produced cotton goods for the market. Their 
materials and equipment were often provided by an engrosser (bakul ), who 
would also decide on the size and quality of the product, and paid the pro-
ducers wages. This indicates that there were professional weavers in the Java-
nese cotton industry during this period.69
 As for the main players involved in the organization of production and 
trade of cotton textiles in eighteenth-century Java, while the Javanese ruling 
class and nobility were involved in providing and organizing the labor, Chi-
nese merchants appeared to be the main dealers of the cotton goods. When 
the Dutch company gave up competing against the Javanese textiles, it sold 
its imports of Indian textiles to Chinese traders. On the north coast of Java, 
Chinese merchants were also dominating the export trade in locally pro-
duced cotton goods. Since the seventeenth century, Chinese commercial 
operators were also the ones who usually become the tax farmers on “brand-
ing” (tjap, sjap) the textiles in the Mataram realm. Only with these authorized 
labels could the textiles be released for trade circulation.70
 Chinese merchants also tended to win the bids to gain privileges as syah-
bandar, who had rights to collect taxes at the port areas, and as toll-gate 
keepers, who collected taxes at various points in the main land and riverine 
routes of transportation. In effect, this meant that they could collect taxes 
on the textiles brought from interior Java to the coast for sales and export. 
By winning these revenue farms, merchants could also have access to the 
commodities before the latter reached their final port of destination. Some 
tax collectors would also coerce traders to sell the textiles to them, as noted 
in the complaints of various Javanese bupatis to the Dutch residents.71
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 Besides buying up textiles available in the markets and using tax farms 
to gain earlier access to these goods, some Chinese traders also began to 
supply credit to peasant households in exchange for guaranteed deliveries 
of textiles at a later date. The first signs that this credit system was at work 
appeared in the last years of the seventeenth century, when Javanese cotton 
textiles became increasingly popular in the Indonesian archipelago.72
 Hence, when the Dutch East India Company employees sought to par-
ticipate in the Javanese textile trade, they had to depend on the mediation of 
both the Javanese ruling elite and Chinese merchants to acquire cotton tex-
tiles. This happened in the early 1750s, when the Batavia high government, 
having observed the popularity of Javanese cotton textiles for some years, 
ordered its Semarang subordinates to purchase Javanese textiles for sales in 
the company’s trading offices at Banda, Basra, and also back in the Nether-
lands.73 In 1752, it also used the service of a European textile trader on the 
Pasisir, Christiaen Mente, to buy textiles made in Java and other parts of the 
region.74 In July 1754, the high government also ordered the Semarang au-
thorities to seek out inhabitants of Banyumas, Bagelen, and Kedu and ar-
range with them to produce textiles for the company in order to get the best 
textiles in the fastest way possible.75
 The plan did not work out well. Supplies were not readily available, which 
the company employees saw as a factor of the state of unrest in the early 
1750s, when the Javanese princes Mangkubumi and Mangkunegara were 
rebelling against the Mataram susuhunan.76 Having signed reconciliation 
treaties with both princes in 1755 and 1757, the company administrators 
were hopeful that peace would be restored and more commodities could 
be acquired. Although it did become easier to acquire Javanese textiles, the 
purchase could only be made at very high prices and many were “not well-
made.”77 There was also another problem: as a result of household produc-
tion, those that were bought up were of varying lengths and widths. Har-
tingh, the governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, reported in August 1758 that it 
was extremely difficult to get textiles of the same length and width, because 
of the method of household production.78 Governor Hartingh also reported 
that, “despite all efforts,” the Javanese remained “reluctant” to alter their 
style of working. As such, he asked to be excused from the procurement of 
the commodity.79
 Some success in buying up Javanese textiles in large quantities was finally 
achieved thirty years later, in the late 1780s. Notably, this was accomplished 
only with the help of Chinese towkays. In 1787 and 1788, the Company signed 
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a contract with the toll-gate keeper (bandar) in Yogyakarta, Que Tjinsing, and 
the Chinese captain of Surakarta, Sie Sokliang, who promised to deliver 350 
corges of Javanese textiles and 30 corges of bunting of the sizes and quality 
stipulated by the company every year.80
concluding remarks
At this point in history, the Dutch mainly contented themselves with the 
amounts they could buy from the market or collect through obligatory de-
liveries from the Javanese bupatis. In the latter case, the company residents 
generally cared that the quota had been met. Since Javanese cotton yarn and 
textiles were not key items of trade for the Dutch company, especially in 
comparison to rice, their superiors also generally kept an eye closed. The 
Javanese bupatis could mostly get away with deficient deliveries of cotton 
yarn if they claimed that pressuring the commoners too much would affect 
rice yields. As the Dutch did not attempt to organize manufacture of the 
cotton products themselves in the eighteenth century, we cannot get a clear 
sense from the Dutch sources of what went on in Javanese textile produc-
tion at the village level.81
 It is evident however that Chinese merchants played a prominent role 
in the trade of Javanese cotton goods. Yet, although the names of the indi-
vidual merchants are made available at times, we do not know how far the 
Chinese merchants who gave credit to local producers as advance payment 
for the cotton textiles were linked with those who sold Indian textiles in the 
local markets. From the Dutch company materials, it is also not possible to 
discern the relationship between the Chinese merchants and the Javanese 
rulers and lords. Both groups must have cooperated, given the way in which 
the former provided credit to the producers while the latter controlled the 
production labor.
 What was clear is that, by the early nineteenth century, Javanese cot-
ton textile production had developed both in magnitude and specializa-
tion. Boomgaard notes that in nineteenth-century Java, not only was there 
production of coarse cloth for home consumption, but also, in areas like 
Cirebon, Tegal, Bagelen, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta, “specialization in one 
or several stages of cotton processing had occurred,” “whence considerable 
quantities of cloth were exported to other Residencies or even outside Java.” 
In 1808, there were 22,628 spinning wheels and 17,641 weaving looms in 
a total of 45,093 families in Surabaya and Gresik, or one spinning wheel 
for every two families and one loom for every two-and-a-half. In the same 
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year, Bagelen was said to have 10,000 weavers, or almost 11 percent of all 
the families. There were 36,000 weavers in Besuki, a relatively small north-
eastern Javanese port town, in 1836, or 50 percent of all households. How-
ever, hemmed in by his conception that Java had, at most, “cottage industry” 
and moderate textile production, Boomgaard judges the archival figures to 
be “extreme” and best left “out of consideration.”82 Yet, these figures were 
probably accurate, considering the expansion in exports of Javanese cotton 
textiles in the eighteenth century.
 Although textile manufacture went into decline with the arrival of Euro-
pean imports after the mid-nineteenth century, the Javanese batik industry 
took off and reached one of its peaks of development in its long history. The 
development of Javanese cotton textile production witnessed another inter-
esting twist of fate in the early 1930s, when the dying industry experienced 
an upswing as the Dutch textile export trade to Southeast Asian markets 
faced competition from the Japanese. To compete against the Japanese, the 
colonial government decided to conduct weaving in Java, using Dutch cotton 
yarns. In this historical context, Majalaya, where the bupatis and residents 
had maintained a small weaving industry, emerged as the center of textile 
production, accounting for almost 90 percent of all weaving enterprises in 
Java by 1938. Two groups of people, in particular, jumped on the opportunity 
and set up textile-weaving industries in the town. The first were members of 
a landowning class among the Muslim Sundanese in Majalaya, who also had 
a commercial background, particularly in the trade of textiles. The second 
group was the Hokchia (pinyin: Fuqing) Chinese, who came from the Fuqing 
region in the northeastern part of Fujian, China. The Hokchia Chinese, who 
had specialized in money-lending services, decided to invest in the weaving 
business when the colonial state imposed an anti-usury ruling in 1936.83 
These two groups of people continue to dominate the industry in the region 
up to the present day.
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the power of Culture and its limits
Taiwanese merchants’ asian commodity flows, 1895–1945
Man-houng Lin
Since the 1990s, newspapers and journals have been using terms such as 
“Greater China Economic Zone” and “Global Chinese Network” to describe 
how Chinese cultural ties facilitate economic relations. Scholars such as Leo 
Suryadinata, Wang Gungwu, and others depict Chinese oscillation between 
the affirmation of their specific ethnic identity and assimilation into other 
cultures.1 Other scholars, such as Marie-Sybille de Vienne, stress that the 
total gross domestic product (GDP) owned by the ethnic Chinese popula-
tion around 2004 is barely the GDP of Germany, and the diasporic rate of 
Chinese is only 3 percent of the Chinese population, while the Greeks have 
more than half.2
 In this chapter I take up the question of the effect of cultural ties on 
establishing economic relations by looking at Taiwanese merchants’ Asian 
commodity flows during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan 
(1895–1945). By “cultural ties” I refer specifically to ethnicity, customs, 
languages, and personal relations, and in the phrase “commodity flows” 
I include goods and capital traded. Taiwanese merchants’ East Asian com-
modity flows denote their trade with and investment in South China, Man-
chukuo, and Southeast Asia.3 The data for this study derive from archives or 
libraries in Taiwan, Japan, the United States, Singapore, and the People’s 
Republic of China (Prc), and consist of Japanese Foreign Affairs archives, 
investigations published by the Taiwanese general government and the Bank 
of Taiwan, and newspapers in overseas Chinese communities, in Manchu-
kuo, and in Taiwan.
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culture and immigration
Following Shibaoka Hisashi, who defined overseas Chinese as settlers rather 
than sojourners who merely stayed abroad for less than three months, im-
migration here refers to settlers rather than to sojourners.4 Immigration is 
a prerequisite for direct investment.5 Statistics on overseas immigration of 
Taiwanese during the period of Japanese rule are scattered. One 1926 docu-
ment offers a basis for understanding the distribution of Taiwanese who 
moved abroad. Like other sources for immigration statistics, this document 
sometimes excludes nonregistered people or dependents and thus provides 
numbers that are lower than the real numbers. Nonetheless, this document 
does effectively illustrate the geographical distribution of Taiwanese immi-
gration: South China had the greatest number (4,118), followed by South-
east Asia (522), other areas of China (118), Guandongzhou (19), Qingdao (4), 
Australia (3), and Chile (1) (see map 1).6 In contrast to Japanese immigrants, 
who moved out of East Asia and Southeast Asia in greater numbers than 
moved within this area from 1904 to 1935, Taiwanese migration was mainly 
restricted to East Asia and Southeast Asia (see map 1, fig. 1).
 Taiwanese immigration remained largely within South China, especially 
within south Fujian, as well as within the overseas Chinese communities 
from this region across Southeast Asia. According to the registered number 
published by the Taiwan general government, the total number of Taiwanese 
in China was approximately 335 in 1907, and 12,900 by 1936.7 If we include 
the estimated 7,000–8,000 who did not register, the number of Taiwanese in 
China in fact reached nearly 21,000 in 1936. Of this number, around 20,000 
resided in Fujian Province alone; the distribution within Fujian put 18,000 
of these in Xiamen, 2,000 in Fuzhou, and several hundred within the Zhang-
zhou and Quanzhou regions.8 An estimated 80 to 90 percent of the ancestors 
of the Taiwanese had arrived within the previous three hundred years from 
Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou, and they often retained family, prop-
erty, and friends in their ancestral homes.9 Guangdong was somewhat fur-
ther from Taiwan than south Fujian was, and the dialects spoken there were 
quite different from Fujianese. But their dialects were similar to the Hakka 
Taiwanese, whose population is about one-fifth of the Fujianese in Taiwan in 
1928.10 While the number of Taiwanese in Guangdong increased in the later 
period of Japanese rule in Taiwan, overall their numbers were far less than 
those in Xiamen.11
 In the early twentieth century, Taiwanese made up the greatest propor-
tion of Japanese nationals in South China, especially in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and 
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Shantou. Immigrants from Japan proper began to expand into South China 
only in the late Meiji period (1868–1912), comprising but a tiny proportion 
by the beginning of the twentieth century. There were virtually no Koreans 
in South China in this period. By 1936, when 12,900 Taiwanese were regis-
tered in South China, only 2,783 migrants had come from Japan proper.12 
According to a survey from 1 April 1937, of the 2,100 Japanese nationals in 
Fuzhou, 1,700 were Taiwanese; of the 10,678 Japanese nationals in Xiamen, 
10,000 were Taiwanese.13 Based on the results of a Japanese consular survey 
from 1 January 1942, the number of Japanese nationals in China indicates 
that Japanese and Koreans clearly outnumbered Taiwanese in north and cen-
tral China, but the opposite was true in South China (see figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
This data corroborates the trend of Taiwanese immigrants settling more in 
South China than in other parts of China.
 According to article 4 of the 1896 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation be-
tween China and Japan, Japanese nationals were only allowed to rent or pur-
chase houses, and rent or lease land for residence, doing business, or engag-
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figure 1 distribution of 
overseas Japanese proper 
in various continents, 1904–
1935. Source: Summed up and 
chart made from gaimushō 
chōsabu, Kaigai kakuchi 
zairyū honpōjin jinkōhyō 
[a population table of the 
Japanese overseas] (Tokyo: 
Tsushokyoku, 1935), 103–6.
figure 2 The distribution 
of Taiwanese in china, 1942. 
Source: chart derived from 
the table in komekura Jirō, 
Manshū, Shina: Sekai chili 
seiji taikei [manchuria and 
china: The great series of 
world geography and politics] 
(Tokyo: hakuyōsha, 1944), 
392. i am grateful to Xu Xueji 
for kindly providing me with 
this material.
figure 3 The distribution 
of Japanese nationals in 
north china, 1942. Source: 
chart made from the table 
in komekura Jirō, Manshū, 
Shina, 392.
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ing in industry at the international concessions or settlements of the treaty 
ports.14 Article 4 stipulated that they could also carry Japanese passports 
with Chinese officials’ agreement, which were valid for thirteen months, to 
travel among the treaty ports. If travel extended beyond the treaty ports, it 
had to remain within 100 Chinese li (189,412 ft) from the treaty ports, and 
it could not extend for a period of more than five days (article 6).15 The dis-
tance between Xiamen and Zhangzhou is 45 kilometers. As one kilometer 
is 3,280.83 ft, and one Chinese li is 1,894.12 ft, 45 kilometers is 78 Chinese 
li. The distance between Xiamen and Quanzhou is 100 kilometers, which 
is 173.12 Chinese li. However, several hundred Taiwanese had inhabited or 
done business in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. As Japanese nationals, the Tai-
wanese could live with the local Chinese.16 They were not required to live 














figure 4 The distribution 
of Japanese nationals in 
central china, 1942. Source: 
Manshū, Shina, 392.
figure 5 The distribution 
of Japanese nationals in 
South china, 1942. Source: 
Manshū, Shina, 392.
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well-established household-registration system, the Taiwanese could claim 
themselves as local people in order to do business or attend school.18 Some 
Taiwanese went so far as to sign contracts with local governments to culti-
vate opium, leveraging familial relations in inland areas. In the years around 
1920, the Taiwanese merchant Li Zhongyi, for example, could send money 
to a relative in Xiamen to purchase a farm of several thousand mou (0.1647 
acres) and over 400 head of plow-oxen; and set up the Zhannan Company, 
which, in addition to farming livestock, grew lychees, longans, mangos, and 
chestnuts.19 Taiwanese merchants could use their relatives to deeply pene-
trate into Fujianese society.20
 At the same time, because China’s Nationality Law, issued in 1909 (re-
maining effective with revisions through 1957), was based on the bloodline 
principle and insisted that any revocation of Chinese nationality required the 
state’s consent, even for people living on territories ceded to other countries, 
the Taiwanese were able to claim legally to be Chinese. Like other Chinese 
with other nationalities in the early twentieth century, the Taiwanese with 
Japanese nationality were able to retain their Chinese nationality and enjoy 
its considerable economic benefits.21 They were not restricted in employ-
ment or excluded from landowning rights as foreigners in China.22
 Taiwanese migrating to Southeast Asia also had the advantage of sharing 
a subculture with overseas Chinese already there. In Japanese colonial Tai-
wan, classes for Taiwanese to learn Southeast Asian languages were avail-
able. The Chengyuan School in Taipei began teaching Malay in September 
1913.23 Yet, when Taiwanese arrived at their Southeast Asian destinations, 
they rarely had problems communicating; whether in Singapore or Bang-
kok, they were able to call for a cab in the Taiwanese dialect to get to hotels 
and restaurants, and local residents could employ overseas Chinese to serve 
as translators in dealing with Taiwanese.24 In 1941, a Taiwanese merchant in 
Indonesia said, “It is common here to hear radio broadcasts from Taiwan, 
and since eighty percent of the overseas Chinese here are from Fujian, Min-
nan dialect is used in radio broadcasts.”25 In 1936, when a trade-oriented 
special program was opened to Taiwanese students in Taipei Commercial 
College, Taiwanese who could not speak Minnan dialect had to take related 
courses.26 In this school, Malay, Thai, Filipino, Burmese, Vietnamese, Can-
tonese, Fuzhou dialect, Minnan dialect, Santou dialect, spoken and written 
Chinese, Dutch, French, German, and Eng lish were offered at a minimum 
of two choices in one semester with two hours a week.27
 By the end of Japanese colonial rule, approximately 3,000 Taiwanese had 
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migrated to Southeast Asia.28 This suggests that cultural affinity could ex-
plain why the number of Taiwanese in Southeast Asia was second only to the 
number of Taiwanese in South China.
 The Taiwanese situation in Manchuria was different. Unlike in South 
China, where Taiwanese immigrants far outnumbered Japanese, in Manchu-
kuo it was not until 1938 that the Taiwanese approached one thousandth 
of the immigrants from Japan proper and one thirty-fifth of the number 
of Taiwanese in South China. According to the Shengjing Shibao, the largest 
newspaper in Manchukuo, the number of Taiwanese in Manchuria rose from 
about 60 in 1911, to 500 in 1932 at the establishment of Manchukuo, to 600 
by 1938.29 Furthermore, according to Liang Jinlan, a Taiwanese whose father 
operated a medical practice in Manchukuo, about 1,000 Taiwanese lived in 
Manchukuo on the eve of 1945.30 The number of Japanese immigrants in 
Manchuria was already 100,000 in 1911, 270,000 by 1932, and 600,000 by 
1938 (excluding military personnel and their dependents).31
 Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the passport ap-
plication procedure for Taiwanese traveling to Southeast Asia or to the Re-
public of China was not as simple as going to Manchukuo, since the latter 
was under greater Japanese influence than the former.32 Still, far fewer Tai-
wanese migrated to Manchukuo than South China or Southeast Asia. One 
reason was the rather high linguistic barrier in Manchuria. According to a 
1919 article in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo,
People from Jiayi (in south-central Taiwan) who have traveled to Fuzhou, 
Xiamen, and all over Southeast Asia have had no difficulties in travel, 
but as their prospects would be constricted by not being well versed in 
Mandarin Chinese, young people in this town thought deeply about the 
problem and formed the Tu’nan [Breaking through the South] Institute 
to study the spoken and written Mandarin.33
 In 1917, the Dongyang Association’s Taiwan Commercial and Industrial 
School also began teaching Mandarin to facilitate trade across the Taiwan 
Strait.34 In 1938, the Jiayi Commercial School in Tainan Prefecture, comply-
ing with Japan’s national policy, began actively cultivating merchant talents 
to expand business in China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. By the fifth aca-
demic year, students had to study written Chinese every Wednesday, and it 
was hoped they would all take up spoken Chinese courses.35 From these ex-
amples, it is clear that moving outside of South China or Southeast Asia re-
quired surmounting the linguistic barrier of Mandarin, even in Manchukuo. 
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It was, of course, possible for Taiwanese to speak Japanese in Manchukuo. 
As Liang Jinlan recalled, “In Manchukuo, I mostly spoke Japanese, and after 
being away from Taiwan for some time, I was not able to speak Taiwanese.”36 
However, Japanese people were the only people who could not communicate 
with the Mandarin-speaking people in Manchuria.
 Taiwanese immigration was 22,935 in South China, 7,045 in Central 
China, 1,442 in North China, 1,000 in Manchuko, and 3,000 in Southeast 
Asia on the eve of 1945.37 Cultural ties certainly provide an explanation for 
this clear trend in migration.
culture and investment
Most Taiwanese immigrants during the period of Japanese rule were mer-
chants who made large and important investments in South China. South-
east Asia and Manchuria ranked next in sequence.
 According to the Tongji nianjian [the statistics almanac] published by the 
Fujian provincial government’s statistics office in 1937, 81.18 percent of 
the Taiwanese in Xiamen were merchants, 4.51 percent were doctors, and 
7.85 percent were prostitutes.38 In Fuzhou, 68.18 percent were merchants, 
8.36 percent were doctors, 7.48 percent were government employees, and 
5.28 percent were teachers.39 According to a 1926 article in the Taiwan Nichi-
nichi Shinpo, “Some Taiwanese merchants and doctors are moving to Man-
churia.”40 In 1941, the Taiwan Association in Thailand had 76 members 
(including 8 Japanese), and if we include 10 others who had not become 
members and 65 family members, the total number of Taiwanese there was 
150; of these, only 3 were not engaged in commercial activities.41
 Even doctors often made investments as a side business. Dr Huang Shunji 
from central Taiwan’s Zhanghua county moved to Manchukuo and made 
purchases in real estate and farmland.42 Cai Shixing from Lugang of cen-
tral Taiwan, who with his uncle’s help was able to attend medical school, 
graduated and worked for the Sanwu [J. Sango] Company as a doctor. After 
ten years in Xiamen, by managing with small capital, he was able to rent 
pastureland to sell milk, his family was involved in the sugar business, and 
he was fast gaining respect.43 Wang Jingqiu, who spent twenty-two years in 
Thailand, engaged in several enterprises in addition to running a successful 
medical practice.44
 In addition to their work as company and store employees, these Taiwan-
ese merchants’ commercial activities extended to investments ranging from 
individual stores to large-scale industries such as factories, farms, mines, 
and banks.
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categories of Taiwanese investment
In 1929, Taiwanese in South China engaged in a wide range of commer-
cial activities. They opened businesses that dealt in foodstuffs (rice, to-
bacco, tea, wine, ginseng, fruit, candy, and seafood); clothing (cloth, dyes, 
leather, rubber shoes, jewelry, and lace); everyday products (coal, medicine, 
timber, antiques, incense, writing implements, printing, toys, porcelain, 
and furniture); modern products (clocks, fertilizer, machinery, chemicals, 
drugs, glasses, cement, alcohol, bicycle parts, medical implements, ship re-
pair items, ship materials, and dry-cell batteries); factories (incense, wine, 
staples, ice, drugs, soda, gas refining, batteries, and mining); and services 
(hotels, restaurants, real estate, and finance).45 In September 1926, the oc-
cupations of Taiwanese in Xiamen included the operation of opium dens, 
grocery stores, restaurants, hospitals, pharmacies, and distilleries. In 1941, 
service trades dominated their business.46
 From 1935 to 1940, Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had food-related stores 
for bread, coffee, tea, vegetables, rice, tobacco, and seafood; and for general 
products including western medicine, ship sail fabric, mosquito nets, exer-
cise equipment, and porcelain. They also invested in factories that produced 
canned fruit, ice, drinking water, iron, lime, and hats; or in factories for 
machine repair. In addition, they had plantations, fishing, and husbandry. 
In the service sector they had investments in finance, hotels, and real-estate 
agencies. In addition, Taiwanese in Southeast Asia included a fair number 
of doctors and actors. Taiwanese in Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
tended to work in Japanese companies or to own grocery stores, hardware 
stores, pharmacies, and tea stores. In Indonesia, more Taiwanese owned 
production industries, including weaving, dying, charcoal, iron, soy sauce, 
candy, canvas, and cold beverages. They also had more extensive financial 
power and a longer and closer relationship with the local overseas Chinese 
than Taiwanese did in other Southeast Asian countries. Taiwanese in Malaya 
and Singapore, being mostly of the laboring classes and weak in economic 
power, formed a great contrast with those in Indonesia.47
 The scale of the factories of Taiwanese merchants in South China and 
Southeast Asia was comparable. From 1935 to 1940, the businesses oper-
ated by Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had mostly ten or fewer employees, 
but there was also a factory employing over 600 workers. In terms of capi-
tal and operating expenses, the range was from 200 guilders to 280,000 
guilders. Factory employees included Chinese, Japanese, and locals.48 One 
Taiwanese business in Xiamen had ten or fewer employees in July 1941.49 
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In the field of manufacturing, a Taiwanese merchant in Fuzhou in about 
1914 operated a shoe factory with 32 employees, capital expenses of 45,000 
yen, and an annual profit of 26,000 yen.50 In Xiamen, a Taiwanese merchant 
opened the Guangjian Leather Factory with a local Chinese in 1920 on the 
Gulangyu international settlement with 62,500 yen as capital. In May 1928, 
another merchant opened the Huang Chengyuan Ice Factory with 22 em-
ployees, and a daily production average of 5 tons of ice. The Jiaji Yanghang 
Distillery had 80 employees and an annual gross profit of 110,000 yen, capi-
tal of 650,000 yen, and a net profit of 50,000 yen. Xinji Yanghang Crystal 
Sugar Factory, using sugar from Java and selling to Tianjin and Shanghai, 
was established in about 1917 with capital of 10,000 yen. With 60 employ-
ees and 12,000 crates of crystal sugar produced per year, the factory netted 
a profit of 120,000 yen.51
Taiwanese investment in Public works
The largest investments were made by the prominent Lin family of Banqiao, 
Taiwan. Lin Erjia (the son of Lin Weiyuan, who helped Governor Liu Ming-
chuan in Taiwan to build the wall of Taipei in the 1880s) established the 
Xiamen Telephone Company.52 In 1907, Lin Erjia assisted the Xiamen Guild 
to establish the Common Electrical Appliance Company and install street 
lamps. Over half of the Xiamen-based Electric Lamp Company’s capital of 
120,000 yuan was provided by Lin Erjia.53 In 1909, Lin Erjia answered the call 
of his relative through marriage, Chen Baochen (the teacher of Puyi, the last 
Qing emperor), to begin planning a railroad for Fujian province.54 In 1918, 
when the Xiamen Merchant Affairs Bureau was established, Lin Erjia was 
asked to repair the road from Anhai to Quanzhou. Lin Erjia also contrib-
uted to the development of the Quanzhou Electric Company.55 In 1913, Sun 
Yat-sen called for the development of modern industry, and the Quanzhou 
region began planning for electrification, but the 10,000 yuan of capital col-
lected by nine well-known locals was insufficient. Since the Lins of Banqiao 
were related by marriage to the Gong family of Quanzhou, the Lin family 
entered into the investment, contributing over 80,000 yuan, with an 85 per-
cent share of the total investment. It was only through this arrangement that 
it was possible to purchase generators to provide light for Quanzhou in 1916. 
Throughout 1913 to 1921, a relative of the Lin family managed the Quanzhou 
Electric Company.56 Furthermore, Lin Erjia’s nephew, Xiongzheng, and his 
uncle, Cai Faping, a merchant in Fuzhou, each contributed 500,000 yen to 
establish the Ri-Hua Joint Stock Company to mine in Anxi.57 In 1935, the 
manager of the Lin family of Banqiao, Xu Bing, carried out three surveys of 
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Tieshan Mountain in Anxi, Fujian province.58 Lin Xiongxiang (the grandson 
of Lin Weirang, Lin Weiyuan’s brother) ran a lumber business in Fuzhou and 
set up the Fuma People’s Car Company.59
 In soliciting investments to establish a sewer system in Fuzhou, Fujian’s 
construction bureau hoped to raise 500,000 yuan from overseas Chinese and 
1,000,000 yuan from the provincial government. The bureau guaranteed a 
return of 5 percent interest every year for three years, and they allowed Tai-
wanese and foreigners to join in; they solicited a loan from Lin Xiongxiang. 
In order to pay off old loans and encourage industry and commerce, the bu-
reau borrowed 2,000,000 yuan, and the Fujian finance bureau also sought 
a loan from Lin of 300,000 yuan to consolidate the province’s finances and 
to encourage industry and commerce. Lin Xiongxiang’s loans to the Fu-
jian provincial government for public works in Fujian in 1921–1922 totaled 
2,600,000 yen, 120,000 yuan of Fuzhou money, and 410,000 of the Taiwan 
Bank’s yen. They took place about every three weeks.60
 Another prominent family, the Lins of Wufeng in central Taiwan, made 
extensive investments in public works as well. Lin Jishang, the son of Lin 
Chaodong (a general merchant who had helped Liu Mingchuan to defeat 
the French in Taiwan and who monopolized Taiwan’s camphor industry), 
operated a canal from Longyan to Huating in Zhangzhou, Fujian, establish-
ing it with a capital of 150,000 yen and jointly operating it with Lin Ruiteng, 
Jishang’s brother. In 1911, Lin Jishang’s firm received permission from the 
Chinese government to extend the canal by 80 li. Lin Ruiteng and Lin Jishang 
set up three steam-powered pumps in Changle County, irrigating 2,000 jia 
of land. They invested about 30,000 yen in Zhangpu, Zhangzhou, to reclaim 
over 980 jia of farmland, and they also owned 1,500 jia of forested land in 
the mountains. Zhangzhou’s merchants once asked Lin Jishang to purchase 
a steamship that could service Zhangzhou and Xiamen. Lin Jishang and Lin 
Ruiteng also jointly ran a light rail between Quanzhou and Anhai. They also 
started the Jingkou Cultivation and Herding Company, in 1909, with a capi-
tal of 50,000 yen, purchased about 500 jia of land, then an additional 100 jia 
of farmland and 200 jia of dry farmland, which they reclaimed and used to 
raise cattle and grow fruit. Lin Jishang, Lin Ruiteng, and Lin Erjia started the 
Fujian Mining Company in Longyan of Zhangzhou with a capital of 400,000 
yen. In 1913, Lin Jishang obtained the Chinese government’s permission to 
mine and sell smokeless charcoal; they produced about 10,000 tons of coal 
per year, an amount that rose during times of war with increased demand.61
 By contrast with the previous two Lin families, whose ancestors both 
came from Fujian and invested heavily in Fujian, the Xiao family, whose an-
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cestors were Hakka from Guangdong, invested in Guangdong. Xiao Xin-
dong from Pingdong, in southern Taiwan, went to Shantou, in 1916, to begin 
a joint venture with a local merchant; they established the Yonghe foreign 
firm on 80,000 yen of capital, with Xiao and his cousin Xiao Enxiang provid-
ing 20,000 yen.62 Xiao’s younger brother Xiao Ranzhao moved to Shantou to 
serve as consultant to the firm. The firm purchased a mine in the Longfeng 
region of Guangdong province and began digging. Xiao also provided capi-
tal for the Shanzhang Light Rail Company, which purchased ten li of track 
produced in Osaka from Mitsui Company. The ten-li light-rail line they built 
connected Shantou and Chenghai.63
 The extent to which Taiwanese merchants invested in public works 
ranging from telephone, electricity, and rail to canals, automobiles, steam-
powered pumps, and mining in South China was simply not found in South-
east Asia or Manchukuo. Other than the big families, Taiwanese in general 
played a decisive role in Xiamen and Fuzhou relative to Shantou and Guang-
zhou in South China.
The role of Taiwanese merchants in South china
According to the Maritime Customs Annual Report from Xiamen in 1903, “They 
[the Taiwanese with Japanese nationality] have larger shop signs, and by 
being able to use the title of ‘foreign firm,’ they are able to thrive off Chi-
nese merchants and contend for the business [of ] other foreign firms. . . . 
In the same year, Xiamen had 254 foreign firms, 230 of which were owned 
by Chinese with foreign nationality, and 150 of whom were Taiwanese.”64 
A survey by the Taiwan general government in 1929 also reveals that Tai-
wanese merchants in Xiamen were very influential in political and financial 
circles; financially, they owned altogether 7,000,000 yen of real estate, and 
12,000,000 yen in liquid assets. Twenty of the Taiwanese merchants collec-
tively owned over 100,000 yen, far more than any local Chinese.65 In 1941, 
during the Japanese occupation of Xiamen, the major companies and trading 
firms were run by Taiwanese. Among these major firms, 76 were Taiwanese, 
while 29 were Japanese, 4 were Fujianese, 2 were Korean, and 2 were non-
Fujianese Chinese. In terms of the number of employees, Taiwanese firms 
had the most; three Japanese firms had over 8 employees, two had 8, and 
one had 17. Five Taiwanese firms had over 8 employees (10, 11, 12, 22, and 
29 employees, respectively). Thus, in terms of scale, Taiwanese firms were 
larger than Japanese firms.
 In Fuzhou, the Taiwanese were fairly powerful in Fuzhou’s politics and 
economy from 1918 to 1921, but their power decreased markedly after 1933 
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as Chinese overseas students grew more powerful and after the 18 Septem-
ber Incident (also known as the Mukden Incident, which gave Japan the pre-
text to invade and occupy Manchuria) sparked anti-Japanese sentiment.66 
In Shantou, fourteen Taiwanese firms owned over 10,000 yen in capital in 
1934.67 In Guangzhou, quite a few of the Taiwanese in Guangzhou were 
laborers, servants, miners, and factory workers; transport workers were par-
ticularly common. While prostitution was common, fewer Taiwanese than 
Japanese joined this trade. Likewise, fewer Taiwanese than Japanese were 
company employees or workers involved in finance. In addition, quite a few 
Taiwanese were professionals such as doctors, artists, and reporters. Lastly, 
some Taiwanese were in the field of industry and commerce, in sundries, 
foodstuffs, clothing, printing, transport, and trade.68
modest Taiwanese investment activities in manchukuo
Japan wanted to develop Manchukuo on the model of Taiwan, and Taiwan’s 
capital had flowed to Manchukuo. Yet most of it came from the Taiwan gen-
eral government or from merchants from Japan based in Taiwan.69 When 
Taiwan’s Lin family of Banqiao visited Manchuria in 1910 and 1932, they were 
cautious in investing here.70 This was very different from the situation in Xia-
men, where Taiwanese merchants including the Lins of Banqiao made major 
investments. In 1935, the native banking industry in Fujian, dominated by 
Taiwanese capital, provided about 70 percent of capital for trade between 
Fujian and Taiwan, leading even the Bank of Taiwan.71 This was also the 
opposite of the situation in Manchukuo, where Japanese capital led Taiwan-
ese resources.
 Not only did linguistic and cultural similarities cause Taiwanese to mi-
grate and invest more in South China, but trade between the two countries 
was also quite developed.
cultural networks and Trade
Quite a few Taiwanese merchants were engaged in trade between Taiwan and 
South China. For example, in 1924 Gu Xianrong operated a 161-ton Japanese-
registered ship, the Jinzhou Hao, between Fuzhou and Quanzhou.72 Jian Shi-
yuan, who was born in 1898 and lived in the Taiping street area in Taipei, 
built Guangshengtang in Xiamen in 1932; he was elected six times as presi-
dent of the Taiwanese Association in Xiamen. He set up a branch of his com-
pany in Guangdong, dealing in medicine and trade.73 Shi Tianshou, born 
in Tainan city in 1892, set up the Heyu Shipping Company in 1910, went to 
Xiamen to work for the postal service in 1920, and in 1927 set up the Yiquan 
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Yanghang, a trading firm. In addition, he served as head of the Xiamen Ex-
port Union’s fourth section, the director of the Xiamen Import and Export 
Union’s Federation, a member of the Xiamen residents’ association’s assem-
bly, a director of the Xiamen finance union, and a council member of the 
Xiamen trade hall.74
 With trade networks like this, the value of Taiwan’s trade with south Fu-
jian actually comprised an average of 72.72 percent of all of Taiwan’s trade 
value with China between 1902 and 1912. After 1913, the percentage gradu-
ally dropped: by 1931 the average was 51.3 percent, and between 1932 and 
1937 the average was 50.6 percent.75 Taiwan’s volume of trade with South 
China was twice that with Southeast Asia in 1922 and eight times that in 
1935.76 This somewhat describes the effect of cultural relations on trade, be-
cause Taiwan’s cultural relations with South China were closer than those 
with Southeast Asia. However, in Taiwan’s case, we see the influence of Japa-
nese policy and power manifesting itself in increased immigration to, in-
vestment in, and trade with South China.
Japanese Policy and Power
When Taiwanese engaged in economic activities out of Taiwan, legally, they 
had to apply for the Japanese passport. This passport allowed Japanese people 
to enjoy extraterritorial rights while they were in China or some Southeast 
Asian countries, and it also gave them closer access to Manchukuo.
PassPorT sysTeM
Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed between Qing China and Japan 
in 1895, reads: “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the 
following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public 
property thereon.” The “following territories” denote the island of Formosa 
and the Pescadores. Article 5 of the same treaty conveys, “The inhabitants of 
the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the 
ceded districts, should be at liberty to sell their property and retire. For this 
purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the present 
Act [5 May 1895] shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of 
the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of 
Japan, be deemed to be the Japanese subjects.”77
 As Japanese subjects, the Japanese from Japan proper (naichijin 內地人) 
were not required to carry Japanese passports when they entered China. 
Article 4 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between China and 
Japan had allowed Japanese nationals to move and reside freely in China’s 
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treaty ports. As the passport was aimed at ensuring that Japanese subjects 
in China could gain protection from their consuls in the destination coun-
try, no passport was needed unless going inland. However, Taiwanese with 
Japanese nationality, hontojin 本島人, had to apply for a passport to enter 
China. Since Taiwan had been China’s territory before its cession to Japan, 
the movement of people across the Taiwan Straits had been controlled after 
cession.
 For the general population to travel from China to Taiwan for business or 
personal matters, a certificate from the government on the China side was 
required as regulated in September 1895. Before 1898, to prevent anti-Japan 
violence from being fanned, laborers from China were prohibited. Between 
1898 and 1905, desperately needed tea workers from China were allowed in. 
From 1905 to 1937, all laborers from China were required to come with the 
agency of a Japanese-run Nanguo gongsi (Nankoku kaisha), which provided cer-
tificates allowing them to enter Taiwan or return to China. Between 1937 
and 1945, people from China were generally not allowed to enter Taiwan.78
 People moving from Taiwan to China had to go through a more thorough 
passport system. In 1878, the Japanese government issued its Passport Act. 
In April 1897, as the deadline for the Taiwanese to decide whether to stay 
as Japanese nationals or to leave drew near, the Taiwan governor-general 
ordered that those who stayed and registered in each district and prefecture 
could follow the 1878 Passport Act when traveling to China or other coun-
tries. However, those going to China still required special investigation. Be-
fore 1907, the attachment of photographs to certificates was encouraged, 
but not enforced, because many Taiwanese still feared to have their photo-
graph taken due to the belief that their soul would thereby be stolen. The 
submission of certificates for household registration was also flexible, as 
the system was not established until 1907. From 1907, certificates were re-
quired. In Japan, photographs were not required until 1918, while in Taiwan 
the requirement was introduced in 1907. In special cases, a guarantee from 
a local notable was required. Japanese nationals from Japan or Korea could 
also apply for a passport in Taiwan via a similar process, but applicants who 
were financially better-off could proceed faster. After Japanese nationals ar-
rived at their destination, they had to register with the Japanese consul there. 
The passport application had to be made at the prefecture. The passport ap-
plication section of the local government had moved from the general affairs 
section to the police section in 1901. On the application form, applicants had 
to provide information on their name, native place, birth date, current resi-
dential address, profession, title, travel destination, and purpose of travel.
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 Taiwanese who went directly to China from Japan without applying for 
a passport could be fined, depending on the circumstances: a Taiwanese in 
Japan who made an urgent visit to his dying father in China without applying 
for a Taiwanese passport in Japan could be pardoned; but an anti-Japan Tai-
wanese on the same route would be fined.79 The discretionary nature of the 
fine opened loopholes for smuggling criminals or anti-Japanese Taiwanese 
into China.80 Of the sixty to seventy Taiwanese who sneaked into China from 
the ports of Japan through Shanghai to Fujian, fewer than 10 percent used 
the cross–Taiwan Strait junks, and 30–40 percent bribed sailors of Osaka 
Steamship Company to hide them in cabins while passing through the Tai-
wan Strait.81
 The Japanese passport illustrated in figure 6 lists the holder as belong-
ing to the category of merchant (merchant category no. 6776). The pass-
port notes his Taiwan address (17, Chome 2, St North Gate, Taipei, Taipei 
district), age (42), business (antiques), and the port (Tamsui) and date of 
departure (29 April 1900). A photo of Li Zhishan, wearing a mandarin robe, 
is attached. “Passport of the Japanese empire” was stamped by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. The main text asks protection for the bearer of the pass-
port. The bearer filled out the destination of his travel (Xiamen and Fuzhou 
of the Qing empire and Hong Kong under the British rule). On the left fold 
of the passport, there are Chinese, Eng lish, and French translations of the 
main elements on the right fold. In addition, a handwritten addendum given 
by the Taipei prefect claimed that this passport could be renewed when it ex-
pired three years after issuance.
 The Japanese passport, though troublesome to obtain, provided Taiwan-
ese in China with the advantage of not having to pay local taxes or be mo-
lested by local bullies as the Japanese consuls protected them. Like overseas 
Chinese from Southeast Asian countries who had taken up French, British, 
Dutch, or Spanish nationalities, the Taiwanese could now hold a foreign 
passport to open “foreign firms” (yanghang 洋行) in China.82 Even the local 
notables in South China attempted to obtain this kind of passport in order 
to be one of Taiwan’s registered people.83
 Japan took Fujian as its sphere of power after 1898, just as France had 
taken Southwest China; Eng land, the Yangtze Valley; Germany, Shandong; 
and Russia, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Taiwanese or Fujianese 
notables could serve as intermediaries for the penetration of the Japanese 
empire into South China. By contrast with the Chinese immigrants in Japa-
nese colonial Taiwan, who were poorer than Taiwan’s notables, the Taiwan-
ese in Fujian were better off than the locals.84 In Xiamen, Japanese nationality 
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figure 6 overseas passport of the Japanese empire. a passport issued by the imperial Japanese 
government in 1917 for use by Taiwanese people for travel to china. reproduced courtesy of  
chang Tun-chih.
was preferred over that of the European countries as the latter would have 
involved military conscription and the inheritance taxes exempted by the 
Japanese nationality.85 The Dutch assimilation law issued in 1907 required a 
familiarity with spoken Dutch, the possession of wealth, the obligation of 
military service, and the equal division of property among sons and daugh-
ters in accord with Western, and not Oriental, ideas of justice.86 By contrast, 
Japanese naturalization in the early twentieth century required no racial or 
geographical condition of birth. Those who had lived in Japan for more than 
five years, were more than twenty years of age, of good morals, possessing 
property or the ability for self-maintenance, and had no other nationality 
could be naturalized. Marriage and adoption were two other routes to be-
coming a Japanese national.87 The Taiwanese in the Dutch East Indies paid 
fewer taxes than the Chinese there, and overseas Chinese often tried to gain 
Japanese nationality.88 For the latter, doing business in Taiwan was one ave-
nue to achieving Japanese nationality.89 As Japan’s southern advance policy 
took the alliance of Taiwan and South China as the basis for the further alli-
ance with Southeast Asia, the Japanese government generally welcomed the 
naturalization of these overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.90 The overseas 
Chinese from Southeast Asia received more advanced technology for invest-
ment from their association with the Taiwanese. For example, when overseas 
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Chinese from Java, Penang, and Hong Kong invested in the railway construc-
tion in Shantou, they obtained Japanese technology through the introduc-
tion of a co-investor from Taiwan.91
 This period witnessed a series of boycotts against the Japanese goods, as 
these movements often drove up the prices of the Japanese goods sought 
after by the market and eventually earned the Taiwan-Japanese profit.92 The 
power or policy of the Japanese government also made South China lose out 
relative to Manchuria as Taiwan’s main trading partner after Manchukuo was 
set up, in 1932. The Sino-Japanese War put the Taiwanese in opposition to 
the Chinese under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.
PoliTics-econoMics TrUMPed cUlTUre
Before 1932, the entire Chinese mainland was governed by the Republic of 
China. Between 1932 and 1944, Manchuria fell out of China’s de facto con-
trol. During the period between 1902 and 1932, the value of Taiwan’s trade 
with Fujian made up the greatest portion of the value of Taiwan’s trade with 
the Republic of China.93 Between 1925 and 1927, the value of Taiwan’s trade 
with South China was greater than its trade value with Manchuria, but from 
1928 to 1939, the value of trade with Manchuria quickly surpassed the value 
of trade with South China. Although there was more smuggling between 
Taiwan and South China than between Taiwan and Manchukuo, the value 
of Taiwan’s legal trade with Manchuria increased rapidly between 1932 and 
1939 and made up 67.6 percent of Taiwan’s total value of trade with the Chi-
nese mainland, while during the same period, that with South China only 
comprised 11 percent on average.94 During this period, the value of Taiwan’s 
trade with Manchukuo was six times that of Taiwan with Fujian and eight 
times that of Taiwan with Southeast Asia (see fig. 7). Taiwan’s trade with 
Manchuria generally fluctuated around the level between that of 1938 and 
1939 until 1941, and then declined after 1943 when Japan increasingly lost 
control of Manchuria with the increasing threat from Russia and the Chi-
nese communists.95
 Taiwanese who participated in the Taiwan-Manchuria trade include 
notables such as Liu Xinshui, born in 1897 in Luliaokeng, Qionglin Village, 
Zhudong County, Xinzhu Prefecture, who worked to expand the marketing 
network for Taiwanese citrus fruits in Manchukuo, Korea, and Tianjin; and 
Liu Zongmiao, born in 1880 in Sanxia Town, Haishan County, who became 
a tea master (who graded the quality of tea) for the Mitsui Tea Company 
in 1927, and set up the Nanxing Yanghang in 1932 to export tea. In 1941, 
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Liu Zongmiao began serving as a council member in the Taiwan Tea Export 
Union for Manchukuo and China.96
 An important factor for the more dominant Taiwan-Manchuria trade 
was Manchukuo’s advantage over South China and Southeast Asia of being 
compatible with Taiwan in terms of a regional division of labor. In agricul-
tural production, both Taiwan and Southeast Asia were at the development 
stage: Taiwan produced sugar, rice, and tea, the major products of South-
east Asia, and besides several fruits that could not be grown in China due to 
the climate, Taiwan’s products were also grown in China in large amounts.97 
Other industries, such as fishing, timber, or mining, were “identical” with 
resources on the Chinese mainland; very few products were unique enough 
to find a profitable niche.98 Thus, the economies of South China, Southeast 
Asia, and Taiwan did not share complementary functions. In contrast, there 
was a great demand for Taiwan’s abundant fruits and vegetables in the cold 
climate of Manchukuo, and Manchukuo’s bean-cakes could be used as fer-
tilizer in Taiwan. Thus, even though Taiwan’s distance from Dalian was far 
greater than the distance between Dalian and mainland China, it came to be 
figure 7 changes in the value of trade between Taiwan and various regions of mainland china, 
and Southeast asia, 1925–1939. Source: calculated and combined from the following trade records: 
for 1925–1926, Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, Shina no jikyoku to Shina bōeki no shōchō, 170; 
for 1927–1936, Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina (bōeki), 43; for 1937–1939, 
















1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
324 man-hou ng li n
that the tonnage of freight transported between Taiwan and Dalian was sec-
ond only to that of Dalian freight with Japan, far outweighing the tonnage 
of freight between Dalian and any other place in China.99
 Relations between Taiwan and Manchukuo were also encouraged by the 
Japanese government, as evidenced by the establishment of a branch of the 
Bank of Taiwan and the increase in shipping. After the 18 September 1931 
Incident, the surge in anti-Japanese sentiment in South China and Southeast 
Asia harmed Taiwan’s trade position there.100
 The 18 September Incident led to the establishment of Manchukuo, and 
the 7 July Incident of 1937 put Manchukuo under even greater influence from 
Japan. These two incidents led Taiwan to replace China as the major pro-
vider of tea to Manchukuo, especially after Taiwan’s tea market in Southeast 
Asia dried up due to anti-Japanese sentiment. These two incidents, in which 
Japan invaded China and earned the enmity of the Chinese people, actually 
received a positive appraisal in Taiwan. Chen Rongsen, of the Dadaocheng-
based Rongxing Tea Company, was quoted in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo, 
during his 1933 inspection tour of Manchukuo, as having said, “As tea sales 
have slumped, the tea farmers who grew tea for me deem the addition of the 
Manchukuo market as a lucky star.”101 When Japan invaded China, in 1937, 
prominent tea merchant Chen Qingpo was deeply moved by the “valiance” 
of the “imperial army,” calling it a “holy war” (sheng zhan). When Chen visited 
Mongolia to work on developing the market for Taiwanese tea, he said, 
“The untrustworthiness of Chinese merchants has earned the hatred of the 
Mongolians.” Further, he said, “Now, the Japanese empire is leading these 
peoples to establish a great East Asian union.”102
 In 1938, when the Japanese army occupied South China, the power of Tai-
wanese merchants in South China expanded greatly. They provided running 
water, electricity, banks, hospitals, newspapers, food cans, marine products, 
garments, ships, intelligence, and even opium for the Japanese army.103 In 
the process of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chongqing government planned 
to take Xiamen as “a base from which airfields could be used to bomb Japan 
and Taiwan.”104 When Japan started to invade China after 1937, many local 
students acquiring a Japanese education at a Japanese-sponsored school in 
Xiamen withdrew, while several Taiwanese students at the school celebrated 
the victory of the imperial army.105 Even though both Taiwanese and the Fu-
jianese shared the same culture, they now belonged to two nation-states in 
conflict.
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conclusion
In view of the overseas migration of Taiwanese merchants during the period 
of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese diasporic rate is less than 1 percent, even 
including those who had migrated to Japan.106 It is less than the 16 percent 
of Japanese from Japan in 1935.107 However, the size of Taiwanese immigra-
tion and investment was still big when compared with other internationals. 
Yang Duanliu’s and Hou Houpei’s Statistics of China’s Foreign Trade during the 
Last Sixty-five Years has listed the annual number of people from various coun-
tries in China between 1872 and 1928. The peak years for each nationality in 
China were as follows: Russia had 148,170 nationals in China in 1919; the 
United States had 9,356 in 1923; Eng land had 15,247 in 1925; and Japan had 
239,180 in 1928.108 The presence of around 20,000 Taiwanese in China in the 
1930s and 1940s was more than the number of American or British people 
in the 1920s. Yang also had statistics of international firms in China. Using 
the 150 Taiwanese firms in Xiamen in 1903 as a basis for comparison, the 
various internationals had the following firm numbers in China in the same 
year: Eng land had 420; Japan had 361; the United States had 114; Portugal 
had 45; Spain had 29; Russia had 24; and Norway had 7.109 The Taiwanese 
had 171 firms in 1938 in Xiamen.110 In 1941, Taiwanese commercial power in 
Xiamen was stronger than that of the Japanese from Japan in terms of firm 
number and employment rate. Japanese foreign-affairs records indicate that 
there were approximately 171 Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asia from 1935 
to 1940.111
 These Taiwanese firms were involved in various trades, from salty fish to 
cameras. In general, their scale was small, but they could be involved with 
big enterprises such as factories, plantations, mining, banks, and even pub-
lic works such as telephones, electric power, canals, and railroads. When 
the American robber barons such as Leland Stanford, Cornelius Vanderbilt, 
Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and J. P. Morgan invested in rail-
roads, mines, telephones, telegrams, and finance and industry at home and 
abroad, including China between the 1880s and 1930s, the Taiwanese joined 
this investment fever in South China.112 Overseas Chinese from Southeast 
Asia also invested in Fujian’s urbanization. An example was Huang Yizhu 
(1868–1945), a Fujian-born merchant in Indonesia who was the most im-
portant real-estate investor among the overseas Chinese in Fujian from 1927 
to 1935, and who was described as the biggest investor among the overseas 
Chinese merchants in modern China by Lin Jinzhi, an overseas Chinese his-
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torian in the Prc. Huang was vice chairman of Xiamen’s chamber of com-
merce in 1920, while the Taiwanese Lin Erjia was its chairman.113
 By contrast with other internationals, the Taiwanese had the advantage 
of speaking the same dialect with some people in Fujian and Guangdong 
Provinces. They could also rely on the bloodline-based Chinese nationality 
law to acquire Chinese nationality. Relatives and friends could help them to 
find work and invest in the interior area, which legally excluded foreigners, 
including Japanese, and to which the Taiwanese now legally belonged. In 
Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese also shared the same dialects or ethnic traits 
with the overseas Chinese communities there, whereas the Mandarin used 
in Manchuria was a foreign language to the Taiwanese under Japanese colo-
nial rule. The cultural affinity certainly explains the greater immigration and 
investment of the Taiwanese in South China and Southeast Asia as compared 
with that in Manchuria.
 On the other hand, the Taiwanese, considered Japanese subjects accord-
ing to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, carried the status of foreigner in China. In 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, many Chinese people tried 
to obtain foreign nationality in the treaty ports of China so as to avoid lijin 
and other political harassment from the unstable Chinese government.114 
Even in Southeast Asia, some overseas Chinese coveted Japanese nation-
ality.115 The legal identity of Taiwanese cast them as intermediaries for the 
Japanese southern advance policy in South China and Southeast Asia, dem-
onstrating the cross-fertilization of the cultural affinity of the Taiwanese and 
Japanese policy and power.
 Yet, when Japan set up Manchukuo, in 1932, Taiwan traded more with the 
latter than with South China or Southeast Asia, due to its Japanese infra-
structure and the comparative advantage that Taiwan gained through selling 
tropical agriculture products in exchange for Manchurian soybean, coals, 
and fertilizer. In particular, when Japan was at war with China, the Taiwanese 
found that their status as Japanese subjects overrode their cultural affinity 
with the Chinese.
 Unlike the Chinese in Malaya under British rule, whose rice trade was 
replaced by the British, as described by Wu Xiaoan, Taiwanese indige-
nous capital under Japanese colonial rule had the chance to develop over-
seas.116 Through the passport system, the Japanese government had actually 
screened Taiwanese merchants abroad through the legal process.
 As with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese merchants 
had legal investments as well as investments in opium or other illegal busi-
nesses. Carl Trocki describes the relationship between Southeast Asian 
Powe r of cu lTu r e an d iTS lim iTS 327
opium development and the European imperialist powers, particularly the 
British Empire.117 John Jennings had depicted the Japanese government’s 
opium policy in Japan proper and in its colonies without mentioning its re-
lationship to the Taiwanese merchants’ overseas opium trade.118 In Taiwan-
ese investment in Manchukuo, even the Lins of Banqiao, the Lins of Wufeng, 
and the Lius of Liuying had cooperated with Manchurian people in setting 
up an opium factory in Manchukuo.119 In Thailand and South China, the Tai-
wanese used their extraterritorial privileges to sell opium or to engage in ter-
rorist activities, and they left a terrible impression on locals.120 Liang Hua-
huang had pointed out the Japanese consul’s guidance of Taiwanese opium 
cultivation and marketing to cooperate with local warlords.121 Zhong Shu-
min provided evidence of the Japanese consul’s tolerance, elimination, and 
encouragement of the sale of Taiwanese opium.122 Wu Lingjun’s study re-
veals an institutional background to the link between extraterritorial rights 
and crime. It was not because the foreign powers intended to nurture crime 
in the treaty ports, but because the foreign powers tended to lack the man-
power to police and enforce laws overseas. Wu’s study is based on an Ameri-
can case in the 1850s–1860s, when the American consuls’ prisons in China’s 
treaty ports had been so full that they were forced to borrow the British con-
suls’ prisons, from which some criminals escaped.123
 The Taiwanese selling opium in Thailand in 1919, for example, had little 
contact with the Japanese consuls, and were reluctant to make known their 
Japanese nationality.124 However, that the Taiwanese tea traders had de-
clared of “Holy War” because Japan had opened a bigger market for them 
through the Mukden and Marco Polo Bridge incidents fully reveals the Tai-
wanese identification with Japan. With Japan having ruled over Taiwan for 
about fifty years, the governmentality and subjectivity had become deeply en-
trenched. The process of Taiwanese “becoming Japanese” was a process that 
put both the Taiwanese and the Japanese government in the same boat. The 
Taiwanese were not only ready to die for the Japanese emperor, as Leo T. S. 
Ching notes, but were also seeking their own benefit while staying with the 
Japanese empire.125
 In Prc scholar Lin Jingzhi’s history of overseas Chinese investment in 
China, the chairman of the chamber of commerce and a leading Taiwanese 
in South China, Lin Erjia, was described as a “Taiwan compatriot,” while the 
vice-chairman, Huang Yizhu, was categorized as overseas Chinese because 
he was from the Dutch East Indies.126 In fact, however, all of Lin Erjia’s sons 
carried Japanese nationality, and Lin’s family endorsed many businesses in 
Xiamen promoted by the Japanese government.127 Lin Erjia’s family, which 
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carried multiple nationalities, including French, British, Japanese, and Chi-
nese, was similar to the overseas Chinese merchant Guo Chunyang, who was 
from the Dutch East Indies but adopted Dutch, British, Japanese, and Chi-
nese nationalities.128 Neglecting the fact that the Taiwanese, under Japanese 
colonial rule, were in fact also overseas Chinese prevents greater reflection 
on the concepts of the “Greater China Economic Zone” and the “Global Chi-
nese Network.” The ways in which the Japanese government utilized Taiwan-
ese cultural traits to promote its southern advance policy and Japan’s war 
with China illustrate the extreme power of culture, as well as its limits.
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riCe trade and Chinese riCe millers in  
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth Centuries
The case of British malaya
Wu Xiao An
Rice is currently the second-largest-produced cereal in the world, and about 
90 percent of the world’s rice production and consumption, 50 percent of 
imports, and 72 percent of exports are concentrated in Asia. The global rice-
export market is also very concentrated, although it consists of only 5 per-
cent of total rice production. In line with postwar political and economic 
changes, many Asian countries have implemented rice self-sufficiency poli-
cies, while China and the United States have emerged as the two most impor-
tant rice exporters. Over the last decade, Thailand was the largest exporter, 
accounting for around 25 percent of global trade. Vietnam ranked second 
(around 17 percent), and the United States was third (around 12 percent). 
China (4th), India, Pakistan, and Myanmar (10th) were also major export-
ers.1 Within Southeast Asia, among the top rice-importing countries cur-
rently are Indonesia (1st), Philippines (8th), and Malaysia (9th).2
 Historically, mainland Southeast Asia has been the major world rice ex-
porter, with the rice-export market centered on three delta areas—the Irra-
waddy in Burma, the Chao Phraya in Thailand, and the Mekong in Vietnam. 
As with other agricultural products such as pepper and other spices, regional 
and long-distance trade in rice and other commodities has always existed.3 
However, it was not until the 1850s that these delta areas started to emerge 
as major world rice-export centers, driven by the colonial expansion, the in-
creasing demand (initially from Europe and later from India and Japan), the 
flows of immigrant labor, infrastructure improvement, and technological 
advancement. Besides faster demographic growth, one outstanding feature 
of Southeast Asia is that domestically, a clear division of labor was organized 
in line with ethnic boundaries. The indigenous people of Burma, Thailand, 
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and Vietnam became farmers while Indians migrated to the Irrawaddy delta 
to become wage laborers, moneylenders, and small businessmen, as did 
the Chinese in the Chao Phraya and Mekong deltas. Regionally, a clear divi-
sion of labor was organized in line with national boundaries. The mainland 
Southeast Asian countries of Thailand, Burma, and Indochina functioned as 
the major rice exporters, accounting for four million tons each year (prior 
to the First World War), more than 90 percent of the world rice export and 
half the value of their total exports.4 While the maritime Southeast Asian 
countries of British Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and the Spanish and Ameri-
can Philippines were the major rice importers, where the colonial economy 
depended on the tin-mining, rubber, and other cash-cropping plantations 
and immigrant Chinese, capital and labor also played a leading role.5
 “Rice production and supplies have always ranked as a problem of first 
importance with the government because the rice situation dominates all 
other industries and it is necessary to the progress of the country,” as one 
prominent Chinese rice miller in Penang insightfully observed.6 If rubber 
and tin were the two main props for the colonial economy of British Malaya, 
then rice and opium were another two main sources for maintaining labor 
and government. The prosperity of both the opium and rice economies re-
sulted from the expansion of the tin and rubber economies. The immigrant 
labor was the core link between the production (rubber and tin) and con-
sumption (rice and opium) economies. The prosperity of tin and rubber 
brought into Malaya a large number of immigrants, who came not as paddy 
producers, but as wage labor and rice consumers. This large new immigrant 
community not only provided an indispensable labor force for the colonial 
production economy, but also provided a huge new profitable market for the 
immigrant consumption economy.7 As Carl Trocki’s research has shown, 
opium not only provided the main revenue source for the colonial govern-
ment and for Chinese towkays, but also became a daily necessity for Chinese 
labor. Therefore, opium formed an integral part of the colonial social order 
and a capital accumulation for the beginnings of Chinese capitalism.8 Just 
as labor was the mainstay of the colonial rubber, tin, and opium economies, 
so was rice. Cheap rice means cheap food; cheap food means cheap labor; 
while cheap labor means cheap costs, more profits, and continued economic 
prosperity for the interests of rubber planters, tin miners, and the govern-
ment. The depressive tin and rubber market in turn also influenced the rice 
and labor situations, which brought social instability and even crisis. These 
could be the dynamics of the colonial political economy.9
 However, although the rice-milling industry was a prosperous and profit-
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able business in British Malaya, the Chinese did not engage in the com-
mercialization of rice cultivation, which was left to the Malays. The colonial 
government did encourage Chinese capitalists for such commercial culti-
vation in the 1890s and 1930s, but was not successful. This is not only be-
cause tin-mining and rubber and other cash-crop plantings, such as sugar 
and coconut, were more profitable and attractive than rice cultivation itself, 
but also because cheap and good-quality rice from mainland Southeast Asia 
was usually available. Interestingly, besides rubber planting, the established 
rice millers in Penang—such as the Lim brothers, Cheng Teik and Cheng 
Law, and the Choong brothers, Lye Hock and Lye Hin—were also among 
the most important coconut-oil millers in early-twentieth-century Malaya. 
Of course, the founding fathers of established rice millers in Penang, such 
as Lim Leng Cheak and Choong Cheng Kean, were also the most important 
opium farmers in Kedah, which again confirms that the development of the 
Chinese rice-milling industry and of rubber planting was based on the capi-
tal accumulation of the revenue (opium) farms.10
 Prior to the Second World War, British Malaya mainly depended on rice 
imports, which comprised over 60 percent of its total consumption. In the 
early 1950s, efforts were made, and British Malaya’s domestic production of 
rice accounted for 55 to 60 percent of total requirements.11 The production 
peaked around 90 percent in the late 1970s and about 85 percent in the early 
1980s due to the Green Revolutions.12 However, the Malaysian domestic rice 
supply was steadily declining, and Malaysia was becoming “the Asian coun-
try most reliant on rice imports.”13 Malaysian rice imports were projected 
to rise marginally from 1998 to 2005, as continued small declines in rice 
area were more than offset by rising yields resulting from the higher pro-
ductivity.14 These days, the Malaysian government targets 65 percent self-
sufficiency in rice production, and it is believed that Malaysia remains de-
pendent on rice imports for 30–40 percent of its supply. This is attributed to 
the impact of more profitable industrial crops such as palm oil and coconut, 
competition arising from the trade liberation driven by globalization and the 
implementation of the asean Free Trade Agreement (afTa), and urbaniza-
tion.15 It is no wonder that the Malaysian government deems rice a security 
issue, not only because it is the staple food for most Malaysians, but also be-
cause of their high dependence on international imports, which exposes the 
state’s vulnerability in case of international political, economic, and nature-
based turmoil. In fact, Malaysia has experienced such lessons many times in 
history due to wars, depressions, and natural disasters.
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rice Trade
For a long time, the world rice trade was dominated by the three mainland 
Southeast Asian countries of Siam, Burma, and Indochina.16 Around 20 
percent of world rice production originated in Southeast Asia from 1920 to 
1990, but the region dominated the world market up to the Second World 
War with 80–90 percent of world rice exports.17 Throughout most of South-
east Asia, the rice trade was dominated by the Chinese, and mostly by one 
clan, the Teochieu. They handled exports to Hong Kong, mainland China, 
Singapore, Malaya, and other Asian markets.18 Although Indian and Euro-
pean merchants initially dominated this field in Burma, Chinese rice millers 
made substantial inroads during the 1930s.19 The rice trade in British Malaya 
was no exception, and it was largely monopolized by Chinese merchants, 
who formed a close-knit trading network linked by credit, kinship, and guild 
associations. However, the Chinese rice traders were largely Hokkien and 
Teochieu.20
 Malaya was the largest single rice importer among Southeast Asian coun-
tries. In 1920, for example, 69.9 percent of Malaya’s total rice supply de-
pended on imports; it was 66.7 percent in 1931, and 62.5 percent in 1941. 
Malaya imported 50 percent of its total rice imports from Siam, 43 per-
cent from Burma, and 5 percent from Indochina.21 Between 1918 and 1929, 
Malaya produced an annual average of 197,000 tons of rice, while it imported 
408,000 tons of rice each year over the same period.22 Singapore was the 
most significant entrepôt in the rice trade. Rice was imported from three 
mainland Southeast Asian countries and re-exported from Singapore to the 
Malay Peninsula and the Dutch Indies, from Hong Kong to Japan and the 
Philippines, as well as mainland China. Singapore handled up to 40 per-
cent of Siam’s exports. Over half the rice import, up to 80 percent in some 
years between 1871 and 1939, was re-exported from Singapore.23 Prominent 
Singapore-based Chinese merchants such as Tan Kim Ching, Khoo Cheng 
Tion, and Tan Kah Kee owned large rice interests in Bangkok, Saigon, or Sin-
gapore.24
 Within the Malay Peninsula, Penang, Malacca, and Kuala Lumpur were 
another three subregional distributing centers that functioned as second-
ary nodes. Unlike Singapore, Penang mostly imported rice from Rangoon, 
as well as very small quantities from other countries. Compared to Siamese 
rice, Rangoon rice was much cheaper and consumed by Hokkien Chinese, 
Malays, and some Tamils, which was in contrast with the other Chinese con-
sumers in Singapore and the Dutch Indies, who preferred Siamese-quality 
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rice. The rice was exported from Burma to Penang and re-exported to Suma-
tra and the hinterlands of the Malay Peninsula. However, in 1920, due to the 
improvement of port facilities in Belawan (Deli), the greatest changes in 
Penang trade occurred when the Dutch took to shipping rice directly from 
Rangoon instead of importing through Penang as before. The Federated 
Malay States not only imported rice from Penang, but also got it by rail from 
Siam and Perak.25
rice milling
The other pattern of rice trade concerned the local rice-milling business in 
northern Malaya.26 These millers dealt mainly in local rice milling, rather 
than rice from mainland Southeast Asia. These millers were situated in or 
near the large rice-producing districts of Kedah, Province Wellesley, Penang, 
and north Perak (Krian). The local rice millers also sold rice to the rice dealers 
and merchants categorized above. However, there were usually two different 
systems of rice trade that functioned in their own respective areas without 
much direct interaction, with each influencing, complementing, and even 
competing with the other through market forces, such as supply and price 
elements. Unlike the rice industry in mainland Southeast Asia, where the 
expansion of rice cultivation and export was driven by the demand from the 
world market, both in Southeast Asia and beyond, the commercialization of 
the rice industry in Malaya was mainly due to the tin and rubber boom and 
immigrant labor, and oriented to the local market in the Malay Peninsula, 
although a small portion was exported to outside markets such as Sumatra 
and China.27 Moreover, unlike mainland Southeast Asia, where the com-
mercialization of rice cultivation and export was the predominant source 
of revenue, in the premier paddy-cultivation state of Kedah, rubber also be-
came another important revenue item.
 Except for their own local paddy, Penang and Perak depended mainly on 
Kedah for their paddy supply. Paddy was imported from Kedah, and milled 
in Penang, Perak, and Province Wellesley. Besides a certain proportion con-
sumed locally, the milled rice was exported to other Federated Malay States, 
northern Sumatra, even to Ceylon, and sometimes to Hong Kong and main-
land China. At the local level of Kedah, the rice millers were concentrated 
in northern Kedah, centering on the Kota Star district. The rice and paddy 
trade route followed a course from west to east, then moved south to Penang 
and the southern state of Perak. The port of Kuala Kedah, near Alor Star, was 
the major loading point in the Muda region. Ports at Kuala Perlis, Langkawi, 
and Yen formed the hinterland collections of Kuala Kedah.28 The rice miller 
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made both white rice and parboiled rice, with the latter especially prepared 
for the consumption of Indian estate labor.29
 There were three types of commercial rice mills. The first comprised large 
and medium-sized commercial mills in Penang, Kedah, Province Welles-
ley, and Perak, which were controlled by a few Penang Chinese. The second 
type comprised small and medium-sized commercial mills, situated mainly 
in Kedah, partly in Penang, Province Wellesley, and Perak. Most of these 
mills were still dominated by Chinese, but with some Malay participation in 
Kedah, particularly in the 1930s. The third type comprised the government 
mills, namely Bagan Serai mill (built in 1919) and Kuala Kurau mill (acquired 
in 1924) in Perak, and Anak Bukit mill (built in 1940) in Kedah. The latter two 
types of mills mainly operated independently to compete with the first type 
of mill.
 In communal terms, Chinese, mostly Hokkien and a few Hakka, domi-
nated the rice milling, while Malays were mainly involved with rice culti-
vation. One prominent Penang Hokkien Chinese miller disclosed that rice 
milling was “almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese, who were origi-
nally pioneers in the trade. And in former years good profits were made by 
millers and the partners. Some of the Chinese rice-milling firms in Penang 
[had] acquired large fortunes in times past.”30 In marketing terms, the rice-
milling structure included two stages and seven channels. The rice mill was 
a core linkage between the production and consumption. The first stage of 
the paddy-collecting and rice-manufacturing process was from production 
to the mills. The second stage of the rice sale was from the mills to consump-
tion. The Chinese shopkeeper usually advanced money to the Malay paddy 
farmers so that he could have their crops after harvest. The Chinese shop-
keeper would be associated with a Chinese miller, from whom he got credit 
to finance the paddy.
rice combine
The history of the rice-milling industry and community in northern Malaya 
(1880s–1941) features the following characteristics. First, there had been a 
rice-milling hierarchy that was controlled by a few Penang Chinese fami-
lies. Second, Chinese rice millers made endless efforts to form a combine 
to coordinate the regional trading networks. Third, parallel to the rice com-
bine was the change of the rice-milling community and its leadership. At 
the regional level, the hierarchy was controlled by a few of the interrelated 
Penang Chinese families, who formed a top layer of the Chinese rice millers’ 
pyramid. They were the Phuah (Lim) Hin Leong family, the Lim Leng Cheak 
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family, and the Choong Cheng Kean family.31 These families’ control over the 
rice-milling networks continued through the second generation, namely the 
brothers Lim Cheng Teik and Lim Cheng Law, of the Phuah (Lim) Hin Leong 
family; the brothers Lim Eow Hong and Lim Eow Thoon, of the Lim Leng 
Cheak family; and the brothers Choong Lye Hock and Choong Lye Hin, of 
the Choong Cheng Kean family (see table 1). The rice-milling business his-
tory of northern Malaya before the Second World War was basically their 
family history.32
 The establishment of pioneer rice mills can be traced back as far as the 
1880s. The first rice mill in Penang was Khie Heng Bee, which was jointly 
established by Phuah Hin Leong, Lim Leng Cheak, and Chuah Yu Kay. Some 
years later, the partnership was dissolved. Phuah Hin Leong took over the 
entire shareholdings of Khie Heng Bee. Lim Leng Cheak built up his own 
rice mill, Chop Chip Hong Bee, around the late 1880s. In 1889, Lim Leng 
Cheak had another rice mill, Chop Chip Bee, in Kedah. These two families 
controlled the regional rice-milling and -trade markets in the 1890s. In the 
late 1900s, Chuah Yu Kay built another rice mill in Penang, named Sin Khie 
Bee. In 1909, their scions brought together four Penang rice mills—Phuah 
Hin Leong’s Khie Heng Bee, Lim Leng Cheak’s Chop Chip Hong Bee, Chuah 
Yu Kay’s Sin Khie Bee, and another mill named Joo Cheang Company—to 
form the Tai Chuan Company rice-milling ring.33
 Tai Chuan Company may be considered the predecessor of the Rice Mill-
ing Agency, the regional milling organization that was formally opened in 
January 1913. There were altogether seven mills in the rice combine: four in 
Penang, one in Kedah, one in Parit Bundar (Perak), and one in Prai, Prov-
ince Wellesley (see table 2).34 Its Chinese name was Tai Yu Company, and it 
table 1 The Penang chinese families controlling regional milling 
interests, 1880s–1941
No. The First Generation The Second Generation
1. Phuah Hin Leong Lim Cheng Teik
Lim Cheng Law
2. Lim Leng Cheak Lim Eow Hong
Lim Eow Thoon
3. Choong Cheng Kean Choong Lye Hock
Choong Lye Hin
Source: Wu Xiao An, Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882–1941: 
Kedah and Penang (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 128.
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held capital of $1,000,000, which was divided into twenty shares. Its main 
purposes were to avoid competition and reduce risk on the one hand, and 
to monopolize the northern Malayan rice-milling and -trading market, on 
the other. Indeed, there were three other rice mills outside the combine that 
belonged to the same families in the milling syndicate. These were Choong 
Lye Hin’s Ban Hin Bee and Lim Cheng Law’s Cheng Law and Company in 
Penang, and the Kwong Hin Mill in Parit Bundar (Perak). This arrangement 
may have been a strategy to deal with public opinion and the government, as 
there was strong public debate in the local newspapers.35 As one commen-
tator observed, “It would appear to be a sort of family arrangement to work 
for mutual profit while keeping up a semblance of competition.”36
 The partnership agreement of the rice combine covered five years, till 1918. 
During this period, the combine closed three mills: one on Penang Island 
and two in Province Wellesley, of which two of the Penang mills had been 
put out of action by fire.37 Therefore till the end of 1918, there were a total of 
eight large rice mills in the region. Another important development was the 
decision of the government to build mills in Kedah and Krian, which finally 
broke up the combine. In 1918, the partnership agreement terminated and 
the partners carried on business independently until 1919. In January 1919, 
the Rice Milling Company was again formed. In September 1919, the part-
ners entered into a supplementary agreement and changed the name to the 
Central Milling Agency, with capital of $1,650,000. The seven mills were 
controlled by the Central Milling Agency (see table 3). Former key member 
Lim Eow Thoon ceased to be a partner.38 Another important member, Lim 
Cheng Teik, left in 1919 to take up the management of the government mill 
table 2 mills controlled by rice milling company, 1913
Mill Principal Owner Place
Chip Hong Bee Lim Eow Thoon Penang
Khie Heng Bee Lim Cheng Teik Penang
Ban Hock Bee Choong Lye Hock Penang
Joo Cheang and Company Khoo Sin Hoh Penang
Chip Bee Lim Eow Hong Alor Star/Kedah
Kwong Mee n/a Prai/Province Wellesley
Kwong Jin Heah Swee Lee
Leong Fee
Parit Bundar/Perak
Source: Wu Xiao An, Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882–1941: Kedah and 
Penang (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 129.
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at Bagan Serai, Perak. At this point, Choong Lye Hock and Choong Lye Hin 
started to play an important role in the milling ring, although there were 
other new members such as Cheng Law and Company.
 The Central Milling Agency continued to operate until 1925, when it 
ceased to be registered in the Singapore and Malayan Directory.39 Now the 
firm controlling the Chinese milling and buying ring in Kedah and Penang 
was Messrs. Hock Hin Bros., although there was no formal name for the 
combine organization (see table 4). The mills paralleled or competed with 
two government mills, one in Bagan Serai and one in Kuala Kurau.40 In 1934, 
the daily capacity of the Choong family mills was 2,000 bags, with each bag 
weighing 170 katis, or 225 lbs., and this daily capacity equaled the total 
amount produced by all fourteen large and medium-sized mills in the state 
of Kedah at that time.41 In 1938, the rice millers in Kedah, Penang, and Prov-
ince Wellesley were again formally amalgamated and formed into a company 
with a capital of $500,000. The primary object was “to buy paddy economi-
cally and to sell rice at a moderate and fair profit,” as the local press stated.42 
The rice combine referred to the controlling firm, Hock Hin Bros. Company.
government Policy on Paddy cultivation
In British Malaya, the government policy on paddy cultivation was deter-
mined by two main interrelated factors: the availability of cheap rice on the 
international market, on the one hand, and the continued prosperity of the 
rubber and tin-mining economy on the other. If this situation remained un-
changed, any criticism of the government’s prewar food policy would be 
useless. There were two conflicting schools of thought on the subject of rice 
production during the colonial period. One held that rice production should 
table 3 mills controlled by central milling agency, 1920
Mill Owner Place
Ban Hock Bee Choong Lye Hock Penang
Cheng Law and Company Lim Cheng Law Penang
Ban Hin Bee Choong Lye Hin Penang
Ban Hin n/a Alor Star/Kedah
Kong Foh n/a Kuala Kurau/Perak
Kwang Hang Tan Lo Heong Parit Bundar/Perak
Kong Mee n/a Prai/Province Wellesley
Source: Wu Xiao An, Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882–1941: Kedah and 
Penang (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 148.
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be encouraged by all possible means so as to reduce dependence on exter-
nal sources of supply. The other maintained that agricultural prosperity had 
been built on a foundation of rubber and tin exports, and that with the avail-
ability of cheap rice on the international market, large-scale effort and ex-
penditure on domestic rice production could possibly lead to a loss of pros-
perity.43 The government policy prior to 1930 generally followed the latter 
view, although there were some government efforts to promote paddy plant-
ing in the late 1890s and early 1910s. However, the government reconsidered 
its position after 1930, and the former view was subsequently pursued. The 
1919 food crisis, the 1931 slump, and the Second World War no doubt con-
tributed to this change of view.
 As far as the local paddy-producing state of Kedah was concerned, two 
basic factors had to be taken into account in government policymaking. 
First, Kedah was the premier state for paddy cultivation in Malaya. Second, 
unlike other Unfederated Malay States (UMs), rubber planting in Kedah was 
the number one agricultural revenue source. Kedah government policy hence 
had to find a balance between the two crops. Two aims were consequently 
established: first, the Kedah government had to serve British strategic inter-
ests by supplying cheap food for the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay 
States (fMs); and second, it had to promote its own state interests of in-
creasing state revenue, guaranteeing the food supply for its rubber-planting 
population, and ensuring the welfare of the Malay peasantry. Reflected in the 
paddy-cultivation policy was the role of the government in encouraging and 
supporting paddy cultivation, and the increase in the acres and amount of 
paddy crop. Reflected in the policy on rice milling and trading was its care-
table 4 rice mills Belonging to the choong 
family in the 1930s
Name Place
Ban Hock Bee Penang
Ban Hin Bee Penang
Ban Heng Bee Alor Star / Kedah
Ban Kean Bee Parit Bundar / Perak
Ban Eng Bee Nibong Tebal /
Province Wellesley
Source: Wu Xiao An, Chinese Business in the Making 
of a Malay State, 1882–1941: Kedah and Penang 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 158.
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ful watch and effective control over the movement of paddy and rice, and the 
issue of price and export duty.
government and chinese rice millers
The government policy on Chinese rice millers had two targets: one was 
the Penang rice combine, and the other, Chinese rice millers in general. 
In dealing with the former, the Kedah government cultivated competition 
by encouraging the Kedah Chinese milling industry to be independent of 
the Penang Chinese. The government tackled the Penang Chinese regional 
rice-milling monopoly by declaring the rice combine illegal, by getting a 
Chinese from Kedah to open a new mill, and by breaking up the rice-mill 
monopoly— previously granted by the sultan—of Lim Leng Cheak in Kedah. 
However, the government found itself in a conflict of interest where Malay 
paddy farmers were concerned.44 The issue of price control was an irrecon-
cilable problem between the state government and Chinese rice millers. The 
latter tried to enhance the price of rice and depress the price of paddy; while 
the state government, on the contrary, aimed to depress the price of rice 
and enhance the price of paddy. In order to achieve their respective aims, 
both state government and Chinese rice millers clashed in a showdown of 
control and anti-control. Chinese millers organized themselves as regional 
milling networks to coordinate the milling and trading market, reduce com-
petition, and maximize profit. In competition with the Chinese millers, the 
state carried out a series of measures by establishing government mills, en-
couraging internal Chinese competition, setting up a credit society for the 
Malay peasantry, and initiating cooperative movements.
 Central to the issues of price and export duty, the interaction between the 
state and Chinese millers had been subject to the interchanges between the 
government’s administrative and political intervention, on the one hand, 
and the competition and free play of market forces on the other, with each 
influencing the other. These elements, which influenced the price of rice 
and paddy in Kedah and Penang, were subject to fluctuations in the interna-
tional rubber and tin markets in general, and the rice market in particular. 
The price was also greatly influenced by natural and political conditions, in-
cluding pests, cattle disease, and war. Whenever they occurred, paddy sup-
plies decreased sharply, while demand rose. These special circumstances, 
in turn, further affected the government policy of liberal trade, which was 
replaced by market intervention in terms of food restriction and control 
(see table 5). In theory, prices eventually depended on the changing relation-
ship of production and consumption, or supply and demand. But, as the 
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demand or consumption in Malaya had been certain and instant, the price 
of paddy, therefore, was mainly subject to one-sided change in the produc-
tion and supply market. Basically, under normal circumstances, the price of 
paddy depended on two main factors: one was the cost of imported rice into 
Malaya; and the other was the abundance of local crops that influenced sup-
plies of paddy for the mills in Kedah and Penang.
The Price
The government also attempted to compete with the rice combine by erect-
ing a government rice mill at Alor Star. The state council invited J. Reid, a 
managing partner in a very large rice mill in Rangoon, to visit Alor Star and 
report on the situation there. In February 1914, Reid submitted a detailed 
report, recommending the erection of a government mill and expressing 
confidence in its success.45 However, the preparations and discussions took 
a long time.46 In 1918, the high commissioner informed the British adviser 
in Kedah that he should advise the state council to take over management 
of the Alor Star rice mill at once. Legislation was then passed giving the 
government power to take over the mill. The scheme was estimated to cost 
$368,600 and would take eighteen months to complete. However, the prob-
lem was how to get access to the relevant experienced management and 
trading networks. In particular, if the object was “to reduce the cost of rice 
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to the consumer, the most detailed elaboration is required,” as the British 
adviser reported.47 This scheme was eventually set aside. It was only in 1939 
that the government rice mill was put into action at Anak Bukit. Once it was 
completed on 23 July 1940, the Kedah government took it over.48 The Perak 
government made a similar attempt, between 1917 and 1920, to oppose the 
Chinese rice combine through the establishment of government rice mills in 
the Krian district. Two mills were built: one at Bagan Serai and the other at 
Kuala Kurau. The Bagan Serai mill was erected by the government, while the 
Kuala Kurau mill was formerly owned and operated by Chinese. From 1 Sep-
tember 1924, the Kuala Kurau mill was taken over by the government, but it 
was closed down in 1926 for lack of paddy supply.49
 As the establishment of government rice mills was to influence the paddy 
price, both the governments of Kedah and Perak maintained good coordi-
nation on this issue. In discussing a food-decontrol proposal in the begin-
ning of 1921, the government mill in Perak was prepared to offer $4.30 per 
picul for Kedah paddy delivered at Bagan Serai railway station, while the 
Central Milling Agency would not commit to any statement as to price. Four 
Chinese shops were appointed agents for the government mill with a total 
paddy supply of 18,000 piculs.50 However, in March 1921, the Kedah Agent 
Food Control requested the sum of $10,000 for the purpose of buying from 
the raiats [peasants] through the medium of penghulus of mukims [heads of 
villages] and forwarding it to the Bagan Serai government mill. The princi-
pal object was to eliminate the “middleman,” who bought paddy from the 
raiats and sold it to the mills at a good profit. They said that the middleman 
made a profit of about $5 per kuncha when exporting to the Perak govern-
ment mill. Before long, a further $10,000 was again requested by the Agent 
Food Control.51 After the Kuala Kurau mill was acquired by the government 
in 1924, the manager immediately wrote to the British adviser in Kedah, re-
questing that the penghulus and paddy planters be informed that govern-
ment mills in Perak were prepared to purchase any paddy. The paddy might 
be delivered either at Bagan Serai by rail or at Kuala Kurau by junk.52 Under 
the arrangement of both governments, the prominent Kedah Chinese mer-
chant Goh Soon Leong was appointed the buying agent, serving between 
1924 and 1928.53
 In order to raise the price in Kedah, H. W. Jack, economic botanist of 
the Straits Settlements and the fMs, suggested in his report of 1928 that 
the Kedah government should “have an arrangement with the fMs govern-
ment mills in Krian, whereby whenever the price of paddy fell below a cer-
tain figure, they would purchase paddy in large quantities at an agreed fair 
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price and thus create the necessary competition.”54 A special rate by railway 
transportation was also arranged on rice and bran between Alor Star and 
Taiping in 1931–1932. Nevertheless, according to a local Kedah official, the 
government mills in Perak did not affect the prices in Kedah too much.55 For 
example, it was disclosed that in 1933–1934, all the millers in Kedah agreed 
among themselves that they would not buy paddy above a certain price. 
Hence the Kedah paddy planters were forced to sell their produce to the 
government mills in Perak at a lower price, instead of to their local mills.56
The export duty
With regard to paddy and rice export, there was structural change in Kedah 
probably from the late 1920s (see table 6). For a long time, Kedah had been 
exporting much more paddy than rice to Penang and the fMs. In the normal 
years prior to 1922, the export of paddy and rice averaged the equivalent of 
10,200,000 gantangs of rice. Of this quantity, 15 percent was exported as rice 
and the remaining 85 percent as paddy.57 At least from 1930 on, the export 
of rice outstripped that of paddy. This development was attributed to the 
government policy of encouraging the rice-milling industry in Kedah since 
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1910, which led to the emergence of many new rice mills in Kedah, particu-
larly from the late 1920s.58
 Long discussions took place between the Kedah government and Chi-
nese millers with regard to export duty. The export duty of paddy and rice in 
Kedah was fixed by the Treaty of 1869, and had been maintained for a long 
time. Paddy was $4 per koyan and rice $8 per koyan (see table 7). In 1911, 
the state council decided to raise the duty beginning in 1912. However, the 
right to collect export duty on paddy and rice was given to the Penang farmer 
Lim Cheng Teik, the eldest son of the pioneering miller Phuah Hin. It was 
initially intended that the government should collect all the duty itself and 
pay the farmer his due portion, but this was strongly opposed by Lim Cheng 
Teik. An agreement was later reached to the effect that, first, the state coun-
cil would allow Lim Cheng Teik to collect the duty, but any duty in excess 
of the amount fixed in the old farm contract should be handed over to the 
government; second, Lim Cheng Teik should appoint Malay clerks and keep 
all accounts in Malay at every place; and third, all clerks and revenue offi-
cials should be selected and placed under the control of the harbormaster.59 
The export duty was raised to $5 per koyan for paddy and $10 per koyan for 
rice.60 However, owing to paddy failure, the government exerted an export-
restriction policy for 1912, out of which there was five months’ absolute 
prohibition. This caused Lim Cheng Teik a great loss. With the intervention 
of the high commissioner, the state council acceded to Lim Cheng Teik’s re-
quest for a remission of the farm rent for five months.61
 With the expiry of the rice and paddy farm at the end of 1918, the gov-
ernment undertook the collection of the export duty itself. The government 
also abolished the system of collecting measure, and introduced a system 
of collecting by weight. The duty was increased with the rice-to-paddy ratio 
of 2:1. During the food-control period, from 1919 to 1921, no paddy was al-
lowed for export without special permission from the state council. A duty 
of 100 percent would be charged if such special permission was obtained.62 
When the food control was removed in 1921, the old rate of 1919 was re-
sumed. The rate was 20 cents per picul on paddy and 50 cents per picul on 
rice. The difference between the paddy and rice duties constituted a serious 
setback to the Kedah rice millers in their competition with the millers of the 
Straits Settlements and the fMs. On the petition of the Kedah rice millers in 
March 1923, the government approved a reduction of the duty by 10 cents, 
to 40 cents, in order to encourage the milling industry in Kedah.63 When 
the Kedah rice millers continued to petition for a reduction of export duty 
for the same concern in 1924, the government refused their claims on the 
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grounds that the duty rate was “substantially fair.”64 The higher duty on rice 
as opposed to that on paddy continued to place Kedah rice millers at a disad-
vantage in competition with external millers. In 1927, the Kedah rice millers 
again petitioned Tunku Ibrahim, regent of Kedah, to reduce the rice export 
duty. According to the going rate at the time, it was estimated that the export 
duty for 100 piculs of paddy was $20, while the total export duty on rice and 
by-products from 100 piculs of paddy amounted to $29.22. It was suggested 
that the rice millers in Kedah were paying about $10 more to export rice and 
by-products manufactured from 100 piculs of paddy than to export paddy 
itself for manufacture by millers outside Kedah, but the state council refused 
to change its stance after consulting with the Perak government mills.65
 However, the situation regarding the rice market changed before long. 
In the international market, supplies of cheap Rangoon rice were available, 
and local rice could be purchased at $7.50 per bag. Many estates had already 
made six- to twelve-month contracts, chiefly with Messrs. Mohamed Kas-
sim and Company for Rangoon parboiled rice at prices of about $8.40 per 
bag. The 1930–1931 season witnessed the largest harvest in Kedah in ten 
years, with a yield of 73,446,000 gantangs (compared to 69,280,000 gan-
tangs in 1920–1921).66 But the prices of paddy and rice were very low, in fact 
the lowest for many years. As they were afraid that they could not compete 
with the low-priced Rangoon rice, all the Penang buyers, the large mills, and 
the government rice mills were holding back from buying. The price of the 
table 7 The export duty of Paddy and rice in kedah, 1869–1934
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new paddy crop was $1.70 to $1.80 per picul and $10 per kuncha (160 gan-
tangs). Paddy at $1.80 per picul could be landed in Penang at $2.10 per picul. 
It cost 84 cents to ship a bag of rice from Kedah to Penang, of which 59 cents 
was export duty.67
 Under these circumstances, the state council had to reconsider the ex-
port duty, which was reduced twice in the space of a few months. From 
21 December 1930 onward, the state council decided to temporarily reduce 
the rice export duty from 40 cents to 35 cents.68 The reduction of export duty 
had the desired effect, causing the Penang Hock Hin Bros. Company to im-
mediately arrang a large rice-supplying contract with a well-known Indian 
rice-importing company and the local estates as well. Nevertheless, paddy 
prices fell further, with the millers offering about $1.40 per picul. In order 
to encourage mills to reopen and to keep up the prices of paddy, the state 
council again reduced the export duty by 10 cents, to 25 cents, and paddy 
from 20 cents to 10 cents.69 This reduction came into effect on 18 February 
1931. However, in half a month, a petition was again submitted to the state 
council asking for a further reduction of the export duty on paddy. The re-
quest was made through the Choong family agent in Alor Star and manager 
of Ban Heng Bee, Kang Cheng Wan.70
The malay Peasantry
To enhance the paddy price and depress the rice price, the government also 
attempted to break the Chinese rice millers’ financial ties with the Malay 
peasantry, who were predominantly rice cultivators, through the commonly 
practiced advance sale of paddy, known as “paddy kunca.” The majority of the 
paddy planters had fallen into the clutches of Chinese paddy dealers owing 
to their debt relationship with the latter. At the beginning of every planting 
season, through paddy dealers, the rice miller advanced loans to most of 
the Malay cultivators. The miller would provide the cash loans in exchange 
for paddy at harvest time. The practice was heavily criticized for its exploit-
ative nature, as the Malay cultivators were required to pay back their loan to 
the miller in paddy at a price under market rates, and at exorbitant interest 
rates.71
 The original idea of paddy kunca was to help and encourage poor Malay 
paddy cultivators on behalf of the sultan, and to guarantee the paddy supply 
market for the miller. In 1891, there was a debate over Lim Leng Cheak’s 
rice mill in Kedah. The Straits Independent and Penang Chronicle charged Lim 
Leng Cheak with exploitative conduct for having entered into a contract with 
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the cultivators in advance, while the Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle argued 
that it saw “nothing particularly immoral” in it. On the contrary, the Pinang 
Gazette and Straits Chronicle argued that the result was that many more Malays 
were going into paddy planting, paddy cultivation was rapidly expanding, 
and Kedah was being developed. In 1893, when discussing a scheme to en-
courage paddy planting, the British were very interested in Lim Leng Cheak’s 
experience in providing monetary advances to the Malay peasantry. The colo-
nial secretary W. E. Maxwell suggested that “some such system might with 
advantage be introduced in connection with the development scheme.”72 
When there was a famine and failure of paddy crops, Phuah Hin Leong took 
over from Lim Leng Cheak. At the request of the sultan, the new farmer 
pursued the same practice of giving cash advances to the cultivators. The 
same Straits Independent and Penang Chronicle admitted that the new farmer 
should assist the cultivators, otherwise the situation of the latter would be-
come worse than before. Also, in his report to the Kedah government in 
1928, H. W. Jack, the economic botanist of the Straits Settlements and the 
fMs, admitted that “the practice of borrowing cash from Chinese Milling 
Agents and others is a necessary one under prevailing conditions, for the 
cultivator must have some cash for the purchase of implements, matting, 
tongs, etc., while on the other side the Chinese must have paddy to keep 
their mills running and so competitive buying forces them to obtain a hold 
on the crops before they are cut.”73
 An important consideration for government policy centered on the rivalry 
with Chinese rice millers for the control of the Malay peasantry. Measures 
such as the government loan scheme of 1910–1916, the credit society for 
paddy planters in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the Cooperative Move-
ment in the 1920s, and the Week Fairs in the 1930s were aimed at destroying 
the Chinese intermediary roles with regard to the Malay peasantry. It was 
claimed that the government policy’s object was to “keep the Malay paddy-
planters out of indebtedness to the Chinese paddy-dealers,” to “release them 
from the ditches of the ‘Rice Combine.’”74 However, all these efforts failed 
in the end, although the government had boasted of its great success. As 
early as 1917, even the British district officer in Perak thought the govern-
ment loan scheme was “a failure although it . . . gave some temporary re-
lief.” The most serious defect was its fixed time for repayment in harvest. It 
made the paddy market situation even worse, as the paddy planters had to 
repay their loans in paddy crop to the government, Chinese paddy dealers, 
and native moneylenders (chetties) at the same time.75 In the 1920s, there were 
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many reports that Malay paddy planters were unable to repay their govern-
ment loans even by selling cattle.76 Many of them were prosecuted by the 
government.77 In 1935, a cooperative rice mill was formed with capital of 
$50,000 authorized by the government. That mill was built in 1936 with a 
total membership of 1,081. Due to the strong monopolistic structure of the 
Chinese corporate business, it failed after a few years. That mill worked for 
only eighty-eight days per year. The British adviser to Kedah, J. D. Hall, ad-
mitted that its failure was due to the price-cutting strategy of the Chinese 
businessmen, sustained for a long period and facilitated by large capital sup-
port.78
 In a word, the situation remained unchanged and most of the Malay peas-
antry continued to be indebted to Chinese paddy dealers, a fact that was con-
firmed in 1938 by the local Malay agricultural official H. H. Tunku Yaacob.79 
The Chinese continued to dominate the rice-milling industry and trading 
networks. As long as the government could not solve the issue of Malay 
poverty, the financial ties between the Chinese paddy dealers and the Malay 
paddy planters could not be broken up. Furthermore, as long as Malay par-
ticipation in the dominant colonial economy continued to be marginal, the 
issue of Malay poverty could not be solved.
conclusion
As with the opium business, the commercialization of the rice industry in 
Southeast Asia, both in terms of production and consumption, was closely 
related to the colonial economy of tin and rubber and other cash crops, all 
of which were tied up in the world capitalist economy. Southeast Chinese 
capitalism was a feature of colonial expansion and the colonial economy, 
such that Chinese capital, labor, and trading networks were able to pene-
trate all essential aspects of the Southeast Asian colonial transformation. In 
Malaya, the large-scale commercial rice milling business emerged with the 
large influx of immigrant labor and the colonial Southeast Asian transforma-
tion in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. If the rice-trade and 
-milling industries were interdependent with the tin-mining and rubber-
planting economies on the one hand, then the international rice trade in-
fluenced and complemented the domestic rice milling trade. The Chinese 
dominated the rice milling business and trading networks, of which Penang, 
Kedah, Perak, and Province Wellesley comprised an integral chain. On the 
top level of the milling hierarchy were a few Penang Chinese families that 
had formerly been prominent revenue farmers. Centering on the rice-milling 
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business had been strong economic competition between the state and the 
Chinese millers on the issue of price. As the Malay peasantry were also 
brought into the struggle, this economic competition took on a political 
and ethnic dimension. Eventually, however, market forces prevailed in the 
form of the international and local rice markets, and the finance, manage-
ment, and trading networks. Hence, under the complex economic, political, 
and ethnic circumstances of the time, the interaction between the state and 
Chinese milling society was a struggle that alternated between conflict and 
compromise, dependence and cooperation.
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tonle sap proCessed fish
from khmer Subsistence Staple to colonial export commodity
Nola Cooke
The Tonle Sap Great Lake and River in central Cambodia together form one 
of the environmental wonders of the world, driving a unique natural regula-
tory system without which the Mekong Delta region would be entirely sub-
merged for nearly half the year. As the Mekong rises, from May to June, fed 
by snowmelt in Tibet and then by monsoon rains, a huge volume of water 
hurtles downstream. At Phnom Penh, where the Mekong meets the Tonle 
Sap, the pent-up pressure overwhelms the smaller river, reversing its flow 
and pushing billions of cubic meters of water back up to its headwaters to 
create a huge inland sea. The dry season lake surface expands fourfold, to 
well over one million hectares, while its volume rises from about five billion 
cubic meters to an immense eighty billion cubic meters. Flooding twenty 
to thirty kilometers beyond the dry season shoreline, the rising waters in-
undate a highly adapted forested floodplain, taking with them innumer-
able fish eggs and fingerlings that fatten on its decomposing vegetation and 
algae. In the dry season, as the waters seep away, the fish follow, first toward 
the permanent lake bed and then later down the Tonle Sap River toward the 
Mekong. From December to June, fishermen from floating lakeside villages 
and neighboring provinces alike converge on the dwindling lake and river. 
Some seek only to secure their family’s off-season protein staple and a small 
excess to trade for other necessities, but others labor for months in large-
scale intensive fishing operations that range from the deployment of seine 
nets several kilometers long to an ingenious array of traditional bamboo fish 
traps, great and small.1
 Cambodia is the fourth largest freshwater fish producer in the world, 
with an annual catch conservatively estimated at 400,000 tons.2 Fish from 
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the Tonle Sap Great Lake alone currently account for about 60 percent of 
the total yield.3 While the vast bulk of the Tonle Sap catch is now consumed 
within the lower Mekong basin, especially by Khmer who live in nearby 
provinces, this was not always the case.4 From the late nineteenth century, 
fishing on Tonle Sap Great Lake and its river was transformed into a major 
export industry, only slightly less valuable than rice in the early twentieth 
century. Chinese played key roles at every level of the new export industry, 
whether as local traders, international exporters, or financiers who supplied 
the essential capital that funded large-scale operations. Without their input, 
it is unlikely that bulk commodity production of processed fish would ever 
have attained the scale that it did by the end of the nineteenth century. By 
then, fishing on the lake had been transformed. Although Khmer peasant 
subsistence producers had dominated Cambodian inland fisheries for cen-
turies, by the early twentieth century they formed only “a tiny minority” on 
Tonle Sap Great Lake, where Vietnamese fishing masters using “Chinese, 
Vietnamese and Malay” laborers produced a cheap protein staple that was 
then exported by downstream Chinese firms to Southeast Asia and China.5 
In the high-colonial era, Indochinese dried fish, overwhelmingly from Cam-
bodia and thus from the Tonle Sap system, became a key commodity import 
that helped to feed the coolie masses of Java, Singapore, and Hong Kong: 
by the mid-1930s, Chinese businessmen in Cambodia were shipping 15,000 
tons of dried fish annually to the Dutch East Indies alone.6 Newly emergent 
bulk commodity production in inland Cambodia thus played a silent but 
nonetheless significant role in sustaining the contemporaneous European 
colonial system in Southeast Asia.
 In the following discussion I chart the remarkable career of Tonle Sap 
processed fish and fish products over the century in which they were trans-
formed from a Khmer subsistence staple to an important colonial com-
modity consumed by tens of thousands of people beyond Indochina, in 
China and throughout the colonial Malayo-Indonesian world. I begin with 
what we know of the emergence and growth of market-oriented fishing in 
the nineteenth century, until about 1880, before considering the industry’s 
transformation in the new economic environment created in Cambodia by 
the royal revenue farming system. I conclude by outlining the disastrous 
impact on fish stocks of the essentially unregulated industry after revenue 
farming was abolished, and the 1920 establishment of the regulatory system 
that controlled fishing for the rest of the colonial era.
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The emerging nineteenth-century Tonle Sap fishing industry, c. 1800–1880
Fish has always formed the main protein component in the Cambodian diet. 
Over millennia, Khmer fishermen had devised an ingenious array of traps, 
nets, rods, and bamboo barrages designed to secure a good supply of this 
precious staple. So locally well adapted was this equipment that much of 
the traditional gear remains in use today. Cambodians also learned to pre-
serve their catch by drying, salting, or smoking it, and to exploit even the 
tiniest fish by processing them into the national condiment, a thick, salted 
fish paste called prahoc. As Ian Mabbett and David Chandler recognized, 
“the technology of fishing, the taxonomy of species, the craft of fish cuisine 
and the science of garnishes and seasoning for fish dishes” had all long ago 
reached “a high pitch of refinement” among the Khmer.7
 Traditionally, however, fishing and fish processing were seasonal peasant 
sideline activities, with only a comparatively small number of long-resident 
Islamic (Malay and Cham) fishing villages engaged in it all year round.8 Every 
year, large numbers of Khmer families, even whole villages, would trek to 
the lake at low water, build temporary homes, and spend about six weeks 
catching and processing their subsistence protein for the coming year, as 
well as rendering fish oil for cooking and lighting.9 These perennial activities 
were undoubtedly identical to those witnessed in 1878 by the French offi-
cial Jean Moura, who described these Khmer groups as living cooperatively, 
with individuals joining short nets to boost a catch that was later shared out 
according to long-established customary rules.10 By the late eighteenth cen-
tury to the early nineteenth, however, things were starting to change.
 In the nineteenth century, access to the Great Lake was free to all. Chinese 
junk crews, for instance, regularly went there to hunt marabouts for their 
feathers during the breeding season and paid only the customary 10 percent 
royal levy in kind on circulating commodities when taking their cargo back 
to China.11 According to a handful of early Vietnamese sources, another sea-
sonal industry with regional ramifications was also taking shape there. From 
at least the early nineteenth century, if not before, itinerant fishermen from 
the Nguyễn realm were taking their boats upstream to catch and process 
fish for markets downstream. A late 1830s Vietnamese account of eastern 
Cambodia, for instance, noted that “Khmer boats and those from Lục Tỉnh 
[southern Vietnam] all gather [at the lake], often in their thousands. The 
fishermen dry the fish and boil the oil.”12 We also know from the 1901 recol-
lections of a highly successful Vietnamese fishing entrepreneur, Lê Thượng 
Tiếng, that his father’s 1840s–1850s operation, the biggest mid-nineteenth-
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century exploitation on the Great Lake, was averaging about 60 tons of fish 
per season.13 If Khmer peasant producers smoked much of their catch at the 
time, as many still do, to dry fish for export itinerant Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and Sino-Vietnamese commodity producers needed the greater preserving 
power of salt (as did Khmer who wanted to make prahoc).14 Lê Thượng Tiếng 
reported that it took one picul (60 kilos) of salt to process 2.5 piculs of fish 
(although later French observers cited one picul of salt per three to four 
piculs of fish), so that his father’s midcentury operation alone would have 
required about 400 piculs (or 24 tons) of salt, if all the catch was salted.15 
Ready access to large quantities of salt was thus crucial for both commercial 
operators and subsistence producers alike. From a Vietnamese source of the 
1820s we also know that a flourishing salt trade had long existed between the 
old “salt province” of former lower Cambodia—the Bassac region (modern 
Sóc Trăng and Bạc Liêu) at the mouth of the Hậu Giang or lower Mekong 
branch—and the rest of the Khmer kingdom.16 Chinese, Vietnamese, and 
Khmer in the Bassac area manufactured a red salt which, when sold upriver 
by Chinese and Vietnamese junk traders, realized good profits for all in-
volved.17
 When French materials become available in the 1860s, we can infer the 
continuing growth of the inland fishing industry from the economic impor-
tance of salt in French Cochinchina, both in terms of its soaring production 
and the vast quantities being imported into Saigon for distribution through-
out the local region, including to Cambodia. From the mid-1860s, cheaper 
white salt from other sources, especially from Bà Rịa in French Cochin-
china, began outstripping traditional red salt in fish processing. After the 
1862 cessation of hostilities between the Huế court and the French, salt pro-
duction at Bà Rịa developed quickly. By 1868, its salines had expanded to 
371.4 hectares, from a mere 13.2 hectares in 1836, soaring past Sóc Trăng’s 
200 hectares in 1868.18 The real breakthrough came in 1865, however, when 
2,504 seagoing junks traded between Bà Rịa and Saigon at the same time 
that thousands of other junks imported over 100,000 piculs of salt there 
from several small ports in the nearby Vietnamese provinces of Bình Định, 
Bình Thuận, Phú Yên, and Quảng Nam.19 According to one French source, 
salt imports in 1865 exceeded those of 1864 by a staggering 233,193 piculs 
(or nearly 14,000 tons).20
 It is hard not to connect the great local increase in salt production and its 
bulk importation with an expansion of the inland processed-fish industry 
around that time. From an estimated average total catch of about 30,000–
40,000 piculs in the 1840s, Tonle Sap Great Lake’s estimated annual yield 
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had risen to around 60,000 piculs by the early 1860s, while important fish-
ing and prawning industries were also emerging elsewhere, especially in 
the three western Cochinchinese provinces that remained under Vietnamese 
rule until 1867.21 Evidence of Cambodia’s share in a growing export-oriented 
fish-processing industry appears in early French records: according to one 
1862 French observer, all 2,430 tons of dried fish exported from Saigon that 
year derived from the Great Lake, with access to more salt the main restraint 
on increased productivity.22 Between 1862 and 1865, the value of processed 
fish exports from Saigon doubled, from 1.2 million to 2.48 million francs, 
although the actual quantity fell to 1,358 tons.23 This might indicate that 
more valuable fish were being targeted by larger operators, who salted them 
for export to distant markets like Java, the Malay states, and Singapore.24 
Certainly, the data show that the proportion of processed-fish cargoes trans-
ported by the large commercial ships that serviced such ports was rapidly 
rising at the time, from around 50 percent in 1863 to 70 percent by 1865.25
 By 1865, customs records show that bulk salt imports into Saigon had 
solved the problem of inadequate supplies downstream, and Chinese junk 
traders were quick to ensure this essential commodity reached Cambodia. 
Indeed, the trafficking of salt from Cochinchina was one of the earliest Chi-
nese economic niches in the developing Cambodian fishing industry. Al-
though Chinese fishermen worked in Cambodia, and Chinese businessmen 
also owned fishery operations there, the most common Chinese involvement 
in fishing during this period was as the indispensable commercial middle-
men supplying the needs of the fishing communities.26
 By the mid-1860s, Louis de Carné of the 1866 Mekong expedition re-
ported seeing “some thousands” of Vietnamese boats working the Great 
Lake.27 Vietnamese had been returning to Tonle Sap in increasing numbers 
from the mid-1860s, encouraged by the protectorate treaty with Cambodia 
that allowed all French subjects free access and settlement rights. In effect 
this opened the country to any Vietnamese or locally born Chinese from 
Cochinchina after 1867. However, of the thousands de Carné saw, only a 
handful of large-scale, well-financed operations could have hoped to take 
their whole season’s requirements with them to the uninhabited lake; the 
vast majority of fishermen had to rely on junk traders, overwhelmingly Chi-
nese but also occasionally Malay, for daily necessities and vital industrial 
inputs like salt and net preservative. They were also often the main source 
of start-up capital for many fishermen.28 In 1869, almost all the vessels Jean 
Moura encountered heading upriver to the lake were chartered by Chinese, 
who took salt, rice, areca, betel nuts, tobacco, alcohol, and ritual items (fire-
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crackers, paper money, joss sticks) to exchange directly for fish.29 Even Cam-
bodian subsistence producers needed some salt, so profits were high in this 
classic sellers’ market. Other benefits were also available. In 1879, on his 
second tour of the lake, Moura reported that most fishermen were “gener-
ally” forced to sell their catch to itinerant traders at the lake, in many cases 
without even being able to add value by preserving it first. Only larger pro-
fessional fisheries could afford to process their own catch and then wait 
to sell it, in order to benefit directly from post-seasonal rises in prices.30 
Thus, even before Chinese financiers took control of the industry generally, 
the Chinese junk traders and middlemen who acquired fish cheaply at the 
lake, whether in return for loans on catches or in exchange for expensive im-
ported items, were already making profitable inroads into small producers’ 
returns.31 But without these circulating junk traders the industry could never 
have expanded as it later did, since no other means existed to supply the 
30,000 (or more) people, mostly Vietnamese, who worked the lake by the 
early 1880s.32
 In an industry marked by large seasonal fluctuations, the perennial scar-
city of operating capital left the great mass of small to medium producers 
highly vulnerable. Fishing was an expensive business. At the time, only a few 
comparatively large-scale operations existed, employing about twenty-five 
men to operate a seine net averaging only about 1.5 kilometers in length, 
and with twelve women to process the fish, among a mass of subsistence 
and small-scale producers.33 (By the end of the century, in comparison, the 
largest operators employed seventy to one hundred men to deploy nets up 
to six kilometers in length, with forty women processing the catch.)34 These 
early professional operations were almost entirely Vietnamese. In 1859–60, 
Henri Mouhot had recorded a few “enterprising Cochinchinese” who were 
taking “literally miraculous” catches at the lake each year.35 The most suc-
cessful of them was Lê Thượng Tiếng’s father. However, his miraculous re-
sults required a huge capital investment of about 3,000 piasters per season 
on hired help, nets, boats, salt, and so on, for a profit of 1,000 to 1,500 pias-
ters. If this represented a fortune at the time, high start-up costs meant new 
operators effectively needed a fortune in order to make one.36
 In 1878, Moura calculated that a large operation employing forty men 
with a single big net (and excluding the cost of women to process the fish) 
would cost nearly 21,000 Vietnamese quan (or approximately 3,800 pias-
ters).37 This figure was later confirmed by a Vietnamese fishing boss who re-
ported spending 20,000 quan in his first year. He employed only men, and 
his busy workers threw away fish heads and entrails from which female em-
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ployees might have extracted oil worth several thousand quan at compara-
tively little additional expense. But as it was considered too uneconomical 
to interrupt the fishing for any reason, the heads were cast into the lake to 
rot. So common was this practice that in 1869 Moura saw Vietnamese from 
Châu Đốc collecting the discarded heads, which they processed for their own 
profit.38 Although fish oil fetched 1.5 piasters per 30 liters in Phnom Penh in 
the early 1860s, undercapitalization restricted its production to a compara-
tively small area along the Tonle Sap River and the Mekong between Phnom 
Penh and Oudong.39
 Open access to the Great Lake was protected by the Franco-Siamese 
convention of 1870, but elsewhere (including on Tonle Sap River) a patch-
work of commercial fishing leases operated in traditional royal or apanage 
waterways. These leases were either auctioned annually to the highest bid-
ders (usually Chinese), who might re-let them to others or operate them 
with their own equipment and crews, or they were granted to local gover-
nors or other officials to rent out in lieu of salary.40 In some respects, these 
lots offered better commercial prospects than the Great Lake: they could 
be completely blocked with fish traps before the water drained and every-
thing within quickly harvested by a few workers; and certain valuable species 
inhabited them. They were also the main locations for fish oil production 
and later for extracting valuable fish bladders, although this activity became 
commercially important only from the 1880s (see table 1).41 Nevertheless, 
during this period, local villages with age-old customary rights to particular 
areas vastly outnumbered such leases, while less productive areas were not 
fished at all.





1873 128,628  83 233
1880  93,200 849 —
1882 183,266 787 —
1887 158,000 — —
Source: For the 1873 figure, see A. Bouinais and A. Paulus, L’Indo-Chine 
contemporaine (Paris: Challamel, 1884), 1, 549, citing Étienne Aymonier; 
for 1880 and 1882, see the customs figures in caoM ggi, fa 11867; and 
for 1887 see the report of Resident General de Champeaux, dated 30 June 
1888, in caoM ggi, a 20 (27), carton 6.
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 Apart from these rents, and a small kingdom-wide customary tax levied 
by local officials on fishing gear, the only fiscal impost on fishing was the 
traditional royal customs duty on all commodities, payable at Phnom Penh. 
In 1862, Andrew Spooner reported these duties were collected only hap-
hazardly, and mostly to the exporters’ advantage.42 From the early 1870s, 
however, matters changed dramatically, after King Norodom transformed 
his customs receipts into a revenue farm and auctioned the right to collect 
them.43 Successful bidders in the 1870s included local Chinese businessmen 
and some Cambodian courtiers, whose sub-farmers or agents, appointed 
as royal officials to mask their activities from the disapproving French rep-
resentative in Phnom Penh, swiftly began to levy the full royal 10 percent, 
plus an extra 1 percent for their own expenses. It was a harbinger of things 
to come.
The fishing industry under the general revenue farm, 1879–1908
In the three decades during which revenue farming interests came to domi-
nate the Cambodian fishing industry, the export value of its products 
boomed, thanks in part to the pursuit of new markets by downriver Chi-
nese exporters. The pressing need to return a profit on increasingly expen-
sive revenue farm investments and fishing leases also drove diversification 
into profitable secondary activities. One such valuable activity was the ex-
port of dried fish bladders to China, where they were processed and either 
used industrially, as a water-soluble glue added to liqueurs, wines, beers, 
and woven silk, or widely consumed in thickened soups.44 These second-
ary products became increasingly important over time. By 1910, Cambodia 
exported about 15,000 piculs (or 900 tons) of fish oil and fats, and 12,500 
piculs (or 750 tons) of fish bladders, more than 15 times the derisory 1873 
quantities reported in table 1, while by the mid-1920s, the combined export 
of fish oils and bladders had soared to over 4,000 tons.45 By 1910, too, the 
worth of the entire export industry had almost trebled. In 1873, Étienne 
Aymonier had valued processed fish and fish product exports—overwhelm-
ingly from the Tonle Sap Great Lake and River—at 2,651,345 francs.46 Al-
though dried and salted fish had not even doubled in quantity by 1910 (from 
128,000 to 220,000 piculs), the value of fish-related exports had soared to 
7,225,000 francs.47 Indeed, the total quantity of processed fish exports for 
1910 was only about 30 percent higher than those in 1882 (see table 1), but 
while the latter had fetched 593,479 piasters, those of 1910 were worth 1.5 
million piasters.48
 Large-scale operators were particularly well placed to benefit from the 
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export boom. They could negotiate equitable contracts with the mainly Chi-
nese companies whose steam launches began plying Cambodian waters in 
the 1880s, and thus transport their products more efficiently to market, a 
change that occurred just as Chinese export networks downriver were also 
developing new markets and while the demand for cheap Cambodian dried 
fish in colonial Asia was increasing. In 1900, Cambodia and Cochinchina 
together exported nearly nine million francs worth of fish products to Sin-
gapore (6,357,930) and Hong Kong (2,296,577), about two-thirds of which 
probably originated in Tonle Sap waters.49 Lê Thượng Tiếng demonstrated 
the vast fortunes generated by this expanding commodity trade when he 
compared his costs and profits to those of his father fifty years before. In 
1901, capital costs were five times higher. The price of salt had doubled, to 
3,800 piasters for 2,000 piculs, as had the wage bill for 120 employees (80 
men and 40 women), who now cost up to 6,000 piasters annually, and the 
price of other necessary inputs had risen even further. Lê Thượng Tiếng’s 
annual catch was also five times more than his father’s, on average 300 tons. 
His profits, however, were seven or eight times higher, thanks to new mar-
kets in Hong Kong, Singapore, and China, to the dramatic increase in the 
price of premium fish, and to his move into processing fish oil, fats, and 
bladders.50
 Perhaps just as important, well-capitalized fishery operators like Lê 
Thượng Tiếng could now also take advantage of the new opportunities 
opened up by King Norodom’s creation of a general revenue farm on fish-
ing leases and equipment taxes. The old Vietnamese fisheries entrepreneur 
was also exemplary in this respect, for at one stage he was also the general 
revenue farmer for Cambodian fisheries and thus the monopolist entitled to 
dispose of the largest area of fishing leases in the country.51 The benefits of 
such a situation for a fishing entrepreneur are self-evident. But in another 
respect Lê Thượng Tiếng was quite unusual, for the position of general reve-
nue farmer very quickly came to be dominated by big Chinese businessmen 
who were mostly speculative capitalists with few direct links to fisheries pro-
duction. As investors anxious to recoup their outlays and make profits, they 
all quickly moved to share their risks with numerous layers of sub-farmers 
to whom general farmers sold shares in their monopolies. In fewer than 
two decades, the operational demands of this typical revenue farming finan-
cial structure would catalyze the Cambodian export-fishing industry into its 
long-standing twentieth-century form, in which Chinese financiers employ-
ing Vietnamese fishing masters would dominate export-oriented production 
on Tonle Sap waters and elsewhere.
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 In 1862, only two revenue farms existed in Cambodia, on opium and gam-
bling.52 By late 1891, when Resident Superior Huynh de Vernéville persuaded 
Norodom to exchange the royal revenue farming system for an annual civil 
list, the king had converted almost every fiscal obligation in the kingdom, in-
cluding ones not customarily paid to the crown, into revenue farm monopo-
lies that he rented out to the highest bidders. Despite signing a convention in 
1877 that forbade the creation of any new taxes and which only allowed reve-
nue farms on opium, alcohol, and gambling, Norodom had managed to out-
maneuver a series of French officials and establish a voraciously expanding 
revenue farming system that, by 1892, had taken major steps towards ratio-
nalizing and modernizing the traditional Cambodian fiscal system. How-
ever, unlike the revenue farms discussed elsewhere in this volume, Norodom 
devoted almost none of the millions the system generated to the modern-
ization of the Cambodian state.53 Instead, its profits went to him personally 
and to those favored businessmen, mainly but not exclusively Chinese, who 
secured monopoly rights to collect the various taxes, charges, and rents.54
 Two specific revenue farms affected the fisheries. The first was the gen-
eral fisheries farm that came into effect in 1880; the second was a sepa-
rate revenue farm on processed fish customs duties established in 1882. In 
operation, they significantly increased business costs in the industry. The 
general fisheries farm began in 1879, when the king secretly resumed the 
customary tax levied by Khmer officials on fishing gear, standardized it for 
all fishing equipment, and then farmed it out, initially for about 300 silver 
taels.55 In 1880, after the French failed to respond, Norodom combined the 
new farm with all preexisting royal fisheries leases into a single monopoly 
that immediately yielded him 2,000 silver taels (roughly 30,000 piasters).56 
Disgruntled Cambodian officials reacted locally to the loss of their ancient 
rights by making demands on waterways traditionally reserved for Khmer 
villagers, beginning the countrywide systemic encroachment on previously 
free waterways that would pose a major problem for fish conservation by the 
early twentieth century.57 By 1884, after two other Chinese businesses had 
bought the general monopoly—the second for 4,000 silver taels (or 48,000 
piasters)—Norodom had doubled his profits.58 Thereafter, the bidding war 
for the general fisheries farm continued relentlessly. In 1890, the successful 
tenderer was the royal crony and Cantonese businessman Lưu Chap, who 
offered 90,000 piasters per year, plus several valuable secret secondary pay-
ments.59 In the final years of its operation, the annual rent soared even fur-
ther, to 240,000 piasters.60
 Ever-spiraling costs urgently pressured general fisheries monopolists 
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to insure their huge investment by on-selling substantial shares to sub-
farmers, who also usually followed suit by selling off parts of their shares. 
By the early twentieth century, one French official described the resulting 
pyramid of speculators as holding “five, six or seven levels of exploiters be-
tween the State disposing of the concession and the fisherman who was 
actually doing the work.”61 While it was in the interest of every one of those 
many sub-farmers to pressure those below for timely payments, in order to 
cover their own commitments to those higher in the pyramid, the tempta-
tion for low-paid men at the base, who dealt directly with producers, to ex-
tract something extra must have been enormous. Reports of such behavior 
appeared right from the start of the new system. Late in the 1880 season, 
Aymonier met numerous angry Vietnamese fishermen who complained of 
being charged double, triple, or even quadruple the customary rate on their 
gear.62 In 1881, St. Sernin heard similar stories on the lake, where even small 
300 meter nets had been assessed at twice the usual amount for the largest 
nets, even though it was a catastrophic season when an average operation 
that normally produced 200–250 piculs of processed fish could only manage 
70.63 Instead of a 250 piaster profit on a 1,000 piastre outlay, these opera-
tions had little return on their fixed costs of 650 piasters, forcing many to 
borrow to survive.64 Then, in 1882, when the separate monopoly on customs 
duties on processed fish came into effect, producers and merchants alike 
discovered that Chinese sub-farmers, appointed as temporary royal officials, 
simply refused to allow their boats to pass until the amounts unilaterally 
levied in tax were paid in full.65
 By 1884, a number of local fisheries operators had recognized the impor-
tance of controlling the general farm and combined to bid for it. However, 
not only was their offer too low, but several also fell foul of the new require-
ment to lodge bids personally in Phnom Penh.66 This early failure typified 
the difficulties producers experienced in bidding for the general farm, with 
Lê Thượng Tiếng being the only one to succeed, to my current knowledge. 
Later that year, the French tried to take greater control of the kingdom’s 
finances and administration, but the ensuing countrywide anticolonial up-
rising forced them to tacitly accept Norodom’s revenue farming system for 
several more years. Protectorate officials did, however, manage to insist that 
its tender processes conform more closely to existing norms in Cochinchina. 
Ironically, the elaborate terms and conditions documents that ensued, with 
clauses stipulating tenderers had to be creditworthy and to provide contrac-
tual guarantors against failure, largely ensured that only Chinese business 
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interests would qualify. Ordinary producers were automatically disbarred 
from competing with speculative capitalists by the need for two solvent 
guarantors who agreed to cover any defaulting payments. The only such eli-
gible individuals in Norodom’s Cambodia were a few favored courtiers, Chi-
nese among them, and Chinese businessmen who appeared wealthy enough 
to guarantee repayments. Under Norodom it was also genuinely a matter of 
appearance: if a monopoly did fail, it was never in his interest to enforce his 
rights over the important Chinese guarantors, for fear of lowering future 
revenue farm bids. In fact, so secure were these personages that when the 
widow of the former Cantonese general fisheries farmer, Lưu Chap, sought 
to extend her husband’s rights to certain fisheries leases with the Queen 
Mother in 1894, leaders of the Teochiu, Cantonese, and Fujianese commu-
nities willingly acted as guarantors.67
 This highly extractive revenue farming system, operating in an environ-
ment of perennial capital scarcity, increasingly squeezed out the small to 
medium independent fishing operations that St. Sernin and others had de-
scribed on Tonle Sap waters in the early 1880s. By the end of the 1890s, they 
were largely replaced with bigger fisheries owned by Chinese, Sino-Khmer, 
or Vietnamese capitalists who employed specialist Vietnamese fishing mas-
ters to organize and superintend operations. By the early twentieth century, 
all but the largest operations were completely dependent on loans from Chi-
nese financiers, whether revenue farmers or itinerant salt sellers, to even 
begin their annual operations.68
 The nature of the workforce on the lake also changed in these years. Diffi-
culties in attracting enough laborers into the expanding 1890s industry had 
led to the pernicious practice of providing advances that exceeded their total 
contracted salary, in order to bind workers through indebtedness. Some 
workers responded, however, by signing the following year for a higher ad-
vance with another employer and using this cash to repay the earlier boss. 
Several rounds of such juggling left workers hopelessly enmeshed in debt 
and prompted a substantial minority to abscond at the last minute with the 
final employer’s total advance. In such cases, local Cambodian administra-
tors might refuse to act against the absconders; but if fishing bosses exer-
cised their former age-old right to arrest and punish fleeing coolies, French 
magistrates now held them, rather than their workers, culpable. As a result, 
fishing masters who worked the Great Lake, where labor was at a premium, 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain their earlier authority over their 
workforce. Most were obliged to sacrifice several days of the fishing season 
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while their employees enjoyed the disreputable pleasures of Snok Trou, the 
only sizeable settlement between Kampong Chhnang and the vastness of the 
inhospitable lake.69 If, as Lê Thượng Tiếng complained in 1901, it now re-
quired three times as much effort as in his father’s day for the same result, 
we might perhaps detect in this the impact of a sullen and demoralized work 
force on the industry’s productivity.
 The general fisheries farm was abolished in mid-1908 and replaced by 
direct taxation on fishing gear and a system of fixed-term leases on fisheries 
lots. Published colonial documents claimed the general farm was scrapped 
because certain Chinese businessmen, who had conspired in 1906 to offer 
100,000 piasters less than the administration wanted, had tried the same 
thing in 1908, as a deliberate attempt to undermine the French adminis-
tration’s budget.70 Given the accumulating economic problems at the time, 
however, this seems unlikely. The low 1906 bid had followed two bad years 
that had visited severe losses on many fisheries outside the Great Lake. Un-
able to attract a higher Chinese bid, the protectorate had finally negotiated a 
contract with a Cambodian named Pean, but by then the fishing season was 
already six weeks old, and by late January 1907 Pean had still not finished or-
ganizing his sub-farmers.71 The large losses incurred by the initial delay were 
compounded by slow payments from Chinese and Vietnamese sub-farmers, 
all of which doomed the endeavor, forcing Pean to seek several delays on his 
scheduled payments.72 By November 1907, the frustrated resident superior, 
Paul Luce, was consulting residents about the future of the fisheries system, 
with a countrywide revenue farm covering all fisheries being one possibility 
canvassed.73
 Low Chinese tenders in 1908 probably decided matters in favor of a sys-
tem of defined fishing lots and direct taxation on fishing gear. The reform 
brought immediate productivity benefits, with the jump in exports suggest-
ing the revenue farming system had ended by depressing fisheries’ produc-
tivity (see table 2). The new system was also profitable, with the protector-
ate treasury collecting 337,816 piasters in 1908, or nearly 100,000 piasters 
more than the general fisheries farm for 1907.74 While the premium Chinese 
speculators reaped during the life of the revenue farm is unknowable, this 
statistic suggests it was quite substantial.
 However, if the abolition of the general fisheries farm instantly boosted 
export figures and protectorate tax yields, over the next decade it would 
have serious unintended consequences for the health of the Cambodian fish 
stocks on which both relied.
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a crisis of fish conservation, c. 1900–1920
From the 1890s, the French had repeatedly subdivided fisheries leases not 
included in the general farm, causing a huge proliferation in lessee numbers 
locally.75 After 1908, the abolition of the general fisheries farm, combined 
with the creation of contracted fishery lots for Tonle Sap Great Lake after 
the retrocession of Battambang and Angkor Provinces by Siam in 1907, saw 
leases multiply enormously. Under the former system, the general fisheries 
farmer, however ineffectually at times, had been legally responsible for the 
activities of the sub-farmers who leased waterways from him. Between 1908 
and 1920, however, no effective regulation of fishing existed, and the im-
pact on fish numbers was potentially catastrophic. If fisheries leases all con-
tained start and end dates for fishing, and described the general locations of 
fisheries lots, no sanctions punished those who broke the rules.76 A solitary 
1911 circular from the Residence Superior which stipulated that fishing must 
end no later than 15 June rapidly became “quite ineffectual,” in part because 
local Khmer often rebuilt leaseholders’ barrages as soon as they were dis-
mantled, claiming a “traditional right” to fish out of season.77 Leaseholders 
also commonly pushed the geographical limits of their allotments without 
administrative penalty, while everyone shortened the off season, progres-
sively reducing the number of spawning females that could lay their eggs 
before being caught.78 Within a few years, millions of fish disappeared.
 Large-scale fisheries on the Great Lake were just as destructive on fish 
stocks as smaller fisheries on leased waterways. Spurred on by the boom-
ing export market, professional operations began to work year-round on 
the lake. In the nineteenth century, fishing with large nets had begun only 
in December or January, but by the 1910s fishing bosses were dragging the 
submerged forest with huge nets, joined end to end and six to seven meters 
deep, from September through to December, and again in June and July, 
table 2 cambodian Processed-fish exports, 1909–1910
Commodity 1909 1910
Processed fish 11,500 tons 16,000 tons
Fish oil or fats 1,600 tons 1,828 tons
Fish pastes, sauces 220 tons 295 tons
Source: Loÿs Petillot, Une richesse du Cambodge: La pêche et les poissons 
(Paris: Challamel, 1911), 131.
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when spawning females were often caught in large numbers. For the rest of 
the year, they used a variety of barrages and traps. In particular, they favored 
the destructive samras that lured fish to spawn within its confines but was 
nevertheless lightly taxed compared to other devices.79
 In less than a decade of intensive, unregulated fishing, the number and 
size of fish caught in the Great Lake and in Cambodia had visibly dwindled. 
Buoyant export statistics and rising treasury receipts saw initial reports of 
the situation dismissed. As late as 1916 one French provincial official claimed 
that “fish formed a resource . . . in no way about to disappear.”80 But after the 
Council of Ministers officially requested an inquiry into fish stocks in 1917, 
French officials discovered that changes in fishing activities at all levels of 
the industry over the previous decade, from the use of dynamite through to 
the increasing height and narrowness of barrages, were indeed placing un-
sustainable pressure on fish numbers.81 After considerable internal debate, a 
reformed system combining detailed maps of local fishing boundaries with a 
properly policed non-fishing season came into effect in 1920, when all exist-
ing contracts were due for renewal. Although modified slightly in 1938, this 
system basically organized the Cambodian fishing industry for the rest of the 
colonial era and beyond, until the Khmer Rouge (1975–1979) abolished fish-
ing lots and attempted to turn swaths of the submerged forest, so essential 
to fish reproduction in the Tonle Sap Great Lake, into rice fields.82
conclusion
From small beginnings, a processed fish industry developed in Tonle Sap 
waters and became a major colonial commodity exporter in the late nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Chinese played crucial roles in every phase 
of this development, whether as itinerant merchants who made large-scale 
fishing possible by supplying the everyday needs of tens of thousands of 
people along the inhospitable shoreline, as the owners or crew of the many 
vessels that shipped the fish or fish derivatives to markets downriver, or as the 
exporters whose networks opened new markets for Cambodian processed 
fish throughout colonial Asia. Chinese and Sino-Khmer also worked at every 
level of the industry, from fishing lot concession-holders down to coolies. 
However, it was as speculative financiers able to take advantage of the new 
opportunities created by the general fisheries farm that Chinese capitalists 
came to greatest prominence in the industry. By the twentieth century, reve-
nue farming had enabled cashed-up Chinese financiers to squeeze out many 
small to medium operators on the lake and to monopolize the most produc-
tive fishing lots elsewhere. Overwhelmingly, they employed Vietnamese spe-
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cialist fishing masters who preferred to hire non-Khmer labor. Unregulated 
overexploitation of fish stocks threatened the industry’s viability after the 
general farm was abolished in 1908, but after sensible conservation rules 
were finally imposed in 1920 the commodity export industry flourished for 
the rest of the colonial era. Within a few decades, Chinese capital and com-
mercial networks had helped Vietnamese fishing bosses and their crews 
transform an age-old Khmer subsistence sideline occupation into an im-
portant bulk-commodity industry whose consumable products were avail-
able throughout colonial Southeast Asia, and beyond.
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moses’s rod
The Bible as a commodity in Southeast asia and china
Jean DeBernardi
[The Bible] is to us what Moses’ rod was to him, the instrument we employ in accom-
plishing the purposes of God; the instrument, too, with which every one of our own 
hearts must be struck, before there can gush from them the waters of life.
—James Legge, addressing the 42nd Annual Meeting of the British and Foreign Bible 
Society (May 30, 1846)
Compelled by the challenge posed by its enormous population, evangelical 
Protestant Christians have long aspired to distribute the Bible to every per-
son in China. In 1815, the London Missionary Society (lMs) launched an 
important program of Chinese translation and printing in its Ultra-Ganges 
Mission (Singapore, Penang, Malacca, and Batavia) under the umbrella of 
colonial rule. The lMs directors relocated this translation and publication 
work to China after the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing opened five cities to resi-
dence by British subjects and awarded Hong Kong to Britain. By midcentury, 
progress in translation projects, technological improvements (including the 
use of the cylinder press), and the promise of political change prompted 
leaders of the British and Foreign Bible Society (BfBs) to decide that the 
goal of placing a Bible in every Chinese household was finally within reach. 
Consequently, in conjunction with its 1854 Jubilee celebrations, the BfBs 
launched a Million Testament Fund for China. Although funds flowed in 
from throughout the British Empire, the campaign foundered when the mis-
sionaries and their Chinese assistants met with insurmountable obstacles 
in distributing the books.
 The printing and distribution of cheap Bibles was the particular aim of 
the BfBs, which had been established in 1804 to promote a Christian moral-
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political economy through the wide circulation of the Bible. The society’s 
1854 Jubilee coincided with a fifty-year history of Chinese Bible translation 
and publication in Canton and Southeast Asia for which the BfBs had pro-
vided considerable funding, printing equipment, and technical support. 
After the lMs missionaries moved from Southeast Asia to China in 1843, 
the diverse Protestant denominations collaborated on a new translation of 
the New Testament as a sign of their union. Although the attempt at collabo-
ration foundered when the missionaries failed to agree on the translation of 
key terms, the BfBs supported the British missionaries’ translation, raising 
enough funds to print and distribute more than two million copies of the 
Delegates Version New Testament in China (although in the end, not even a 
million were printed).
 Although the Bible has obvious significance for all Christians, there were 
many complex reasons why the universal distribution of the Bible was so im-
portant to mid-nineteenth-century British Protestants: the Bible was both an 
instrument of personal transformation and an expression of British national 
character; its distribution addressed issues of national guilt and served as a 
form of atonement; the New Testament prescribed a moral economy based 
on humility and benevolence that (British elites argued) had a good influ-
ence on political communities; and finally, the Bible was a sign of Protestant 
unity in opposition to Catholicism. When British Christians raised funds 
to donate a million New Testaments to China, they mobilized all of these 
 meanings.
 James Legge’s allusion to Moses’s rod in the epigraph suggests further 
that British Christians regarded the Bible as having extraordinary and tran-
scendent powers to rescue people from their adversaries, including despotic 
rulers. The Old Testament Book of Exodus described how God instructed 
both Moses and Aaron to use the rod (by some accounts a branch from 
the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden) as the instrument by which 
the Israelites were to be rescued from Egypt. Aaron used the rod to afflict the 
Egyptians with seven plagues. When thrown down, it transformed into a 
serpent and swallowed up the rods-turned-serpents of the Egyptian priests. 
Later, Moses used the rod to produce water from the rock, and also to part 
the Red Sea. Thus, the rod symbolized true miracles caused by God through 
his chosen leaders in contrast with the false magic employed by the Pha-
raoh’s magicians and priests. The magical rod was the instrument of their 
rescue, thus the credit for the redemption of the Israelis belonged not to 
Moses but rather to the God who had worked these miracles. To this anthro-
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pologist, the rod further suggests the tree of life—the world axis connect-
ing heaven and earth—and hints at divinely ordained rule and its associated 
sacred centers.
 Victorian Christians believed that the Bible performed real “magic” on a 
person’s heart as an instrument of personal transformation. However, not 
all persons were alike. Starting in the period after the French Revolution, 
influential members of the British elite regarded Christianity as a means to 
promote vertical integration in a society whose moral economy had signifi-
cantly broken down. Although many opposed state intervention in relief for 
the poor, they supported Christian social activism of varying sorts, including 
education through Sunday schools, protection for vulnerable populations 
such as child workers and prostitutes, the abolition of slavery, and later on, 
the anti-opium movement.
 The founders of the BfBs included a number of influential figures who 
were active in the antislavery movement, and cofounder William Wilber-
force’s writings on slavery demonstrate his skepticism concerning the utili-
tarian perspective that the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain would 
naturally result in the greatest good for all. Wilberforce was especially well-
known for his 1818 work, A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Pro-
fessed Christians in the Higher and Middle Classes in this Country, Contrasted with Real 
Christianity, which is often simply called Practical Christianity. In chapter 6, he 
comments on the way that religion promotes “the temporal welfare of politi-
cal communities,” a fact that he observes has been maintained by “the most 
celebrated philosophers and moralists and politicians of every age.” Conse-
quently, he concludes, the state of religion in a country in any given period 
is a “question of great political importance.”1
 In Practical Christianity, Wilberforce characterized Eng lish Protestantism 
as complacent, “embodied in an Establishment” and lacking in passion. In 
the midst of growing affluence, religion had sunk low in life, and the relaxed 
morals and dissipated manners of the upper classes had diffused downward 
to the newly wealthy members of the middle class. If nominal Christianity 
were replaced by true religion, he suggested, this would promote greater 
happiness and peace for all. In particular, Wilberforce argued that Jesus 
prescribed universal love, and he recommended Christian benevolence as 
essential to the well-being of political communities, and indeed as “the most 
exalted patriotism.” He took the river as a metaphor for the fertilizing power 
of benevolent action, which might start out locally, but which has the poten-
tial for global reach.2
 Wilberforce proposed that even a so-called false religion that prescribed 
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good morals would produce good effects on political societies. Nonetheless, 
he promoted Christianity as being the religion most “powerfully adapted to 
promote the preservation and healthfulness of political communities.” By 
contrast with individual selfishness, he concluded, public spirit and “en-
larged vigorous operative benevolence” was Christianity’s master principle.3
 Evangelical Christians often propose that Christians win salvation 
through faith, not deeds. However, the British Christian elites who sup-
ported the foundation of the Bible Society regarded Christianity as prescrib-
ing a moral economy that accepted social inequality but urged elites to dem-
onstrate benevolent concern for nonelite members of society. In a period of 
social change, urban migration, and industrialization, the elites who pro-
moted publication and distribution of the Bible sought to persuade non-elite 
members of society that they were part of the social body, attached and inter-
dependent.
 Christian concern with the health and integrity of the social body ex-
tended to the conduct of global mercantile activities, and evangelical Chris-
tians used their programs of charitable outreach to promote moral account-
ability in the European diaspora, from soldiers and sailors to mercantile and 
administrative elites. Rather than use Christianity unreflectively to justify 
and support the imposition of colonial power, nineteenth-century Chris-
tians publicly addressed issues of national accountability and guilt. Many 
held that God would punish nations for their sins and that all citizens were 
responsible for moral behavior to win blessings. They engaged in acts of 
charity and sought to shape social policy in light of notions of “expiation 
and regeneration,” hoping that the far-flung distribution of the Bible would 
“make up for the sins of Eng land’s past,” including the slave trade.4
 By 1854, the year of the Million Testament Fund drive, many British Chris-
tians were deeply ashamed of Britain’s role in the opium trade and criti-
cal of the military means by which they had won access to China’s treaty 
ports. However, they also considered the Chinese political system to be des-
potic and its religious practices to be dark and superstitious. They viewed 
the translation and distribution of the Bible throughout China as a vehicle 
through which they could convince the Chinese of the superiority of the 
Christian moral economy and aspired to transform China into a Christian 
nation.
Translating and distributing the Bible: from Southeast asia to china
BfBs funds supported the translation, printing, and distribution of tracts 
and Bibles. Missionaries who had specialized linguistic competence some-
384 Jean de Be rnardi
times were seconded for long periods to the BfBs to engage in the work of 
Bible translation. The society’s directors also sometimes sent (or assisted 
missionary agencies in sending) modern printing equipment to missionar-
ies so that they could print and distribute Christian literature locally.
 Just as the Bible Society employed colporteurs (as those distributing reli-
gious books are known) in Britain, the BfBs supported individuals who trav-
eled widely in Asia to distribute Bibles and tracts. With support from the 
BfBs, and sometime accompanied by BfBs agents, the missionaries and 
local evangelists often took long tours by sea, which allowed them access to 
coastal cities, or followed rivers and canals inland by boat (at least until an 
extensive network of railways was built) to distribute the Bible, Testaments, 
and religious tracts that had been translated into many languages.
 In a study that focuses on the BfBs’s position in the history of nineteenth-
century publishing and printing in Britain, Leslie Howsam sums up the so-
ciety’s approach to publishing and distributing the Bible.
The dynamic nature of the BfBs can best be described as a “Bible trans-
action,” a complex set of relations that were commercial, personal, phil-
anthropic and cultural. The transaction was inescapably commercial, 
based upon the purchase and resale of printed books. But its importance 
was characterized by contemporaries in terms that transcended the cash 
nexus. The Bible transaction was conceived as a personal relation, too, in-
volving face-to-face encounters between people. Despite this commercial 
aspect, it was also philanthropic, because charitable funds underwrote 
the low retail prices that were charged to the Society’s customers. Finally 
it was a cultural transaction, a medium through which the virtues of Prot-
estant Christianity, as interpreted among the more prosperous classes of 
the British Isles, could be conveyed to less fortunate individuals, whether 
they lived at home in poverty or infidelity, or abroad in heathenism, or 
under the “yoke of Rome.” This notion became identified as a mark of the 
British national character.5
In China and Southeast Asia, as in Britain, all four of these dimensions came 
into play in the translation and distribution of the Bible.
 The project of translating the Bible into Chinese was one of the earliest 
on the BfBs agenda. The founders knew that a Chinese translation of most 
of the New Testament had been deposited in the British Museum and rec-
ommended its publication. However, due to the high estimated cost of the 
project, the committee declined to pursue it. Nevertheless, Baptist mission-
aries at Serampore, India, were independently at work on a new translation 
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of the New Testament at Fort William, which they completed in 1810 with 
a £500 grant from the BfBs. They printed this edition with movable metal 
type—an innovation introduced and refined by agents of the BfBs—but also 
used the more traditional wooden block printing.6
 Robert Morrison (1782–1834) joined the London Missionary Society in 
1804—the same year in which the BfBs was established—and after language 
training in Britain, went to China in 1807. He studied Chinese well enough 
to translate the Bible into Chinese, using the translation of the New Testa-
ment in the British Library as a basis for his work. In 1812, the BfBs com-
mittee voted to grant him £500 and forwarded further grants as his work 
progressed. He and William Milne (1785–1822) collaborated on another 
translation of the New Testament, which was printed in Canton in 1814. In 
1823, the son of Joshua Marshman (1768–1837), the Serampore Baptist mis-
sionary translator, presented the BfBs with a complete copy of the Bible in 
Chinese; in 1824, Morrison visited the society and presented the translation 
he had completed in Canton; a copy was also “graciously received” by His 
Majesty George IV.
 Southeast Asia was a particular focus for distribution of the Chinese Bible, 
since an estimated 200,000 Chinese settlers lived there. Milne reported that 
they found many opportunities to circulate the scriptures among Chinese 
immigrants throughout Southeast Asia, “from Penang, through the Malay 
Archipelago, to the Molluccas and Celebes, on the one hand; and from Kid-
dah, round the Peninsula, through the Gulf of Siam, and along the coast of 
Cochin-China, on the other.”7 Morrison reported that the Chinese in the 
Malayan Archipelago could receive the scriptures without any impediment; 
and that “it was hoped, that through these individuals the Scriptures might, 
and would find their way into China itself.”8
 Because Southeast Asia afforded such ready access to the migrant Chi-
nese population, with support from the London Missionary Society (lMs), 
Morrison and Milne established the Ultra-Ganges Mission there, includ-
ing the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca, and mission stations in Penang, 
Singapore, and Batavia (Java). The work of translation was conducted both 
in Canton and Malacca, where it was carried out under the auspices of the 
Anglo-Chinese College (est. 1818), which took the printing and publishing 
of religious literature as a primary concern.9 By 1820, a translation of the 
Chinese Bible, supervised by Morrison and Milne, was complete and ready 
for printing. In 1822, Morrison sent 1,000 copies of the Chinese New Testa-
ment to Singapore, which “became, after a few years, the seat and centre of 
considerable Scripture distribution.”10
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 When a committee to promote Christianity was formed in Singapore in 
1827, one of its members wrote to the BfBs to offer their services in the task 
of Bible distribution, noting Singapore’s enormous potential as a Bible depot 
and distribution center. As this unknown member described it, Singapore 
was a multiethnic city whose population comprised Chinese, Malay, Bugis, 
Malabar, Bengali, Portuguese, Armenian, and British residents. Moreover, 
Singapore’s harbor was visited daily by boats from China, Siam, Cochin-
china, Java, Europe, and South America, which offered further opportunities 
for Bible distribution. The committee anticipated that the extra Bible copies 
that they gave to the Chinese to carry with them on their return to China 
would be passed on to those at home.11
 Some have observed that Christian missionaries followed the flag of colo-
nial rule, but the distribution of the Chinese Bible and tracts also followed 
circuits of commerce and migration. After 1815, European missionaries and 
Chinese evangelists based in Singapore, Malacca, Penang, and Batavia rode 
the expansive sea highway of the Asian Mediterranean, seeking immigrant 
Chinese who might be receptive to their message, including the Chinese 
miners of Bangka and Phuket (Junk Ceylon).12
 Although details are scant on the work of Chinese Christians who returned 
from Southeast Asia to China to proselytize, there is one well-documented 
case. Morrison’s and Milne’s first convert was the Cantonese printer Liang 
Ah Fa (1789–1855), who together with his assistant, Kew Ah Gung (1818–
1843), joined the Ultra-Ganges Mission in Malacca in 1815. Liang Ah Fa re-
turned to China in 1819, where Morrison ordained him, but then fled back to 
Southeast Asia in 1821 after the Qing government restricted his evangelical 
work. Although Liang Ah Fa and Kew Ah Gung returned to Hong Kong on 
a permanent basis with Legge only in 1843, in 1830 they visited China and 
traveled 250 miles inland from Canton to distribute Chinese tracts. Among 
those whom they approached with their Christian message were candidates 
for positions in the imperial bureaucracy.13
 In 1833 or 1834, Hong Xiuquan—the future leader of the Taiping Rebel-
lion—received one of Liang Ah Fa’s tracts, “Good Words to Admonish the 
Age,” when he sat the imperial examinations in Canton.14 The tract deeply 
impressed him, serving as one important inspiration for the Christian-
syncretic ideology of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. However, before 1843, 
China remained largely inaccessible to Christian evangelists, European and 
Chinese alike.
 When the five treaty ports were opened to missionaries, the lMs de-
cided to close the Ultra-Ganges Mission, including their mission stations in 
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Penang, Malacca, and Batavia. The lMs continued to support a Malay mis-
sion in Singapore for a time and left behind a printing press, but the society 
moved their China mission entirely to China, leaving the work of prosely-
tizing Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia to others. Although most of 
the graduates of the Anglo-Chinese College took jobs in Singapore, a few 
joined Legge in Hong Kong when the lMs mission relocated from South-
east Asia to China in 1843, including the printers Liang Ah Fa and Kew Ah 
Gung.15 Shanghai soon joined Singapore and Hong Kong as a major hub 
for the printing and distribution of religious literature, including the Bible.
 After the Ultra-Ganges mission ended, first independent, then Plymouth 
Brethren missionaries took over the work of evangelical Christianity in Sin-
gapore and Penang.16 One of the missionaries who continued the work in 
Penang was an independent German missionary named Johann Georg [John 
George] Bausum (1812–1855), who received support from the Chinese Evan-
gelization Society and the Bible Society, not only for himself but also for Chi-
nese evangelists whom he trained. The eventual goal was to prepare them 
to return to China and work as colporteurs, following the model set by the 
Chinese Union, an evangelistic society that Gützlaff and seven Chinese had 
formed in 1844.
 Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803–1851) was an independent mission-
ary who resigned from the Netherlands Missionary Society and lived and 
worked in Thailand from 1829 to 1831. After his wife’s death in 1831, he 
traveled along the coast of China, as far north as Tianjin, before settling in 
Macau. For the next few years, Gützlaff acted as an interpreter for foreign 
traders (including opium smugglers) on various ships, taking advantage of 
the opportunity afforded him by travel to distribute tracts, proselytize, and 
offer basic medical assistance. In 1834, he published a widely popular ac-
count of his adventures in Thailand and China.17
 As Jessie Lutz explains, Gützlaff proposed to sinify the work of evan-
gelism by having Chinese present the essence of Christianity in local dia-
lects, compose tracts that were Chinese in tone and style, and supervise the 
proselytizing, so that in the end “Chinese would win China for Christ.”18 
The Chinese Union raised funds to train Chinese colporteurs to carry tracts 
and New Testaments to the interior of China, and the Chinese workers re-
ported spectacular successes. Inspired by Gützlaff, in 1850, British evangeli-
cal Christians formed the Chinese Society for Furthering the Promulgation 
of the Gospel in China, and Adjacent Countries, by Means of Native Evan-
gelists, which they soon renamed the Chinese Evangelization Society (ces). 
Although they later broke their connection with the Chinese Union, British 
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evangelicals printed, as one of their first projects, 10,000 copies of a cor-
rected edition of Gützlaff ’s Chinese translation of the New Testament.19
 Among the first applicants to the ces was Bausum, who applied to them 
for assistance in the training of four native evangelists (three Chinese boys 
in his Penang school and a young Malay), whom the ces directors hoped 
would some day “enter their native land as heralds of the gospel, and aid in 
the glorious work of putting down the strongholds of Satan.”20 The Million 
Testament Fund provided an incredible level of financial support for colport-
age starting in 1854, including independent missionaries like the newly ar-
rived James Hudson Taylor and a number of Chinese agents. Chinese Chris-
tians commonly traveled between Penang and Singapore and China, and it 
seems likely that some of those trained at mission stations in Southeast Asia 
returned to engage in colportage and evangelism in China just as their sup-
porters hoped. However, as with the Chinese who assisted the missionaries 
in Bible translation projects, their names usually were not publicized, so the 
records are regrettably silent on this point.21
Bible Translation in china: The delegates Version new Testament
One of the first projects that Protestant missionaries in China pursued was 
a new translation of the Bible, a project that they resolved to undertake co-
operatively at a conference in 1843, and for which they received pledges of 
support from the BfBs and the American Bible Society.22 For the Protestant 
missionaries in China, Bible-centered outreach distinguished them from the 
Catholic missionaries, whom they viewed as their chief competitors.23 For 
example, in 1846, Walter Medhurst and Dr. Lockhart wrote to the lMs for-
eign secretary that their translation work was urgent since “the agents of a 
corrupt Christianity are at our elbow diffusing the Popist agenda and monk-
ish fables, the only antidote to which is the tree of life intended for the heal-
ing of nations,” by which they meant the Bible. At the same time, the BfBs 
committee learned that the missionaries had new opportunities to prosely-
tize since the Chinese authorities had announced that missionaries were at 
“liberty to teach, receive, and profess the Christian religion.” In response, 
the BfBs granted the lMs £1000 to send a cylinder printing press, additional 
metal type, and assistants to Shanghai to help the missionaries produce the 
Chinese scriptures.24
 While the Bible distinguished them from Catholics, it was, at the same 
time, intended to be a sign of Protestant Christian unity. For example, an 
lMs missionary notes that when a Parsee, whom he met in China, asked him 
why Christians were so divided, he responded by explaining the “origin, rise 
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and progress of the Bible Society” and gave him an Eng lish Bible, “not only 
as a memorial of [his] own individual interest in his eternal welfare, but also 
as a monument of the unity of Christians.”25 Nonetheless, unity was an issue 
among Protestant missionaries, and the project of translating the Bible re-
vealed its points of fracture. Indeed, this translation of the New Testament, 
which came to be known as the Delegates Version New Testament, is a more 
apt symbol of disunity than of unity.
 The project had been launched in 1843 at a conference in Hong Kong 
attended by members of several mission societies, including the lMs, the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and representa-
tives of the American Baptists and Presbyterians.26 Their resources included 
not only financial support but also human capital that an earlier generation 
of missionaries had not had. Most important to their effort were Chinese 
converts, who assisted them in the work of translation, tract composition, 
printing, and colportage. By 1843, a new generation of European Christians 
who had been born in Asia and who had grown up speaking Chinese lan-
guages also contributed to the China mission effort, including the work of 
translation and printing. Among these European Christians were the sons 
and daughters of Robert Morrison, William Milne, and Samuel Dyer.27
 The translation work started in 1847, but the delegates almost immedi-
ately began arguing over how best to translate the term for God into Chi-
nese. Morrison and Milne had used shen (spirit) in their earlier translations, 
but Medhurst, Gützlaff, and Bridgman had chosen to use the term shangdi 
(supreme ruler). The lMs missionaries preferred shangdi, and further ampli-
fied the discord by proposing to use the disputed term shen (spirit) to trans-
late Holy Spirit, whereas the missionaries who advocated using the term shen 
to refer to God promoted ling (numinous power) as the best translation for 
Holy Spirit.28
 The lMs missionaries justified their preference for shangdi with a his-
torical argument, claiming that God had revealed himself to the Chinese 
in the Zhou dynasty (c. 1122–235 B.c.) as shangdi—the highest deity and the 
creator of all things. This allowed them a certain rhetorical purchase, since 
they could claim that the Chinese who converted were returning to an earlier 
golden age, rather than turning their backs on Chinese culture (and mission-
aries still use this term and argument to good effect). Because the trans-
lation committee could not agree on a compromise, they continued their 
debate in writing, producing about 600 handwritten pages, many of which 
were published in the Chinese Repository and Chinese Recorder.29
 Because the group of delegates had no final authority to whom they could 
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appeal for a decision, each group made arguments to their respective Bible 
societies. The BfBs’s editorial subcommittee found that they could only ex-
press an opinion on the alternatives proposed, but gave grants to both the 
lMs missionaries and the Church Missionary Society (cMs) missionaries. 
The cMs missionaries preferred shen, and when an agreement could not be 
reached with the lMs and the BfBs for a “united plan of action,” they chose 
to decline the grant.30
 In 1850, the American Bible Society also came down in favor of shen. The 
missionaries could have resolved the dispute by publishing different ver-
sions of the translation, leaving blanks in the text where the disputed terms 
appeared, but finally the committee split, and the BfBs edition of the Dele-
gates Version New Testament was the only one published. Due to the split, 
funds that had been pledged by the American Bible Society were not forth-
coming, and the BfBs financed the project almost entirely on its own.31 In 
1852, the lMs missionaries printed 5,500 copies of the new translation. 
Copies were not only distributed in China, but also sent to Batavia, Penang, 
Calcutta, California, London, and Australia.32
 The Delegates Version NT was small, lightweight, and inexpensive to pro-
duce, and was praised for its elegant literary style (a style that, while praised, 
was nonetheless superseded when the missionaries discovered Mandarin 
and a more widely accessible lower classical style).33 The timing of the Dele-
gates Version NT was fortuitous, falling in the year before the BfBs started 
to plan its Jubilee Year, and just as the Taiping rebels were becoming well 
known to the British public.34
The Jubilee year
1854 was the British and Foreign Bible Society’s fiftieth year, and the society 
marked its Jubilee with a variety of activities, including special initiatives 
to distribute the Bible throughout Great Britain, to supply emigrants with 
Bibles, and to distribute Bibles and Testaments in schools, prisons, mis-
sions, and other institutions; they also made special efforts in India, Aus-
tralia, and other British colonies. Finally, they launched an ambitious ap-
peal—the Million Testament Fund for China.
 The Taiping Rebellion raised Christian hopes that a new government 
whose leaders were Christian-influenced, if not Protestant like them-
selves, might overthrow the Qing dynasty. On 19 March 1853, the Taiping 
rebels entered Nanjing, and on 29 March, their leader, Hong Xiuquan, was 
carried into the city on a golden palanquin, wearing a yellow robe and yel-
low shoes—signs of his claims to imperial sovereignty.35 The Taiping leader 
moSe S’S rod 391
had read a tract written by Liang Ah Fa and became convinced of the truth of 
Christian revelations. Among the Taiping leaders’ first acts was the printing 
of the Books of Genesis and Exodus, and by the end of 1853, they had also 
printed Leviticus and Numbers, all based on an early translation of the Old 
Testament completed by Gützlaff.36
 Between 1853 and 1854, representatives of the British, French, and 
American communities in China met with the Taiping leaders and as a re-
sult, received and examined copies of their publications. Although the mis-
sionaries found much encouragement in Taiping assurances that “as chil-
dren and worshippers of one God we were all brethren,” others were more 
skeptical, finding Taiping decrees and messages—some of which included 
claims to universal sovereignty—to be unreasonable and bizarre.37 None-
theless, reports of these extraordinary events were widely reported in British 
newspapers and were a topic of intense interest to evangelical Christians. 
Many saw in these events the workings of providence, and the coincidence of 
the rebellion with the BfBs’s fiftieth anniversary events suggested that five 
decades of support for Bible translation, publication, and distribution was 
about to pay off handsomely with the creation of a new Christian dynasty in 
China.
 Reverend J. A. James proposed the Million Testament Fund in an ad-
dress entitled “China: Something Must Be Done, and Done Immediately, 
for China—What?,” which was subsequently published in The British Banner, 
in September 1853.38 James had learned about the Taiping Rebellion from 
published letters written by Legge and Hobson that had appeared in British 
newspapers, and he declared the Chinese movement to be “the wonder of 
wonders.”
 James cited a letter from one of the insurgent chiefs to Dr. Charles Tay-
lor, which had been translated into Eng lish and published. In that letter, 
the leader declared that the Taiping celestial dynasty had received the com-
mand of heaven to rule the empire. The leader also mentioned that Taylor had 
brought him books, and because Taylor also worshipped God (the author 
pointedly added Shang-te [shangdi] in brackets), they acknowledged him as a 
brother. James concluded that this new faith was Christian and that the in-
surrection was “essentially a Protestant and not a Popish movement.” Most 
important, he celebrated the fact that the Taiping rebels were willing to enter 
into fellowship with them. The door that had been closed for so many de-
cades was now opened, and he concluded that the duty of the church was to 
multiply missionaries. James had received a letter from Thomas Thompson 
proposing that they launch a fund for printing and circulating in China “A 
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Million Copies of the Chinese New Testament,” asking for his help in putting 
the proposal before the public through the press, and calling all Sunday-
school teachers and scholars to do the work of fund-raising. James proposed 
that it become a basis for “Christian union for action,” and suggested that 
the BfBs would be the organization best suited to carry out the project.
 James further proposed that donations be taken down not in dollar 
amounts, but in the number of testaments, since “giving sixty copies of 
scripture to sixty chinamen sounds more pleasant than giving a pound to a 
fund for purchasing a million copies. It brings out more forcibly the value and im-
portance of individual effort” (emphasis in original). He proposed that the dis-
tribution be entrusted to missionaries and that Protestants of all denomi-
nations ally against their competitor, Rome. He acknowledged that “errors” 
were mixed into the religious views of the movement, but proposed that cir-
culating the Bible would help to correct these. An editorial in The Watchman 
further noted that the rebels had published Old Testament books, but lacked 
the New Testament, which the author predicted would “temper their po-
lygamy and fanaticism.” Meanwhile, news had reached Eng land that William 
Chalmers Burns had completed a Chinese translation of Pilgrim’s Progress and 
that this would be printed at a mere four cents a copy.
 Among the earliest responses to his appeal was a letter from the Earl 
of Gainsborough, who sent a check to James for £20. A person identifying 
himself only as a Father also wrote to the editor of The British Banner to report 
that he and his wife and six children had all agreed that each would give 
a Bible to a Chinese family, so that eight families would be supplied with 
the Word of God. Two individuals were so moved by the proposal that they 
wrote poems extolling the wondrous doings in China, and calling on British 
Christians to “give them the Bible” so that they could uproot “heathenish 
notions” and assert themselves against despots.39 A number of British news-
papers—including the Nonconformist, the Record (Evangelical Church Party), 
the Watchman (Methodist Conference), the Wesleyan Times (Wesleyan Reform-
ers), the Patriot, British Banner, and Christian Times—rallied support for the 
interdenominational project.
 The secretary of the Bible Society agreed to take on the responsibility 
for the Million Testament Fund, noting that “China is ready for the Bible 
Society, and, thank God, the Bible Society is ready for China.” A torrent of 
donations followed, some accompanied with touching letters published in 
the society’s Monthly Extracts From the Correspondence of the British and Foreign Bible 
Society. Most of the donors were British, but donations also came from South 
Africa, Canada, the United States, Barbados, Antigua, and even Syria and the 
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Holy Land, where students in a mission school donated funds and “a gift of 
the Bible from the Bible’s birth-place to Eastern Asia.”40
 In his second appeal, James also noted with approval that the insurgents 
had prohibited opium, adding that the use of the drug had become common 
and was “a still more formidable obstacle in the way of moral reformation 
than even drunkenness is in these Kingdoms.”41 His comment raises a sig-
nificant issue: British evangelicals might have won the battle against slavery 
with the 1807 Slave Trade Act and the 1833 Slavery Abolition Act, but they 
faced further issues of national guilt over the opium trade.
 Christians felt great joy at gaining access to China, but also expressed 
enormous ambivalence about the military means by which that access had 
been obtained, and about the motives for war, which included forcing the 
Chinese authorities to accept the opium trade. The Christian stance on tem-
perance conflicted with the European merchants’ promotion of this highly 
addictive drug, whose sale also provided significant funding for the colonial 
enterprise in the Straits Settlements.42 Even before the opium wars, mis-
sionaries in Southeast Asia regarded opium as a vice, visiting opium dens in 
Singapore and Penang to exhort against its use and offering treatment to ad-
dicts. However, when they addressed Chinese on street corners and in public 
settings like temple festivals, their listeners sometimes retorted that even as 
European missionaries encouraged them to give up opium, it was Europeans 
who sold it to them. The missionaries confessed in their letters the sense of 
shame they felt.
 Meanwhile, William Milne’s son, William Charles Milne (1815–1865), re-
ported that the insurgents had “broken loose from all the bands of supersti-
tion; they were determined to put down idolatry; they went from one place 
to another, upsetting their idols, ransacking their temples, emptying their 
monasteries, discarding their priests.” However, the insurgents went fur-
ther, notifying the public that “the living and true God was the only God to 
be worshipped by the people; and moreover they prescribed a sacred ritual 
for His service, and set apart one day in seven as a holy day.”43 Milne was 
uncertain as to the outcome of the rebellion, but was encouraged by the 
prospect that China might one day have an emperor who printed the scrip-
tures, and displayed to the BfBs committee a copy of the Book of Gene-
sis that Hong Xiuquan had printed, on which he had placed his “sign and 
stamp, the insignia of government, like the arms of our beloved Queen on 
the Scriptures in our own honoured country.”44 The British Christians found 
encouragement in Hong Xiuquan’s opposition to both idol worship and 
opium use.45
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 As a result of the scale of this project, the BfBs set up a separate account 
for contributions, suggesting that donors might either send a sum of any 
amount, or the exact value of a specific number of copies, estimated at 4d. 
(four cents) a copy. The fund-raising program was an extraordinary success.
The intensity, activity, and rapid result of this new effort of Christian zeal, 
were perhaps never surpassed; contributions flowed in from all quarters, 
and from all classes, in almost endless variety of amount. In this, as in 
the general Jubilee Fund, the poor man vied with the rich, the child with 
the aged sire, the Colonies with the mother country, and even foreigners, 
in climes far distant from each other, pressed to take, though it were but 
a humble part in this magnificent act of charity.46
Many members of the society were optimistic that China was soon to be-
come a Christian nation, and indeed anticipated that China would become 
“the largest ruby that is to blaze, the most precious diamond that is to 
sparkle, in the diadem of Immanuel [Jesus].”47
 The BfBs raised enough money to print a million New Testaments by 
February 1854, but continued until they had amassed a total of £52,368.48 
Meanwhile, the missionaries commenced the project by printing 250,000 
copies of the New Testament (115,000 at Shanghai, 50,000 in Hong Kong, 
and 85,000 at other mission stations). However, the Bishop of Victoria and 
the missionaries soon cautioned the BfBs that it would be unwise to print 
a large number of scriptures that the country was not yet open to receive, 
and which they did not have adequate means to distribute. In response, the 
committee voted to give the missionaries an additional £1000 to pay for col-
portage.49
 Starting in 1855, the BfBs published numerous letters from China re-
porting extensive travel by the missionaries and their colporteurs, and the 
distribution of tens of thousands of New Testaments. However, by 1856, the 
BfBs committee members were discouraged. Although they had expected 
to be able to accomplish “a great work” in a very short period of time, their 
hopes were not realized, since “the facilities anticipated for diffusing, far 
and wide, the Scriptures, have not been presented.”50
 Among those involved in Bible colportage were the missionaries William 
Chalmers Burns (1815–1868), who worked for the Eng lish Presbyterian mis-
sion, and James Hudson Taylor (1832–1905), who came to China with sup-
port from the Chinese Evangelization Society and who later founded the 
China Inland Mission. As his brother described it in his memoir, in 1854 
Burns itinerated in Fujian, traveling to Britain briefly before returning in 
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1855. Between 1855 and 1858, Burns was based in Shanghai, but made fre-
quent trips around the region, living on his boat and following in his lei-
surely travels the network of canals and rivers that “spread over the whole 
face of the country”—in China, as in the Cambodian water world, “eco-
nomic activities followed the movement of water.”51
 The British evangelists typically traveled with local Christians, and Burns’s 
memoir offers the conversion stories of three Chinese with whom he itiner-
ated in Fujian in the mid-1850s. The first was a glib fortune-teller who used 
his talents to provide the “fit word at the fitting time,” the second a soldier 
who viewed evangelism as offering him the opportunity to learn the craft 
of professional storytelling.52 Finally, the memoir describes Tan See Boo, 
a young man who, before his conversion, had carved small idols for family 
altars.53 Tan relinquished his trade and “cast himself on the providence of 
God,” carving beads and ornaments instead of god images.54
 In late 1855, Burns traveled with an unnamed Chinese Christian who was 
employed “in connection with the Million Testament Scheme,” and in 1856, 
Taylor joined him in this work. The BfBs not only offered Taylor as many 
copies of the New Testament as he could distribute, but also paid most of 
his travel expenses, and he and Burns traveled together to distribute tracts 
and Testaments in areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong.55 When they 
worked in nearby Shantou (Swatow), an American missionary based in Hong 
Kong dispatched two additional Chinese Christians to assist them.
 Taylor returned to Shanghai, but when Burns and the Chinese colporteurs 
stopped in Chaozhou, the authorities arrested them on the boat. Commis-
sioner Yeh dispatched Burns and his books to Shanghai with an escort and an 
official statement addressed to the British consul in which he charged that 
Burns’s penetration into the inland riverine region wearing Chinese dress 
was highly improper. The local authorities detained the Chinese Christians, 
whom they beat and imprisoned for four months.56
 Although the Christians had celebrated when the Taiping rebels had 
printed the scriptures, they now found that this put them in considerable 
danger. The following year, the lMs missionary William Muirhead wrote to 
the BfBs after two colporteurs and their boatmen were arrested and impris-
oned, reporting that the mandarins associated books with the name Jesus in 
the title with the rebels, who were widely known to have adopted the “reli-
gion of the Heavenly Father and Jesus.” The colporteurs were imprisoned for 
a month and only freed after the British consul intervened.57
 Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Second Opium War (1856–1860) further 
hampered their efforts. In 1857, Legge announced that colportage would 
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have to be suspended since the Chinese colporteurs did not dare to go into 
the interior, to let it be known that they associated with foreigners, or to cir-
culate books printed by foreigners.58 Nonetheless, in 1857, the BfBs shipped 
out an additional cylinder printing press for the use of the corresponding 
committee at Shanghai; it also decided to print 50,000 copies of the entire 
Bible in Chinese as soon as possible, determined to use the surplus funds.
 Blocked from distributing New Testaments in China, the missionar-
ies briefly refocused their efforts on the Chinese populations in the Straits 
Settlements. In 1857, B. P. Keasberry, the lMs missionary to the Malays, 
formed the Bible and Tract Society in Singapore (which had been without a 
Chinese mission since 1843) and Medhurst sent him 3,000 Chinese New Tes-
taments for distribution.59 The next year, the British Methodist missionary 
Josiah Cox, whose hopes of establishing a mission in the rebel capital Nan-
jing had been disappointed, itinerated in the Straits Settlements and distrib-
uted over 3,000 New Testaments.60 However, he returned to China, where he 
eventually established a mission in Hankow.
 The BfBs had raised enough funds to print 2,334,000 copies of the scrip-
ture at fourpence each, but disbursement of the sum proved more difficult 
than the collection. By 1859, the BfBs reported that only 313,000 copies 
of the New Testament had been printed in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Canton, 
Fuzhou, and other places, and that many still sat in storage (especially in 
Shanghai) since the means to distribute them was lacking. They found inno-
vative uses for the fund (for example, to produce a Chinese version of the 
Bible with raised characters for the blind), but could not expend the money 
as they had planned. The committee expressed their hope that they might 
still see “enlarged opportunities” in the future on which they might ex-
pend the funds remaining. Meanwhile, they reported their satisfaction that 
“China had received from the hands of Eng land that rich supply of Scriptural 
truth ‘the merchandise of which is better than the merchandise of silver and 
the gain thereof than fine gold.’”61
conclusion
As C. Patterson Giersch has observed in this volume, circulation implies 
both the movement of people and goods, and the movement of technology, 
ideas, and forms of cultural production. The Million Testament Fund not 
only supported the widespread distribution of the Chinese New Testament 
to Chinese communities in China, Southeast Asia, Australia, and North 
America, but also paid for the introduction of the most up-to-date print-
ing technology to China: the cylinder press and the use of metal type. The 
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Testaments themselves were not just utilitarian goods but the vehicles with 
which Christians hoped to convey their religious ideas, which the founders 
of the British and Foreign Bible Society regarded as the foundation of a just 
political economy.
 The Christian founders and leaders of the BfBs sought to widely circu-
late the Bible (and an associated set of ideas and practices) in a competi-
tive marketplace of ideologies and agendas. In the early nineteenth century, 
Christian texts competed with Thomas Paine’s revolutionary pamphlets (and 
also pornography) in Britain, whereas in China, missionaries viewed the 
Bible as competing both with Catholic translations of the stories of the saints 
(which they abhorred as a form of idol worship) and the Confucian classics 
(which they disliked, since Confucius taught that humans were essentially 
good, rather than innately sinful). When British Christians donated money 
to the Million Testament Fund, they sought to promote through their gift a 
utopian view of a just global ecumene that offered an alternative not only to 
Chinese political and social practices, but also to economic utilitarianism 
and unbridled capitalism.
 In raising funds for collective projects, Christians translated passionate 
convictions (including the abhorrence of slavery and compassion for opium 
addicts) into campaigns whose tone and momentum were measured by the 
level of participation and the degree of financial success. Donations created 
a social body of like-minded Christians, announced through a published 
donation list (figure 1). These lists gave equal weight to the donations of 
the child and the wealthy man, and often were printed together with stories 
of personal sacrifices, or of unexpected windfall gains that the recipients 
viewed as providential.
 Fund-raising was an index of moral opinion, and donation a form of 
moral participation—a kind of plebiscite, if you will. Indeed, Milne observed 
that the “Bible Christians” of Britain had come forward to “vote One Mission 
Testaments to the people of China.”62 When Christians donated to charity, 
they made their virtue visible and quantified their values.
 Donors were aware that contributions, however small, made them par-
ticipants in a project of unimaginable scope and ambition, and they reveled 
in it. Take, for example, this letter published in the Bible Society’s Monthly 
Extracts:
dear sir—I’ve been thinking about the Million Testaments for China, 
and I thought they never could be gathered together. What a heap! It is 
impossible it can be done. Whilst I was musing one day, it came into my 
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mind what a Minister once said—“The ocean is made up of drops; the 
shore is only a multitude of little grains of sand.”—Then I thought, If 
everybody would only put down one Testament as one little grain of sand, 
we should have the heap out of hand. So I made up my mind to give my 
little savings this year to China. Please to put it down from Elizabeth.63
 This donor was dazzled by the enormity of the project, which she found 
unthinkable until she imagined the million testaments metaphorically as 
grains of sand or drops of water, joining together to create a vast ocean or 
seashore. But the New Testaments also symbolized the collective action of 
British Christians who translated their financial means into signs of Chris-
tian benevolence towards China. They imagined their donations as buying 
Bibles that were gifts from British families to Chinese families, from British 
children to Chinese children.
 Although the Million Testament Fund of 1854 fell far short of the goal 
of distributing a million Chinese testaments in China, and in Chinese com-
munities in the Nanyang and elsewhere, the Christian quest to distribute 
the Bible to every Chinese household continues. In a development that the 
leaders of the Bible Society of Singapore hail as a “modern miracle,” the 
United Bible Societies (a global network of 141 Bible societies) recently col-
laborated with the China Christian Council to establish the Amity Printing 
Company in Nanjing.
 Foreign evangelists still sometimes smuggle Bibles into China, but since 
1988 Amity Printing has engaged in legal Bible printing and distribution. The 
company has now printed over 50 million Chinese Bibles and Testaments at 
a subsidized cost for sale through Chinese churches and distribution cen-
ters. The effort is a global collaboration, but the Nanyang Chinese continue 
to play a key role in this effort through organizations like the Bible Society 
of Singapore.
 Scholars and sectarians may argue over the authenticity and correctness 
of different versions and translations of the Bible, but Christians worldwide 
regard the Bible as a single text whose global distribution in many languages 
symbolizes Christian unity-in-diversity. Today, as in 1854, they have pooled 
global financial resources to underwrite the production and distribution of 
Bibles in China, which allows Amity Printing to sell the Bibles that it prints 
very cheaply.
 Christians still measure the success of their undertaking in the number of 
Bibles produced and distributed. However, rather than experiencing results 
that fall short of their ambitions, the United Bible Societies reports nearly 
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unqualified success. During the Cultural Revolution, the Bible was banned 
and copies destroyed. Nonetheless, by 2007, the United Bible Societies’ 
China Partnership Coordinator, Kua Wee Seng, could claim that there were 
more Bibles than any other book in China. Although Buddhists and Daoists 
now widely distribute free copies of their own sacred texts, and although the 
government now celebrates the contribution that these two official religions 
have made to social harmony, this claim may well be true.64
 Due to low production costs in China, Amity Printing can further realize 
a profit by producing Bibles for export to Asia and Africa. Chinese Chris-
tians see God’s hand in China’s recent transformation: a country whose 
ideologues once destroyed Bibles now allows their production and export. 
Indeed, an article in the United Bible Societies’ newsletter shows a photo-
graph of a pile of Bibles next to a photograph of a pile of shoes, with the 
caption “Bibles (left) and shoes (middle) are among the many products that 
China is now exporting across the world.”65 However, unlike a pile of shoes, 
a pile of Bibles carries a heavy freight of meaning.
 When Christians sell the Bible, one might say that they are not selling a 
figure 1 extract from a fifteen-page list of contributions to the chinese new Testament fund 
published in the Monthly extracts from the Correspondence of the british and foreign bible Society, 
no. 36 (29 april 1854): 382. The British and foreign Bible Society listed contributions by the names  
of individuals and societies, and included both the amount of the contribution and the number of  
new Testaments that would be produced with that contribution at fourpence a copy. reprinted by 
permission of the Bible Society library, cambridge university library.
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book so much as an entire worldview. Christians recognize that this world-
view competes with other ideologies, including Marxism and materialism. 
In a contemporary Chinese textbook used to prepare evangelists for work in 
China, for example, the authors pay special attention to explicating Marxist 
ideology, offering the interesting observation that communist and Christian 
ideals are very similar, and that some even regard Marxism as an atheist sect 
of Christianity. They conclude, however, that Christianity and Marx’s theory 
are opposed: “God’s way of changing society is to change individual hearts 
(from the grassroots), Marx’s way is to change the economic and political 
system (from the top).”66
 Christians hope that the distribution of the Bible in China and in over-
seas Chinese communities will stimulate non-Christians to seek them out, 
so that they can teach them their cosmology (which explains human history 
from eternity to eternity), their salvation message, and their moral frame-
work. In a world that many believe to have lost its moral compass, Christians 
seek to transform others, one person at a time, and view the Bible—Moses’s 
rod—as a near-magical instrument of that transformation.
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market priCe, labor input, and relation of  
produCtion in sarawak’s edible birds’ nest trade
Bien Chiang
Edible birds’ nest, or yen-wo 燕窩, ranks among the top of the long list of 
Chinese delicacies-cum-tonics.1 A large majority of Chinese people have 
likely never seen nor consumed any edible birds’ nests before, but almost 
all have heard about them and can claim to know a few things about them. 
To most Chinese, edible birds’ nest carries the aura of royalty, extravagance, 
luxury, and exoticism. People usually have only a vague idea about the ori-
gin and the zoological and medical details of birds’ nests, but all are aware 
of the legendary amount of labor and money involved in their procurement.
 Birds’ nest is well known to scholars of Southeast Asian studies as an 
exotic commodity that caters to the Chinese market. According to an estima-
tion done by the Singapore-based asean Birds’ Nest Traders Association, 
the annual export of edible birds’ nest from Indonesia alone, which contrib-
utes 70 percent of global production, is worth between Us$200 and Us$250 
million. In 1997, Indonesian exports of edible birds’ nest weighed 170 tons, 
with a projected 10 percent growth for 1998. Other major birds’ nest– 
producing countries include Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand.2 Environmen-
talist and international wildlife conservation agents keep a close watch on 
this trade, fearing endangerment of the two species of swiftlets that are 
credited with building these nests.
 Nowadays it is common knowledge to scientists and general consumers 
alike that the edible ingredient of these nests comes from the saliva of the 
birds. One does not need exceptional curiosity to be intrigued by the source 
of “value” of this saliva-based commodity. What sociocultural values and po-
litical economic realities have been joining forces to keep this transnational 
trade in birds’ nest going? Some angles for investigation are evidently in 
order. On the one hand, on the consumer side, the body of Chinese medici-
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nal knowledge has apparently sanctioned the “subjective value” of birds’ 
nest. On the other hand, the well-known difficulty in procuring birds’ nest 
no doubt warrants an examination along the line of “labor theory of value.” 
However, it is not my goal in this essay to defend one value theory against 
the other. Rather, based on textual as well as ethnographic data, I present 
an—admittedly not yet complete—picture of how value is constructed re-
spectively on the production and the consumer ends of the birds’ nest trade. 
I also show how the value of birds’ nest on both ends is related to social pro-
duction and reproduction.
 Scholarly, business, and public attention notwithstanding, systematic 
studies of the modes of production and trading of edible birds’ nest are rela-
tively few. The few noteworthy articles are either solely descriptive or policy 
oriented.3 In contrast to these works, Leonard Blussé’s article “In Praise of 
Commodities: An Essay on the Cross-cultural Trade in Edible Bird’s Nests” 
is written with a much clearer scholarly goal.4 In the article, Blussé hopes 
to shed light on “the true nature of Oriental Trade” through an examina-
tion of trade in birds’ nest. Relying on various historical documents, Blussé 
examines the patterns of collecting and trading birds’ nest in four places—
Eastern Kalimantan, Java’s South Coast, Batavia’s countryside, and the 
Champa Islets—from the mid-eighteenth century to the early nineteenth. 
The organization of production differed from one case to another. In east-
ern Kalimantan, native Bornean “slaves” worked the caves owned by Sulu 
grandees. In Java’s South Coast and the countryside of Batavia, birds’ nest–
producing caves were owned, variously, by local rulers, the Dutch East India 
Company (Voc), the colonial government, and private Dutch landowners, 
but the mode of production at the base remained the same: the caves were 
worked by the local population as a kind of corvée duty. In the Champa Islets, 
the Nguyen regime set up brigades, “which were allowed to exploit the re-
sources under payment of heavy annual taxes.”5 The brigades, in turn, taxed 
the nest-collecting fishermen either by ship or by head.
 Significantly, these various arrangements in birds’ nest production gradu-
ally gave way to a Chinese monopoly in the trade by the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. According to Blussé, this was due to Chinese tax farmers moving in-
land, as close as possible to the production region, and providing the natives 
with the much sought-after Chinese industrial products at a highly competi-
tive price. The Chinese also sent home birds’ nest as a substitute for silver 
to fulfill their familial obligations. In Blussé’s words, “A once cross-cultural 
trade network had now effectively become a mono-cultural one.”6 Further-
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more, if we “focus on the power struggle surrounding the mode of produc-
tion and the production areas of a specific commodity,” we notice that the 
“Western expansion of power meant paving the way for Chinese expansion 
of trade.”7
 This “Sinification” of trade in specific commodities is echoed in Heather 
Sutherland’s study of Indonesian tortoiseshell trade in the late seventeenth 
century and the eighteenth.8 The picture presented by Sutherland is a more 
complex one: the Chinese monopolization of trepang trade, in which only 
the Chinese own the cultural knowledge of its use-value, results in the pene-
tration of the Chinese into the “upstream levels of the trade, once dominated 
by Sulawesians,”9 such as the trading of tortoiseshell, which was used more 
widely in local handicrafts before the coming of Chinese traders. Suther-
land’s conclusion is applicable to a broader range of phenomena: “Ethnic 
differentiation was important in that it related directly to relevant knowl-
edge about production and consumption, and to social capital embodied in 
networks of trust.”10
 In a similar vein, I explore further the knowledge that the Chinese traders 
command regarding the production and consumption of edible birds’ nest—
how their knowledge of the commodity’s use-value allows them to manipu-
late its exchange value. Also, I demonstrate that the local communities re-
sponsible for the actual collecting of birds’ nest are not without agency in 
the trade. Their agency is shown in the more or less successful conversion of 
the profit from their involvement in the birds’ nest trade into means of social 
production and reproduction.
Birds’ nest in chinese medicinal Tradition
noT so ancienT a TradiTion
The prominent position of edible birds’ nest in Chinese medicine and cuisine 
notwithstanding, documentation about its origins and attributes is surpris-
ingly scanty. Contrary to some literature that conceives of birds’ nest con-
sumption as an “ancient Chinese custom,” the mention of birds’ nest in his-
torical documents appears no earlier than the fourteenth century.11 Blussé 
accepts the opinion of the Japanese historian Shinoda Osamu that “the first 
reference to edible birds’ nest is the entry in Chia Ming’s Yin-shih hsü-chih 
(‘What we need to know about food and drink’), a book that appeared in the 
early years of the Ming dynasty.”12 In this book, the author simply noted, 
“Yen-wo tastes sweet and has a mild quality; the yellowish, blackish, and rot-
ten ones are poisonous and should not be eaten.”13
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 Throughout the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), however, references to birds’ 
nest are rather sporadic. As Blussé notes, “Neither Wang Ta-yüan in his Ticl 
(1350) nor Ma Huan, who in the yysl described the famous travels of the 
eunuch Chen Ho to Southeast and South Asia in the early decades of the fif-
teenth century, mention edible bird’s nests as an import-commodity from 
the Nanyang.”14 Chang Hsieh in his Dung Xi Yang Kau [Investigation of the 
east and the west oceans] (1618) did record edible birds’ nest among the local 
products of Jiau-zhe, Champa (Vietnam), Pahang, Melaka, Kelantan, Johor 
(Malaysia), Aceh (Sumatra), and Cambodia. Under the entry for the kingdom 
of Jiau-zhe, Chang noted, “The swiftlets feed on seaweed and then spit it out 
to make nest. The nests are attached to the walls of grottoes. In the nests, the 
swiftlets lay eggs and rear broods. It is therefore full of feather. The natives 
climb ladders to collect them.”15 For Champa, he said, “The swiftlet is about 
the size of pigeon. They come back to grottoes or cliff to make nests every 
spring. . . . The island natives wait for them to leave in the autumn, fixing 
spade to pole, collecting the nests and eating them. The nest is referred to as 
yen-wo, a delicacy in feast.”16 Except for the size of the bird and the building 
material of the nest, Chang’s description is not very far from the facts. What 
is worth noting is that he seems to be indicating the habit of eating birds’ 
nest among the natives and at the same time the existence of a market for it 
in China. Other than mentioning edible birds’ nest as a local product, Dung Xi 
Yang Kau provides no detail of its use as medicine or a tonic.
 Nor does the famous encyclopedia of Chinese herb medicine written by Li 
Shih-chen (1518–1593), Pen-ts’ao kang-mu [Compendium of materia medica], 
list birds’ nest. Only in the supplement to this work, Pen-ts’ao kang-mu shih-i 
[Supplement to Compendium of materia medica], which appeared almost 
two hundred years later, in 1765, did birds’ nest receive extensive coverage. 
The author of the supplement, Chao Hsüe-ming, compiled a substantial 
amount of firsthand as well as secondhand information about the healing 
effects of birds’ nest and remarked, “The pity is that it is not listed in Pen-ts’ao 
and rarely used in prescription.”17 Among the literatures that Chao Hsüe-
ming cited, the earliest is Cüan-nan Tsa-zhe [Miscellaneous notes on southern 
Fujian], written by a Ming officer, Chen Mau-ren.18 According to Chen,
Far offshore of Fujian and closer to the aborigines’ territory, there is a 
kind of swiftlet called chin-si [golden thread]. Its head and tail look like 
that of the swallow, but it is much smaller in size; the feathers are like 
golden threads. Before laying eggs and rearing broods, the whole flock 
would descend on a beach that is sandy with scattered rocks and feed on 
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the “silkworm conch.” The seafaring trader I interviewed claims that, ac-
cording to the aborigines, inside the flesh of the silkworm conch there are 
two “ribs,” white and sturdy like the silk of the “maple silkworm.” Taken 
internally, the “rib” is replenishing to asthenia and can stop diarrhea. The 
swiftlet eats the conch, digests the flesh but not the “ribs,” spits out the 
“ribs” along with saliva and uses them to build nests on grotto walls. As 
time passes, the swiftlets fly away with the new fledglings, and the coastal 
peoples collect the nests in season. This is called yen-wo.19
 The edible birds’ nest was not mentioned in earlier Chinese medicinal lit-
eratures. Both Dung Xi Yang Kau and Cüan-nan Tsa-zhe, on the other hand, sug-
gest the possibility of it being consumed originally by the native peoples of 
Southeast Asia. It is still uncertain as to the dates of its initial introduction 
into China. It seemed to be quite rare in the Ming dynasty. What is certain 
is that starting from the early Qing dynasty, the number of times yen-wo 
is mentioned increased dramatically. It is listed among the royal tributes 
from Southeast Asian polities, mentioned as a taxable commodity, referred 
to in popular novels, and served on the imperial table. It was also during 
the Qing dynasty that more systematic knowledge about yen-wo’s healing 
effects began to accumulate.
healing and TheraPeUTic effecTs
The entry on yen-wo in the “Grand Dictionary of Chinese Medicine,” com-
piled and published by the Jiang-su New Medical College in 1986, lists its 
healing effect as “nourishing the yin element, moisten the malign dryness 
inside the body, strengthening the chi and replenishing the middle warmer. 
It provides remedy to asthenia, impairment, pulmonary overstrain, cough-
ing, respiration with phlegm, bloody sputum and hematamesis, chronic 
diarrhea, chronic intermittent fevers, frequent dysphagia and regurgita-
tion.”20 This is basically the same range of effects listed in Pen-ts’ao kang-mu 
shih-i. Birds’ nest is considered beneficial to the pulmonary and digestive 
systems. It can be boiled into “juice” either by itself or in combination with 
other herb medicines. In addition to naming these principal healing effects, 
Pen-ts’ao kang-mu shih-i mentions that birds’ nest can cure micturition; that it 
is capable of strengthening the yang element, supplementing the chi, regu-
lating the middle warmer, improving appetite, adding the essence of life, 
and replenishing the marrow; and that the red ones can cure dysentery with 
bloody stools.21
 In some of the literature cited by Pen-ts’ao kang-mu shih-i are explanations 
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as to the healing effects of birds’ nest. A common opinion is that it has 
something to do with the food of the swiftlets. In addition to “silkworm 
conch” and seaweed, small fish are also considered to be part of the swiftlet 
diet. The most significant remarks, however, are the following.
On the surface of the rocks by the seashore, “sea powder” gathered like 
moss. The swiftlets feed on this powder and spit it out to make nest. . . . 
The sea powder is cold in nature; being taken in and spat out by the swift-
lets makes it warm. The sea powder tastes salty; being taken in and spat 
out by the swiftlets makes it sweet. Its appearance and quality are totally 
transformed; therefore, it has the effects of resolving sputum and im-
proving appetite. The nests come in either black or white; the red ones are 
hard to come by. Since the swiftlet belongs to the category of fire, the red 
nest is especially the essence.
 The swiftlet carries sea powder in its mouth for nest building. With 
the help of the mild chi from the sun and the wind, the saltiness and the 
coldness are transformed into sweetness and neutrality. This will cause 
the mutual generation between the metal and the water elements, ele-
vate the chi of the kidney to nourish the pulmonary system and also to 
calm the chi in the stomach.22
The “Grand Dictionary of Chinese Medicine” states, “The sea powder is salty 
and cold. After the swiftlet carries it in the mouth and into the high wind, it 
becomes sweet and neutral. . . . The birds’ nest replenishes without causing 
malign dryness, moistens without causing sluggishness; it is the mildest 
and fairest of all medicines.”23
 It is now well established that the edible component of the nest is actually 
the swiftlet’s saliva, rather than transformed foodstuffs.24 In the systematic 
knowledge of Chinese medicine, however, the transformative capacity of the 
swiftlet is considered the key factor in the therapeutic effects of birds’ nest. 
Being classified as “fire,” the swiftlet transforms things from the sea, which 
are “salty and cold” by nature, into something mildly cool and having calm-
ing, cooling, and cleansing effects on the pulmonary and digestive systems.
 On the other hand, among Chinese consumers, there is always an aura of 
mysticism surrounding the therapeutic effects of birds’ nest. In the 31 Octo-
ber 1964 issue of the Sarawak Gazette, an author named Chu Chin Onn con-
tributed a short essay entitled “Birds’ Nests: Sarawak All-Cure.” Chu was 
a Chinese Sarawakian with a background in traditional medicine and was 
working with the Sarawak Museum at the time.25 In this essay, Chu offered 
his own rather unique interpretation of birds’ nest’s therapeutic effects.
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It is logical that the person who wishes to take birds’ nests, he himself 
should not do the work—cleaning, picking, etc., for this is a tedious job, 
which requires time, concentration and energy; and also this work is 
liable to exhaust health, breath and energy which may be absorbed and 
radiate to the birds’ nests, so that he takes away his own energetic health in-
stead!
 In olden days persons were exceptional and cunning. They used to en-
gage healthy young and unmarried person to do the job and to prepare the 
steaming at a quicker pace, as special preparation for health sake. Quicker 
pace saves a lot of time, avoids the birds’ nests remaining (dipped) in 
water to soak away the good properties. Healthy young persons possess 
stronger health, energetic heat and breath. These can warm the birds’ 
nests through contact of body heat, circulating around the working area 
at the time of concentration, when the young clean and pick the nests, 
which can then absorb the healthy heat and energetic process from them, 
the young.26
Chu’s opinion is not in line with those of the Chinese medicinal classics; 
and presently it is difficult to decide how much it can be considered as rep-
resenting the popular folk notion. His idea of radiating breath and energy is 
more like a crude imitation of the chi theory. However, the Sarawak Gazette, 
though not a scholarly journal, is a well-respected magazine that has been in 
press for over a hundred years. Chu’s Eng lish writing leaves plenty of room 
for improvement but carries the flavor of colonial “Chinglish.” In the same 
issue, next to Chu’s essay, the editor of the Sarawak Gazette published another 
article entitled “Cave Swiftlets and Birds’ Nest.” The author, Michael Fogden, 
wrote in a naturalist’s manner about the varieties of the swiftlets, the com-
ponents of the nest, the birds’ ecology and breeding patterns as well as some 
sociocultural background to the collection of birds’ nest. The juxtaposition 
of the two essays revealed the editor’s intention of providing a balanced re-
port that included both the point of view of a naturalist and that of the major 
consumers. Once published, Chu’s explanation became public knowledge 
and could not be casually brushed aside.
 In a sense, Chu’s point can also be viewed as a parable—it tells the truth 
about the huge labor input in birds’ nest production. It is well known that 
the collecting and processing of birds’ nest is extremely labor-intensive 
and time-consuming. Birds’ nest collectors need to ascend high into the 
chimneys of caves or descend down formidable cliffs with very simple gear, 
and accidents are often fatal. The cleaning and feather removing works are, 
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furthermore, both tedious and taxing on workers’ eyesight; these processes 
are usually handled by Chinese traders, rather than the collectors, while the 
real work is always done by hired young female laborers. These women come 
from all ethnic groups and are usually not very well paid. In a home video on 
the processing of house-farmed birds’ nest in Indonesia, one sees rows of 
female workers in uniform sitting in a room about the size of a classroom. In 
front of each worker is a bowl of water containing unprocessed birds’ nests 
and another small dish of water in which to rinse feathers off the tweezers. 
The room is filled with clinks as the women rap the tweezers against the 
ceramic dish to rinse off the feathers. When the male boss, hands behind 
his back, walks down the aisle to inspect the jobs of the workers, the scene 
becomes rather oppressive.27 In other words, the preparation of birds’ nest 
requires a huge amount of labor input, a fact of which consumers are aware. 
Both objectively and subjectively speaking, therefore, consuming birds’ nest 
is essentially consuming behind-the-scenes labor.
 Now we should turn to another aspect of the value of birds’ nest that 
is also based on, and sanctioned by, Chinese medicinal knowledge. Retail 
stores carry a kind of dark-reddish birds’ nest that commands the highest 
price; this is the so-called blood nest. We have already seen that, according 
to Pen-ts’ao kang-mu shih-i, the red ones can cure dysentery with bloody stools. 
The traditional explanation holds that the swiftlet, having built two nests 
continuously and having had both removed by a collector, is so exhausted 
when building the third nest that it spits blood. These reddish nests are con-
sidered the most nourishing and the most exquisite, and are therefore the 
most expensive among all the types of birds’ nest. Although we now know 
that the tints in birds’ nest, be they reddish, brownish, or yellowish, result 
from the different minerals in the rock on which the swiftlets choose to 
build their nest, the legend of the “blood nest” remains prevalent.28
 For scientists and birds’ nest collectors, the blood nest category does 
not exist. In Sarawak, only two kinds of birds’ nest have commercial value. 
Those built by Aerodramus maximus are called the “black nest.” The “black” 
refers to the large number of feathers that cover and intermix with the “sub-
stance” that is the saliva. Before being cleaned, the whole nest looks black-
ish. After the feathers and other particles are cleared away, the birds’ nest 
substance looks white, yellowish, or reddish. The price of black nest on the 
production site—between middleman and collectors—is determined by the 
portion of the nest substance that each piece contains. The more feathers 
and less substance, the lower the price.29 The price here actually reflects the 
ratio between the labor that would be needed in the cleaning process and 
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the amount of substance that can be recovered. In fact, according to Charles 
Leh, a zoologist and curator of Sarawak Museum, the reddish ones com-
mand a lower price.30
 The other kind of nest is built by Aerodramus fuciphagus and is called the 
“white nest.” It contains very few feathers and needs less cleaning. The bare 
birds’ nest substance generally looks whitish, but is also susceptible to the 
tints from rock. White nest commands a higher price at the production site.
 In retailer’s shops, however, the price ranks among different categories 
of birds’ nest are almost totally reversed. Three retail stores in Kuching City, 
the capital of Sarawak, price birds’ nest categories as listed in table 1. We can 
compare these with the price list of an Internet retailer as listed in table 2.
 In both cases, blood nest fetches the highest price; the yellow nest comes 
in second, and the white nest the lowest. Nowadays, the yellow nests on the 
retail market are mostly house-farmed birds’ nests from Indonesia. They are 
generally better in shape and are consider by some consumers to be cleaner. 
As for the blood nest, the Internet retailer claims that it is “the most nu-
tritious of all swiftlet nest. Best for pregnant women, patients after sur-
gery. Healthy Nest Bloody is a house type nest. Hence, Healthy Nest Bloody 
is much more delicate and tasty than the Cave type Bloody.”31 It is not at 
all clear how house-farmed birds’ nest can be reddish, since such nests 
are built either on cement or wooden walls. But during a conversation, the 
third-largest shopkeeper in Kuching City assured me that “our blood nest is 
one hundred per cent natural color. The redness is original. Unlike some other 
shops who use artificial color to turn the nest dark red.” However, he avoids 







Blood nest cupi n/a n/a 500ii
Blood nest cakeiii 200 180 250
Light reddish and yellowish cake n/a n/a 220
White nest cake 180 200 190
i. “Cup” refers to the original shape of the nest.
ii. Prices are in Malaysian ringgit (1 Us$= 3.8 ringgit, as of September 1999). All items 
come in 37.5g packs.
iii. “Cake” refers to the way in which the nest breaks up into strips of jelly-like 
substance after cleaning, which are then dried and molded into oval-shaped pieces.
Source: Field data.
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confirming that the “original redness” is from blood. “We Chinese have this 
old belief that it is from the blood spat by the swiftlets, but I am not sure. I 
think it has something to do with the food of the birds.” According to one 
middleman at Long Lama, near the cave sites along the middle Baram area, 
artificial colors are widely used during the processing, either to turn the 
white one whiter or the brownish and reddish ones redder.
 In short, at the production end, the price is decided more by the estimated 
labor that is needed to process the raw nests. At the consumption end, the 
price is decided by a long-established conceptual framework that, based on 
its own understanding of bird ecology, connects a color classification with 
a system of nutrition evaluation (red signifies blood). In the present time, 
helped by much more effective communication technology and wrapped in 
a new set of technical jargon and biochemical terminologies, birds’ nest re-
mains at the top of popular health and food therapeutic discourse for many 
Chinese. “Scientific” revelation of the “true nature” of coloring (or discolor-
ing) of the nests has not been very successful in discrediting the conven-
tional framework of evaluation.
early history and folklore of the Birds’ nest Trade in Sarawak
Sarawak is presently a state of the federation of Malaysia, and is located in 
northwestern Borneo. The name Borneo derives from the name of the sul-
tanate of Brunei. Since the thirteenth century, Brunei has been documented 
in various sources as a major player in maritime trade; its influence covered 
the entire coastal area of Borneo and extended to the Philippines and the 
Sulu Sea. Its power began to wane after the Spanish took over Manila, in 
table 2 retail Price of Birds’ nests from an internet advertisement
Merchandise Price per tael (US$)
Blood Nest Whole Nest Grade 1 220
Blood Nest Whole Nest Grade 2 170
Blood Nest Ungrouped Small Piece 118
Yellow Nest Whole Nest 188
Yellow Nest Regrouped Large Piece Grade 1 156
Yellow Nest Regrouped Large Piece Grade 2 145
White Nest Regrouped Large Piece Grade 1 139
White Nest Regrouped Large Piece Grade 2 128
White Nest Regrouped Large Piece Grade 3 118
Source: Healthy Nest website, http://healthynest.com (accessed January 1999).
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1571, and invaded Brunei Bay, in 1578.32 After 1777, the Taosug from the 
Sulu started attacking Bruneian ships and settlements on the northeastern 
coast of Borneo, and by 1820 had formally driven the sultan’s influence out 
of the area.33 Their losses on the eastern front notwithstanding, before 1842, 
Brunei still nominally controlled the area that was to become Sarawak. In 
1842, Sultan Omar Ali asked for the help of the Eng lishman James Brooke to 
put down a rebellion along the Sarawak River and granted him the title “Raja 
of Sarawak.” For the following half century, the Brooke regime managed to 
annex all the regions of Sarawak at the expense of the sultan of Brunei. Even 
Brunei itself would have been annihilated had it not been for intervention by 
the British government in 1906.
 Major power in maritime trade as Brunei was, neither Chinese sources, 
such as Dung Xi Yang Kau (1618), nor the observation of the Dutch admiral 
Olivier van Noort, who visited Brunei around 1600, mentioned birds’ nest 
as among the trade or tribute items.34 The documentation that Blussé cites 
regarding birds’ nest production in the Sandakan area of northeast Borneo 
dates back to 1849.35 The earliest documentation of birds’ nest production in 
Sarawak points roughly to the same period of time. There were, and still are, 
three major birds’ nest production sites in Sarawak: the Bau area in Western 
Sarawak, the Niah Caves, and the Middle Baram area in northeast Sarawak.36
 The caves at Niah produce black and yellow nests. According to local 
folklore, the original inhabitants at Niah were the Preban. After floods de-
stroyed the Preban settlement at Niah, the Penans from Beluru, Bakong, 
and upper Bintulu migrated into the area.37 On hearing of the arrival of the 
Penans, some of the Preban returned to Niah and formed a large village 
called Manong, where people of different ethnic groups lived together, in-
cluding the Segans, Bakongs, Bruneis, and the Chinese. The first Chinese 
trader was a certain towkay, Moh Khim, from Brunei.38 According to Bene-
dict Sandin, “It was really a Penan named Nyerulang who first discovered the 
Subis cave. This discovery was made by him while shooting with his blow-
pipe along the Subis stream. When Nyerulang first brought the edible birds’ 
nest home, Moh Khim told him that the stuff was eatable and exportable. 
It was from this time that many traders from Brunei and Bintulu started to 
come to Niah to buy bird’s nest.”39
 Another story started with the people who lived in Suai, whose leader was 
Dudop. After having lived there for some time, the people were forced, due 
to sanitary problems, to desert the village and stay separately in small huts 
in the jungle. Stricken by epidemic in the jungle, they moved back to Suai, 
only to be afflicted again by diarrhea. This time, some people moved back 
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to the jungle, while others went to live in the caves at Niah. Many, including 
Dudop, died at the Niah Caves.
After this epidemic ceased, Dudop’s son, Murai, afterwards moved down-
river and lived at Pelalid, below the present site of the Niah Fort.
 Some years after Murai had lived at Pelalid, a Brunei official came to 
enquire whether the people of Niah agreed to purchase from Brunei Gov-
ernment foodstuffs which the latter would sell to them. Murai and his 
people agreed to buy them if they were brought to Niah.
 After this had been agreed, the official returned to explain to the 
Sultan his successful mission. In due course the foodstuffs were brought 
to Niah. As there was no money in those days, the natives bartered these 
foods with rattan, bezoars-stones and kulat dalam batu (edible birds’ nest). 
To regulate the trading in these foods, a special agent was appointed in 
Niah. About fifteen years afterwards the people of Niah became more 
civilized. Twenty years later, the trade became more flourishing, and Niah 
was ceded to Sarawak with Baram.40
In both accounts, the origin of the collection and sale of birds’ nest is pre-
ceded by disasters and diasporas. It is not clear at the moment whether, in 
a demographic sense, birds’ nest production and exportation actually con-
tributes to the formation of a more or less sedentary lifestyle among the 
local populations. The Punan (Penan) of the Niah are now dispersed again 
throughout the area for different reasons. Nevertheless, in both cases, the 
collection and sale of birds’ nest is recounted as a major event in economic 
development. In the first case, it attracted traders from different places to 
come to Niah, where the birds’ nest operation today is still a significant part 
of local life. In the second case, birds’ nest was remembered as a factor that 
brought “civilization” to Niah through trading connections with Brunei.
Birds’ nest Production at niah
The niah caVes and The PracTice of Birds’ nesT collecTion
The Niah Caves are located in the Subis limestone massif, on the north coast 
of Sarawak. The total area is 10.5 hectares and divided into many branches 
and sections. Among the many entrances and openings, the West Mouth is 
the biggest one, with an opening 250 meters wide and 60 meters high. The 
archeological evidence of human activities at the West Mouth covers a time 
span from 40,000 to 2,000 years before the present. Presently, the archeologi-
cal sites are under the administration of the Sarawak Museum, the birds’ nest 
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operations are controlled by the forest department, while the caves them-
selves are managed by the national park agency. Niah is 109 kilometers from 
the city of Miri. A bus ride of a little more than two hours takes one from Miri 
to Batu Niah; from there, it is a fifteen-minute boat ride to the park entrance, 
followed by a forty-five-minute walk to the West Mouth of the Main Cave. 
The place is easily accessible and located near a fairly populated area. The 
settlement closest to the West Mouth is an Iban longhouse, Rumah Chang.
 Boardwalks are constructed along the main tourist path that cuts across 
the national park area. Before arriving at the West Mouth, one comes to a 
rock shelf about 200 meters wide, 50 meters deep, and 7–10 meters high. 
This is the Traders’ Cave, which used to shelter tens of roofless housing 
units—some connected in rows, some detached—on piles. According to 
local records, until 1985 a bustling community would fill the place for a 
period of two months during the collection season. Chinese and Malay 
traders, from either nearby towns or as far as Brunei, would come and stay 
in their own quarters, wait for the nest collectors on their way back from the 
caves, and purchase the nests directly from them. There was a common water 
spring, a big earthen stove for communal use, and even a coffee stall in this 
cave. According to Cranbrook,
The pattern of ownership of cave rights and the nature of the harvest-
ing contract thus lends itself to corporate (if not cooperative) enterprise. 
Traditionally, the nest harvest at Niah occurred twice annually, for two 
60-day periods, during which all interested parties assembled at the 
lower cave (Traders’ Cave), in the famous roofless village, to participate 
and no doubt to monitor all aspects of the proceedings. Under such ar-
rangements, collective decisions must be made and the community itself 
can check infringement of the accepted conventions.41
Lord Medway also noted that “the biggest crowd came at the pupol tahun, the 
New Year season (January and February), when the collection was mostly 
better than the August pupol merai, the Moult season.”42 Today, the Traders’ 
Cave is totally desolate; only the belian hardwood skeletons of those housing 
units remain.
 Another few minutes’ walk from the Traders’ Cave brings one to the West 
Mouth. In addition to the sheer size of the opening and the stalactite pillars, 
the most stunning scene in the West Mouth is no doubt the many bamboo 
and belian masts for birds’ nest collection. At the same time, one is also 
struck by the strong smell of guano. According to Medway’s estimation, at 
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that time, there were one and a half million swiftlets in Niah Caves.43 Like 
birds’ nest, guano was also a source of income for the local people, but with 
a much lower value.
 Inside the main caves, the clefts and many of the chimneys, where the 
swiftlets build their nests, are often more than sixty meters above the 
ground. The collectors usually work in teams of two, a tukang julok, who 
climbs the mast and scrapes down the nest, and a tukang pungut, who stays 
on the ground to pick up the fallen nests. Medway provides this vivid de-
scription of the scene.
The most striking sights in the big cave at Niah are the tall tiang (masts) 
of bamboo or belian that reach up to or hang from, respectively, the roof 
two hundred feet above. They lead to thick clutters of spiders’ web scaf-
folding, again belian or bamboo, wedged in the clefts and chimneys where 
the swifts nest. When climbing a tall tiang, the collector first knots a cloth 
over his insteps, to tie his feet together in such a way that if he opens his 
knees, the downward pressure of his weight will increase the grip of his 
soles on the pole,
 The rising bamboos are built before the hanging belian. Lengths of 
a conveniently strung local bamboo, buloh betong, that grows in single 
stems about forty feet high, topped by a palm like tuft of fronds, are cut 
and brought to the cave. A stem is stood upright and guyed with rotans; 
another may be hauled up, and joined to it, male and female-wise, and 
again stayed with rotans. Ultimately the roof is reached. A prepared beam 
of belian is wedged again among the rock, and from it is hung, on belian 
pegs, the tiang of the square cut lengths of belian joined by belian pegs, not 
lashed. The belian structures are permanent; there are about 50 of them 
in the 26 acres of cave. Some have fallen, some are no longer safe, but 
others are still in regular use, although they may have been first erected 
50 years ago. . . . Bamboo tiang do not have a life of more than two years, 
in the damp cave air, and are stood up whenever needed, and left stand-
ing after use. A crowd of them on Bukit Bungkok, between the main East 
and the main West mouths, look like Trafalgar relics, sinking in the sea 
of guano.44
 On top of these masts and the crisscross beams, the tukang julok uses a 
penyulok to scrape loose the nests: “The penyulok is made of light, dry bam-
boo, bound at the joints with patterned whippings of split rotan. It is in four 
long sections, which can be joined end to end; the head is a hoe-like, but 
straight, steel blade, also rotan bound, and just below the head is a loop, of 
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rotan again, to take the long beeswax candle that lights the wavering rod.”45 
Except that the beeswax candle is nowadays replaced by an electric flash-
light, the tools of today’s birds’ nest collectors are basically the same as 
those described by Medway some fifty years ago. On the ground, the tukang 
pungut is responsible for the gathering of the fallen nests. At places where 
the nests might tumble irrecoverably to the bottom of a crevasse, a light net 
(selambau) is installed on the ground to catch the nests.
 From the West Mouth, walking deeper into the caves, one sees the tiang 
standing here and there, some on the side of the boardwalk, some farther 
away. A few of them have people working on the tops, and invariably there is 
someone waiting underneath. Further away from the boardwalk and in the 
total darkness of the caves, here and there one sees dim camp lights accom-
panied by music that comes from either a guitar or a cassette player. These 
are the guardsmen who are hired to watch each designated area against 
thefts. Theft is a serious problem at Niah. This is only partly due to the ac-
cessibility of the location; the more important reason lies in the social rela-
tions of birds’ nest production here.
ownershiP, lease, and hired laBor
The Punan are officially recognized as the earliest inhabitants of Niah. After 
settling down at Kuala Tangap, however, these Punan gradually converted 
to Islam. They changed their residential pattern into independent houses 
and claimed to be Malay. Many of them moved out of the area, some to 
Miri or Bintulu. After the Second World War, when the Sarawak govern-
ment launched the registration of birds’ nest collection rights, they were 
first turned down by the then curator of Sarawak Museum, Tom Harrisson, 
on the ground that they were not Punan, but Malay. Only after they had man-
aged to produce genealogies to demonstrate their Punan heritage were their 
rights officially recognized. Currently, every birds’ nest producing section of 
the Niah Caves is registered under individual Punan-Malay families.
 The actual operation rights of birds’ nest collection at Niah, however, 
have almost entirely been leased by the Punan-Malay owners to different 
Chinese traders, at prices ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 ringgit per year, 
depending on the production of the specific section concerned, and for the 
duration of ten to fifteen years. The Chinese traders, however, do not work 
the caves themselves either; they hire the local Iban, Malay, and Bugis to do 
the guarding and collecting jobs. It is said that many Chinese traders like to 
hire Bugis as guardsmen because of their reputed fierceness.
 The Iban in both Niah and the Lower Baram migrated into these areas 
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from southeastern Sarawak during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
The Iban longhouse Rumah Chang, which is the nearest to the West Mouth, 
moved here from Bintulu about fifty years ago. When the settlers first arrived 
here, there were only twelve doors (bilek). Now Rumah Chang has seventy 
doors, which form two parallel blocks. Except for the very old and the very 
young, almost every male at Rumah Chang works the caves at one point or 
another, either as guardsmen or collectors, or both.46 The households in Ru-
mah Chang are divided into several working units; each unit is contracted 
by a Chinese towkay to work in one or several sections in the caves that 
the Chinese towkay leases from respective Punan-Malay owners. The big-
gest working unit in Rumah Chang consists of forty-two households. All 
the able-bodied males of the forty-two households are grouped into teams 
of three. Each team works a half-day shift, guarding as well as collecting the 
nests. Although the government regulations stipulate that there should be 
only two harvest seasons per year at Niah, workers at Rumah Chang say that 
the Chinese towkay would push for more frequent, even monthly, harvest-
ing, each time from a different part of the sections that he leased.
 The Iban workers are not paid by fixed wages. After each harvest, the 
working unit is entitled to half of the sale. According to my informants at 
Rumah Chang, between 1988 and 1990, when the price of birds’ nest was at 
its highest, one kilogram could fetch 1,000 ringgit, and each harvest could 
amount to 40 kilograms. During that period of time, each household could 
earn 400 to 500 ringgit, sometimes even 1,000 ringgit a month. In 1999, 
however, both the harvest and the unit price declined. Nowadays each har-
vest of birds’ nest amounts to only 15 kilograms, and the price is 600 ring-
git per kilogram. The monthly household income from birds’ nest sales are 
therefore down to 80 to 200 ringgit. The Iban of Rumah Chang have never 
given up rice cultivation; there are both hill and swamp paddies in their ter-
ritory. When birds’ nest operation was at its peak, women were almost en-
tirely in charge of the agricultural works. When the price of birds’ nest was 
good, it was the sole source of cash income for the household. Now the 
major sources of cash income are pepper planting and working oil palm 
operations.
 “Working in the caves” actually includes three kinds of work. The climber-
cum-scraper is called tukang julok. This is the most difficult and dangerous 
work in birds’ nest collection. The one who stays on the ground and collects 
the fallen nests is called tukang pungut. The third kind of work, which is 
seldom mentioned in birds’ nest literature, is the guardsman ( jaga). If one 
walks deep into the darkness of the Great Cave, one will see the entire area 
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is dotted with dim lights of candles or oil lamps. Each titled section in the 
cave is guarded by a hired jaga, who wards off trespassers. While the role of 
jaga is a year-round job, climbers and collectors work, in theory, only dur-
ing the harvest season that is stipulated by the authority and agreed on by 
the cave leaseholders. Therefore, the jaga can also work as tukang julok or 
tukang pungut during the collecting season, and vice versa. The cave needs 
to be guarded due to an extremely high rate of trespassing and illicit collect-
ing. Because of the size, openness, and accessibility of the caves, the birds’ 
nests in Niah Cave are highly susceptible to theft. According to some Chi-
nese traders in Batu Niah and veteran tukang julok from other villages in the 
region, theft started to become a serious problem only after 1975, and the 
people of Rumah Chang were in fact the original perpetrators. They recalled 
that, in the years after the Second World War, the birds’ nest trade, although 
it enjoyed a stable regional market, was not highly lucrative. Everybody 
honored regulation of the harvest season and the individual rights of owners 
and leaseholders over particular sections of the caves. Starting around 1975, 
the people of Rumah Chang were granted permits to collect guano in the 
caves. After becoming familiar with the caves and learning the technique 
by observing veteran tukang julok at work, they started to collect birds’ nest 
illegally and recklessly. The birds’ nests thus collected were continuously 
brought down to the bazaar in small amounts and sold to “crooked” Chinese 
towkay. By 1985, as the situation was getting out of hand, Chinese lease-
holders asked the police force to intervene and track down the perpetrators. 
The police operation was met with armed resistance staged by the people of 
Rumah Chang. In the late 1980s, the leaseholders were forced to seek recon-
ciliation with the Rumah Chang people and start hiring year-round guards to 
protect their interests. Rumah Chang has since become the main supplier of 
jaga, tukang julok, and tukang pungut to the birds’ nest industry at Niah.
 The people of Rumah Chang have a different point of view regarding this 
episode. One informant says, “Last time when the Malay were the owners of 
the caves, we Iban were free to collect whatever [was] useful in the caves. 
After they leased the caves to the Chinese, we could not do that anymore. 
Nowadays we have to work as julok or jaga to earn wages. We are becoming 
coolies to the Chinese. We Iban were definitely not coolies to the Malay.”
 This might be the case in the eyes of Iban Rumah Chang, but one can 
also see the people of Rumah Chang, with their agency, as having created an 
unprecedented job opportunity for themselves through their energetic and 
aggressive exploitation of the caves. The regional commodity market might 
be beyond the control of local communities, and its encroachment unavoid-
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able. At the juncture when the regional or global system needs to be articu-
lated with the local, however, the chaos created by the people of Rumah 
Chang has successfully forced the birds’ nest trade to come to terms with 
them. They earn their share (though not the biggest one) in the profit that is 
generated from this regional trade and use it to embellish their community 
life.
froM Birds’ nesT collecTion To longhoUse  
and regional social ProdUcTion
The Iban of Rumah Chang did not spoil their once brilliant financial oppor-
tunity. They put their money effectively in the renovation of the longhouse 
and they did this in a collective way. The present longhouse, beautifully reno-
vated in the mid-1990s, has a uniform appearance for each bilek (family apart-
ment), spacious open walkways with sitting areas, and verandas. The outside 
of the entire longhouse is painted light blue. Electric wiring is professionally 
done throughout the house. Many households have ceiling fans, and one 
bilek even has an air conditioner. My informant, showing me around and 
pointing at all the things in sight—including the air conditioner—said un-
hesitatingly: “Birds’ nest money.”
 The longhouse of Rumah Chang won the third prize in a 1998 subdis-
trict longhouse contest. People of Rumah Chang often comment about their 
longhouse—always with traces of pride and contentment detectable under-
neath their cultivated modesty—that although it is not the most beautiful 
and modern longhouse in the subdistrict, all the bilek were finished around 
the same time: “Unlike most other longhouses, where some of the bilek are 
finished while others are still skeleton.” This indicates both the financial 
might of most of the households and the spirit of community solidarity. The 
rebuilding was proposed by the tuai rumah (longhouse head) in 1990, after he 
visited some modern longhouses near Bintulu. The old building was already 
fifty years old at the time and deteriorating. Tuai rumah Chang brought the 
idea to the people and, after a thorough discussion, won the support of the 
entire village. Two Iban architects from Bintulu were commissioned to pre-
pare the blueprint. It was agreed that all the units of the two blocks of the 
longhouse would follow basically the same design. Minor variations in terms 
of the quality and style of wooden planks, doors, and windows were allowed, 
but there were only a few designated varieties to choose from. According to 
some villagers, after the decision to rebuild the longhouse was made, there 
was a preparation period that lasted about three years. Even though Rumah 
Chang was already a well-off community, not every family could immedi-
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ately come up with enough cash for the completion of the project. During 
the following three years, almost all the households had someone working 
somewhere for money. Some villagers went to work in the oil industry in 
Miri or Brunei, some in commercial construction. The most available source 
of cash income close to home, however, was the birds’ nest industry in the 
Niah Caves. When the rebuilding was completed, each household had spent 
from 20,000 to 60,000 ringgit.
 The two blocks of the longhouse of Rumah Chang now look absolutely 
polished and neat, with sturdy common staircases on both ends, wide and 
bright ruai areas, and similar-looking ceiling fans in front of almost all the 
bilek. Beside the one bilek with air-conditioning, most bilek are equipped 
with a television, a Vcr or Vcd player, a stereo, a gas stove, and a refrigera-
tor. Nowadays, sitting on the ruai for late afternoon or evening chatting, 
people still occasionally compare and comment on the different quality and 
price of the building materials that each bilek uses. Out on the ruai of Rumah 
Chang, one experiences and witnesses the realization and perpetuation of 
the core Iban value that emphasizes both the spirit of community solidarity 
and individualistic competition.
 A ritual called semah used to be performed annually to appease the spirits 
of the caves and to ask them to protect the birds’ nest and guano collectors 
working in the caves. It is considered a Punan ritual, to be performed every 
year before the opening of the first formal harvest season, in April. A spiri-
tual medium (dayung), who has exclusive knowledge of the names of the 
spirits and can perform the chanting, conducts the ritual. After the dayung 
communicates with the spirits, a chicken is sacrificed and various kinds of 
rice cake are offered to the spirits. After the performance of the ritual, no 
one is to enter the caves for three days, so the spirits can enjoy the offerings 
in peace; there are stories relating the breaches of the taboo and their fatal 
outcomes. By the early 1990s, the ritual had already been discontinued for a 
long time due to the dispersal of the Punan and the unavailability of dayung. 
In 1998, the Punan community managed to have an aging dayung, Pa’ Udek 
Seman, conduct the ritual. Several hundred people, including Punan Mus-
lims, Malays, Iban, and Chinese, attended the ceremony. The Chinese traders 
community is said to have contributed a significant amount of money to 
cover the expense of the ceremony, but there is talk of disputes inside the Pu-
nan community regarding their share of financing the ritual. Unfortunately, 
Pa’ Udek Seman passed away in late 1998. Under the current worldwide trend 
of nativistic movements, the desire to “revive” the ritual is rather strong both 
in the government and among the various parties concerned, but it is not 
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certain whether or not the Punan community can produce another dayung 
to continue the ritual in the future.
The PlighT and ProsPecT of Birds’ nesT enTerPrise aT niah
There is unavoidably a dark side of the birds’ nest enterprise at Niah. The de-
cline both in the swiftlet population and in birds’ nest (and guano) produc-
tion is evident. Evasion of the stipulated harvesting schedule by the Chinese 
towkay is compounded by the problem of theft. Hiring full-time guards-
men does not solve the problem, since many of the “thieves” are either the 
guardsmen themselves or their friends and relatives. Presently almost all 
the locals coming out of the caves—off-duty guards, designated collectors, 
and people just “visiting”—have some birds’ nest in their pocket. Each one 
would have 20 to 30 ringgit worth of “pocket money birds’ nest.” In the short 
run, this appears to be a swindling of the Chinese towkay. In the long run, 
however, everybody loses.
 In addition to the accessibility of the place, Niah’s plight also has some-
thing to do with the once huge population of the swiftlets and the low price 
of the black nests. Large amounts of harvested nests were needed to make 
the sale profitable, and very few parties really work to protect the diminish-
ing swiftlet population. It is also closely related to the social relation of pro-
duction. The real owners of the cave rights, the Punan, are by now mostly 
absentee landlords. The Chinese towkays have the capital and business con-
nections to process and market the nests, but they do not have the skill or the 
will to work the caves themselves. The onsite workers do not have much of a 
personal interest in following conservation guidelines or in safeguarding the 
interest of the Chinese towkay. The manifold administrative arrangement at 
Niah results in a virtual vacancy of authority to enforce the policy stipulated 
by laws. The problems foreseen by Sarawak lawmakers in the first half of this 
century are now emerging.
 Amid this highly commoditized and rather alienated productive relation, 
traces of sociality survive. Some may lament the disappearance of the once 
lively seasonal multiethnic community in the Traders’ Cave. But the material 
well-being of the Iban worker at Rumah Chang is certainly a demonstration 
of the underlying sense of community and cooperation. Most significant 
of all, despite the predominance of Chinese capital and Iban (and others’) 
labor, the Punan still retain the authority of ritual sanction over birds’ nest 
production. The semah ritual contains the potential for sustainable multi-
ethnic social production. This is especially so in face of mounting interna-
tional pressure on the birds’ nest trade. While more effort and enforcement 
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in conservation is definitely crucial and beneficial to all the parties involved, 
including the swiftlets, the continuation or revival of a traditional ritual that 
unites different peoples to establish a harmonious and productive relation-
ship with the spiritual beings in the cave is probably no less effective as a 
means to neutralize or disarm the stiff gaze of international wildlife agen-
cies, at least to a certain extent. Some of the Sarawak government agents, 
such as the Sarawak Museum, are certainly aware of this prospect and are 
taking an encouraging attitude toward its continuation. Now it is largely up 
to the Punan to maintain the transmission of their ritual knowledge.
conclusion
It has been demonstrated that the value of birds’ nest is constructed and 
sanctioned by Chinese medicinal tradition. This includes both the general 
therapeutic effects of all kinds of birds’ nest as well as the especially fabu-
lous effects of the “blood nest.” Judging from the expanding scope of the 
Southeast Asian transnational birds’ nest trade, one may say that neither the 
demythification of the true quality of birds’ nest nor the disapproving gaze 
of the environmentalists is deterring the consumer’s enthusiasm for the yen-
wo. The use-value (subjective value) of birds’ nest thus determined is further 
differentiated into several grades, with “blood nest” on the top and white 
nest regrouped at the bottom. This value categorization is conspicuously dif-
ferent from the categorization at or near the locations of production, where 
whole white nest fetches a much better price than do the colored ones. There 
is ample room for the middlemen, almost exclusively ethnic Chinese, to ma-
nipulate this discrepancy to their benefit. This is because they have a much 
better comprehension of what Sutherland calls “relevant knowledge about 
production and consumption.” The situation is also a vivid illustration of 
what Arjun Appadurai says about transactions in the precapitalist context.
In precapitalist contexts . . . the translation of external demands to local 
producers is the province of the trader and his agents, who provide logis-
tical and price bridges between worlds of knowledge that may have mini-
mal direct contact. Thus it is reasonably certain that traditional Borneo 
forest dwellers had relatively little idea of the uses to which the birds’ 
nests they sold to intermediaries have played in Chinese medical and culi-
nary practice. This paradigm of merchant bridges across large gaps in 
knowledge between producer and consumer characterizes the movement 
of most commodities throughout history, up to the present.
 Problems involving knowledge, information, and ignorance are not 
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restricted to the production and consumption poles of the careers of 
commodities, but characterize the process of circulation and exchange 
itself. In a powerful cultural account of the Moroccan bazaar, Clifford 
Geertz has placed the search for reliable information at the heart of this 
institution. . . . Much of the institutional structure and cultural form of 
the bazaar is double-edged, making reliable knowledge hard to get and 
also facilitating the search for it. . . . [To put it] in a more general form: 
bazaar-style information searches are likely to characterize any exchange 
setting where the quality and the appropriate valuation of goods are not 
standardized, though the reasons for the lack of standardization, for the 
volatility of prices, and for the unreliable quality of specific things of a 
certain type may vary enormously.47
 While the birds’ nest example might serve as a strong case in favor of the 
subjective value theory, it also represents an interesting cultural twist to the 
labor theory of value. The use-value recognized by the Chinese consumers in 
birds’ nest is actually based on the recognition of huge labor input behind 
the procurement of the commodity. Derived from a reputed holistic cos-
mology, both professional and folk ideas in Chinese medicinal tradition re-
gard the therapeutic effects of birds’ nest as substantiated by the life essence 
of other living things, in this case including both working human beings and 
the nest-constructing birds themselves. In other words, in the case of this 
commodity, birds’ nest, the subjective and the labor theories of value actu-
ally merge.
 On the other hand, the communities that occupy the laborer position in 
this commodity chain are not entirely exploited passive players. Their agency 
is not negligible in the processes. At Niah, in appearance, each group in-
volved in the production is alienated in different ways: the cave-owning 
Punan-Malay do not manage the operation; the Iban that work the caves are 
only wage earners; and the Chinese traders do not have the legal status to 
own the cave or the physical capacity to work the cave, but can only lease it 
from the Punan-Malay and hire the Iban as laborers. However, a trace of so-
ciality or communalism is produced, or at least shows the potential of social 
production at a different level. This is demonstrated in the multiethnic cele-
bration of the semah ritual. The Iban of Rumah Chang, on the other hand, 
have successfully converted the cash income generated from their participa-
tion in the birds’ nest trade into capital for their social production, as repre-
sented in the building of their prize-winning longhouse.
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a sino-southeast asian CirCuit
ethnohistories of the marine goods Trade
Eric Tagliacozzo
The renowned sociologist Georg Simmel has famously written of the para-
doxical nature of “the stranger”—at once alien and uncomfortable in any 
given local society, but also able to use this status to further economic and 
even occasionally political ends, often associated with trade.1 Simmel was 
building on the work of others who had thought about these processes, most 
notably Max Weber and his interrogations of the so-called Protestant ethic, 
with all that this historical “ethic” supposedly signified.2 Many contempo-
rary scholars have seized on these ideas to study the mechanics of “stranger 
communities” in their own academic bailiwicks, encompassing Indians 
in East Africa, Jews in Europe, and even Armenians spread out across the 
Middle East. Scholars of overseas Chinese communities have been no excep-
tion: some of the most important analytic writing about diasporic communi-
ties and their linkages with trade and long-distance commercial enterprises 
has focused on these populations. The reasons for this have been disparate, 
but one of the most important among them is that the Chinese—and those 
who conducted business with them—have often left very good records, 
though accessing these records across the bandwidth of societies and lan-
guages that Chinese traders visited has not always been the easiest of tasks.3
 In this essay I look at overseas Chinese networks through one window: the 
historical and contemporary trade in marine produce, which linked China 
and the many countries of Southeast Asia in an economic embrace for hun-
dreds of years. In the first third of this essay, I note some of the theoretical, 
historiographical, and historical outlines for examining these communities 
and processes across historical time. This is done in fairly shorthand form, 
as I have written about these connections in more detail in other places.4 
The second two-thirds of the essay link these historical peregrinations with 
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how the marine-goods trade works now between China and Southeast Asia. 
This portion of the essay is based on published academic literature, but also 
significantly comprises my own oral-history interviews with these traders 
throughout East and Southeast Asian ports, as well as visits to collecting and 
transshipment sites of these commodities too. I hope to show the broad di-
mensions of this commerce in both historical and contemporary terms, as a 
crucial connective link between China and Southeast Asia over the past sev-
eral centuries. Far from being an antiquated trade in strange and often exoti-
cized objects culled from the sea, the traffic in marine goods can be seen as 
an important vestige of historical transoceanic connections. This commerce 
echoes the past in nostalgic and interesting ways, but it also continually 
evolves into the future, as the statements of these traders reveal when they 
speak into the record on their own terms.
marine goods in the Past: woven Threads
sino–soUTheasT asia: connecTiVe hisTories
Scholarship on the historical dimensions of the Chinese economy has come 
a long way in the past several decades in attempting to explain how and why 
Chinese commerce expanded in the last three to four centuries. Some of 
these studies have focused on guild and clan associations, the famous gongsi 
that G. William Skinner and others researched in such fine detail in the 1970s 
and earlier.5 Other studies have combed the Ming Shi-lu (or Ming Veritable 
Records), as well as the archives of particular provinces, such as Fujian, for 
clues as to how commercial activities expanded in the early modern period 
before exploding in number, importance, and volume in the nineteenth cen-
tury.6 Most of these earlier studies looked at the oceans when the tendrils 
of commerce were scrutinized as moving away from the Chinese polity, but 
now such research also deals with overland connections in detailed and 
sophisticated ways as well.7 There has even been an effort more recently to 
highlight particular commodities and to follow them as “tracers” in unrav-
eling these processes, with goods such as opium proving to be particularly 
useful in this regard.8 If analyses of the Chinese historical economy used to 
be the realm of dry number-crunchers and arcane local archives, more re-
cently these inquiries have sprouted off in new and different directions, to 
the profit of Chinese historiography as a whole.
 One of the most pressing contemporary research agendas on the nature 
of Chinese social and economic history has been the role of Chinese mer-
chants in trans-Asian networks. This research has built on some of the foun-
dational work of Skinner, R. Bin Wong, Peter Purdue, and William Rowe, and 
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now asks a range of questions on how commerce has worked in China, but 
particularly as one of several strands of commodity movement that became 
important during the last two centuries. The connections with Western firms 
have been queried in this regard, as well as links and commercial piggy-
backing with Japanese business concerns as well.9 Some of the research has 
looked at particular dialect subgroups as windows into these processes on 
both a micro and a macro scale, while other studies have examined how the 
efforts of many different actors—Chinese, French, Dutch, British, Spanish, 
and even Persian—have combined to push and pull certain items through 
Asian geographies on an unprecedented scale.10 It is clear that the old story 
of a more or less “sealed Chinese economy” via dictate of the Ch’ing state is 
no longer tenable, as more and more research is brought to bear on the way 
networks have expanded outward from China proper to other places, some 
as far away as Chicago and Peru.11
 Though Chinese did indeed end up in places as far afield as this, it is clear 
that the locus classicus for both Chinese emigration and Chinese commercial 
expansion during this period was the Nanyang, or “South Seas” (Southeast 
Asia). This is particularly true for the history of marine-goods procurement, 
but it is also true on the whole for most fields of business and endeavor, as 
the numbers of Chinese who eventually left for these places attest to over 
many years. French scholars (writing in French) have been particularly good 
at theorizing these connections, showing how the South China Sea acted as a 
fulcrum for movement and radials of contact and dispersion, even as far away 
as the distant island of Java.12 Eng lish-language scholarship has also worked 
on these connections, either via longue durée histories or through the vantages 
of particular institutions, such as Chinese revenue farming as a connective 
strand between China and Southeast Asia.13 Japanese writers (translated into 
Eng lish) and Chinese scholars have also become involved, ensuring that not 
all attempts at explanation of these phenomena are grounded solely in West-
ern social-science paradigms.14 Taken as a whole, the collective has set up 
very useful parameters in helping us understand the template of historical 
travel, whether this was for commercial reasons, such as the trade in marine 
goods, or for any other rationale.
in soUThern waTers
One of the most important destinations in the Nanyang for Chinese traders 
and immigrants was Java. Java had long had contact with China, but the 
establishment of a Dutch presence in Batavia around the turn of the seven-
teenth century increased the demand for Chinese merchants, artisans, and 
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workers in far greater numbers than had previously arrived. The autocratic 
Jan Coen was the despot of the town, but Dutch-language scholarship shows 
us that Chinese kapitans were quickly established to look after the Chinese 
population, especially with regard to regulating commerce along lines of 
which the Dutch approved.15 Things went fairly smoothly at first, but by the 
eighteenth century there were significant troubles, including massacres of 
these same Chinese populations.16 When the Chinese inhabitants were not 
being periodically culled in such ruthless ways by the colonial overlords 
of the island, they were used to expand Dutch commerce in many sectors of 
the economy, such as petty trade, agriculture, and increasingly, the sale of 
chandu, or retail opium.17 Intermarriage with local women took place on a 
fairly large scale, and the Chinese on Java gradually phased into both a sepa-
rate community as well as a mestizo society that was mixed with the indi-
genes themselves.18 Many Chinese were, in fact, scattered in the port towns 
and on other parts of Java’s coasts, and they played a large part in the buy-
ing, selling, and transport of marine products to these larger towns, where 
such commodities were consumed or packaged for export to other places.
 Dutch-language scholarship shows us how quickly the Chinese, and Chi-
nese marine-goods traders in particular, spread into the rest of the burgeon-
ing Dutch Indies as well, away from the center of Dutch authority on Java.19 
Economically, this community began to serve a crucial feeder role for the 
Dutch via all things that the latter needed to make their colony profitable—
dried fish, pearls, and fish maws among them. The most famous Chinese fish-
ing station in the archipelago was located at Bagan Si Api-api, off the coast 
of north-central Sumatra, and the amounts of sea produce collected, dried, 
and packaged for sale here reached huge quantities by the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth. Proximity to British-controlled Singapore, with 
that island’s huge port and transregional shipping connections, was at least 
as important as Bagan Si Api-api’s connections to the Dutch primate port 
city of Batavia, further south and away from the mouth of the Straits of 
Melaka (see fig. 1).20 Yet Chinese appeared elsewhere as well, on the long 
outstretched coasts of Borneo, for example, in Sulawesi, in Eastern Indo-
nesia, and especially in Riau, as fishers, driers, collectors, and packagers of 
marine goods.21 Ethnic business connections with other Chinese merchants 
and with Dutch colonial officials ensured that much of this produce reached 
Dutch and foreign markets quickly and fairly efficiently. Chinese communi-
ties were so important in this respect that the Dutch undertook extensive 
surveillance on these populations to ensure that Batavia would always get 
its cut of moving merchandise.22
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 Further north in the waters of the British dominions of Malaya and Bor-
neo, a similar state of affairs existed with respect to Chinese communities 
and the collection of ocean produce. On Borneo, both in today’s modern 
Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, as well as in the sultanate of Brunei, 
Chinese took on busy roles as the organizers and collectors of ocean pro-
duce in a variety of places.23 The coasts of Borneo were found to be under-
exploited compared to many other places, so Chinese merchants and occa-
sionally small business concerns often had their pick as to where to set up 
shops, drying facilities, purchase points, and other institutions to make 
these businesses run.24 Revenue-farming syndicates with primary interests 
in other products, such as opium or alcohol, sometimes helped in smooth-
ing out some of these arrangements.25 On the Malay Peninsula in places such 
as Penang, where Chinese syndicates such as the well-studied Khaw Group 
held economic sway, the connections between marine produce and efficient 
forms of Chinese business organization were even more in evidence, espe-
cially with large populations of Chinese and other ethnic laborers nearby 
needing to be fed.26 The buying, sorting, packaging, and eventual shipping 
of marine products were a crucial part of the local economy in places such as 
Penang, connecting the British port to Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Siam, 
and even Burma in one large, maritime economic arena.
 Finally, in the Philippines, first run by the Spanish and eventually run for 
figure 1 fishing and other local ships in Singapore, c. 1900. KITLV: image code 50215; haven in 
Singapore, c. 1900; oost Java album no. 70, lambert and company, photo, 14 x 21 cm.
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half a century by the United States, we see a similar story, though with dif-
ferent local permutations. Chinese had been coming to the Philippines for 
many centuries and often in larger numbers than in other parts of South-
east Asia, as the archipelago was closer and easier to reach using prevailing 
wind and current patterns of the monsoons. With more than 7,000 islands, 
Chinese became heavily involved in the marine-produce trades of the colo-
nial Philippines very easily, often using ships that they had originally piloted 
to the Philippines, first as vessels of transport and eventually as carriage 
containers for marine produce heading back to Fujian.27 The ocean produce 
trade from the Philippines was extremely important, first for supplying cities 
with food (such as Manila and Cebu), but also in mining the exceedingly 
plentiful waters of Sulu in the southern parts of the archipelago, where 
pearls, mother-of-pearl, shark fins, and fish stomachs could be procured in 
very large quantities. Chinese crews sailed from South China to take advan-
tage of these riches, but they eventually also came from Singapore and other 
Southeast Asian ports, all in an effort to make a living off these fecund seas.28 
Though the Spanish, in particular, periodically legislated against Chinese 
over-involvement in regional trades outside of the cities, the rules often went 
unenforced because of Spanish weakness, and because of the outstretched 
geography of the islands.29 Even into the early twentieth century and after 
the arrival of the Americans, Chinese involvement in these trades was main-
tained, though other agricultural staples—often fetching very high prices on 
world markets, at least until the Great Depression—later drowned marine 
goods as one of the most important items of commerce in maintaining long-
distance commercial connections.30
marine-goods connections in the contemporary Period
Theories, conTeXTs, and The chinese “hearTland”
Fast-forwarding to the last two decades of the twentieth century and the 
first few years of the twenty-first century, a remarkable picture of change 
and continuity appears in the transit of ocean commerce between China 
and Southeast Asia. If the period between roughly 1780 and 1860 was a high 
point of this commerce, followed by a lessening in importance of this trade 
as it was swamped by the much larger movement of goods in the so-called 
high colonial era, then the last two to three decades have seen a resurgence 
in these items, as the record-growth economies of both China and many 
Southeast Asian states have spun off the charts. If the worldwide depression 
of the 1930s, the Second World War, and the early years of Southeast Asian 
nation-states after decolonization continued the pattern of marine goods 
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living in the shadow of other, more important lines of commerce since the 
late nineteenth century, then the explosive growth of economies in East and 
Southeast Asia since the 1980s has revitalized this traditional conduit of 
trade between the two regions in new and interesting ways. Much of this 
growth has been attributed to the overall dynamism of regional economies, 
which has encouraged a brisk flow of goods between subregions that have 
traditionally traded with one another for many hundreds of years. Yet it is 
noticeable that the passage of marine goods has become an important sub-
rubric of this larger economic success story, begging the question as to why 
and how this trade fits into a larger story of growth. I address this question 
both through social-science literature on the topic, and through my own 
interviews with Chinese marine-goods merchants in various parts of China, 
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia itself. Both avenues of inquiry are supplemented 
as well by my observations from field trips to marine-collecting sites scat-
tered throughout the region (see map 1).
 Certainly the success of Chinese business in reasserting itself through-
out Southeast Asia since the fall of the colonial powers at midcentury has 
drawn no lack of interest from social theorists seeking to explain this suc-
cess. The reasons put forward for this dynamism have been various in nature, 
from the importance of clan associations and language-dialect groups, to 
notions of guanxi and transnational networks, to an interesting thread re-
flecting on the nature of “Chinese capitalism” itself as a modus operandi for 
a range of ethnic Chinese merchants scattered throughout Southeast Asia.31 
Some of these explanations have been more sophisticated than others, but 
all of them point to an opinion and a worldview that Chinese business has 
been in a growth mode not only in “Greater China” (the People’s Republic of 
China (Prc), Hong Kong, and Taiwan, over the last twenty-five years or so), 
but also in Southeast Asia, a traditional field for Chinese merchant activity 
over the centuries (known collectively as the Nanyang).32 Several important 
scholars have looked specifically at the dynamics of these interactions from 
China down to Southeast Asia itself, both historically and in the years lead-
ing up to our own time.33 Others have concentrated more on the Southeast 
Asian side of things, analyzing patterns in the receiving countries of these 
flows, rather than from the source areas of migration and merchant move-
ment in East Asia as a whole.34 Regardless of the approach chosen, it is clear 
that marine-goods movements between the two spheres connect these lit-
eratures very well, and help show some of the mechanics of commerce and 
ethnicity in action. The business radials operate over a very large field and are 
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therefore instructive in showing how an old trade such as the one in marine 
goods survives and changes over time.
 China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are mostly end-destinations for the flow 
of goods, as the majority of items come from Southeast Asia, but sometimes 
also from further afield than this. Interviews done in these places with shop 
owners show how truly transnational their contacts can be: owners signaled 
their entrenchment in much larger geographic systems in interesting ways. 
Some shops, such as the Kin Sang Dispensary in Kowloon, Hong Kong, are 
very low on the chain—they are merely bottom-rung outlets for these goods, 
and sell such products only in very small quantities per package, and only 
to local consumers.35 These stores are common in Hong Kong, but also in 
China proper, where comparatively small numbers of large-sized concerns 
deal with the outside world. This was certainly true in Xiamen, Fujian (one of 
the most “networked” places in China), but it was also true in Guangzhou, 
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Guangdong, and even in Ching-ping Market, where dried sea products are 
sold by many dozens of merchants side by side.36 Their connections with 
the outside world of marine goods tend to be mediated by larger concerns 
that have better contacts with the government and can get the necessary 
licenses. Back in Hong Kong, and only a few blocks away from the Kin Sang 
Dispensary, Citiherb is a very different kind of place: gleaming and impres-
sive, its wares are shipped from far and wide in the Nanyang. The fish maws 
alone (dried fish stomachs, used medicinally) were among the largest and 
best-preserved specimens that I saw anywhere in my interviews in Asia.37 Yet 
even this apothecary paled in comparison to the Ho Sheng Tang Company, 
headquartered in Taipei, Taiwan. Ho Sheng Tang obtained its shark fins from 
the large fleets of Taiwanese fishing ships that comb the world’s seas, and its 
abalone came from Mexico and California, across the vast Pacific itself. Its 
edible-sea-cucumber stocks not only had various grades of Southeast Asian 
holothurians, but even tiny, extremely expensive specimens from Japan, sell-
ing at NT$9,800 (or at Us$300 per specimen).38 This was the high end of 
end-destinations, and therefore representative of a different kind of access 
to the outside world compared to some of the previously mentioned shops.
The coasTs of The soUTheasT asian Mainland
Marine produce and dried goods come to China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
from many parts of the Nanyang, but certainly the coasts of mainland South-
east Asia have a very long history of shipping such products north. Viet-
nam is China’s closest neighbor in Southeast Asia, and because of its long, 
extended coastline, fish has very often been transported to South China, 
frequently by ethnically Sino-Vietnamese merchants. Even fishermen them-
selves do this on occasion, evading customs patrols, as they know where 
they can land their boats to quietly unload large holds of precious fish. Ob-
servers of Vietnamese economic life have often commented on the impor-
tance of the Sino-Vietnamese community, centered on Cholon in Ho Chi 
Minh City, but present in large stretches of the rest of the country too, in 
connecting the Chinese and Vietnamese economies.39 It is clear that, in the 
realm of marine goods and dried natural products, these binding commer-
cial sinews have been very important. In Cambodia, too, the marine industry 
has been vital both in feeding Cambodia’s own population and as an export 
industry for profit, often to China. Nola Cooke has studied some of these 
patterns over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particu-
larly as they related to fish and marine life coming from the Tonle Sap, Cam-
bodia’s great lake.40 This lake is said by scientists to have the greatest density 
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of fish in the world, and some of that density is shipped off to China every 
year in dried form, both by Sino-Khmer merchants and by Chinese traders 
who know to come to Cambodia’s markets on a seasonal basis to pick up 
their supplies.
 In Thailand, the picture is little different. Ethnically Sino-Thai merchants 
are also important in this country, and help to form an economic conduit 
between the kingdom, which also boasts a large, extended coastline, and 
China, which is often a market-destination for sea produce caught both in 
the Gulf of Thailand and in the Andaman Sea. From fieldwork done on the 
docks of Songkhla, on the gulf coast in the south, it is clear that very large 
specimens of fish—including shovel-nosed sharks and various species of 
rays—are being sold to China for the feeding of both humans and animals 
alike (for the latter, some of these fish species are ground up to make animal 
feed).41
 On the Indian Ocean coast of southern Thailand, astride the Andaman 
Sea, slightly different dynamics rule the market in these goods. In places 
like Ao Phra Nang, a Muslim fishing village just north of Krabi, a small re-
sort town catering to Western travelers (as opposed to tourists, who tend to 
flock to Phuket and other offshore islands), much of the fishing economy is 
also geared toward export. Here, shellfish are collected seasonally and with 
the tides, mostly by women in the mud-flat shallows, and then boxed and 
transported to collection depots for eventual resale to the Chinese market.42 
Further north along this same coast, and at the bottom terminus of Burma, 
the border town of Ranong is also an important fishing and collecting cen-
ter for marine exports from Thailand. Here, as opposed to Ao Nang, the 
industry is just that—industrial—with large, oceangoing fishing trawlers 
setting out each day from Ranong’s docks, the boats fishing for catch in 
Thai waters, international waters, and sometimes (illegally) in Burmese or 
Malaysian waters too (see fig. 2). Here too, I have been told in interviews on 
the docks, a large portion of the eventual catch is dried and shipped to Hong 
Kong and China to meet demand.43
 Finally, in Burma, too—one of the world’s most isolated countries, be-
cause of the coup that brought the Burmese military to power, in 1962— 
traditionally sought marine goods are shuttling en masse to China, and 
only sometimes in officially recorded fashion. Here, as in the shops and dis-
pensaries of Hong Kong, there are different kinds of concerns with differ-
ent kinds of reach into the marine-goods trade. Small shops, such as the 
one in Yangon (Rangoon) owned by U Myint Thein, have traditional roots 
in the trade and have been passed on from generation to generation. One of 
figure 2 Burmese and Thai fishing boats: ranong and Songkhla (andaman Sea and gulf of Thailand). 
Photos by author.
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U Myint Thein’s parents was ethnically Burmese, but one was also Yunnanese 
Chinese, and it was from this generation that he learned how to conduct his 
business in the buying and selling of items inside this pharmacopeia.44 A 
nearby shop, also in Yangon, had firmer roots in this commerce, and because 
Burma is still relatively isolated, many of the wares on view in this store were 
new to me, and I had not seen them in markets outside of Burma. These in-
cluded items such as several species of dried fish (some black in color, others 
white), though there were also very expensive species of holothurians on 
offer, which was surprising for a country as economically poor as Burma.45 
Fieldwork done on the Arakan coast, not too far from the Bangladesh border, 
also confirmed that the fishing was on a small-scale, community basis, and 
not just by large fishing boats owned by industrial concerns. In one village 
alone, I saw huge drying mats set out with fish of several different species 
(Commerson’s anchovy [Stolephorus commersonii]; Silver Pomfret [Pampus ar-
genteus]; and Lonfin Mojarra [Pentaprion longimanus]), all baking in the sun.46 
When I asked a Chinese merchant in town where these small species of dried 
fish were heading, he told me that some were used for local consumption, 
some were eaten in Yangon and in other big cities of Burma, and that others 
were on their way to China, though that was certainly very far away.
soUTheasT asia’s island world
If these patterns are discernible on the coasts of the mainland world of 
Southeast Asia, then they are nearly omnipresent in insular Southeast Asia, 
where the sea is literally everywhere, and its bounty is readily available for 
transport. A large literature has sprung up to study the tendril of Chinese 
commerce in the contemporary Philippines, for example, where Chinese 
families have mixed into mestizo communities with local Filipinos for hun-
dreds of years.47 Some of these networks are centered on Manila, the “pri-
mate city” of the Philippines and by far its most important economic engine, 
but there are also important Chinese merchant interests in the provinces as 
well, especially in places such as Ilo-ilo in the Visayas.48 Chinese marine-
goods sellers in the warehouse districts of northern Manila (Binondo and 
Divisorio) told me of huge orders that they received for ocean produce from 
China, from both Hong Kong and the Prc proper. Most of these merchants 
are Hokkien speakers whose ancestors came to the Philippines from Fujian, 
and many of them still have good contacts and family scattered throughout 
southern China, as well as more formal business associates in Hong Kong.49 
It is a noticeable attribute of these Filipino-Chinese families that sons and 
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daughters help with the business, especially because so many of them can 
speak good Eng lish, and this connects them to wider radials of procurement 
than merely the Chinese-speaking contacts allow. Because the Philippines 
is one of the world’s largest archipelagos (with some 7,000 islands), there is 
no lack of maritime environment from which to find supplies for this out-
stretched commerce, either. Contacts of these families stretch all the way 
south to Zamboanga and the Sulu Sea, one of the richest historical marine 
grounds for maritime-goods procurement, going back to at least the fif-
teenth century.50
 If this state of affairs holds true for the Philippines, then it is even truer 
for Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelago bar none. Scattered among 
Indonesia’s 13,000-plus islands is also a large ethnic Chinese merchant com-
munity, some of whom have been there for centuries, and others who are 
more recent arrivals from elsewhere in East or Southeast Asia (China, Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, etc.). Chinese merchants have been involved in the sea-
products trade of this region for a very long time, and their tendrils of busi-
ness and association extend far and wide.51 It is not only Western social 
scientists who are interested in this phenomenon, but Indonesian schol-
ars too—many, but not all, of them of Chinese ancestry—and the latter 
have also written about this phenomenon, sometimes in Eng lish, but also 
in Bahasa Indonesia.52 Fieldwork done in harvesting areas such as Lombok 
in Nusa Tenggara, Makassar in Sulawesi, and Ternate and Banda in Maluku, 
Eastern Indonesia, shows that Chinese capital finances sea-products col-
lecting on a grand scale, across large parts of this scattered archipelago.53 
Jakarta is often the national collecting depot for such products, but the items 
can also be sent directly to Singapore, or occasionally to Hong Kong to by-
pass layers of middlemen.54 The commodities are almost always harvested 
from the sea by local indigenes, but as soon as they get to market, they 
go through various rungs of sorting and sale through ethnic Chinese mer-
chants, often locally born, but based progressively further and further away 
from acquisition sites. This is, in fact, a broad pattern throughout South-
east Asia, whether it is mother-of-pearl, sea cucumbers, fish maws, or other 
items that are being collected.
 In Malaysia, having conversations with Chinese marine-goods merchants 
is easy: there is little of the occasional discomfort (or even downright fear) 
that pervades Chinese Indonesians during interviews, and there is plenty of 
commercial activity in the sea-products arena here, too. Speaking to these 
traders throughout Malaysia’s major cities is an exercise in tracking the Chi-
nese diaspora over time, and seeing the fullest expression of its breadth, 
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all in dealing with one product line. In Kuala Lumpur the majority of these 
traders are Cantonese, in keeping with historical migration patterns to the 
city, while in Penang and Ipoh they are Hokkien for the most part.55 In Malay-
sian Borneo, where Chinese migrants came from different parts of China, 
and for different reasons, the majority are Hakka.56 Yet despite these vary-
ing sub-ethnicities among the merchants, many of them seem to be buying 
and selling the same goods, though often along dialect lines when they can. 
In other cases these traders use Mandarin as a lingua franca among other 
ocean-products businessmen scattered throughout Malaysia, in Southeast 
Asia, and back to East Asia itself. Quite a number of these Malaysian Chi-
nese merchants spoke of doing their business along “traditional lines”; they 
do indeed use computers, faxes, and telexes in their daily transactions, but 
they also make use of abacuses and good tea when doing business, as their 
fathers before them would have done, and perhaps their fathers’ fathers be-
fore that. These links to the past are interesting and widespread, and they 
also seem to be of both sentimental and utilitarian value to many traders 
who are still concerned with this highly traditional line of Chinese com-
merce. This may be not only the case in the marine-products trade, but may 
also be true among other product lines, according to studies on Chinese 
business in that country.57
Singapore redux: Back to the center
Yet perhaps the best place to study the warp and weft of the traditional (and 
modern) Chinese marine-products trade, as well as its connections and dis-
sonances with its own long past, is probably Singapore, then—as now—the 
central organizational axis for this commerce in Southeast Asian waters. 
Singapore has been a favored place to study the ins and outs of Chinese com-
merce for several reasons, not least of these being that China was closed to 
such study for a very long time, and Singaporean merchants’ facility with 
the Eng lish language meant that research could be conducted in both Chi-
nese and Eng lish, side by side. As a result of this, the literature on Chinese 
commerce in Singapore is particularly rich, including several somewhat re-
cent dissertations that achieve a level of detail that would previously have 
been very difficult to achieve in a mainland Chinese context.58 Sophisticated 
theories of Chinese merchant behavior have sprung from Singaporean field 
examples, and often have been put forward as being representative in some 
ways of Chinese business practices as a whole across wider regional geogra-
phies.59 There has been some truth to these assertions, but also—perhaps—
some overreach, in figuring out how emblematic Chinese business in this 
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one small place may be of the larger dynamics and mechanics of Chinese 
commerce generally, in East and Southeast Asian waters.
 For marine- and dry-produce sellers, these patterns are very much in 
evidence, though they are only infrequently mentioned in the actual litera-
ture on trade and ethnicity among Chinese communities. In Singapore, the 
main area for these trades is scattered around South Bridge Road and its 
cross streets, near Singapore’s traditional Chinatown area, and north of the 
modern-day financial complex centered around Shenton Way.60 Walking 
into these shops, in some senses, is like walking into a different time. Big 
burlap sacks of samples sit scattered on the floor, and on the burlap of the 
sacks one can see stenciled the ports of many countries: Dobo (in Aru, East-
ern Indonesia); Davao (in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines); even Aus-
tralia (some sea cucumbers make it all the way north from Darwin, which 
has a monsoon climate and is more connected to Southeast Asia’s mari-
time rhythms than to those of Australia). You can touch and taste specimens 
of the produce, even though these are company headquarters with modern 
communications equipment and orders are coming in (or going out) to the 
four corners of the world. The fact that many Chinese marine-goods sellers 
have kept their shops in this area is important in and of itself—it is a conti-
nuity with tradition, a conscious choice, though other real estate (for all in-
tents and purposes) would now be just as good. Dialect-group preferences 
still manifest themselves in this community, though Singapore’s Chinese 
population is more diverse (sub-ethnically) than most other places in South-
east Asia, simply because it is so large.
 Yet the changes are just as noticeable. Fifty or one hundred years ago, 
it was a good bet that many of these shops would have had sons involved 
with the business, learning the trade and helping out with day-to-day opera-
tions—this is no longer the case in most of these concerns. Most shop 
owners with whom I spoke lamented the fact that their sons would not fol-
low them into their line of work, though some were glad of this, citing it 
as too competitive a way to make a living. Others were more philosophical: 
they wanted their children to receive better educations than they had, so that 
their lives would not be taken up with pushing odoriferous, salt-caked mer-
chandise around Asia as a means of making ends meet.61 Singapore is still 
the center of these trades in Southeast Asia; it is still a collection and trans-
shipment point for large quantities of these goods, which are collected else-
where in Southeast Asia and eventually transited up to China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan. Yet even this competitive advantage—and link to the past—is 
disappearing, as ethnic Chinese concerns in various other Nanyang coun-
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tries are now making their own deals with East Asia, to obtain products 
to market quicker and without the rising costs of Singaporean middlemen. 
The trade has a remorseless logic to it—the passage of marine goods must 
compete (like all other lines of trade) in the ferocity of today’s global mar-
ket.62 Though sea cucumbers, seahorses, fish maws, pearl products, dried-
fish varieties, abalone, and many other commodities of the traditional trade 
still pass through Singapore, the days of the port city acting as the arbiter 
of this trade may now be numbered. Singapore has competed too well, in a 
sense, in the global economy; it has bypassed these trades in its own eco-
nomic lifecycle. The men I spoke with over the last eighteen years may in fact 
be the last generation to control this trade, as it passes from Singapore into 
the periphery, and is guided by other Chinese hands.
conclusion
It seems a truism that the development of the global political economy in 
the last two to three centuries had much to do with the spread of capitalism, 
as new ways of conducting commerce filtered to nearly every corner of the 
known world. These processes have been discussed within the larger struc-
tures of colonialism and existing patterns of trade, with scholars such as 
Philip Curtin and others showing how this happened in a variety of places, 
and at a variety of times, over the past several hundred years.63 Critical to this 
discussion has been the role of ethnic middlemen, those who competed and 
later collaborated with the advancing imperial projects of the West, but who 
also carved out their own niches within the new parameters of commerce 
that came into being. These racialized networks have been visible across a 
number of empires and creeping colonial projects, showing that there were 
indeed interstitial spaces within the larger economic structures where such 
communities could carve their own niches of importance.64 Chinese marine-
goods sellers were one among these many groups, moving from a position 
of early significance in the centuries before imperial rule to compradors in 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth, before being reborn yet again 
into new post-independence roles after the end of the Second World War.
 Many of these networks still have salience in the economic world of East 
and Southeast Asia today. Though marine-goods traders possess only an 
echo of the importance they once had in helping to prop up intraregional 
systems of exchange, in numerical and value terms these trades are actu-
ally larger and richer than they have ever been. This is in keeping with the 
growth of Asian and global markets, and it is also in keeping with the rising 
abilities of human beings to elicit the varied riches of the sea in ever-larger 
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numbers. It is clear that some of the centuries-old ways of “doing business” 
in this arena are still with the Chinese marine-goods sellers of East and 
Southeast Asia, and that some of their own specific traits and traditions as 
a community have been lost, or are quickly being lost right now. This has to 
do with the passage of time, but it also has much to do with shifting per-
ceptions of what is important, profitable, and desirable for Chinese families 
and Chinese family firms, whose interests used to overlap, possibly more so 
than they often do today.65 The outstretched community of Chinese marine-
goods traders is a very useful population to question and map some of these 
changes in commercial history, as this trade—like many others—tries to 
fit itself into the dictates of the modern commercial world.66 Using a com-
bined approach of historical and ethnographic methods makes visible these 
changes over time and space, and allows us to watch as the members of these 
families and diasporic commercial concerns continue an avenue of com-
merce that has been important for a very long time.
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from a shiji episode to the forbidden 
Jade trade during the soCialist regime in burma
Wen-Chin Chang
Shiji is the first book that contains records of the communication between 
present southwestern China and its neighboring countries. The following 
passage from Shiji has been frequently quoted and studied by scholars work-
ing on this region.
In the first year of Yuanshou (122 B.c.), Zhang Qian, the Bowang marquis, 
returned from his mission to the land of Daxia (Bactria) and reported 
that while he was there he had seen cloth produced in Shu and bamboo 
canes from Qiong. On inquiring how they had arrived in Daxia, he was 
told, “They came from the land of Shendu (India), which lies some several 
thousand li west of here. We buy them in the shops of the Shu merchants 
there.” He was also told that Shendu was situated some 2,000 li west of 
Qiong. “Daxia, which is situated southwest of our country,” Zhang Qian 
reported to the emperor with enthusiasm, “is eager to open relations with 
China and is much distressed that the Xiongnu are blocking the road in 
between. If we could find a new route from Shu via the land of Shendu, 
however, we would have a short and convenient way to reach Daxia which 
would avoid the danger of the northern route.”
 The emperor therefore ordered Wang Ranyu, Bo Shichang, Lü Yuerren, 
and others to go on a secret expedition through the region of the south-
western barbarians and on to the west to search for the land of Shendu. 
When they got as far as Dian, Changqiang, the king of Dian, detained 
them and sent a party of ten or twelve men to the west to find out the way 
to Shendu for them. The Chinese party waited over a year, but all the roads 
to the west had been closed off by the inhabitants of Kunming, so that 
none of the men who had been sent ahead were able to reach Shendu.1
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This passage underlines a few points of significance. First, transnational 
economic activities had been going on between southwestern China, Daxia, 
and Shendu, prior to the knowledge of the powerful Han court. Second, the 
economic activities were possibly undertaken via a convenient trading route 
connecting today’s Sichuan, Yunnan, Burma, and India that led to Bactria (in 
present Afghanistan). Third, on hearing Zhang Qian’s report, the Han em-
peror Wu gave orders to uncover this trading route in order to secure the ex-
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was impeded by local powers and did not succeed. Regional kingdoms re-
mained as uncertain forces in relation to China proper, sometimes serving as 
subjugated tribute states, at other times as rebellious polities. Turning over 
this underlined state-centric perspective that is characterized by the rhetoric 
of Sinocentrism in Shiji, one nevertheless finds the operation of the unoffi-
cial connections among regional traders across different political entities.
 While conducting fieldwork among the migrant Yunnanese Chinese dis-
persed in upper Burma and northern Thailand, my mind often moves be-
tween different layers of time, connected to people’s migration history and 
their memories about their ancestors’ movement into Yunnan and their sub-
sequent economic and military explorations.2 Relevant passages from Shiji 
have frequently echoed in my mind. They are the earliest written sources for 
tracing Chinese influence to this ethnically diverse borderland. While Shiji 
and other historical materials remind me to view my ethnographic findings 
of Yunnanese transborder engagement from the perspective of the longue 
durée, the mobility and economic dynamism of migrant Yunnanese suggest 
the limitations of the state-oriented viewpoint embedded in Chinese im-
perial historiography, and spur me to go beyond written texts with such a 
viewpoint.
 Using the Shiji passage extracted above as a starting point, I am intrigued 
by several underlying questions related to the issue of the underground jade 
trade in Burma during the socialist period (1962–1998). How did the Shu 
merchants engage in the long-distance trade to Shendu without the involve-
ment of the state regulations issued by the Chinese court? How did they 
manage to pass through all the countries en route that even the Han empire 
was unable to gain access to? In other words, how did they interact with the 
hierarchy of different regional powers? Furthermore, how did they handle 
capital transference and currency conversion? While the era’s remoteness 
in time and a lack of sources make it difficult to find answers, I think of the 
transnational Shu merchants over two thousand years ago and of the Yun-
nanese jade traders in question, who were confronted with parallel circum-
stances, and regard the questions raised above as inspiration for the present 
study.
 The concerned jade trade was dominated by migrant Yunnanese traders 
based in Burma and Thailand.3 It was a transnational business from Burma 
to northern Thailand and then to other Chinese societies, mainly Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, from the 1960s to the mid-1990s, largely during the Burmese 
socialist period. Such a trade required flexible flows of capital, information, 
goods, and people. However, to the private sector inside Burma, it was a for-
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bidden trade. Not only were there no state regulations to back up the trade, 
but the official ban entailed forceful restrictions, as well as risks and dan-
gers for participating traders. In response to the external situation, the Yun-
nanese merchants had to interact with complex power structures consisting 
of local ethnic militias and Burmese troops and officials. In light of the case 
of the Shiji and that of the Yunnanese jade trade, the traders then and now all 
demonstrated marvelous economic agency in the face of similar constraints. 
The Shiji episode accordingly provides meaningful threads for reflection and 
comparison.
 In addition, the antiquity of the Shiji episode suggests another signifi-
cant point of reference that draws attention to the double aspects of histori-
cal continuity and contingency. The participation of Chinese merchants in 
commerce in this historical activity space has been persistent in the form of 
long-distance caravan trade.4 Especially with the incorporation of the Yun-
nan province into the territory of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 c.e.), and 
subsequent massive Chinese resettlement to the province throughout the 
Ming (1368–1644 c.e.) and Qing (1644–1911 c.e.) dynasties, the Chinese 
(now called Yunnanese Chinese or simply Yunnanese) merchants have played 
a predominant role in the transboundary trade of the region.5 On the other 
hand, they have been constantly shaped and reshaped by changing socio-
political contexts. Their economic acumen and risk-taking spirit have inter-
acted with varied challenges emanating from the complex trading environ-
ment in terms of its physiography, ethnic structure, and political systems. 
Their trading history is composed of numerous life and death experiences 
in the face of the external changes of each period and the severe conditions 
posed by nature.6 While focusing on the period of the Burmese socialist 
regime, one must consider the persistence of the Yunnanese cross-border 
movement and economic activities.
 Bearing in mind the inquiries derived from the Shiji episode on non-state 
regulations, merchants’ interaction with different political entities en route, 
and the means of capital flows, the present study looks into Yunnanese mi-
gration and resettlement in Burma, Yunnanese interaction with state agents 
and other ethnic communities, the mining and trading regulations involved, 
the internal transaction, and the operation of capital flows. Although the 
focus is on the Burmese socialist period, comparisons are made with rele-
vant economic practices by the Yunnanese in previous times. While my 
earlier work on the jade trade has centered primarily on Thailand,7 I turn 
in this present study to an examination of Burma, with the attempt to shed 
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light on a significant part of the politico-economy of contemporary Burma 
which has been much neglected.
 In 1962, Burma entered a period of isolation with the authoritarian Ne 
Win regime. This junta, set up by a military coup, was preceded by a short-
lived parliamentary government that had come into power in 1948, after the 
end of British colonial rule. The Ne Win regime steered the country with 
the guiding ideology of the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” Its operation was 
carried out with a series of economic measures to nationalize trade and in-
dustry, and was, unfortunately, characterized by gross mismanagement, lack 
of infrastructure, and policy mistakes. The country quickly fell into a mire of 
economic recession and suffered from drastic shortages of essential every-
day goods.
 As a result, the demand for consumer goods by the Burmese people was 
satisfied by the black market (hmaung-kho) economy with links to the under-
ground border trade. Cattle and products like rice, teak, antiques, hides, 
ivory, opium, and jade stones were illegally taken to neighboring countries, 
exiting Burma from areas under the control of rebel groups. In exchange, 
consumer goods and weapons were smuggled into Burma by mule-driven 
caravans.8 Ethnic militias financed their expenses by levying taxes on these 
goods. Most of the goods came from market-oriented Thailand, which 
emerged as Burma’s main partner in this illegal trade.9
 The socialist rule impoverished Burma and aggravated ethnic divisions. 
The junta was finally toppled in 1988, following a series of nationwide re-
volts by the people. However, democracy did not ensue; the country is still 
controlled by a military regime named the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (slorc), which was later renamed the State Peace and Develop-
ment Council (sPdc), in 1997. Certain changes have been made, includ-
ing, significantly, the launch of a market economy, although it is one based 
on capricious policies and inefficient socioeconomic infrastructure. Many 
former underground businesses and enterprises have turned legal, and the 
jade trade is among them.
 To obtain an insight into the migrant Yunnanese traders’ economic dyna-
mism beyond the restrictions imposed by the state, and also to suspend 
unnecessary moral judgments on the question of legality, it is necessary to 
avoid taking a state-dominated perspective. As Kyaw Yin Hlaing has pointed 
out, a state-centric perspective tends to present Burma as a unitary society 
and the government as the highest legitimate power.10 According to such 
a view, traders’ agency exercised in underground trafficking is easily dis-
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missed. In addition, it gives the “illegal” transnational trade a criminal 
image and prevents reflection on a parallel system that operates according 
to its own set of unofficial rules and links with the daily life of the people.11
 What I intend to develop here could be called the minjian (popular realm 
民間) perspective, which highlights the unofficial connections interacting 
with and reacting against the state bureaucracy.12 The composition of these 
connections is often diversified; some are founded on personal bases, others 
on institutional formation. In Burma during the time in question, there 
existed ethnic forces and a large dissatisfied public. Alliances and struggles 
coexisted among these unofficial nexuses; their power structures were com-
plex and alternating. It is thus important to discern the intricate relations 
from the viewpoint of the unofficial order. Seen from this viewpoint, it is also 
possible to perceive how state agencies were incorporated to a certain de-
gree into the operation of the popular realm, since the government was only 
one of the power regimes. Therefore, I will explore the Yunnanese jade busi-
ness in Burma from the people’s perspective rather than that of the state, by 
delving into the historical contingency that they faced during this particu-
lar period, and the historical continuity in Yunnanese commercial skills and 
spirit in transboundary endeavors.
yunnanese migrants in Transborder Trade
Cross-border economic ventures have always figured prominently in the lives 
of the Yunnanese.13 Continuity in this engagement is especially notable in 
Yunnanese border towns. The common Yunnanese proverb qiong zou yifang 
ji zou chang 窮走夷方急走厰 best describes the situation: when one needed 
money, one joined the caravan trade and went to areas occupied by “barbari-
ans” (other ethnic groups), or alternatively tried one’s luck in jade or other 
mineral mines in Burma. Those who were hesitant to take up such ventures 
were considered timid and often teased by fellow Yunnanese.14 According 
to the interpretation of the culture of migration attributed to Douglas S. 
Massey et al., transborder movement can be seen as “deeply ingrained into 
the repertoire of people’s behaviors” in areas bordering Yunnan.15 It has 
even developed as a “rite of passage” to indicate the transition to adulthood 
among males. From a historical point of view, the continuous flow of Han 
Chinese to Yunnan and their involvement in long-distance trade constitute a 
vital part of the long history of the movement of Yunnanese overland.
 Among its neighbors, Burma in particular has been the major country 
that the Yunnanese look to for economic adventures, as well as for political 
asylum when unrest occurs, due to its physiographical connection with Yun-
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nan. Some Yunnanese even established home bases in both places.16 The year 
1949 witnessed a Yunnanese exodus to Burma on a hitherto unseen scale due 
to the communist takeover in China. Large immigration flows continued 
into the 1970s owing to a series of political movements launched in China. 
Some informants estimated that the Yunnanese refugees who arrived after 
1949 together with their descendants account for 80 to 90 percent of all Yun-
nanese immigrants in Burma today. Without legal permission to stay in the 
country, most of the Yunnanese refugees settled in the mountain areas of 
Shan and Kachin states in the early stage.
 Among these refugees, a group of stragglers from the Chinese National-
ist (Kuomintang or KMT) armies and local self-defense guards from Yunnan 
organized themselves into guerrilla forces in early 1950. They established 
connection with the Chinese Nationalist government, which had retreated 
to Taiwan in 1949. Many civilian refugees stayed around the KMT troops, 
seeking protection against the harassment of the Burmese army or ethnic 
militias. During the 1950s, the KMT forces repeatedly launched guerrilla 
battles in Yunnan and had military confrontations with the Burmese army, 
too. These actions, however, compounded the political tension in the region 
and provoked debates in the United Nations on the legitimacy of the KMT 
forces.17 They were then compelled to disband first between 1953 and 1954, 
and again in 1961; but two armies, code-named the Third and Fifth Armies 
under the respective leadership of Generals Li and Duan, survived the dis-
bandment, and later entered northern Thailand.18 Due to subsequent socio-
economic instability caused by the Ne Win regime, many civilian Yunnanese 
followed Li’s and Duan’s armies and escaped to Thailand. (Nevertheless, a 
much larger number of Yunnanese stayed behind.) These KMT troops helped 
their fellow refugees establish villages along the border, which functioned 
as havens for later Yunnanese migrants throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
 Informants pointed out that prior to the flight from Yunnan, many KMT 
soldiers, as well as fellow civilians, had been caravan traders traversing an-
nually to upper Burma. During the guerrilla period, many troops were in-
volved in the drug trade. “The troops were caravan traders and the caravan 
traders were troops. Both were combined as a unit,” a former KMT official 
wrote.19 After entrenching themselves along the border of northern Thai-
land, the armies of Li and Duan continued to grow in strength, essentially by 
engaging in transborder trade between Thailand and Burma. They developed 
spheres of influence in the region by forming alliances with or struggling 
against other ethnic rebels. Moreover, their commercial acumen, familiarity 
with Shan State, and the demands of the black-market economy in Burma 
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resulted in their predominance in handling the trade throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.20 The armies controlled several major trading routes and played a 
primary role in the underground circulation of merchandise, people, capital, 
news, and intelligence. A great number of Yunnanese migrants in northern 
Thailand and upper Burma were dependent on the KMT forces for move-
ment, resettlement, and armed escort of their trade.
 The status of these KMT armies was ambivalent. Seen by the Thai gov-
ernment as buffer forces along the border for the prevention of communist 
penetration, they took part in quelling the Thai communists, following a 
request by the government. They were, however, definitely regarded as in-
surgent groups by the Burmese junta. By the end of the 1970s, due to aging 
among the troops, the KMT’s power began to decline and was gradually sur-
passed by another militia, called the Shan United Army, led by the notori-
ous warlord Khun Sa. Most of Khun Sa’s key officers were also Yunnanese, 
with connections to the KMT armies. Despite the shift in the power struc-
ture among the ethnic militias, Thai-Burmese trafficking was basically un-
affected; the Yunnanese persisted in their foremost engagement.
 Informants often attributed their predominance in the trade to factors 
related to time, geography, and human reciprocity, and described such 
conditions with the Chinese expression tianshi dili renhe 天時地利人和. The 
Yunnanese migrants were compelled to flee, owing to a series of histori-
cal contingencies as mentioned above. Their economic activities in Burma 
and transnational networks that connected to the KMT troops greatly facili-
tated their movement. In addition to transnational migration, Yunnanese 
migrants in Burma also experienced repeated internal movement. An im-
portant event was related to the Burmese government’s suppression of the 
Ka Kwe Ye (KKy) forces that were entrenched in the mountainous areas. 
The KKy had been officially accepted as auxiliary local defense troops based 
on a policy promulgated in 1963, but the government decided to wipe out 
these forces in 1973. The military action simultaneously forced local civil-
ians to leave. An elderly female informant related: “[At that time] mountain 
areas were not quiet. Government troops came to fight against the rebels. 
They recruited civilians by force and often burned down villages. We had 
to run.” Many Yunnanese gradually moved to the cities. Corruption among 
state officials was rampant at that time because their salaries were mea-
ger. By bribing the officials, most Yunnanese obtained the legal status to 
stay. Their economic power thus expanded to urban areas in upper Burma.21 
This urban expansion when integrated with their knowledge of rural trad-
ing routes enabled them to take control of both import-export trafficking 
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and the redistribution of smuggled goods in upper Burma. Whether internal 
or transnational, Yunnanese mobility brought about the formation of wide-
spread networks that greatly enhanced their participation in the Burmese 
black-market economy.
embedded regulatory Practices
To ensure the operation of network flows in an environment with diversified 
ethnic communities and political entities, it has been essential to initiate 
and implement trading regulations. Andrew Walker, in his research on the 
recent Economic Quadrangle cooperation of the Upper Mekong area, argues 
against the popular perception of the borderlands as lawless. His findings 
lead to the conclusion that the quadrangle is the latest stage in a series of 
regimes of Upper Mekong regulation, and that “state (and non-state) regu-
lation is intrinsically involved in the creation of the contexts in which mar-
kets flourish.”22 The jade trade in question, too, was predicated on a series of 
regulatory practices that had been developed for several centuries.
 Although informative records concerning the Burmese jade business only 
appeared in the late nineteenth century, when the British colonial govern-
ment tried to take control of the trade, piecemeal sources point to the popu-
larity of Burmese jade stones among the Chinese several centuries earlier. 
Historical records indicate that the Ming eunuchs were assigned to Yunnan 
from the fifteenth century to purchase gemstones, including jadeite, from 
Burma.23 By the end of this dynasty, the imported volume of Burmese jade 
was notable. Reflecting the Qing court’s growing passion for this precious 
stone, demand continued to increase, and the appreciation of Burmese jade 
gradually spread to the general public.24 In the eighteenth century, great 
numbers of Yunnanese miners and jade traders flowed into the mining re-
gion in upper Burma to seek their fortune.25
 The mining and trading of the Burmese jade stones involved a complex 
power hierarchy that included the indigenous chiefs, the Burmese king, the 
Chinese officials, the imperial court, and, later, the British colonial govern-
ment. To ensure its operation in response to the different political parties, 
the mining and trading of jade was predicated on a series of regulatory prac-
tices developed over several centuries. A description of relevant tax regula-
tions appeared in the Burma Gazetteer: Myitkyina District in the early nineteenth 
century.
The Burmese Collector imposed no tax upon the stone until it was ready 
to leave Mogaung, when he levied an ad valorem duty of 33 per cent, and 
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issued a permit. . . . After this the stone passed freely anywhere in Burma 
without further charge or inspection. The value of jade was determined for 
purposes of taxation by an official appraiser. . . . The actual duty paid was 
therefore small and business proceeded smoothly, cases of friction be-
tween the traders and the customs officers being of very rare occurrence. 
All payments were made in bar silver. The metal used was at first fairly 
pure. . . . Rupees did not come into general use until 1874.
 Besides the duty leviable at Mogaung, the stone had to bear certain 
charges, authorized and unauthorized, at the mines and Namiakyaukseik 
(Nanyaseik), one day’s journey from the mines: (1) The Burmese officer 
at the mines imposed a monthly tax of 1 tael (about 4 annas) on every-
body who came to trade; from this charge Burmans and actual workers 
in the mines were exempt; (2) a further sum of 2.5 taels (about 10 annas) 
was charged for a pass which was issued for each load of jade leaving 
the mines for Namiakyaukseik; (3) at Namiakyaukseik, 4 taels (about a 
rupee) was paid on the arrival of every load to an agent of the Mogaung 
Collector, permanently stationed there.26
 Be it under Burmese or British rule, the ownership of the jade mines by 
the local Kachin chiefs (duwas) was respected and officially recognized. The 
Burma Gazetteer recorded: “[The rights of the Kachins] appear to have been 
well under[s]tood and respected. They were regarded as the absolute owners 
of all the stones produced in their country. This ownership was never di-
rectly called in question by the King of Burma.”27 In addition to listing the 
tax categories, the Burma Gazetteer detailed the duties on excavation, trans-
action, and gambling, and the tolls on imported food and house tax. Parallel 
information was also documented by a Chinese officer, Yin Deming, on his 
expedition to the Kachin mining region in 1929–1930.28 Yin vividly described 
the mining conditions and methods, and various regulatory practices that 
he observed. He recorded that most miners he encountered were Yunnanese 
Han. During each dry season from the tenth month of the lunar calendar 
to the fourth month of the following year, nearly twenty to thirty thousand 
Yunnanese worked at the mines. On choosing a spot to work, the mine boss 
had to pay an amount of money to the local chief to purchase the excavation 
right; he then marked his right to the place by sticking a piece of bamboo or 
plant into the land. Between the second and the third months each year, the 
region received another ten thousand jade dealers from Yunnan.
 These regulatory practices ensured the rights of the different parties, and 
served to maintain order in the region. Even the rights of the mine workers 
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were protected. Aside from receiving food and board, the miner, on excavat-
ing a piece of jade stone, was entitled to half the share of its estimated value. 
Despite the change in regional politics, these regulations were largely pre-
served. With the establishment of the parliamentary government, the jade 
enterprise proceeded without interruption. In 1959, Ne Win forced the local 
chiefs to resign. However, in the 1960s, local auxiliaries arose and resisted 
the junta; subsequently, they replaced the traditional authority of original 
chiefs and supervised the implementation of the mining and trading regu-
lations. Most jade mines were under the control of the Kachin Independence 
Army (Kia).
 The mining methods and living conditions during the socialist period 
remained as rudimentary as they had been during the colonial period. Yet, 
in the face of social instability, this venture provided an opportunity and a 
grand get-rich dream predicated on the possibility of discovering good jade 
stones. In his autobiography, Yushi tianming 玉石天命 (Destiny of jade stone), 
Zhou Jinglun relates his own life story: having become a Yunnanese refugee 
in upper Burma from 1969, he eventually became a jade miner, a foreman, 
and then a jade trader.29 His story combines his understanding of the phi-
losophy underlying Chinese jade culture with the sociopolitical conditions 
encountered in the mining areas during the socialist regime. The regulatory 
practices were inclusive and, in general, corresponded to the earlier ones. As 
Zhou describes,
Anyone who would like to go to the mines had to register first and pay 
registration fees and passage toll [to the Kachin troops]. The petty traders 
who imported consumption goods paid business tax. Those who pur-
chased zhuangtou (庄頭 [large-sized jade stone with mediocre quality]) 
paid a [smaller amount] of tax. Those who purchased feicui (翡翠 [valuable 
jade with clear green color]) paid a [higher amount] of tax. The miners 
paid labor tax; and the mine bosses the mining tax. Excavated jade was 
taxed ad valorem dues of 10 percent. On payment of each tax, a receipt was 
given, which also served as a kind of license. Cattle carts, elephants, and 
motorcars were also taxed. The Kachin rebels thus earned great profits 
from taxes.30
 In an interview, Zhou told me that the interaction between the Kachin 
troops and civilians was generally satisfactory. Though the tax categories 
were encompassing, the dues were bearable and also negotiable. Moreover, 
their implementation contributed to the maintenance of law and order in the 
region. When disputes occurred between mine owners, they would go to the 
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Kachin officers for arbitration. Nevertheless, on discovering high-quality 
jade stones, they tried to hide them from the Kachin rebels for fear that they 
would be confiscated. With regard to the Burmese authority, people deemed 
it alien. Zhou mentions that the Burmese police and army carried out two 
routine arrests every year, in which a few hundred people were put in jail. 
However, the payment of probation money was enough to ensure their free-
dom. Zhou writes,
A [Burmese] soldier’s monthly salary was about 100 kyat; a [Burmese] 
policeman’s salary was about 200 kyat. But a jade miner’s board and food 
amounted to 400 kyat. How could the [Burmese soldiers] and policemen 
support their family with their meager pay? When catching miners, the 
Burmese authority was willing to let them go when [their bosses or fami-
lies] could put up a bail to secure their release. It was also an opportunity 
for the Burmese officers to be friends with local people.31
Accordingly, the local Burmese authority was integrated into the operation 
of this underground enterprise. The bribes they received amounted, in fact, 
to much more than their state salaries. The world of the jade mines reflected 
complex interactions between the different groups, intertwined with sym-
biotic and conflicting relations, and this world’s sustenance was predicated 
on the continuity of regulatory enforcement and observance despite political 
changes at different times.
internal Transaction
Regardless of great hardships and dangers, the jade mines continued to at-
tract fortune-seekers annually. Before 1980, the number of Yunnanese jade 
traders and mine bosses in the mining areas was still small due to the re-
striction implemented by the local rebel group, the Kia. The Yunnanese had 
to disguise themselves as Kachin or Shan in order to obtain permission to 
enter the areas. Nevertheless, after 1980, the Kia relaxed its control, and in-
creasing numbers of Yunnanese arrived to venture into the business. They 
gradually became the majority. However, whether it was before or after 1980, 
informants claim that outside the mining areas, the jade trade was domi-
nated by male Yunnanese operators with their well-organized networks and 
knowledge of the trade that enabled them to get around the state laws of 
Burma and Thailand, and to compete among themselves, and also against 
other ethnic traders. The extension of the trade to Thailand was nearly mo-
nopolized by Yunnanese traders, and made it primarily a Yunnanese ethnic 
enterprise. Nevertheless, the Yunnanese had to rely on the assistance of local 
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people in transactions that took place in Burma. Unlike the situation in Thai-
land, where there were jade companies that helped to store sellers’ stones 
and arrange deals between sellers and buyers, all transactions in Burma were 
dependent on personal arrangement—local people primarily took up this 
job. Mr Hong, who was in the jade trade for more than twenty years, said, 
“When a Yunnanese trader obtained some jade stones, he first placed the 
stones in a Burman’s house. If cutting stones were required [mostly for the 
very big sized ones], they were done in Burmans’ places too. The Burmese 
authorities usually did not catch their own people; even if they knew which 
house stored jade stones. Most Burmans had kith and kin working at gov-
ernment offices and had their connections. Most of them had family mem-
bers in the army too.”
 Local brokers ( jieshouren 介紹人), comprising mostly Burmans, Indians, 
Kachins and Shans, helped to introduce buyers. The service had been part of 
the trading tradition. The Burma Gazetteer records, “The stone is purchased at 
the mines by Chinese traders. All payments are made in rupees. An expert, 
or middleman, is nearly always employed to settle the price. These middle-
men, who are without exception Burmans or Burmese-Shans, have from 
early times been indispensable to the transaction of business at the mines; 
they charge the purchaser 5 percent on the purchase money.”32 During the 
socialist period, it was said, the movement of local people was safer than 
for the Chinese. Unlike the sophisticated jobs involved in the brokerage that 
were handled by the jade companies in Thailand, the practice of brokerage 
in Burma did not require money for investment or tax arrangements, or the 
transport of traded stones abroad. Yunnanese traders only needed to pay 
petty commission for the brokerage. The Yunnanese did not consider the 
involvement of local people in brokering to be competition, but more as 
mutual reciprocity.
 In addition to the Yunnanese traders based in Burma, some Yunnanese 
buyers came from Thailand. The purchase of jade stones was preceded by 
shopping around and price negotiations between buyers and sellers. In areas 
where the jade mines were located, buyers would wander the excavation spots 
seeking interesting stones. The shopping was called guang dongzi (逛洞子), or 
“roaming the holes.” Mine bosses also purchased stones from one another. 
Before leaving the mines, the traded stones would have “passed a few hands” 
(zhuanle jishou 轉了幾手). They were carried by porters or mules, cattle, or 
elephants to the nearest train stations, for instance Mogaung, Hopin, and 
Mohnyin, and then by train to Mandalay. These places were all underground 
trading centers, and Mandalay was especially important. In these places, 
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buyers were taken to private houses where the stones were stored; if they 
were interested in buying a piece, they would check the price and then try to 
bring it down through long negotiations with the seller. Mr Hong described 
the process vividly.
When the buyer is interested in a piece of stone, he would first ask the 
broker about the price. He normally did not ask the seller directly. After 
he thought that the price was O.K., he would then start to bargain with 
the seller for a lower price. When the seller asked for a certain price, for 
example one million [kyat], the buyer would then offer a much lower 
price, for example five hundred thousand. The seller would say no way. 
The buyer would then increase his offer. Price negotiation often took the 
whole day when both parties were interested in making a deal. After the 
buyer had raised the price several times, for example up to seven hundred 
thousand, but the seller was still not willing to sell, the buyer would call 
this his last offer. Though the deal was not settled, the seller may agree to 
have the stone packed with a piece of cloth and have the potential buyer 
sign his name on the cloth. On doing this, other buyers were not allowed 
to open it. That was the rule. A meal often followed afterwards. Negotia-
tions could continue the next day. . . . If afterwards the seller was willing 
to sell the stone with the last price offered by the buyer, then the buyer 
must purchase the stone, because he had proposed that price and signed 
his name on the packed stone. . . . [But] if the buyer discovered that the 
packed stones had been opened, he could refuse to buy it.
 Price negotiation was like a game, predicated on many unwritten rules. 
It required patience, negotiation skills, and the ability to read the mind of 
one’s counterpart. Informants commonly referred to the process as a kind 
of psychological battle (xinlizhan 心理戰). Most traders were Yunnanese, but 
some Burmans, Indians, Kachins, and Shans also engaged in the jade trade. 
The amount of capital involved was said to be comparatively much smaller, 
and the participation of these traders took place primarily within Burma, 
as very few of them had access to transnational networks that could extend 
their business abroad.33
 After having purchased jade stones, Yunnanese merchants often entrusted 
them to caravan companies for conveyance to Thailand. Most caravan com-
panies were also run by the Yunnanese. Transportation was accomplished by 
bribing officials of the customs house, police stations, immigration office, 
intelligence department, and the military. The bribes resembled the regu-
lated taxes levied on different ethnic insurgent groups located on the way. 
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When the stones arrived at Thai border points, representatives of the jade 
companies, who had been contacted in advance, would show up to receive 
the stones. The import of jade stones operated with tacit permission from 
the Thai government. The jade companies helped pay tax to the Thai customs 
house and thus transform the illegally smuggled stones into legal commodi-
ties. Meanwhile, the caravan traders would buy Thai goods and sell them on 
the black market in Burma. In short, the Yunnanese jade trade networks from 
Burma to Thailand were essentially composed of three nodes: the traders 
(based in both Burma and Thailand), the caravan companies (mostly based 
in Burma), and the jade companies (based in Thailand).
capital flow
Apart from the widespread network formation, the flexibility of the Yun-
nanese in handling capital flow was another key factor that facilitated their 
transnational economic operation. “No matter legal or illegal, we Chinese 
merchants know how to launch business,” commented Mr Chuan, who used 
to travel from Mae Sot (a Thai border town in Tak Province, Thailand) west-
ward to Mawlamyaing, then north to Mandalay (in Burma) for the purchase 
of jade stones in the 1980s and early 1990s. The transnational jade trade in 
question required capital flow between various nodes. In the mining areas, 
there were different means of capital transference to meet demand during 
the excavation period, which lasted for about half a year. The period co-
incided with the dry season; it started in the ninth or tenth month of the 
lunar calendar and ended in the third or fourth month the following year. 
When the rainy season began, the miners had to leave for fear of catching 
malaria and other diseases. People with little capital took the money they 
had to the mines and tried their luck in excavation until they had used up the 
money. If they discovered any marketable stones, they could sell them in the 
mines or in the nearby marketplace, acquire more capital, and extend their 
stay in the mines. However, if no valuable stones were found, they would 
have to leave or work for other mine owners.
 Those with more capital could hire more people to work for them. Three 
to five miners worked at a “jade hole.” The mine boss had to take care of the 
miners’ food and board and provide pocket money for smoking. The half-
year stay required a large amount of money, and it was both inconvenient 
and dangerous to carry all one’s money at one time to the mining area. Big 
grocery stores at nearby marketplaces therefore also functioned as under-
ground stations for money transference. Those stores had urban bases for 
business connections. A mine boss could send his foreman to a certain shop 
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to purchase the consumption goods his work team needed, and have his 
family or partner pay the money at one of the shop’s urban bases. The urban 
base of the shop used the money to replenish and transport the merchandise 
to the mining area. The mine boss could also borrow money from the shop 
for buying stones from other jade holes. In addition to the underground 
transference stations, there were individuals who also participated in this 
process. They packed money in sacks or cartons and took them to the mines 
by train or car. They lent the money to the familiar mine bosses and jade 
traders, and afterward collected debts from the debtors’ families in the cities 
with a certain percentage of interest added. However, there was always the 
chance of not being able to retrieve debts, especially when traders or mine 
bosses went bankrupt.
 The transaction of jade stones also illustrates the Yunnanese penchant for 
finance management. Merchants often traded in uncut stones. High-quality 
jade stones were mostly small in size, and their value was not revealed until 
they were cut. Traders could only evaluate stones by observing features in-
dicated on the surface. While price bargaining took place, both the buyer 
and seller appropriated their jade knowledge with reference to the marked 
features on the stone. The former would point out as many defects as pos-
sible, in order to bring down the price, while the seller would boast about the 
quality of his stone. The manipulation of jade knowledge became a tactic in 
the trade, and the transaction thus came to resemble gambling. In general, 
traded stones, except for large pieces weighing hundreds of kilos, remained 
uncut in Burma, and the price fluctuations were not too extreme. However, 
once the stones were safely transported to Thailand and traded at the jade 
companies, the process of price bargaining would intensify.
 Most buyers at the jade companies were dealers from Hong Kong or Tai-
wan, the major jade trade centers among Chinese societies. After a trans-
action, the Hong Kong and Taiwan dealers would either have the stones cut 
immediately in Thailand or after they were transported back to their coun-
tries. To reduce economic risk, both sellers and buyers were usually com-
posed of a group of three to five partners. The selling partners often came 
from Burma and Thailand, which aided in the allocation of tasks accord-
ing to each one’s special abilities. Those in Burma handled the purchase of 
stones from jade mines and arranged to have them trafficked to Thailand; 
those in Thailand participated in the sale through the brokerage of a jade 
company. Moreover, the formation of a trading group helped in the accu-
mulation of capital, which enhanced the possibilities of buying good jade 
stones.
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 In addition to their brokerage services, the jade companies provided 
money transference and loan services too. Like the grocery stores of the 
mining places, they functioned as informal finance stations. Prior to sell-
ing their stones, jade merchants from Burma in Thailand could borrow 
money from the companies to finance their living expenses. After selling 
their stones, they would ask the companies to help transfer their remain-
ing money back to Burma. This money was usually converted to Burmese 
kyat. On establishing a good relationship with the jade companies, traders 
could also borrow money from those companies for purchasing jade stones 
in Burma. These traders were said to be experienced and good at procuring 
high-quality stones. In this way, the traders could acquire capital for invest-
ment, and the jade companies were guaranteed a sufficient supply of good 
commodities, with which they could attract dealers from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.
 Looking closer into this underground finance system, one finds that in 
addition to the danger of being arrested, traders faced the threat that the 
Burmese government might implement demonetization without warn-
ing or guarantee of reasonable compensation. Despite the involvement of 
foreign currencies and gold bars in the transnational trafficking of differ-
ent commodities, monetary circulation in the black markets inside Burma 
was still based on kyat.34 Each demonetization caused tremendous loss to 
local traders. To combat this uncertainty, well-off Yunnanese merchants re-
invested part of their profit in Thailand in cash cropping, restaurants, or 
hotels.
 The uncertainty of the Burmese situation paralleled the indeterminacy 
of the quality of jade stones that compounded the risk of the trade. Many 
traders whom I interviewed confessed to multiple bankruptcies, which were 
due either to economic loss through price gambling or to the demonetiza-
tion of the Burmese currency. Moreover, several of them had been arrested 
and jailed in Burma. The wonder was that they continued to try their luck at 
all with the help of partnerships or capital loaned from various underground 
finance stations. Informants explained that involvement in the jade trade is 
like a drug addiction—the temptation of obtaining an invaluable piece of 
jade stone overcomes any fears. A popular saying among traders is that one 
should never look down on anyone in the trade, for even miners may sud-
denly become millionaires when luck knocks on their doors. Even though 
the number of people who have encountered such good luck is very small in 
reality, the possibility is tempting enough to lure Yunnanese traders, who are 
said to be gamblers by nature, to stick to the trade.
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 The Yunnanese traders created a system of flexible capital flow in connec-
tion with different parties for constant reinvestment and maximization of 
their profit. Even the Burmese official apparatuses, local insurgent groups, 
and the Thai authority were incorporated into the trade. Facing the difficul-
ties presented by the Burmese socialist economy, the migrant Yunnanese 
dispersed throughout Burma and Thailand, and opened up an underground 
market economy that connected to the capitalism of the outside world. Their 
uncertain status did not confine them geographically; instead, it resulted in 
their mobility, building of networks, and engagement in transborder eco-
nomic activities.
 Seen from a long historical perspective, the traders’ adventurous com-
mercial endeavors were not simply contemporary practices but an extension 
of the longue durée of Yunnanese overland activities. In terms of economic 
undertaking, the Yunnanese have, throughout history, oriented themselves 
more toward Southeast Asia and South Asia than toward China. The Shiji epi-
sode has pointed this out, and the persistence of long-distance caravan trade 
affirms its development. Furthermore, Yunnanese adoption of the regional 
monetary system by using cowries best illustrates this economic orienta-
tion. Archeological excavations have shown that Yunnan had been import-
ing cowries from South Asia and Southeast Asia since ancient times. Cowries 
were traded both as commodities and as a primary medium of exchange for 
the regional monetary system; in other words, they were the major com-
modity currency.35 Traces of their use in Yunnan have been found particularly 
along the trading routes connecting these neighboring countries. Other cur-
rencies used in Yunnan included silver, gold, copper, cloth, and salt. These 
multiple currencies illustrated the diversified conditions of Yunnanese com-
merce and the traders’ flexibility in their mutual conversion.36 The Chinese 
court was not successful in integrating Yunnan into its national monetary 
system until the seventeenth century.
 Following the penetration of Western powers in the nineteenth century, 
various currencies issued by respective colonial governments flowed from 
India, Burma, Vietnam, and Laos. Even so, Western powers did not take eco-
nomic opportunities away from the native population. Indigenous traders 
reacted positively to the new situation. With the help of existing trading 
networks, Yunnanese merchants set up many trading firms (shanghao 商號), 
with branch offices in the major cities of Yunnan and neighboring coun-
tries. They were linked to foreign firms and engaged in import-export trade, 
and thereby responsible for a large flow of goods to widespread local mar-
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kets. They also bought and sold foreign currencies and made remittances for 
their clients across countries.37 Accordingly, Yunnanese traders have been 
dynamic in the area of capital flow since ancient times. Their management 
has been in response to the external circumstances of each period, and has 
been transnational rather than national, and unofficial rather than official. 
The underground finance system of the jade trade serves as another contem-
porary example.
concluding remarks
The jade trade effectively highlights the economic agency of Yunnanese mi-
grants during the Burmese socialist period. It was a time of darkness, but 
these people created different means by which to survive. Informants often 
referred to the paradoxical belief in Burma that “many things were not pos-
sible, but everything was possible.” Departing from the Shiji episode, I have 
pointed out the embedded significance of historical continuity and contin-
gency, using them as the foundation of the analytical framework to bring out 
the insights of the trade. On the one hand, throughout history the Yunnanese 
adoption of practical tactics in dealing with local powers and state agencies 
and integration of regulatory practices, and the system of brokerage and 
flexible capital flow have both carried forward the persistence of a regional 
politico-economy. On the other hand, in response to different external con-
tingencies they face, the strategies applied have varied in different periods. 
Informants themselves are also aware of the interaction of these two aspects 
in the formation of their trading spirit. They refer repeatedly to their risky 
endeavors as being the result of external circumstances on the one hand, and 
of the persistent Yunnanese tradition of long-distance trade in the region, 
on the other. The former points to environmental influences and a series 
of sociopolitical contingencies, and the latter, to a Yunnanese commercial 
ethos developed throughout history. Mr. Huang, who participated in the 
jade trade for over thirty years, said,
We Yunnanese have a kind of daring spirit [maoxian fannan de jingshen 冒
險犯難的精神] and tough personality. This is mainly due to the moun-
tainous environment. The land is not fertile for agriculture. Yunnanese 
simply have to leave their homeland to make a living. Our ancestors had 
been engaged in the caravan trade for hundreds of years. . . . On account 
of not having legal status when we arrived [in Burma], we had to stay in 
mountains . . . and engaged in illicit trade. Yunnanese are the best group 
among the ethnic Chinese abroad who are capable of enduring hardship.
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Similar remarks were made by other informants. They commonly stress their 
risk-taking behavior and audacity as the distinctive “overland” temperament 
in this ethnically diverse land, and often apply it to distinguish themselves 
from the more conservative overseas Chinese from the Fujian and Guang-
dong Provinces. Ah Song, a second generation Yunnanese businessman in 
Chiang Mai, vividly describes their differentiation: “We Yunnanese love gam-
bling on big trade. . . . [We] have a sort of wild temper [shanba piqi 山巴脾
氣]. . . . Those Teochiu are good at business.38 They are willing to earn one 
baht, two bahts [yikuai laingkuai douzhuan 塊兩塊都賺, meaning making small 
profits]. We Yunnanese aim only at big profits [douzhi zuo dade 都只做大的].”
 Nonetheless, when asked to explain their economic predominance in 
comparison with non-Chinese ethnic groups, Yunnanese Chinese infor-
mants replace the statement of the overland disposition with an ethnocen-
tric response tied to their Han Chinese origin. Mr. Huang says: “I think it is 
the question of cultural standard. Those Kachins do not have the brain of we 
Han Chinese. They mostly take up manual work, such as mining. The Shans, 
too, generally work as laborers.” Even the majority of Burmans and Thais are 
said to lack the talent and guts needed in the jade trade.39 The mercantile 
ethos of the Yunnanese is thus illustrated with a double nature, grounded 
both on local Yunnanese tradition and on Han Chinese ethnicity. The Yun-
nanese switch to either emphasis depending on which group they are related 
to. Vis-à-vis the ethnic others, they naturally emphasize the dimension of 
civilized Chineseness, which they use to highlight their ethnic superiority.40 
This cultural superiority also embraces their shrewdness in trade. Stories of 
how some Burmese and minority traders are compelled to sell high-value 
jade stones with low prices were repeated by informants.41
 However, regardless of their overland toughness and ethnic superiority, 
the Yunnanese traders had to rely on assistance from local people. In reality, 
they were sometimes betrayed by indigenous collaborators. Informants re-
ported having lost stones that were stored at local people’s houses or while 
being transported from one location to another. They accused the home-
owners of releasing information to the Burmese authority in order to make 
large profits. Once such an incident took place, the traders would end the 
business relationship with the collaborators, and the latter would be barred 
by other traders, too. According to informants, this strategy was useful to a 
certain degree, but the danger of being sold out still existed, and they had to 
be constantly alert. Moreover, bribes to the Burmese officials did not guar-
antee absolute safety. Sometimes, checks became more stringent or would 
occur unexpectedly. At other times, military conflicts between the Burmese 
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army and ethnic rebels flared up. Such situations obstructed the operation of 
the trade, and merchants had to wait until things calmed down.
 By adopting a minjian perspective, I have illustrated the complex trading 
environment and relations involved in the jade trade. I have moved beyond a 
state-centric stance that would simply label the jade trade illegal, depriving 
the government of a huge amount of tax income and foreign exchange, and 
posing serious threats to national security. I have instead followed the mo-
bility of the migrant Yunnanese and tried to illuminate their strength and re-
silience, as well as the limitations in their interaction with multiple regimes 
of power. The Burmese socialist junta was only one of the involved parties. 
Moreover, it was not a unified one. Likewise, the community of Yunnan-
ese traders was fragmented. Deception among Yunnanese trading partners 
occurred more often than betrayals by local collaborators.42 Partnerships 
based on ties of kith and kin were not everlasting, given the temptation of 
massive economic margins. Almost all informants confided that they had 
been cheated by their partners or fellow traders. Despite all the internal and 
external complexities, based on the double nature of their trading ethos, the 
contemporary migrant Yunnanese have maintained the rationale of maxi-
mizing economic gain and assuring a continuity that underlies their trans-
national trading activity.
notes
I conducted fieldwork for this paper in Burma (Mandalay, Yangon, Taunggyi, Lashio, 
Maymeo, and Myitkyina), Thailand (Chiang Mai Province, Chiang Rai Province, and 
Bangkok), Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou in 2000, 2002, 2004–2005, and 2006, 
totaling nine-and-a-half months. During my field research, I conducted in-depth inter-
views, in addition to participant observation. I would like to thank C. Scott Walker, 
digital cartography specialist at Harvard Map Collection, for his help with producing 
the map.
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ConfliCt timber along the China-burma border
connecting the global Timber consumer with Violent extraction Sites
Kevin Woods
As China continues to surge ahead with the world’s fastest-growing econ-
omy, the Chinese government and businessmen are increasingly looking 
toward Southeast Asia as a cheap source of natural resources to feed their 
expanding markets. The resulting economic-social-environmental cost 
is currently redefining China’s relationship with Southeast Asia. China’s 
economic miracle, massive rural migration to urban centers, market neo-
liberalization, and logging bans all contribute to China’s extended reach 
into Southeast Asia’s tropical forests. Chinese businessmen and the markets 
they serve increasingly covet unprocessed tropical timber from other coun-
tries in order to rebuild China and reap huge profits from processing wood 
for the the international tropical-timber market. Sources of tropical timber, 
however, are becoming scarce in industrialized and politically stable coun-
tries and, as a result, are protected with strict national conservation laws. 
Valuable global commodities, such as tropical timber, will therefore increas-
ingly originate from areas such as conflict areas in Burma, which are not 
as yet well integrated into global natural-resource-extraction/conservation 
networks. It is, however, exactly these conflict zones where natural resource 
concessions can be most prone to compounding violence.
 In this essay I trace “conflict timber” originating in northern Burma 
(Myanmar), traveling overland to Yunnan Province, China, and on to Chi-
nese domestic and global tropical-timber markets.1 Burma has the world’s 
longest-running civil war, with ongoing conflicts situated in the mountain-
ous ethnic border regions. Kachin State, in northern Burma, bordering Yun-
nan, China, remains extremely rich in natural resources and has been inti-
mately involved with the arms struggle against the Burmese junta since the 
fight for autonomy began more than sixty years ago (see map 1). My analysis 
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of the Sino-Burmese conflict timber trade will exclusively examine Kachin 
State since the cease-fires.2 Although cease-fires were signed by the differ-
ent Kachin insurgent groups in the early 1990s, ostensible peace optimisti-
cally describes this war-torn sub-Himalayan mountainous region, where the 
Kachin political resistance groups still possess armies and territories. Chi-
nese logging companies cutting down forests in this hostile ethnic border 
region incites further violence among the Burmese government (the State 
Peace and Development Council, or sPdc), the various ethnic political re-
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tion of violence that becomes deleted while the timber travels from extrac-
tion sites to consumption nodes. As such, there is a complete erasure and 
subsequent re-creation of the image of the commodity to match consumer 
desires.
 In a wider context, I utilize commodity-chain analysis to reconnect the 
slippage between international consumers buying furniture made from Bur-
mese tropical timber and the place and conditions in which it was extracted. 
More specifically, I will examine the political ecology of war that underpins 
the overland timber trade between these two countries. The China-Burma 
border fuses global tropical timber-market networks—facilitated by the 
sPdc, the cease-fires with Kachin political resistance groups, Chinese do-
mestic corporations, and transnational investment—with a Kachin war 
economy. The result is an overhaul of the historical cross-border timber trade 
between Kachin and Yunnanese traders, into the control of sPdc and Chi-
nese officials and overseas investors, at the expense of the Kachins. This has 
led to a process of consolidation of power over the timber trade by the Bur-
mese regime as a means to obtain more funds and subsequently cut off the 
access of Kachin political resistance groups (notably the Kachin Indepen-
dence Organization, or Kio) to capital that primarily funds their fight. This 
situation thus provides insight into the loose relationships between national 
versus insurgent economies, legal versus illegal resource extraction, (trans)
national versus local resource control, and trade versus trafficking. Zones of 
conflict experiencing the “natural resource curse” help unbundle some of 
these binaries, because insurgency uproots political stability and national 
government authority and legitimacy.
global-commodity-chain analysis:  
connecting conflict Timber to the consumer
“Distancing”: the severing of ecological and social feedback along the commodity 
chain as points are increasingly separated along dimensions of geography, culture, 
agency, and power.
—Michael S. Carolan, “Unmasking the Commodity Chain”
The global commodity chain (gcc) has been defined by Emily Hartwick: 
“[The] radiating effects of the commodity at the consumption node, the so-
cial and natural conditions at the production node, and the complex inter-
sections of commodity chains at various intermediating and terminal points 
are added to a simple model of commodity movement to complete integra-
tion of the vertical and horizontal dimensions.”3 In this way, the commodity 
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links extraction sites, people, enterprises, and states through sets of inter-
organizational networks. Formerly placeless commodities suddenly become 
grounded at different nodes along the commodity chain, giving light to so-
cial relations and political realities. The global-commodity-chain framework 
exposes the well-hidden timber trade by connecting places of production 
and consumption, and highlighting the cultural, social, and environmental 
conditions of global timber commodities originating from northern Burma.
 Focusing on the different actors at each commodity-chain node reveals 
the political relations tied to resources, thus highlighting the politics of 
natural-resource extraction. The players collude and collide to access the 
timber, to control its trade routes, and to finance its processing in order to 
put it onto the global tropical-timber market. The China-Burma timber trade 
is a complex mix of involved parties: Chinese provincial and national govern-
ment authorities, Chinese logging and processing companies, Asian finance 
corporations, on-the-ground middlemen connecting the Chinese logging 
companies to inside Burma, Burmese government officials, ethnic Kachin 
and Burmese elite businessmen and political leaders, Kachin headmen, and 
international consumers, among others. Cashing in on timber has enabled 
insurgent business elites to supersede enemies in order to profit from the 
chaos and absence of the rule of law in the cross-border region. In such 
confusion and political instability, the multinational, state, and local elites 
have brought their business into the border black-market economy. Friction 
exists between historical cross-border local trading schemes and forming a 
centralized, regulated national economy. The result: a fusion of global capi-
tal with ethnic political resistance groups.
a Briefing on the cross-Border Timber Trade
China is the world’s only developing country that is a major net timber im-
porter and is the world’s fastest-growing market for tropical-timber prod-
ucts. China went from seventh to second place in the world in just ten years 
for the total value of imported forest products, and it is now the leading im-
porter of industrial round wood.4
 China’s trade in timber products with Burma grew substantially from 
1997 to 2002, from 295,474 m3 (round wood equivalent, rwe) in 1997 to 
947,765 m3 (rwe) in 2002.5 In 2005, cross-border exports from Burma to 
China totalled more than 1.5 million m3 with an estimated value of Us$350 
million.6 China’s timber sales officially accounted for 20 percent of Burma’s 
foreign-exchange earnings from 1990 to 2000.7 In 2004–2005, timber was 
the Burmese government’s second most important source of legal foreign 
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exchange, generating about Us$427 million.8 In 2003 98 percent of Burma’s 
timber exports to China were considered “illegal” (i.e., overland).9
 Despite Burmese restrictions mandating that all processed-timber ex-
ports must either pass through Yangon and be shipped by sea, or through 
the Muse (Burma)-Ruili (China) border (the only government-sanctioned 
legal checkpoint along the China-Burma border), 96 percent of China’s im-
ports of logs and sawnwood from Burma arrived in Kunming overland in 
2003.10 This statistic reveals that the vast majority of timber leaving Burma is 
done through nongovernment channels, namely ethnic political resistance 
groups. Most of China’s increase in timber-product imports from Burma 
occurred between 1998–1999 and 1999–2000, due to a host of factors: the 
implementation of China’s national logging ban (Natural Forest Protection 
Program) in 1998; cuts in China’s forest-product tariffs in 1999; the opening 
up of new tracts of virgin forest in Kachin State to Chinese companies in the 
late 1990s due to the cease-fire agreements; China’s increasing consump-
tion of forest products due to exceptional economic growth; increasing 
international demand for low-cost forest products manufactured in China; 
and China’s tree plantations being unable to meet domestic demand.11 It is 
thus a combination of factors working in concert to get logs from Burma 
into China and beyond, but just two aspects co-drive the clear-cutting ma-
chine: partial liberalization of China’s economy (supported by transnational 
financial capital), and tropical-timber consumer demand (encouraging the 
former).
Patron-client networks: local and national
MiliTary econoMies Merge ThroUgh TiMBer Trading
The Chinese were putting heavy pressure on the Kachins to strike a deal with Ran-
goon: private merchants and state corporations in Yunnan were eagerly waiting to 
exploit the vast resources of timber and jade in Kachin State.
—Bertil Lintner, The Kachin: Lords of Burma’s Northern Frontier
The entrenched economy within state military control in cease-fire areas 
creates avenues for furthering informal channels of personal patronage 
among military personnel, bringing the military-command economy into 
the local, insurgent economy. Mya Maung comments that “all foreign trade 
and investment transactions are conducted through personal contact and 
connection with the ruling military elite and their families, cabinet minis-
ters, and directors of various government ministries and departments.”12 
The Burmese government operates under the hmaung kho sector, an informal 
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business based on patron-client relationships, and in the military regime’s 
case, through military connections.13 The forests provide the sPdc a sink 
of potential revenue, a source to be used as brokerage for leveraging power, 
making new clients, and redistributing power through granting logging 
concessions.
 Putting down weapons in favor of cooperative plundering broke up the 
unified Kachin political-resistance group, the Kio, into two other Kachin 
cease-fire political factions: the New Democratic Army-Kachin (nda-K) 
and the Kachin Defense Army (Kda). Soon thereafter, in 1994, the Kio and 
their army, the Kachin Independence Army (Kia), also signed a cease-fire, 
which acted only as a temporary halt to open fighting; the Kio still retains 
their arms, soldiers, and limited political territory. In this way, the cease-
fires have shifted political alliances such that “it is the businessmen, not the 
politicians, who are controlling everything.”14
 For example, in return for ending all military activity, the nda-K, with 
direct links to Yunnan through their political leadership, focused exclusively 
on operating logging and mining concessions with consent from the sPdc. 
Ethnic political leaders-cum-businessmen aligned themselves with the Bur-
mese and Chinese businessmen and government officials to gain greater ac-
cess to profits through access to transnational military and business-client 
networks than informal, local networks would originally allow. Several 
Kachin informants told me that they did not have the trading knowledge 
necessary to accelerate the timber trade further into global timber mar-
kets, which reflects how in the jade trade “very few [Burmans, Kachins, and 
Shans] had access to transnational networks that could extend their [jade] 
business abroad.”15 Furthermore, the Burmese military and their compa-
nies simultaneously strengthened and gained cross-border business part-
ners with control over access to lucrative resources in Kachin State.
chinese connecTed To conflicT TiMBer in norThern BUrMa
We don’t have enough investment so we need to cooperate with the Chinese. We have 
to pay 50,000 kyat [Us$60] for each truck carrying logs at every sPdc checkpoint. 
That is why we do not have enough money ourselves to invest. That is why we are 
sharing with the Chinese.
—Interview with Kachin logging businessman by Kachin field staff for Images Asia 
Environment Desk, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2001
Two interrelated alliances enable this complex web of timber trading from 
northern Burma to China and beyond: domestic (sPdc and ethnic political 
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groups in Burma, and private firms and state authorities in China) and trans-
national Asian finance centers linking the two nations to the international 
tropical-timber markets. Along the China-Burma border, many actors work 
together to make the logging business profitable in an increasingly competi-
tive and liberalized market. The main border timber industry actors include 
local villagers, migrant workers, and national nonlocal logging companies, 
all of whom are looking for quick profits. China’s tropical-timber-industry 
boom involves three main nodes: the Chinese logging and small wood-
processing companies based along the China-Burma border; the Chinese 
wood-processing and manufacturing companies based in Shanghai and 
Guangdong Province, who purchase the timber, process it, and sell it either 
domestically or abroad; and the international finance corporations who pro-
vide enough capital to make it all happen.16 The desire for profits connects 
the different players, while the timber commodity is physically connected 
to them through transportation systems that deliver the wood further down 
the commodity chain.
conflicT TiMBer linKing goVernMenTs and  
BUsinessMen on BoTh sides of The Border
Before there were no relations between the Chinese government and the Burmese 
government to deal with the border “min jian mao yi” [unofficial small-time trade]; 
but the more the central governments on both sides increased power, the closer they 
got to the border.
—Interview with Chinese academic in Kunming, 2004.
Perhaps one of the most contested, and therefore most interesting, aspects 
of the conflict-timber trade is the degree to which Chinese government au-
thorities and national and local policies promote its continuation. National 
and provincial Chinese policies have been established to aggressively de-
velop the Yunnan border. China’s grandest national campaign, the “Great 
Opening of the West,” or Great Western Development Program (gwdP), strives to 
“not only equalise living standards between the interior and coastal regions 
of the country, but also to integrate more tightly with the rest of the coun-
try’s politically troublesome regions.”17
 Local government officials backed by national Chinese policy are aggres-
sively promoting cross-border trade and infrastructure linking the borders. 
Since August 1988, just days before the 8-8-88 bloody massacre in Rangoon 
against Burmese calling for democracy in their military-ruled nation, Bei-
jing, as well as Yunnan provincial and prefecture government officials, have 
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been rapidly signing numerous trade agreements with the sPdc. Further-
more, Chinese fiscal incentives, encoded in various laws aimed at attracting 
investment, have been supported by the development of infrastructure to 
facilitate border trade. These roads and bridges, however, have done little 
more than pave the way for large-scale natural-resource extraction and the 
dumping of cheap Chinese goods. One Kachin activist laments, “The only 
thing the Kachin people get is roads to get the trees out.”18 This has outraged 
one Kachin religious leader, who shouts, “The roads are only for taking trees! 
They are not for the people!”19 These roads not only enable resource extrac-
tion, but also act as a conduit for other commodities, such as drugs, as well 
as migrants and related social and public-health problems.
 In 1991, when the provincial Kunming government designated Pianma 
Township—a provincial-level checkpoint in Lushui County, Nujiang Prefec-
ture—as one of twelve Special Economic Zones, it became a “provincial level 
open port” for trade, and is now one of the busiest border-crossing points.20 
This merging of Chinese national and provincial policy with private business 
interests provided a crucial state-sponsored incentive for the logging boom, 
while at the same time, like many resource-extraction frontiers in the world, 
created a space of scant government regulation. For example, in Pianma 
Township there were only four legally registered logging companies in 2003, 
despite all of the smaller-scale companies operating along the border.21 To 
encourage more logging companies along the border in other towns, local 
government authorities have opened “International Border Ports,” but ac-
cording to Global Witness, “these ports are simply logging roads.”22 Forest 
Trends estimates that between 800 and 950 sawmills that process Burmese 
timber are located along the China-Burma border.23
 In Gongshan County, six Chinese logging companies paid the county gov-
ernment 1 million yuan (Us$120,000) for the 2002–2003 period to extract 
timber from Burma via the Danzhu path, with a road recently built to help 
increase the timber flow.24 In the early 1990s, the Kio and the Yunnan For-
est Department in Kunming met to discuss the N’Mai Hku project, located 
within an area known as the “Triangle,” a large territory mostly controlled 
by the Kio and situated between two major rivers (the N’Mai Hku and Mali 
Hka). Global Witness believes that “given the size of the project, its strategic 
importance and the level of investment, it is highly likely that the authori-
ties in Beijing were also involved.”25 The Huaxin Group, based in Kunming, 
is an alliance of six companies from Kunming, Beijing, Shanghai, two from 
Guandong, and the Ministry of Railways, and has a contract to extract all 
timber resources from the lower Triangle area for fifteen years. According to 
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Huaxin, the cooperation of the Nujiang Prefecture authorities in Yunnan is 
crucial to the success of the project, as the county is a major partner through 
its control of land along the border.26
 Burmese businessmen, backed by high-level sPdc officials and their 
military support, control more cease-fire logging concessions as they pene-
trate further into Kachin State. Control over logging operations has been 
devolved to key figures in the military, who in turn grant logging permits in 
sPdc-controlled areas to influential Burmese businessmen and companies 
for their support. In this way, the logging concessions act as a medium of ex-
change used to mutually support allies. The Burmese business partners then 
contract Chinese companies to do the actual logging as a joint venture to 
share the profits, with generous kickbacks to the sPdc top officials and the 
likelihood of more future collaboration. For example, Awng Mai Company, 
presumably a Chinese company with a Kachin-sounding name, received a 
teak-logging contract from sPdc’s former northern military commander, 
General Ohn Myint, to log large tracts of forest along the Kachin State bor-
der from 2005 to 2009. In addition, the Htoo Trading Company obtained a 
logging concession in the beginning of 2006 in Bhamo district on the Chi-
nese border in Kachin State. Htoo is owned by Tay Za, a Burmese millionaire 
who has very close relations with the sPdc’s senior general, Than Shwe, in-
cluding his recent marriage to the general’s daughter.
 Much of the logging in Kachin State involves the sPdc, so that Chinese 
companies, even if at times indirectly, are aiding the military regime to gain 
more control, territory, and income from granting logging concessions and 
taxing the trade. “As the Burmese government encroaches into [northern] 
Burma [due to the cease-fire agreements], the Chinese companies will have 
to cooperate with them.”27 As more territory comes under the control of 
the sPdc (about 60 percent of Kachin State) and ethnic elites submerge 
themselves into patron-client relationships with the central sPdc authori-
ties at the capital, the regional sPdc authorities (northern military com-
mander and his military associates), and local sPdc troops, the more the 
sPdc acts as a proxy for the conflict-timber trading. According to Global 
Witness, “The Northern Command and front-line Tatmadaw [military branch 
of sPdc] perform essential organising or facilitating roles and scant com-
mercial resource extraction occurs in Kachin State without the sPdc, at dif-
ferent levels, being paid off.”28
 The following case study illustrates how the sPdc takes political and 
economic advantage of the increasingly globalized timber trade originating 
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in northern Burma by expanding their control over the cross-border tim-
ber trade, in cooperation with Chinese officials, thus pushing the Kachin 
out. While the timber trade has become more internationalized, it simul-
taneously becomes nationalized as both the Burmese regime and Chinese 
government steer the trade through their channels en route to international 
markets. The Burmese forest minister Brigadier-General Thein Aung finally 
publicly admitted, in January 2006, that timber was crossing the border into 
China without official sPdc permission. High-level sPdc officials and their 
business partners in Rangoon (Yangon) realized how much cash was bypass-
ing their channels and was instead filling the pockets of Kachin business-
men and resistance groups as well as of local government officials along 
the border. The regime wants logging revenue to go exclusively through the 
state-owned Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTe), the commercial arm of the 
forestry department, and their associates’ timber-export businesses, which 
would not only make them wealthy, but also squeeze the Kio out of the tim-
ber business and thus weaken their political position against the regime. 
According to the sPdc, “legal” timber is that which is cut by the MTe and 
transported by the sPdc to either Rangoon and then shipped overseas or 
to cross into China at Muse (Burma-side)/Ruili (China-side), the only legal 
overland checkpoint with China. Thus “legal” timber translates into a na-
tional natural resource; that is, a resource owned by the military state.
 The Chinese government decided they would respect Thein Aung’s re-
quest to only support logging in Burma that is done by the sPdc. At the end 
of March 2006, the Yunnan provincial government, in cooperation with the 
Chinese People’s Armed Police Force for Border Affairs, declared it illegal 
for Chinese to enter Burma for mining and logging purposes. “Every border 
checkpoint and workstation will stop transacting the approval for Chinese 
labour and transportation to Burma on the purpose of logging and mining. 
The timber and minerals being transported from Burma to China and the 
illegal action of leaving the country will be stopped as well.”29 Subsequently, 
the Chinese provincial government authorities began to clamp down on a 
few of the major border crossings.
 The Chinese national government and provincial officials in Yunnan con-
trolling the Ruili border trade will profit from collecting timber taxes since 
enforcement measures will try to cut off all timber coming over the border 
controlled by nongovernment parties. There is apparently only one Chinese 
company that has a legal contract with the sPdc to import logs along the 
Burmese border; and supposedly one company that can legally export across 
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the border (Awng Mai Co., allegedly owned by former northern military 
commander Ohn Myint). The “legalization” of logging in northern Burma 
equates to a national “militarization” of local Kachin forests.
conflicT TiMBer linKing Kachin To The  
chinese goVernMenT and BUsinessMen
Despite the recent effort by the sPdc and Chinese government to direct 
logging and its generated revenue into government channels, the Kachin 
businessmen and ethnic political leaders remain intimately involved in the 
logging trade. However, since the 2006 bilateral cross-border timber trade 
clamp down, their involvement continually decreases in competition with 
national government and businessmen. Those ethnic elite who maintain 
close relationships with those people who increasingly control the timber 
trade (for example, Burmese and Chinese officials or businessmen) will sub-
sequently merge into the “legal” timber trade network. Many ethnic leaders 
in northern Burma have close connections to Chinese authorities and busi-
nessmen at the prefecture and district levels in Yunnan Province. Yunnan’s 
Gongshan government has close relations with the Kachin political resis-
tance group nda-K, which controls the area across from Pianma on the 
Burmese side of the border. Ting Ying, the most senior nda-K general, is 
ethnic Chinese but a Burmese citizen with a Kachin identity, and was born in 
Baoshan prefecture, Yunnan. Gao Liang is the director of the finance division 
for the nda-K, with a representative office in Yunnan; he has reputedly made 
contracts with Chinese logging companies. Ting Ying and Gao Liang have 
made a lot of money and then invested it in their birthplace of Baoshan.30 
Their success is built on their relationships expanding beyond this locality 
into both the Burmese and Chinese governments and companies. Accord-
ing to one informant, the Chinese company needs to foster a relationship 
with someone who has control over the border, such as Ting Ying, in order 
to access the forest across the border; the best people to connect with are 
ethnic political leaders and powerful Burmese government officials. In order 
to meet these high-demand, high-level people, however, the Chinese must 
first meet a middleman in order to be brought to the person who adminis-
ters concessions. Further research needs to be undertaken to examine the 
role of local Kachin and Shan brokers, or jieshouren, in introducing Chinese 
middlemen to Burmese concession-holders.31 It is suspected that Chinese 
middlemen from previously out-competed smaller logging companies con-
nect with local Kachin brokers, who in turn put them in contact with both 
Kachin headmen, to find a concession site, and regional elites, such as the 
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Kachin administrative unit or sPdc officials controlling that area, to get per-
mission to log the concession.
 Several interviews conducted in Kachin State in 2001 by Kachin field staff 
of Images Asia Environment Desk in Chiang Mai, Thailand, outline the pro-
cess of Chinese companies connecting with Kachins. Buyers from China’s 
east coast go to the Yunnan-Burma border to meet agents who then connect 
them with local Kachin logging-permit holders inside Kachin State, who 
were either granted permits from the political groups controlling that area, 
the sPdc, or at times, both. For example, local Kachin people request log-
ging permits from the Kio administration office, which justifies giving out 
the permits as the method to bring development to their Kachin people.32 
According to 2001 data, each permit, issued by the Kio Trade Department, 
cost about 3,000 yuan (Us$360), and after the trees are cut, another tax 
needs to be paid to the Kio, according to the volume of timber cut.33 The 
complex logging concession process unfolds as follows.
They [the Kio granting the concessions] divide the logging area by blocks. 
The local concessionaire pays the Chinese to cut the logs as workers, and 
the Chinese also build roads and transport the logs for the local conces-
sionaire. Then the concessionaire sells the logs to the Chinese. After the 
concessionaire gets the money from selling the timber, he pays the [Chi-
nese] people who cut the trees; he also has to pay for the road construc-
tion [done by the Chinese] to his logging area, and for the transport of the 
logs [also provided by the Chinese]. After cutting the trees, they weigh the 
logs at the Kio office. This station will check the logs and their prices and 
also determine the taxes to be levied. The Chinese come to this station to 
buy logs, and the local concessionaires also sell their logs there. The Kio 
collects a type of tax. They also collect taxes to undertake local develop-
ment, such as building schools. In addition, the Kio collects another tax 
to support their army, the Kia.34
This does not equate, however, to any sort of stable condition wherein the 
“tickets” are always honored. The ethnic insurgencies in northern Burma 
have created a very unpredictable political situation with constantly shifting 
alliances within and among insurgent groups.
 Territories in northern Burma are loosely controlled by various ethnic po-
litical groups, all of whom in Kachin State have already entered into a cease-
fire agreement with the sPdc. Nevertheless, their control of territory often 
overlaps, and in some places is co-controlled with the sPdc. Therefore, in 
order to obtain a logging concession, a Chinese company must appease all 
492 keVi n woodS
of those in loose control of the area and the transportation route to the bor-
der. It is, therefore, nearly impossible to separate ethnic involvement with 
sPdc control in natural-resource extraction. For instance, in the Triangle, in 
Kachin State, although the Kio controls most of the region, logs leaving this 
area going to the China border pass through nda-K areas, where the logs 
and a number of trucks are subsequently taxed. The sPdc also taxes the logs 
passing through this area and has a checkpoint near the Jubilee Bridge at 
Magramyang Village.35 The control of logging areas versus checkpoints can 
be reversed as well. Ethnic cease-fire groups controlling border checkpoints 
tax timber as it goes to Yunnan, but this timber sometimes does not even 
come from territories under the control of those ethnic political groups, as 
it is often cut in sPdc-controlled areas.
Timber Travels: from the Border to Beyond
They [Kachin] do not know how or where to sell the wood abroad, and that is why 
they sell the wood for a low price in the local area. . . . [S]o they have to sell to the 
Chinese companies, and the companies don’t give them a good price for the wood—
that is why they are suffering. 
—Interview with retired Kio official in Kachin State by Kachin field staff for Images 
Asia Environment Desk, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2001
froM The yUnnan Border To china’s easTern seaBoard
As China commits itself to unfettered economic growth, the timber industry 
has shifted toward concentrating on importing unprocessed forest products 
to match its mushrooming wood-manufacturing capacity. After the timber 
is transported across the border into Yunnan, another node of the com-
modity chain thus unfolds. Timber first travels from the border to Dali, and 
then to Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, where it either undergoes 
further processing or simply awaits further transportation to China’s eastern 
seaboard, mainly Guangdong Province or Shanghai. As the timber travels 
from rural Kachin villages to the eastern seaboard, there is a correspond-
ing increase in organizational structure of the timber industry: from Kachin 
villages to small logging companies in Kachin State, to small-scale border-
processing companies, to buyers and medium-sized companies for partial 
processing in Kunming, to wholesalers and large-scale processing compa-
nies along the eastern seaboard.36 This new commodity-chain configuration 
for the Chinese tropical-timber trade is partly a response to greater timber 
industry liberalization, with the partial elimination of import and export 
licenses in 1999 and growing manufacturing specialization on the east coast.
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 The border and Kunming are connected to the eastern seaboard mostly 
through private family-run timber businesses propped up by relatives.37 In 
most cases, buyers working for large-scale timber-processing companies 
come from outside of Yunnan, mostly from Guangdong Province, to strike 
deals with logging and processing companies and small- and large-scale 
sawmills along the border. The border company then arranges either for the 
timber to first undergo crude processing or for timber to be shipped directly 
to the company’s own sawmills for value-added processing. Alternatively, 
processing companies or wholesalers make arrangements with larger saw-
mills to purchase high-quality sawnwood or finished products.38 The Chi-
nese business diaspora continues to fuel the timber trade and keep out West-
ern competition by increasingly connecting the different production nodes 
through linkages that combine production, processing, and marketing net-
works.
 The mixture of Burmese and domestic Chinese timber, as well as tim-
ber from other countries, in China’s timber markets signals a major “place-
erasure” step in the commodity chain. For example, the majority of “domes-
tically produced timber” (guochan cai) from Yunnan is actually cross-border 
timber (bianmao cai) from Burma. Timber products produced in China but 
with Burmese timber are then labeled as guochan or yunnan cai (Yunnan tim-
ber). In fact, wood products using Burmese timber constitute about 30–40 
percent of wholesale products in Chinese timber markets.39 Thus, Burmese 
timber becomes, in the eyes of the consumer, Chinese timber during the 
shift from one node—extracting—to another node further down the com-
modity chain. It is this blinding of the true timber source that erases the 
conflict aspect of the timber, and thus makes the purchase by the distant 
consumer possible and indeed acceptable.
froM china’s easTern seaBoard To The  
inTernaTional TroPical-TiMBer MarKeT
After the timber has been processed on China’s eastern seaboard, the tim-
ber enters the international tropical-timber market, yet another node of the 
commodity chain. For this to happen, however, international firms and do-
mestic Chinese companies must cooperate, or at times merge, as part of 
a joint investment. This “transnational alliance capitalism” is exactly what 
makes the cross-border timber trade financially viable.40 The mounting de-
mand for cheap wood-based products, especially furniture, in the developed 
world has prompted a reconfiguration in China’s export-oriented forest in-
dustry. The result is a hybrid of domestic Chinese and international finance 
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corporations, often managed by overseas Chinese, who invest in Burmese 
timber logging, processing, and marketing all along the commodity chain. 
Taiwanese (perhaps the largest investor), Hong Kong, and Singaporean 
companies provide the majority of finance and corporate structure for the 
Yunnan-Burma border timber trade.41 For example, of the forty furniture-
production lines in Guangdong, about 80 percent are Taiwanese invested.42 
De Long Forest Resource Development, based in Xingjiang Province in 
northwest China, is a joint venture between Taiwanese and Japanese com-
panies, worth 20 million yuan (Us$2.5 million).43 Another example is the 
largest sawmill in Liuku, the Nu Jian Hong Ta Chang Quing wood factory, 
which is the largest single investment along the border and a joint venture 
between a Malaysian company (60 percent) and the Chinese state-owned 
Hong Ta Group (40 percent). The company purchases most of its timber 
from the De Long company in Pianma and exports over 1,000 m3 of pro-
cessed timber each month, of which much goes to Korea in the form of 
doors and window frames.44
 China has become a re-exporter of finished wood-based products (mostly 
imported from Hong Kong) due to a host of events, such as forest-product 
tariff reductions in 1999 (to ensure a constant supply of timber after the Chi-
nese logging ban in 1998), great improvements in domestic-manufacturing 
capacities, and the agglomeration of wood-based industries in key manu-
facturing hubs along the eastern seaboard. For instance, a substantial por-
tion of timber products from Hong Kong imported into China have in fact 
been transshipped or processed and then re-exported.45 China’s re-exported 
timber products serve international tropical-timber demand, rather than do-
mestic Chinese consumers.46
 However, there is Chinese domestic consumption of Burmese timber. 
Domestic products made from high-value Burmese timber are mostly pro-
cessed into veneers that overlay composite boards, since the former is ex-
pensive. Low-value timber is instead processed into solid wood products 
for domestic consumption.47 China’s population and increasing consump-
tion patterns, especially for timber, give reason for concern. Burmese tim-
ber follows China’s domestic demand by becoming a popular substitute for 
more expensive hardwoods because of its cheaper cross-border price. With 
China’s aspiration to be rich, the tropical-timber market will become less 
directed by international markets, and instead follow domestic Chinese 
 tropical-timber demand.
 It would be easy to blame only China for the conflict-timber trade on 
the Yunnan border, but it must be stated clearly that the international tim-
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ber and timber-product markets significantly influence Chinese logging in 
Burma. The largest Asian destinations for China’s secondary processed wood 
products manufactured from Burmese timber are Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan, with the first being the largest importer, and lesser amounts exported 
to Malaysia and Thailand.48 Hong Kong is the largest Asian importer of Chi-
nese furniture (followed by Japan and South Korea), but this is misleading 
since 99 percent of Hong Kong’s furniture exports were in effect re-exports 
from mainland China, and 70 percent of these exports were shipped to the 
United States.49 If this is taken into account, then the United States would 
be the largest importer of Chinese wooden furniture. The United States is 
the largest importer of Chinese manufactured timber products in 2007, fol-
lowed closely by the European Union, of which the United Kingdom is the 
top importer, capturing about one-third of all E.U. timber products im-
ported from China. The other countries distantly trailing include Japan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, in that order.50 According to the gen-
eral manager of the American Forest and Paper Association’s China office, 
the United States is certainly responsible for China’s high timber imports, 
due to China-U.S. bilateral trade.51
 Timber and wood-product imports into the g8 countries account 
for nearly two-thirds of the global timber trade, and about 50 percent of 
tropical-timber imports into the European Union are in fact illegal.52 One 
reason for this is that it is still legal to import timber, even if it is illegal to 
import timber from the country of origin, into timber-consuming countries 
(including the g8 nations and China). This is because once the timber has 
been “substantially transformed” (for example, processed into wooden fur-
niture), its designated country of origin becomes the country where the tim-
ber was processed, not where it was logged. As such, timber illegally logged 
in Burma and then processed into furniture in China is legally exported to 
Western countries despite existing embargoes against Burma. In this sense, 
the timber-extraction sites become hidden both by marketing gimmicks and 
by timber-import policies.
frontier war economies: connecting Timber to Violence
Violence stems from existing power relations . . . the underlying causes of conflict lie 
in these unequal power relations and the resulting violence reinforces them.
—Catherine Brown, “The Political Economy of Violence”
Violence has been transformed, rather than terminated, following the cease-
fires between the Kachin insurgent groups and the Burmese regime. The 
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cease-fires transformed conflict from brute force (i.e., “war violence”) into 
both “structural violence” (i.e., violence embedded within economic, politi-
cal, and religious structures) and “internal violence” (i.e., violence mani-
fested within Kachin society and their representative political leadership).53 
Such structuralized violence has been channeled through “extractive devel-
opment” (that is, development stemming from extracting natural resources) 
in Burma, which does not bring peace as purported by the Burmese regime 
and the Kachin elite who helped administer the cease-fires. Most Kachin 
believe that “the Burmese government is exploiting natural resources for 
their personal use and benefit—they put the money into banks; this is clear 
abuse.”54 Logging concessions coerce Kachin elites into cease-fires with the 
Burmese military regime, which results in the physical displacement of the 
Kachin from their land, widening economic inequalities, heightening ethnic 
disparity, and the carving out of denuded land—and in so doing, linking vio-
lence to environment. These concessions offer a valuable vantage point from 
which to analyze violent military territorialization.55 Cease-fires cease to be 
about bringing peace and development to Kachin State, and operate instead 
as loss of resources for the majority and increasing wealth and corruption 
of the elite minority, which has already led to increased social and political 
unrest in Kachin State. “They [the sPdc] are not coming for the peace; I am 
afraid of a situation worse than before the cease-fire agreement.”56
 Conflict can be profitable by providing an alternative system of profit and 
clientism, for example, “war economies.” Economic coercion transformed 
Burma’s “frontiers” into sources of military revenue enacted through cease-
fires, which dissolved the political boundary, but left behind a fermenting 
ethnic divide and growing resentment about the degraded environment. As 
such, Burma’s political war economy operates such that warfare acts as an 
“instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode of accumulation.”57 The 
privatization and institutionalization of violence act as an exercise of power 
that allows elites to access resources through relations. Thus, “economic vio-
lence” is violence which accrues profit, a system in which “elites try to priva-
tize conflict by exploiting the civilian economy.”58 This act of privatizing vio-
lence becomes especially prevalent in states without a strong state capacity 
for preventing elites from using violence for personal profit. In short, the 
economic benefits of violence may outweigh those of peace.
 The sPdc incites conflict between the ethnic political groups as another 
way to weaken them—because if they are fighting each other, then they can-
not organize against the government as effectively. For example, the nda-K 
is currently expanding its logging activities into the southern Triangle since 
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most territory under their control has already been deforested of valuable 
species.59 This is being done with the permission and possible encourage-
ment of the sPdc, and with the cooperation of Yunnan’s Tengchong County 
government, despite the fact that these areas were granted to the Kio as part 
of their cease-fire agreement. The result of this intrusion is greater animosity 
between the Kio and the nda-K, which perhaps was sPdc’s intended re-
sult.
 Violence not only escalates among the ethnic political groups and the 
sPdc, but as well within ethnic political groups. According to a report in-
vestigating environmental-rights abuses in Burma, the conflict-timber trade 
has “played a key role in further dividing political opposition to the regime 
by financially rewarding certain groups at the expense of others.”60 Pillag-
ing of natural resources in cease-fire areas by the respective ethnic political 
groups has led to increased corruption from rent-seeking activities and has 
thus subverted the functional and political capacity of the ethnic groups. 
The ethnic political groups, especially the Kio, have lost political direction, 
unity, strong leadership, and committed followers since the rampant whole-
sale of their natural resources that has taken place since they signed the 
cease-fire agreement.
 The denuded landscapes and political disunity act as potential sources 
of renewed social and political turmoil for the Kachin. Many Kachin people 
have blamed their political leaders for forcing their society into their current 
cease-fire situation and its resulting economic and social marginalization 
and environmental destruction, despite the obvious benefits of ending open 
warfare. “It is difficult to consider the Kio as good leaders for us, because 
they made an agreement with the sPdc; but no benefits from the agreement 
have come to our community.”61
 Several coups within the Kio and nda-K have occurred since 2001, 
spurred by jealousy resulting from ethnic political leaders sealing close ties 
to Chinese businessmen from Yunnan and offering plentiful logging conces-
sions to them. Disputes between and within the Kio and nda-K have in part 
been triggered by the desire for control over logging revenue and territorial 
control of the remaining areas with valuable timber, especially in the Tri-
angle. The attempted internal coups and external attacks on Kachin political 
leaders and cease-fire groups signal a recurrence of Kachin political conflict. 
Logging business interests have led to strife both among and within ethnic 
political groups, which in turn has aggravated political and social instability 
in Kachin State.
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The forgotten landscape: local kachin livelihoods
After the cease-fire agreement, many companies came [into Kachin State]; the sPdc 
created private property and kicked the Kachin people out.
—Interview with Kachin youth in Kachin State, 2003
A new power struggle has emerged, further marginalizing local Kachin vil-
lagers at the expense of patron-client networks involving the sPdc, Kachin 
leaders, and Chinese businessmen. The civil-war situation in Kachin State 
created conditions in which more marginalized sections of Kachin society 
were able to access resources and integrate themselves into a peripheral in-
surgent economy. As the Burmese junta gains further control over previously 
hostile areas, the Kachin villagers are pushed out of their local resource-
extraction networks to make way for the sPdc and their business partners. 
Philippe Le Billon outlines a similar process in Cambodia, where the margin-
alized lose economic maneuverability during the “political ecology of transi-
tion.” “The illegal character of logging shaped this ordering and reduced the 
share of profits for many of the less powerful groups, as people in positions 
of power—high-ranking officials and military commanders—were able to 
extract large benefits for turning a blind eye, protecting, or even organizing 
these activities.”62 For Kachin State, the political ecology of cease-fires illus-
trates this transition from war to cease-fire peace, and how this relates to a 
corresponding shift from marginal villager participation to exclusion from 
natural-resource access and extraction.
 Village headmen have lost autonomy but have expanded their own patron-
client networks since the cease-fires, being now under the administrative 
control of local Kio offices that were established in post-cease-fire Kachin 
State. The head of the village committee, who is often appointed by the Kio, 
not the villagers, asks the Kio for permission to sell off their land for log-
ging by Chinese companies in order to generate money for schools, elec-
tricity, and water pipes. “The village committee doesn’t say no to logging, 
they don’t know about the forest, they only know money,” while “the vil-
lagers can’t say anything because the committee has the authority.”63 Thus, 
while it remains unclear how much influence the local villagers have in pro-
tecting their own land from outside loggers, the village headmen seem to be 
very willing to exchange their land for expensive electricity and water pipes, 
and of course, a large private commission for administering the deal.
 Chinese companies, through their logging contracts with local Kachin 
leaders, have gained more power and authority in Kachin State, such that 
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the companies, supported by Kachin political leadership, often kick out vil-
lagers in the area so that they can extract the timber. “The area is controlled 
by the Kio. It is a very new logging area and the Kio issued an announce-
ment that people are not allowed in the area.”64 Local inhabitants are also 
frequently removed from logging areas by the military. As another person 
explained, “Whenever they do logging, a lot of soldiers come around our vil-
lage and they go everywhere. They go deeply into the jungle, they force the 
local villagers to move to town and then destroy their houses.”65 Keeping 
the forests off-limits to local Kachin takes away their livelihoods by deny-
ing them access to forest products and non-timber-forest products, which 
they rely on for supplemental income and food. The Chinese workers bring 
in most of their own food and hunt in the forests for meat, thus limiting any 
trading with the local Kachin while also killing off wildlife. Very little tim-
ber processing, other than some crude sawmilling, occurs in Kachin State 
along the Burma side of the border, thus offering only marginal employment 
opportunities for Kachin people.
 The Kio sometimes sells traditional village forests, or permits villagers 
to sell it themselves, to pay for basic services such as electricity from China 
and piped water. “Because of the prices of road construction and electricity 
are high (1.2 yuan/kilowatt) the villagers have to sell off their forests; for 
electricity for one village they have to pay 30,000 yuan (Us$3,615). So the 
Chinese got concessions from the villagers, but the land given away by the 
villagers is just enough to exchange for the electricity.”66
 Logging roads are built, with a trail of tree stumps and muddy rivers, 
prostitution, hiV/aids, drug abuse, and gambling brought by migrants 
left in their wake.67 United Nations Office on Drug Control (Unodc) re-
gional director Akira Fujino attributed the increase in [opium] production in 
Kachin State in part to rampant deforestation and the corresponding influx 
of more sophisticated opium farmers and techniques.68 Just one environ-
mental catastrophe thought to be linked to rampant logging occurred in July 
2004, when the Irrawaddy River flooded—reportedly the worst flooding in 
thirty years. The environmental destruction in Kachin State will have a direct 
negative impact on the people of Kachin State, since those living in the few 
nonurban areas rely on the health of forest ecosystems for their day-to-day 
survival.
Even in summer the Mung Lai River in Laiza [Kio headquarters] used to 
be very deep and to cross the river was difficult. But now the river only 
comes up to the knee. The Laiza stream [another stream] is also the same. 
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In the past, we can drink the water from Laiza stream, it was very clean 
and clear, but now on the upstream part of the stream logging is being 
done as well as road construction through the forest, so the stream has 
become muddy. It is not good for the next generation.69
These ecological concerns are also reflected in the following observation, 
made by a pastor: “Villagers are very worried now, even the small logs are 
going, so that in ten years there will be no wood for them to build houses, 
barns and hoes, and the water will slowly dry up.”70
 Local Kachin people lose land to the cease-fire logging-concession areas, 
and have no legal recourse to voice concerns. Local sPdc and cease-fire 
groups, for example, frequently require local people to purchase a “permit” 
to farm their own fields, harvest timber and non-timber forest products, and 
undertake informal trading. When the land has coveted natural resources, 
such as valuable hardwoods, different “permits” are sold to businesses. In 
exchange, the military units and cease-fire groups impose a tax. Villagers do 
not possess official papers proving their ownership of the land, and they do 
not have the funds to purchase any permits. Neither do they have the politi-
cal leverage to make deals with the local elite, and thus they are forced off 
their land.71 Local Kachin are also further marginalized from their own land 
by being physically moved down from the mountains to the roads to be re-
settled into larger, controlled villages, the reason ostensibly being to protect 
the forest from shifting cultivation. This is despite the fact that these areas 
often soon become logging concessions.72
 Even for the few Kachin who participate in the logging industry, life can 
be very difficult. Having lost their financial security, they are now dependent 
on the unstable cash economy. A Kachin youth who has experienced this 
firsthand explains this difficult transition.
I didn’t know that after they cut the trees, everything is quite expensive. 
Before, we can survive on my mother’s salary. After that we can’t survive 
on her salary. We can see the situation changing day by day . . . hard to 
survive for even one day. Now it is difficult—my father is a buyer/trader 
before—now he can’t survive with that and he is now in the forest doing 
the logging for the last 2 years. Logging can’t get much money—because 
you have to pay to the Burmese, the workers, machines and the gates 
[checkpoints].73
For all of the reasons outlined in this essay, one Kachin elder Baptist leader 
agrees “the environment is the most important issue in Kachin State right 
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now.”74 One Kachin environmentalist pushes this view further in believing 
that “environmental damage is furthering [Kachin] nationalism in Kachin 
State.”75 The increasing ecological destruction in Kachin State, intricately 
tied to the ethnic political crisis in Kachin State, thus provides an environ-
mental platform for an “ethno-ecological” resistance.
conclusion
The global commodity-chain approach, from the logging sites in Kachin 
State to the tropical-timber consumers, helps to highlight the underlying 
conditions of the trade. The gcc analysis helped reveal some of the socio-
cultural and political elements embedded within the China-Burma timber 
trade: the Chinese trade-relation networks stretching from Asian financial 
centers to China’s eastern seaboard to the border; the political ecology of 
war embedded along the Kachin State-Yunnan border; the Burmese regime 
attempting to gain greater control of the increasingly globalized overland 
timber trade; and the structural violence inflicted on Kachin villagers as a 
result of the burgeoning trade. Examining the different nodal points along 
the commodity chain enables one to travel beyond the border, to situate out-
side a statist, “legal” analysis, and into a more locally nuanced, globalized 
perspective. Chinese domestic businessmen in search of logs, supported 
by regional financial centers with investment capital, pried open a broader 
transnational cease-fire space to enable them to integrate more with north-
ern Burma’s timber-extraction networks for the purpose of securing logging 
concessions. In this essay I have revealed the elements that support this 
transnational logging trade, with transborder patron-client relationships, 
transnational alliance capital, and international consumer desires radiating 
from and penetrating the border—all in all, a truly awesome global game.
 Before the cease-fire agreements in Kachin State, the small-scale tim-
ber trade remained more within local and traditional Kachin networks. This 
is not to say that historical pre-cease-fire trading did not spread beyond 
the Kachin communities; Eric Tagliacozzo describes how local villagers 
in Northwest Borneo, despite living within geopolitical margins, became 
firmly grounded within global networks through trading high-demand for-
est products.76 The cease-fires, however, expanded the scale on which cross-
border trading operated, both in terms of volume extracted and destina-
tions reached, further marginalizing local Kachin traders in the process. 
The cease-fires in Kachin State forged new political space, offered financial 
incentives, and shifted minjian, which enabled the sPdc, Chinese business-
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men from the eastern seaboard, the Chinese government, and international 
finance corporations to reach deeper into Kachin State to accelerate timber 
extraction by linking it to the global timber trade. Several Chinese factors 
have overhauled the local war economy into a more globalized form. These 
are China’s partially liberalizing economy (including forest-product tariff re-
ductions), improved manufacturing specialization capacity on China’s east-
ern seaboard, China’s partial ban on domestic logging, cheap Chinese mi-
grant labor, a lack of Chinese government regulation, and a transportation 
infrastructure stretching from China’s coast.
 These circumstances in effect reshape local Kachin natural resources 
into transnational resources. However, Chinese local and national govern-
ments and the Burmese regime have recently been clamping down on the 
cross-border timber trade to ensure national control of logging and its gen-
erated revenue. Underneath the mounting national control of the trans-
national timber trade, however, Kachin political resistance groups contest 
their loosening grip on the extraction networks as they continue to fight for 
their autonomy and fund their armies. Tension thus exists among Kachin 
villagers, Kachin political leaders, national and local government authori-
ties on both sides of the China-Burma border, and Chinese and international 
businessmen, but this tension to some extent eases through profit-sharing. 
All of these different players collude and collide over quick profits from sell-
ing and buying tracts of forests in Kachin State, at the expense of Kachin 
villagers.
 “Transnational alliance capital” carries the capital necessary to ignite the 
commodity chain, enabling large multinational corporations based in East 
and Southeast Asian finance centers to connect North American and Euro-
pean tropical-timber consumers with tropical trees from northern Burma. 
Transportation and digital infrastructure glue these unlikely allies together. 
The inherent violence in this conflict zone becomes erased as the commodity 
becomes globalized as a product to be consumed. Regardless, those involved 
in the trade, including the consumers, leave their large and heavy footprint 
along the Kachin State-Yunnan border. Although much of the Burmese tim-
ber is destined for international markets, the Chinese businessmen, sup-
ported by their nation’s policies and liberalizing economy, help to make this 
a “China problem” as well. And as Chinese strive to be modern capitalists 
in industrial cities, the conflict border timber trade will increasingly serve 
domestic Chinese demands, rather than just those of their international con-
sumer companions.
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